# A. H. J. Greenidge, *The Legal Procedure of Cicero’s Time* (1901) ## A comprehensive annotated contents guide **Edition:** Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1901; xiii + 599 numbered pages. **Scope:** every heading, numbered section, lettered subsection, appendix, additional-note entry, and index listed on the three supplied contents pages. The annotations explain the book’s substantive arguments rather than merely expanding its headings. **Source and citation convention.** The working source is the complete PDF in the user’s Cicero library, verified against its title page, contents, and printed pagination. All page numbers below are **printed pages**, not PDF-image numbers. In this copy, Arabic printed page *p* is PDF page *p* + 20. A [parallel public scan of the 1901 edition](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft) supplies the reader links. The local source’s bibliographic metadata identifies a different Internet Archive scan; the two scan identifiers should not be conflated. The companion source record records the local file and its checksum. **How to read the annotations.** Unless expressly identified as an observation about the guide, statements below report **Greenidge’s account**. They do not certify that his reconstructions represent current scholarship. “He argues,” “he reconstructs,” and “he suggests” retain significant differences in evidential strength. Ancient works named here are the evidence Greenidge discusses; their editions, readings, and historical accuracy have not all been independently audited. OCR was used for access, with targeted full-page reading and image verification; this is a comprehensive guide to the contents, not a new critical edition or a line-by-line audit of every footnote. **A contents-page anomaly.** Book I, Part I, §1 is printed as pp. **15–49**, overlapping §§2–3. Its separately headed opening discussion actually occupies pp. **15–18**, with §2 beginning on p. 18. Both facts are retained below rather than silently correcting the contents. The unusual **§10\***, “The Oath,” is likewise preserved. ## The volume’s design and central argument The book explains the legal machinery presupposed by Cicero’s writings. Greenidge deliberately chooses a systematic institutional history over a sequence of speech commentaries. Procedure is his organizing subject, but substantive law enters whenever the form of a remedy cannot be understood without it. His distinctive concern is the connection between a legal entitlement and the particular procedural route that makes it enforceable. The preface identifies a fundamental asymmetry in the evidence. Cicero’s criminal speeches permit a comparatively full reconstruction of late Republican criminal courts. His four surviving private-law speeches provide a much narrower and more difficult foundation for civil procedure. Greenidge consequently fits their indications into the later framework supplied by Gaius and other imperial jurists. He believes procedural continuity generally makes this legitimate, but acknowledges that some institutions can be assigned to Cicero’s period only as probabilities. This methodological decision is essential to understanding both the power and the limits of Book I. The additional notes preserve changes of mind made while the volume was in press. **Source: Preface, pp. vii–x.** Three themes unite the work. First, Roman civil justice distributes authority between the magistrate who authorizes and frames proceedings and the judge or panel that decides them, without achieving a simple modern separation of law from fact. Second, remedies develop through the interaction of inherited forms, juristic interpretation, and magisterial authority; formal innovation can create practical rights. Third, criminal justice remains constitutionally plural: popular assemblies, magistrates, households, priests, extraordinary commissions, and permanent courts coexist. The legal consequences of a proceeding depend on its particular source of authority. ## Introduction — pp. 1–14 Greenidge defines contentious procedure as the symbolic acts, words, and documents through which an already disputed right is reasserted before a competent authority. Judgment is its central purpose, but execution must also be included because the enforcement of a judgment can itself generate further litigation. He argues that substantive rights and procedural forms develop at different rates: a community may recognize relatively sophisticated rights while enforcing them through cumbersome or antiquated forms. He then distinguishes civil, criminal, and administrative jurisdiction by the parties entitled to initiate proceedings, the interests protected, the constitution of the tribunal, and the destination of penalties or compensation. These criteria do not always coincide. A private delict may carry a punitive money award; a criminal prosecution may be followed by compensatory assessment. His historical sketch moves from religious and royal justice through the secularization of procedure to the convergence of civil techniques and public prosecution in the late Republic. The final pages isolate administrative cases in which the state appears as claimant, defendant, or coercive authority. **Read for:** the book’s definitions and the warning against identifying “civil” and “criminal” simply by the seriousness of an injury. [Text, pp. 1–14](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/1/mode/2up). ## Book I. Civil Procedure — pp. 15–296 This book first reconstructs the historical formation of the courts and then follows late Republican litigation through its institutional and procedural stages. Its central explanatory distinction is between proceedings **in iure**, before the magistrate, and **in iudicio**, before the judge or judges. It also tracks a second distinction: remedies supported by the civil law and remedies supported by the magistrate’s *imperium*. Those distinctions govern jurisdiction, forms of claim, the duration and extinction of actions, security, execution, and review. [Text, pp. 15–296](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/15/mode/2up). ### Part I. The Courts of the Monarchy and Early Republic — pp. 15–78 The historical foundation is not merely introductory background. Greenidge uses it to explain why the Ciceronian system retains a private arbitrator, ritualized assertions of ownership, wagers, personal enforcement against debtors, and magisterial commands outside ordinary actions. Much of the earliest history is expressly reconstructive: institutions known from later sources are used to interpret traditions about kings, clans, pontiffs, and the early Republic. [Text, pp. 15–78](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/15/mode/2up). #### §1. Theory of Civil Procedure at Rome; the Magistrate and the Iudex — contents: pp. 15–49; opening discussion: pp. 15–18 The magistrate supplies authoritative *ius*; the *iudex* gives the case its judicial determination. Greenidge considers explanations of this division as a guarantee of liberty, an anticipation of popular appeal, or a practical device for reducing the praetor’s workload. He does not find these satisfactory as accounts of its origin. His preferred reconstruction treats the judge as the descendant of an arbitrator chosen within pre-state village or clan communities, subsequently subordinated to royal and magisterial authority. The distinction therefore combines voluntary acceptance by the parties with public authorization. **Qualification:** the clan-arbitration origin is Greenidge’s historical hypothesis, not a directly documented account of Rome’s earliest courts. [Text, pp. 15–18](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/15/mode/2up). #### §2. The Magistrate — pp. 18–37 The development of civil jurisdiction is traced through changes in the holders, distribution, and geographical reach of magistracy. The king’s combined executive, military, religious, and judicial powers pass into Republican institutions whose collegiality and annual tenure alter their operation. Expansion beyond the city then creates the problems of municipal delegation, foreign litigants, and provincial command. The three subsections distinguish these institutional environments instead of assuming one uniform Roman court system. [Text, pp. 18–37](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/18/mode/2up). #### (a) At Rome — pp. 18–32 Greenidge presents the king as the authoritative interpreter of law, assisted by the pontifical college, while considering traditions about popular lawmaking and limits on regal authority. Under the Republic, dual officeholding introduces the possibility of intervention by a colleague; annual tenure and the consuls’ separation from priestly office increase dependence on pontifical knowledge. The Twelve Tables publish law without exposing all the procedural formularies. The disclosure associated with Cn. Flavius and the later *Tripertita* of Sextus Aelius help explain the secularization of procedural expertise. He then follows the emergence of the praetorship, the appointment of the peregrine praetor, and the curule aediles’ limited civil jurisdiction over particular market and public-safety matters. He argues that dealings with foreigners must have encouraged procedural simplification before the creation of a separate peregrine praetor. **Qualification:** his early institutional chronology and account of that prehistory depend heavily on later tradition and inference. [Text, pp. 18–32](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/18/mode/2up). #### (b) The Municipal Magistrate — pp. 32–36 The key distinction is between allied communities possessing their own law and jurisdiction and communities incorporated into Roman citizenship. Acceptance of Roman civil legislation by a Latin or allied town does not, by itself, transfer jurisdiction to Rome: the adopted rule can become local law administered by local officials. Conversely, citizen colonies and incorporated communities require some extension of Roman judicial machinery. Greenidge explains the dispatch of *praefecti iure dicundo* as the solution to a central praetor’s inability to serve distant citizen communities personally. He understands their jurisdiction as an extension of the capital’s jurisdiction, authorized by law, rather than as completely autonomous local judicial power. **Read for:** the separation of citizenship, reception of Roman law, and subjection to Roman courts. [Text, pp. 32–36](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/32/mode/2up). #### (c) The Magistrate in the Provinces — pp. 36–37 The short subsection explains the movement from provincial administration by serving praetors toward government by proconsuls and propraetors through continuation of command. The expansion of the provinces outstrips the original arrangements for allocating magistrates. Praetors increasingly become officials occupied with business at Rome, while promagistrates govern abroad; Sulla’s increase in the number of praetors is connected with the growing demands of criminal courts. This supplies the institutional premise for the later discussion of provincial justice as resting on *imperium*. [Text, pp. 36–37](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/36/mode/2up). #### §3. The Iudex — pp. 37–49 Greenidge distinguishes the single *iudex*, the *arbiter*, the centumviral and decemviral bodies, and the *recuperatores*. The *arbiter* is associated especially with division, valuation, boundary settlement, and obligations requiring adjustment rather than a simple fixed award. Yet *iudex* and *arbiter* are not invariably exclusive technical categories. The early history of the centumvirs and decemvirs is reconstructed from later functions, ritual survivals, and disputed constitutional language; the connection of the former with assessable property and of the latter with liberty is central. The judge is accepted by the parties but remains responsible to the state and bound by oath. Greenidge emphasizes that judges interpret law as well as establish facts. He connects the *recuperatores* with international dispute settlement and their later domestic use with the advantages of a plural, comparatively expeditious tribunal. **Qualification:** several origins and early qualifications are proposed rather than securely attested. [Text, pp. 37–49](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/37/mode/2up). #### §4. Procedure in iure; the Legis Actio — pp. 49–78 This is a substantial reconstruction of the older forms of action. Greenidge explains *legis actio sacramento* through the challenge to a wager or oath, tracing its religious interpretation and later financial operation. In a claim to property, the parties assert ownership, perform the formal contest, and obtain an arrangement for interim possession and guarantees. He discusses the adaptation of this procedure to inheritance, servitudes, freedom, and personal obligations. The other principal forms receive separate treatment: *iudicis postulatio* for cases requiring judicial or arbitral settlement; *condictio* as a simplification associated with fixed claims; *pignoris capio* as seizure with important administrative antecedents; and *manus iniectio* as enforcement against the person. The last leads into the distinction between contractual debt bondage and execution of a judgment, the intervention of a *vindex*, and changes associated with the *lex Poetilia*. The closing pages explain how interdicts could grow from the magistrate’s commands into protection for interests inadequately covered by older law. **Qualification:** reconstructed speeches and formulae are assembled from surviving notices; Appendix I revisits the most uncertain debt-enforcement issues. [Text, pp. 49–78](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/49/mode/2up). ### Part II. The Courts of the Ciceronian Period — pp. 79–296 The system is now examined in operation. Greenidge moves from the magistrate’s relation to law and the distribution of jurisdiction to the practical sequence of a suit: approaching the court, selecting a remedy, framing the issue, defending or representing a party, joining issue, trying the case, enforcing judgment, and seeking intervention or restoration. Older procedure remains important because the formulary system has not simply erased it. [Text, pp. 79–296](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/79/mode/2up). #### §1. The Relation of the Magistrates to the Laws — pp. 79–82 Greenidge contrasts two developments. Public and criminal liberty grows through legislation restraining magistrates; civil rights expand substantially through an enlargement of the judicial magistrate’s practical power. He examines Cicero’s language of submission to law alongside claims that a more fundamental *ius* limits what even legislation can accomplish, particularly in arguments about citizenship. In practice, litigants obtain their usable law from authoritative interpreters and magistrates, while statutes may be obscure or obsolete. The section explains how professions of legal rigidity could coexist with active adaptation of remedies to changing social needs. [Text, pp. 79–82](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/79/mode/2up). #### §2. The Magistrate — pp. 82–132 This section asks what authorizes a court, which persons and disputes fall within it, and how its rules are made known. Rome, municipal Italy, and the provinces share procedural techniques but differ in the magistrate’s legal basis and restraints. The provincial discussion is especially extensive because local law, civic privilege, taxation, and delegated jurisdiction intersect there. [Text, pp. 82–132](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/82/mode/2up). #### (a) At Rome — pp. 82–99 The praetor is both custodian of remedies belonging to the civil law and author of remedies supported by his own office. Greenidge carefully distinguishes the **album**, the published board containing procedural material, from the **edict**, properly the magistrate’s rulings and promises. Civil formulae, edictal clauses, and formulae expressing praetorian remedies must therefore not be collapsed into one category. The formula makes a rule usable in a particular action; the edict states the broader undertaking or regulation. He considers customary law, the continuity of successive edicts, annual validity, retrospective application, and restrictions imposed by colleagues and the Cornelian law requiring adherence to the published edict. Verres’ handling of female inheritance supplies a concrete test of statute interpretation and alleged innovation. The final discussion stresses the limitation of the praetor to the proper work of *in iure* proceedings: granting a procedure should not settle disputed facts that belong to the trial. [Text, pp. 82–99](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/82/mode/2up). #### (b) The Municipal Magistrate and Municipal Jurisdiction — pp. 99–109 The extension of citizenship after the Social War creates an awkward balance between integration into Roman law and preservation of local institutions. Greenidge rejects the assumption that every community was instantly recast in one uniform constitutional form. Titles can survive after powers change, and evidence for the extent of local jurisdiction is sparse. The *lex Rubria* provides his most detailed example of the division of business between local magistrates and Rome. It differentiates cases by their character and value, gives procedures for securing appearances elsewhere, and supplies elaborate formulae—even warning against taking illustrative names literally. Greenidge uses this material to explain how local proceedings could reproduce Roman *ius* and *iudicium* while remaining restricted in competence. **Qualification:** the law’s date is discussed as uncertain; the additional note to p. 102 adds important Tarentine evidence without claiming that it proves the details of civil or criminal jurisdiction. [Text, pp. 99–109](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/99/mode/2up). #### (c) The Provincial Magistrate and Provincial Jurisdiction — pp. 109–132 The governor’s *imperium* operates with fewer checks than magistracy at Rome, but Greenidge identifies constraints in treaties, civic charters, provincial settlements, and local legal traditions. He distinguishes free and allied cities from subject communities and expressly warns that Sicily’s relatively well-documented arrangements cannot stand for every province. The *lex Rupilia* is analyzed through rules about disputes between members of the same city, different cities, Romans and Sicilians, public bodies and private persons, and cultivators and tax collectors. There is no single Republican “provincial edict” governing the empire. Each province has its own transmitted and modified edict. Cicero’s account of his Cilician edict illuminates financial regulations, inheritances and bankruptcy, and an unwritten residue of principles to be applied as cases arise. The discussion of provincial debts and the Salaminian loan shows the tension between obligations contracted under one governor and remedies offered by another. Finally, circuits, quaestors, legates, interim commanders, and review of delegated jurisdiction explain how justice was actually delivered. **Qualification:** Greenidge distinguishes guaranteed civic autonomy from local jurisdiction merely permitted by the governor; his note to p. 115 revises the possibilities for selecting Sicilian judges. [Text, pp. 109–132](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/109/mode/2up). #### §3. The Action — pp. 132–181 This section follows the making of a litigable case. Court setting and calendar, summons, eligibility to approach the magistrate, disclosure of the intended remedy, and construction of the formula all affect access to adjudication. The procedural form is not an incidental wrapper around the dispute: its language identifies what the judge may decide and what relief can follow. [Text, pp. 132–181](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/132/mode/2up). #### (a) Preliminaries to Action — pp. 132–141 Greenidge reconstructs the physical and temporal setting of litigation: forum and basilica, raised tribunal, curule chair, benches for assessors and litigants, and the surrounding audience. Publicity is an institutional feature, including in provincial proceedings. He distinguishes acts performed formally on the tribunal from business transacted *de plano*. The calendar discussion separates restrictions on the magistrate from restrictions on the judges, examining sacred days, festivals, games, the working court day, and local or provincial observances. Finally, the duration of a pending action depends on its source: an action supported by *imperium* is affected by the magistrate’s term, whereas the later eighteen-month limit on *iudicia legitima* should not simply be projected into Cicero’s time. [Text, pp. 132–141](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/132/mode/2up). #### (b) The Summons — pp. 141–145 The plaintiff normally bears responsibility for bringing the defendant before the magistrate. Greenidge contrasts older coercive *in ius vocatio* with *vadimonium*, the promise backed by a financial undertaking to appear at an agreed time. Originating in arrangements for reappearance after adjournment, *vadimonium* becomes a practical means of initiating litigation and allows advance notice of the claim. He also considers transfer from a local court to Rome and the difficulties of provincial summons. Evidence for a governor’s own compulsory summons is strongest where public or administrative interests are involved; he does not treat those examples as proof of a routine magisterial summons in all private disputes. [Text, pp. 141–145](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/141/mode/2up). #### (c) Proceedings in iure — pp. 145–149 The object of the proceedings is to obtain the magistrate’s authorization of a *iudicium*. *Postulatio* covers the plaintiff’s request and the defendant’s contradiction. Greenidge distinguishes legal representation of another person from an advocate’s assistance and explains restrictions on who may postulate, including age, disability, and disqualifying status or conduct. The magistrate may hear argument about the proper legal form or the equity of granting a remedy, but pressure of business limits prolonged pleading. Difficult legal issues can be reserved for consultation. Cicero’s account of Quinctius’ supporters being removed from the tribunal illustrates the difference between an opportunity to ask for justice and unrestricted freedom to argue before the praetor. [Text, pp. 145–149](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/145/mode/2up). #### (d) The Formula — pp. 150–161 A formula is the written statement of the case and a conditional judgment: if the relevant claim is established, the judge is to condemn; otherwise, to acquit. Greenidge explains the principal components—*demonstratio*, *intentio*, *adiudicatio*, and *condemnatio*—while stressing that no single formula necessarily contains all four. Preliminary determinations may require only an *intentio*. He distinguishes formulations referring to civil-law entitlement from those based on described facts and shows how legal fictions extend established remedies to otherwise unsupported situations. Condemnation is ordinarily pecuniary. An arbitral clause encouraging restitution, and valuation if restitution is refused, can make recovery of the thing practically desirable without turning the formula into simple administrative repossession. The judge must obey the formula, but deciding whether its condition is satisfied can require substantial legal interpretation. **Read for:** why “praetor decides law, judge decides fact” is inadequate. [Text, pp. 150–161](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/150/mode/2up). #### (e) The Formula and the Legis Actio — pp. 161–175 Greenidge assembles the evidence for coexistence and warns that Cicero’s words *actio*, *formula*, and *iudicium* do not always identify mutually exclusive systems. The old sacramental procedure remains vigorous in particular courts; other forms survive at least in elements or expressions. Meanwhile, written formulae serve an extensive range of claims. The *lex Aebutia* is crucial but obscure. Greenidge examines several possible relationships between it and the old actions: abolition in selected fields, a litigant’s option, praetorian power of substitution, or a mixture of written and spoken procedure. These need not all be alternatives. He then explains the continuing importance of the distinction between *iudicia legitima* and proceedings supported by *imperium*, particularly for the extinction and duration of claims. **Qualification:** neither a precise date nor a fully recoverable legislative mechanism is supplied by the evidence he uses. [Text, pp. 161–175](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/161/mode/2up). #### (f) Dangers of the formulary system — pp. 175–177 Written procedure reduces some dangers of oral ritual without removing formal traps. A defective statement of the background transaction and an excessive claim in the *intentio* have different consequences. In Greenidge’s account, a false *demonstratio* can allow a corrected action, whereas *plus petere* can destroy the claim: a judge instructed to determine a specified debt cannot simply award a smaller debt that the evidence proves. Claiming too little is less destructive but may provoke a procedural defence against repeated fragmentation of the dispute. **Qualification:** the detailed classification depends substantially on Gaius, whose rules Greenidge considers applicable to the earlier period. [Text, pp. 175–177](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/175/mode/2up). #### (g) Actionis or Formulae Editio. Discussions connected with the Postulatio — pp. 178–181 The plaintiff must communicate the intended claim or formula and, where relevant, the document on which it rests. Greenidge describes dictation, delivery of a copy, and pointing to the published model as possible means of disclosure. Questions to the defendant may establish the capacity in which he is sued, such as heirship and the share inherited. The praetor then decides whether to grant the action. Grounds for refusal include an unsuitable formula, an unenforceable obligation, prior adjudication, prohibited prejudgment of a capital prosecution, or failure to provide necessary security. If the case proceeds, disputes may concern the parties named, qualifying words, exceptions, or the upper limit of condemnation. The subsection shows the adversarial negotiation that lies behind the apparent simplicity of the final written formula. [Text, pp. 178–181](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/178/mode/2up). #### §4. The Different Kinds of Action — pp. 182–210 Greenidge classifies actions by what the plaintiff seeks to establish and by the character of the obligation or wrong. Real actions concern entitlement to a thing or status; personal actions enforce an obligation against a particular debtor; penal actions impose a monetary consequence for a delict. The categories also expose different relationships between compensation, punishment, restitution, and the judge’s freedom of assessment. [Text, pp. 182–210](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/182/mode/2up). #### (a) In rem actiones — pp. 182–195 Three principal routes structure the discussion: sacramental proceedings before the centumvirs, procedure through a preliminary *sponsio*, and the direct *formula petitoria*. The centumviral court deals with property, inheritance, and associated status questions. Cicero’s examples—including the dispute in which Crassus defended Curius’ claim under a will—show how interpretation of intention and words could determine succession. Greenidge traces the preliminary identification of disputed property, symbolic ejection, allocation of interim possession, and guarantees for restoration. The possessory interdicts can determine who litigates as possessor without deciding ownership. The *formula petitoria* brings the ownership claim directly before a judge and combines restoration with pecuniary condemnation in default. The section closes by separating decemviral adjudication of liberty from status questions arising incidentally in property litigation. **Read for:** the procedural difference between establishing ownership and protecting possession. [Text, pp. 182–195](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/182/mode/2up). #### (b) In personam actiones — pp. 195–206 Personal actions are organized around obligations of strict law and those governed by good faith. The former tend to present a one-sided debtor–creditor relation and a tightly defined claim. Greenidge explains the *condictio* for money or a definite thing, the risks of claiming more than is due, the possible penal wager, and actions involving an uncertain performance. A claim to a specified thing still requires monetary valuation at condemnation. Actions *bonae fidei* allow the judge to examine reciprocal obligations, counterclaims, care, fidelity, and the quality of performance. Sale, hire, partnership, mandate, deposit, and related relationships supply examples. Greenidge insists that good-faith obligations are not distinguished merely by informality: their mutual reliance and ethical content matter. Formulae for deposit and partnership show how this wider evaluative task is expressed. [Text, pp. 195–206](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/195/mode/2up). #### (c) Actiones Poenales — pp. 206–210 Private prosecution of a delict can seek a penalty, sometimes alongside recovery of the thing or compensation for its loss. Greenidge discusses personal injury and insult, theft, and unlawful damage under the *lex Aquilia*. He follows the movement from older fixed or retaliatory responses toward assessed monetary remedies while retaining the punitive dimension. The section culminates in the praetorian remedy for damage caused by armed or assembled bands, central to *Pro Tullio*. Its fourfold award and recuperatorial trial respond to organized private violence for which ordinary damage remedies were considered inadequate. The example shows a civil action performing a public-order function without becoming an ordinary criminal prosecution. [Text, pp. 206–210](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/206/mode/2up). #### §5. The Interdict — pp. 210–227 An interdict retains the language of an immediate magisterial command, but in developed procedure its factual conditions can themselves be disputed. The issue of the order is therefore not equivalent to a final finding that it must be obeyed. Litigation may ask both whether the conditions existed and whether the required conduct followed. Greenidge distinguishes restitutory, exhibitory, and prohibitory interdicts, then examines their protection of possession and of certain public interests. The ordinary *unde vi* and the stronger remedy for armed violence differ in their conditions and available defences. He reconstructs *uti possidetis* through symbolic violence, an auction of interim enjoyment, mutual wagers, and possible consequential proceedings; *utrubi* differs in the possession-period it considers. Restitutory interdicts can lead either to an arbitral formula or to wager and subsequent recovery. **Qualification:** his account of the original social basis of possession and of the earlier purpose of *uti possidetis* is argumentative; the absence of a defective-possession defence in the armed-violence remedy does not automatically settle whether possession itself was required. [Text, pp. 210–227](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/210/mode/2up). #### §6. Defence; Exceptio; Praescriptio — pp. 227–235 Defence can challenge the grant of the action or defeat the claim at trial. A direct defence denies that the plaintiff’s asserted entitlement is established. An indirect defence invokes a recognized circumstance that prevents condemnation despite the apparent claim: agreement not to sue, fraud, intimidation, or previous litigation are important examples. Greenidge explains how these pleas enter the formula, distinguishes *exceptio* from the prefixed *praescriptio*, and considers the development of their respective positions. Some protections arise from legislation, others from praetorian jurisdiction; not every available exception is necessarily listed in the edict. He also discusses permanent and temporary bars and objections concerning the proper proceeding or forum. A plea that appears merely procedural can have a final effect once the case has passed into judgment. [Text, pp. 227–235](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/227/mode/2up). #### §7. Representation — pp. 235–243 The growth of geographically dispersed business makes strict personal appearance impracticable. The formally appointed *cognitor* represents a party in a specified case; the *procurator* of Cicero’s period is characteristically a general business agent. Greenidge resists importing the later special *procurator litis* without evidence. The central technical problem is how a judgment binds the represented person and protects the opponent. The formula can name the principal in the *intentio* and the representative in the *condemnatio*. Different forms of representation therefore require different guarantees against renewed litigation or non-payment. The discussion of Quinctius and Alfenus shows that the requirement of security was not necessarily settled in all its later detail. Cicero’s arrangements concerning Dolabella’s sureties illustrate how representation could also affect the reputational consequences of recovery. [Text, pp. 235–243](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/235/mode/2up). #### §8. The Litis Contestatio — pp. 243–251 *Litis contestatio* marks acceptance of the constituted *iudicium* and the transition from the magistrate’s preliminary proceedings to adjudication. Greenidge connects its name with earlier witness-attested formalities but does not assume that the later written procedure preserved every old ceremony. Its importance lies in its effects. The original obligation is transformed into the obligation associated with judgment, and the same claim cannot simply be pursued afresh. He explains why extinction operates differently in civil-law personal actions, real actions, and actions supported by *imperium*, and why an exception concerning a matter already adjudicated or brought to trial is sometimes necessary. Identity of litigation requires attention to the persons, thing, and ground of claim, not just repeated words in a formula. The final pages gather the guarantees securing compliance and preventing a second action, especially in real actions, suspicious defendants, and representation. [Text, pp. 243–251](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/243/mode/2up). #### §9. Confession — pp. 251–254 Confession before the magistrate is examined as a possible way of concluding proceedings without a full evidentiary trial. The *lex Rubria* provides concrete language for admission of a debt, duty, entitlement, possession, or wrongful act. Greenidge sets the traditional equation of the *confessus* with a judgment debtor against the detailed wording of those clauses. His significant conclusion is that confession may not invariably be irrevocable: the defendant might satisfy the admitted claim or withdraw the admission and accept the appropriate trial. It is failure to take either course that produces the consequences of condemnation. **Qualification:** this is Greenidge’s interpretation of the municipal-law evidence, not a simple quotation of an uncontested universal rule. [Text, pp. 251–254](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/251/mode/2up). #### §10. Neglect of Defence — pp. 255–258 Greenidge distinguishes a defendant present but refusing to plead from one who stays away. The older procedure could respond to refusal in court but was poorly equipped for absence; the praetorian edict develops remedies against different forms of non-defence, including concealment, lack of a representative, and failure to honour *vadimonium*. The principal remedy is entry into the debtor’s property, potentially followed by sale. It rests initially on necessarily incomplete information and is not a full trial of the underlying claim. Justifiable absence, particularly on public service, limits the consequences. *Pro Quinctio* illustrates both the commercial damage such measures can inflict and the demanding conditions for contesting them. [Text, pp. 255–258](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/255/mode/2up). #### §10*. The Oath — pp. 259–263 Greenidge expressly acknowledges that the oath as an alternative to ordinary proof does not play a role in Cicero’s writings. He nevertheless includes it as part of the procedural system he reconstructs. An oath voluntarily tendered and taken outside court can acquire protection through an exception; an oath tendered in judicial proceedings raises questions about compulsion and its binding effect. He distinguishes the sacramental oath, whose justice still has to be investigated, from an oath that settles the controversy. The anecdote of Albucius, whose rhetorical challenge was accepted by opposing counsel and the centumvirs, shows the danger of offering an oath casually. **Important correction:** the additional note on p. 576 questions whether the cited Quintilian passage concerns ordinary Republican adjudication at all; the chronological basis here is weaker than elsewhere. [Text, pp. 259–263](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/259/mode/2up). #### §11. The Iudex and the Iudicium — pp. 263–277 The section first asks who judges: the decemvirs, centumvirs, single judge, and *recuperatores* have different modes of constitution. Greenidge treats the parties’ acceptance as particularly important for the single judge and does not assume that the criminal judiciary laws automatically regulate civil appointments. Recuperatorial procedure is associated with dispatch, especially where violence or disturbed public order is involved. He then follows the hearing through preliminary explanation, advocates’ speeches, witnesses, documents, adjournments, and judgment. Repeated hearings explain why surviving speeches can discuss evidence already delivered. Documentary material includes public enactments, private accounts, stipulations, and diaries; oral and hearsay testimony are assessed rather than excluded by an elaborate rigid code. The judge’s overall evaluation remains decisive, subject to the burden of proof and the formula. The closing discussion introduces the *actio iudicati*, showing why an unpaid judgment can generate another procedural stage. [Text, pp. 263–277](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/263/mode/2up). #### §12. Execution — pp. 278–286 Personal detention and execution against property coexist. Greenidge distinguishes confinement for an unpaid obligation from slavery: the detained debtor retains legal status, though the practical loss of freedom can be severe. He discusses the conditions of arrest, opportunities for renewed defence, and release after satisfaction of the debt. Property execution proceeds through *missio in possessionem*, public notice, participation by other creditors, appointment of a *magister*, and sale. The creditor initially obtains custody and protection of the estate, not outright ownership. The *bonorum emptor* purchases the estate under conditions involving satisfaction of creditors and is treated through a fiction of universal succession. **Qualification:** the exact relationship between personal and property execution is not fully recoverable; Greenidge does not demonstrate that one invariably excludes or follows the other. [Text, pp. 278–286](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/278/mode/2up). #### §13. Appeal and reversal of Sentences — pp. 287–296 The chapter distinguishes a superior’s prohibition, effective through coercion, from *intercessio*, which invalidates the opposed magisterial act. An *appellatio* seeks such intervention; it is not automatically a new trial before a higher court. The ordinary judgment of a *iudex* is protected by finality, while the magistrate’s preliminary acts and later enforcement remain vulnerable to intervention. Greenidge also considers transfer to Rome, renewed proceedings, allegations that judges were coerced, and a governor’s review of his delegates. Q. Cicero’s provincial rulings provide an unusually concrete example of possible remedies for an allegedly forced verdict. The final pages distinguish reversal of an unjust decision from restoration against a proceeding founded on defective law. **Read for:** the different constitutional mechanisms hidden beneath the English word “appeal,” and the limits of the evidence for full rehearing. [Text, pp. 287–296](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/287/mode/2up). ## Book II. Criminal Procedure — pp. 297–525 The criminal book explains how several kinds of public and non-public punitive authority coexist before turning to the permanent courts. Its historical argument traces the movement from vengeance, expiation, and magisterial inquiry toward prosecution before statutorily constituted juries. That development does not erase older powers. The final chapters follow prosecution, proof, voting, penalties, and restoration, consistently asking which body possesses authority at each stage. [Text, pp. 297–525](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/297/mode/2up). ### §1. The Criminal Procedure of the Earliest Times — pp. 297–307 Greenidge begins with three conceptions of wrongdoing: an injury inviting private vengeance or compensation, a sin requiring divine expiation, and an offence against the political community. He finds survivals of all three in Roman sanctions. Pontifical assessment of expiation, the significance of intentional wrongdoing, and *consecratio* explain a religious background to later exclusion from the community. Royal *imperium* supplies the secular framework. *Perduellio* and *parricidium* are treated as broad early categories, and the king may act through delegates, especially duumvirs and quaestors. The tradition of Horatius becomes evidence for Roman legal ideas about appeal, even if the narrative is a juristic construction rather than dependable event history. Greenidge explores whether any popular jurisdiction existed independently of royal permission but emphasizes how limited it would have been beside military and religious authority. [Text, pp. 297–307](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/297/mode/2up). ### §2. The Criminal Procedure of the Early Republic — pp. 307–326 The main subject is the extension and protection of *provocatio*, together with the magistracies and assemblies that make it effective. Greenidge examines the consular delegates, the consequences of their election, the city–military boundary, and the initial weakness of a right lacking an adequate sanction against violation. The Twelve Tables lead into a lengthy analysis of *privilegium*: the prohibited adverse measure against particular persons and its relation to retrospective penalties, extraordinary commissions, and political proscription. Their reservation of capital jurisdiction to the greatest assembly is considered alongside the development of tribunician proceedings. The later Valerian, Porcian, and Sempronian measures strengthen or restate protections and challenge unappealable commissions and emergency executions. **Qualification:** dates, sanctions, and the exact jurisdiction contemplated by several enactments are reconstructed. The note on p. 577 offers Mommsen’s different interpretation of the third Valerian law’s sanction. [Text, pp. 307–326](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/307/mode/2up). ### §3. The Jurisdiction of the Tribune and of the Plebs — pp. 327–331 Tribunician punitive authority originates, in Greenidge’s account, as the means of making protection of plebeian rights effective. The power to intervene would be empty without power to respond to its violation. That jurisdiction expands into political accusation beyond the original defence of the plebs. The constitutional problem is the relationship between this activity and the capital competence of the centuriate assembly. Greenidge distinguishes pecuniary proceedings before the plebs, capital accusation brought to the centuries through a praetor, and plebiscites declaring the outlawry of an absent fugitive. He also considers whether Gracchan legislation created a special capital jurisdiction before the plebs. This last possibility is an argument from connected examples, not a fully preserved statutory provision. [Text, pp. 327–331](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/327/mode/2up). ### §4. Magisterial Coercitio — pp. 331–338 *Coercitio* compels obedience to magistrates and public duties; it is not identical with prosecution for a defined crime. Its potential sanctions—death, confinement, scourging, fines, consecration of goods, and seizure or destruction of pledges—nevertheless bring it directly into contact with criminal jurisdiction. A penalty may become a matter for popular adjudication when it crosses the limits of unreviewable magisterial power. Greenidge uses late Republican confrontations to show coercion operating against senators and magistrates as well as private citizens. He distinguishes punitive pressure from custody securing appearance and explains why the tribune’s immediate power of arrest differs in origin from ordinary summons. These powers help explain how a citizen could suffer severe restraint without receiving a normal criminal sentence. [Text, pp. 331–338](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/331/mode/2up). ### §5. The Jurisdiction of the different Magistrates and the separate Comitia. The Triumviri Capitales — pp. 338–344 The presiding official and proposed penalty generally indicate the competent assembly. Greenidge distinguishes the judicial roles of consuls, praetors, curule and plebeian aediles, and tribunes, stressing how little ordinary criminal jurisdiction remains with consuls by Cicero’s time. Aedilician prosecutions are connected particularly with their administrative responsibilities, though their potential scope is not absolutely confined to them. The *triumviri capitales* supply policing, initial examination, custody, and supervision or performance of executions. Greenidge describes their part in the deaths of the Catilinarian prisoners and their earlier investigative functions. He finds no evidence that they themselves possess ordinary criminal jurisdiction over citizens equivalent to the higher magistrates’ power to bring a case before the people. [Text, pp. 338–344](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/338/mode/2up). ### §6. The Procedure of a Iudicium Populi and of the Provocatio — pp. 344–349 Greenidge refuses to make every popular trial formally an appeal from a completed magisterial sentence. A magistrate who recognizes the limits of his authority can initiate popular adjudication directly. He describes the preliminary *anquisitio*, the successive public accusations, promulgation of the proposed penalty, the interval before assembly, and the final vote. The people accepts or rejects the proposal; the bill’s legislative form constrains amendment and renewal. A true *provocatio*, by contrast, follows a sentence or attempted exercise of authority that the citizen challenges. Rabirius supplies the principal late Republican illustration. The distinction matters because public investigation, a magistrate’s proposed penalty, and the assembly’s final determination are separate stages, even when the sources use the vocabulary of accusation and judgment loosely. [Text, pp. 344–349](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/344/mode/2up). ### §7. Survivals of popular jurisdiction in Cicero’s day — pp. 349–366 The opening survey of political prosecutions shows that popular jurisdiction survives alongside the permanent courts. Greenidge then concentrates on Rabirius and Cicero’s exile. Rabirius’ prosecution revives the duumviral procedure for *perduellio* to challenge the authority behind the killing of Saturninus. The analysis covers appointment of the judges, condemnation, appeal, the defence, dissolution of the assembly, and the legal possibility of renewal. The exact role of the lot is qualified in the additional note to p. 356. For Cicero, Greenidge distinguishes Clodius’ general measure concerning execution of citizens without trial from the subsequent enactment declaring Cicero’s outlawry. He tests Cicero’s objections: alleged lack of prosecution or conviction, the form and tense of the interdiction, retrospective targeting, and Clodius’ part in implementation. He does not simply adopt Cicero’s declaration of nullity. The geographical extent and anti-repeal provisions of the ban receive separate discussion. **Important correction:** p. 577 clarifies the distinction between a tribunician declaration of an existing interdiction and a popular measure creating one. [Text, pp. 349–366](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/349/mode/2up). ### §8. Domestic Jurisdiction — pp. 367–373 The household is treated as a surviving centre of disciplinary and judicial authority over sons, wives, slaves, and, in certain circumstances, freedmen. Greenidge connects this authority with the state’s relatively limited judicial apparatus. He discusses paternal punishment, the role of a family council, adoption, marital arrangements, and the relation of a domestic decision to possible public proceedings. Cases involving serious public offences show that household and civic jurisdictions can overlap. The treatment of women in the Bacchanalian investigation and accounts of punishment within elite households illustrate this interaction. Greenidge also distinguishes punishment of enslaved people by masters from proceedings concerning offences against others. **Qualification:** the legal extent, social legitimacy, and actual exercise of domestic powers are not interchangeable; some of the evidence used to illuminate their persistence comes from the Principate. [Text, pp. 367–373](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/367/mode/2up). ### §9. Religious Jurisdiction — pp. 373–380 The pontifex maximus and pontifical council retain authority within a sphere of sacred public law. Greenidge first examines ecclesiastical discipline, especially conflicts between priestly obligations and political or military office, in which fines and popular intervention can test the limits of religious obedience. He then considers religious obligations affecting magistrates and laypeople, distinguishing an expiatory offering from punishment. Many offences with a religious character are handled by secular authorities. The principal remaining capital example is the trial of a Vestal and her alleged partner for *incestum*. The re-examination of the Vestals’ cases in 114–113 BCE illustrates intervention by a popularly established commission after pontifical acquittals. **Qualification:** Greenidge expressly leaves unresolved whether this intervention displaced the older pontifical jurisdiction or only interrupted its operation. [Text, pp. 373–380](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/373/mode/2up). ### §10. Special Commissions — pp. 380–397 Extraordinary inquiries are classified by their authorization: senate and people together, the people alone, or the senate alone. The last category raises the sharpest question about the legality of excluding appeal. Greenidge distinguishes what narratives establish from what they omit; the Bacchanalian investigation does not yield an unambiguous procedural precedent. Later commissions increasingly borrow the structure of permanent courts. The Varian inquiry illustrates a politically charged definition of responsibility for the Social War. Clodius’ Bona Dea trial shows the successive roles of religious assessment, senatorial initiative, legislation, jury selection, and prosecution. The final and longest case study concerns Pompeius’ legislation in 52 BCE and Milo’s trials: special laws, selected jurors, accelerated evidence and pleading, successive panels, challenges, and verdicts. **Qualification:** the reconstruction of the panels and timetable is not a straightforward transcript of Asconius; the additional note on p. 578 explicitly discusses the disputed chronology. [Text, pp. 380–397](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/380/mode/2up). ### §11. Martial Law — pp. 397–406 Greenidge uses “martial law” for emergency claims that the ordinary magistrate may exercise otherwise restrained military authority against persons treated as public enemies. The senate does not, on his analysis, create a new *imperium*: it advises that latent powers be used. The magistrate still acts at his own risk, and the senate’s advice is not itself a judicial sentence. A sequence from the Gracchan conflicts through Saturninus, Catiline, and the final civil wars demonstrates the changing use of emergency decrees and explicit declarations of *hostes*. Greenidge regards the general legality as resistant to a simple answer because custom and necessity competed with statutory safeguards. Nevertheless, he sharply distinguishes armed rebellion from executing prisoners captured within the city. Treasonable intention alone cannot lawfully turn a citizen into an enemy without adjudication. **Read for:** his criticism of attempts to make the Senate’s discussion in 63 BCE a court that legally condemned the conspirators. [Text, pp. 397–406](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/397/mode/2up). ### §12. Italian and Municipal Jurisdiction — pp. 406–410 Greenidge relates criminal jurisdiction to the changing civic status of Italian communities. Full citizens’ participation in the Roman political community supports a right to popular trial, but local criminal jurisdiction also survives and some Roman permanent courts have narrow territorial competence. References to local trials and the municipal disqualifications in Caesar’s legislation indicate substantial activity outside Rome. Citizens without the vote, allied states, and Latin communities raise different problems. The *lex Acilia*’s offer of appeal rights to successful Latin prosecutors and the disputed treatment of a magistrate from Novum Comum illustrate why citizenship, Latin status, and a particular protection against coercion must be distinguished. **Qualification:** Greenidge’s explanations of how early appeal was extended beyond the city are conjectural, and he cannot determine the exact legal basis of every reported incident. [Text, pp. 406–410](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/406/mode/2up). ### §13. Provincial and Military Jurisdiction — pp. 410–415 The governor exercises broad criminal authority over subject populations, ordinarily advised by a *consilium* including local Roman residents and members of his staff. Local courts can retain ordinary business, while serious political cases may be sent to Rome. Greenidge points to the absence of a fully organized system of extradition or empire-wide criminal administration. His most distinctive argument concerns Roman citizens abroad. He finds no secure evidence for a general Republican statutory extension of *provocatio* to the provinces and interprets much protection against degrading or capital punishment as customary. Thus *civis Romanus sum* asserts an expected immunity whose basis need not be identical with an appeal at Rome. Military discipline remains severe, and he does not infer its legal limits simply from civil-war practice. **Qualification:** this is a substantive historical thesis of the volume, to be cited as Greenidge’s argument rather than silently adopted as present consensus. [Text, pp. 410–415](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/410/mode/2up). ### §14. The Iudicia Publica or Quaestiones Perpetuae — pp. 415–428 Greenidge characterizes the permanent criminal court as a hybrid drawing heavily on civil procedure: a private accuser, a defined issue, and a panel of judges, but with a public purpose and a penalty fixed by law. Unlike ordinary civil litigation, the magistrate remains associated with the jury through the hearing. The new courts gradually occupy fields formerly handled by other authorities; no comprehensive criminal code or wholly uniform empire-wide system results. The chronological survey starts with provincial recovery claims and the *lex Calpurnia* of 149 BCE, then follows extortion legislation, judicial corruption, electoral bribery, and Sulla’s more systematic definition of offences. Later measures address violence, citizenship claims, kidnapping, parricide, and renewed regulation of political and ordinary crimes. Overlapping statutory descriptions can leave prosecutors a choice of court. **Qualification:** Greenidge repeatedly distinguishes known legislation from uncertain dates, attributions, or inferred permanent courts; his chronology should not be converted into an unqualified modern list of statutes. [Text, pp. 415–428](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/415/mode/2up). ### §15. The Presidents of the Quaestiones Perpetuae — pp. 428–433 The assignment of criminal business is reconstructed from the praetors and other presidents known in particular years. Greenidge argues against imagining an inflexible one-to-one correspondence between each statutory crime and a permanent presidential office. A praetor may handle related courts; competing demands and new legislation can change the distribution. The *iudex quaestionis* supplements the praetors, especially in the crowded field of homicide and poisoning. Greenidge examines the quasi-magisterial character of that office, its oath and responsibility, and the scope of its control over the trial. **Qualification:** the manner of appointment is not securely known. The presence of a person styled *quaesitor* does not automatically prove that he held the praetorship. [Text, pp. 428–433](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/428/mode/2up). ### §16. The Iudices of the Quaestiones Perpetuae and the Leges Iudiciariae — pp. 433–456 This is both an institutional history of jury recruitment and an account of political conflict over the courts. Greenidge traces the movements between senatorial and equestrian control, the proposals associated with the Gracchi and Drusus, Sulla’s senatorial panels, and the Aurelian settlement dividing service among senators, equites, and tribuni aerarii. He distinguishes the older functions of the tribuni aerarii from the qualification denoted by that name in the late Republican judiciary. The mechanics matter as much as the social categories: annual compilation of the *album*, divisions into decuries, allocation by lot, challenges, replacement jurors, possible panel sizes, and voting arrangements all shape a trial. Later changes under Pompeius, Caesar, Antonius, Fufius, and Vatinius illustrate continuing instability. The final discussion explains the special *iudices editicii* for prosecutions involving electoral associations and the use of tribal selection. **Qualification:** several numerical estimates and reconstructions of selection are explicitly tentative; Cicero’s invective against Antonius’ jurors is not treated as a neutral statement of their qualifications. [Text, pp. 433–456](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/433/mode/2up). ### §17. The Course of the Trial in a Quaestio Perpetua — pp. 456–504 This is the criminal book’s main practical account of a prosecution. Its internal sequence is worth separating even though the printed contents give it a single entry. **Access to the court and formulation of the charge, pp. 456–467.** The assize, priority of cases, and exceptional treatment of *vis* establish when a case can proceed. *Postulatio* tests the accuser’s eligibility; competing accusers require a *divinatio* to select a suitable prosecutor. *Nominis* or *criminis delatio*, questioning of the accused, inscription, and formal acceptance define the charge and create the procedural status of *reus*. Greenidge distinguishes admissions of facts from confession of legal guilt. He finds no basis for treating the president of a permanent court as entitled to impose a summary sentence merely because an admission is made before him. Time is then allowed for gathering evidence. **The responsibilities of the accuser and the position of the accused, pp. 467–476.** The system depends on a private prosecutor acting faithfully for a public purpose. Malicious accusation (*calumnia*), collusion (*praevaricatio*), and abandonment (*tergiversatio*) are examined separately; Greenidge does not assume that all possess the same legal sanction. The oath against malicious prosecution and reputational disqualifications help regulate conduct. He considers absence, exemption for public service, appearance of jurors, the accused’s advocates, and the distinct role of subordinate accusers (*subscriptores*). Emotional display and appeals to character belong to the practical conduct of the case, even when they are not formal procedural acts. **Pleadings and proof, pp. 476–495.** Set speeches ordinarily precede oral testimony; a subsequent *altercatio* permits rapid exchanges over the evidence. This order explains the importance of later hearings for speeches that analyze earlier testimony. Cicero’s shortened opening against Verres is interpreted within this structure. Greenidge examines confession, oral and hearsay testimony, rules about witnesses, compulsory prosecution evidence and voluntary defence evidence, cross-examination, written depositions, civic delegations, and character testimonials. He differentiates attestation that a document is an authentic copy from a guarantee that its factual contents are true. Slaves’ evidence, usually obtained through torture, is restricted especially where it incriminates their owner. Account-books, search, sealing, custody, and production of records complete the discussion. **Decision, renewed hearing, and assessment, pp. 495–504.** The court must determine the charged offence and cannot freely remodel the statutory penalty. Greenidge discusses the uncertain evidence for collective deliberation, voting for acquittal, condemnation, or *non liquet*, and the president’s declaration. *Ampliatio* is a renewed hearing following an inconclusive result; *comperendinatio* is a prescribed division into first and second actions, especially in extortion cases, without an intervening verdict. Finally, conviction for extortion or peculation can lead to *litis aestimatio*, with the jury assessing recovery. Recovery from recipients of the proceeds is a further, distinct issue. **Read for:** the indispensable procedural context for interpreting the surviving criminal speeches. [Text, pp. 456–504](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/456/mode/2up). ### §18. Execution — pp. 504–516 Pecuniary execution involves security, assessment, and, where necessary, possession and sale of property through public officers. Greenidge distinguishes recovery of money from the imposition of a separate personal penalty: exile following inability or unwillingness to meet damages is not necessarily the punishment prescribed by the extortion law itself. His discussion of personal consequences differentiates death, interdiction, disqualification, temporary exclusion, and voluntary exile. The older ability to escape punishment by entering another civic community is related to Rome’s conception of exclusive citizenship. *Aquae et ignis interdictio* changes from a measure preventing a fugitive’s return into a principal statutory penalty. This makes Cicero’s insistence that exile is never formally prescribed only narrowly true. Parricide and its archaic punishment receive separate attention. The last pages explain the anomalous place of imprisonment. It ordinarily belongs to coercion or prevention rather than a statutory sentence, yet refusal of release can make it punitive in practice. Caesar’s proposal for the Catilinarian prisoners is analyzed as an extension of such detention. **Qualification:** Greenidge distinguishes securely attested penalties from those inferred from later law or from the practical consequences of conviction. [Text, pp. 504–516](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/504/mode/2up). ### §19. Appeal and Restitution — pp. 516–525 In popular trials, magisterial acts can be stopped through intercession. In permanent courts, intervention is mainly possible during the preliminary magisterial stage; once the president’s role is merged with that of the jury, the ordinary scope for such interference disappears. The court’s statutory foundation explains the absence of normal *provocatio* from its verdict. Antonius’ attempt to create popular appeal in cases of treason and violence is treated as an exceptional political innovation. Restoration is a different matter. The people can repeal outlawry or set aside the consequences of conviction through legislation, often in the setting of political reversals. Greenidge distinguishes this sovereign act from a court changing its own verdict, considers the governor’s possible pardoning authority, and ends with remission of declarations of public enmity and amnesty for acts not yet adjudicated. The amnesty following Caesar’s assassination illustrates how a purported settlement could fail to prevent subsequent prosecution. [Text, pp. 516–525](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/516/mode/2up). ## Appendix I. The Nexus and the Vindex — pp. 527–529 Greenidge explicitly calls his explanation of *nexum* conjectural. He rejects the automatic identification of contractual debt bondage with the *manus iniectio* applicable to judgment debts. His proposed distinction makes the nexus a person placed under another’s power through a transaction, rather than necessarily a debtor treated as already judicially condemned. He does not equate that condition simply with slavery. For the *vindex*, he separates three questions: what part the intervener plays, what he owes if unsuccessful, and whether intervention releases the original debtor. Unger’s objection is important: the vindex may materially protect another while formally conducting his own case, rather than acting as a later-style representative who assumes the debtor’s *litis contestatio*. Greenidge leaves unresolved how the double penalty relates to these possibilities. **Significance:** this appendix corrects any impression that the main text’s account of early enforcement is secure or internally inevitable. [Text, pp. 527–529](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/527/mode/2up). ## Appendix II. Commentaries on Cicero’s Speeches for Quinctius, Roscius the Actor, Tullius and Caecina — pp. 530–568 The appendix puts the civil system to work in four exceptionally difficult cases. Page 530 supplies a selected bibliography of earlier legal commentaries rather than a fifth substantive case. The individual studies reconstruct the dispute, identify the precise procedural issue, and assess the strength of Cicero’s reasoning. Greenidge regularly separates the client’s broader grievance from what the formula or interdict actually requires the court to decide. [Text, pp. 530–568](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/530/mode/2up). ### (1) Pro Quinctio — pp. 531–541 The background is a Gallic business partnership inherited by P. Quinctius and a deteriorating relationship with Naevius. Disputed arrangements to appear in court lead to a praetorian order permitting possession of Quinctius’ property. Representation by Alfenus, a demand for security, tribunician intervention, and Quinctius’ eventual personal appearance complicate the case. Cicero’s surviving speech concerns a preliminary wager about whether the property had been possessed for thirty days in accordance with the edict, rather than an uncomplicated trial of the partnership accounts. Greenidge tests the arguments separately: whether there was a debt, whether *vadimonium* had been broken, whether Quinctius was defended, whether violence in Gaul invalidated the relevant proceeding, and whether the required possession was continuous and sufficient. He is often critical of Cicero’s legal inferences. Some acts might support another remedy without defeating the particular writ; later representation does not prove that the original order was improperly issued. Quinctius may nevertheless have a strong equitable case, and Naevius’ subsequent conduct and delay may undermine his claim to the necessary continuous possession. **Qualification:** a possible route to victory is not evidence of an independently recorded verdict. [Text, pp. 531–541](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/531/mode/2up). ### (2) Pro Roscio Comoedo — pp. 542–551 The partnership concerns Panurgus, a slave trained by Roscius as an actor and then killed by Flavius. Claims for his enhanced value, Roscius’ private settlement, Fannius’ representative role, and earlier arbitral arrangements create a complicated accounting history. Greenidge marks uncertainties arising from the fragmentary speech and from the disputed numeral used to date it; the commonly accepted date in his account depends on an emendation. The immediate action is a *condictio certi* for a fixed sum, allegedly supported by a literal obligation. Greenidge therefore distinguishes the equitable merits of sharing partnership receipts from the existence and proof of the particular book-debt. An entry in rough *adversaria* is not equivalent to the formal ledger evidence that would establish the alleged obligation. The claim that Fannius independently recovered money from Flavius rests, in Cicero’s presentation, on weak hearsay. **Central finding:** Cicero’s strongest point is the failure to prove the precise literal obligation, not the claim that Roscius deserves a favourable settlement because he created Panurgus’ artistic value. The discussion is an unusually clear demonstration of the distance between persuasive narrative and the issue framed by an action. [Text, pp. 542–551](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/542/mode/2up). ### (3) Pro Tullio — pp. 551–556 A dispute over land near Thurii supplies the background, but the surviving action concerns damage inflicted by organized armed force. Greenidge reconstructs the projected property litigation and the violent intervention of Fabius’ household, then identifies the praetorian action with fourfold damages rather than treating the case as a direct decision of ownership. The legal argument turns on the formula’s language: *dolus malus*, responsibility for acts of the *familia*, and especially the refusal to insert *iniuria*. The defence seeks room for self-defence and justification; Cicero argues that the action was designed precisely to suppress this kind of organized violence. The unsuccessful approach to the tribunes shows that the dispute about the formula had already been raised before the trial. Greenidge distinguishes the new remedy from an ordinary Aquilian damage action and leaves the possibility of noxal surrender uncertain. [Text, pp. 551–556](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/551/mode/2up). ### (4) Pro Caecina — pp. 556–568 Greenidge calls this, with a possible exception for *Pro Balbo*, Cicero’s most juristic surviving speech. He reconstructs Caesennia’s property, Aebutius’ purchase in his own name, the subsequent inheritance, competing assertions of possession, and the frustrated attempt at formal ejection. Crucially, those facts can be given a different colour from the defence’s perspective; Cicero’s narrative is not treated as a neutral record. The case proceeds under the interdict concerning armed violence. The disputes are distinct: whether blocking entry constitutes *deiectio*; whether threats count as *vis*; whether the stronger interdict requires prior possession; whether Caecina actually possessed; and whether his Volaterran civic status permits the claimed inheritance. Greenidge examines arguments for requiring possession even though the ordinary defective-possession exception is absent. He also separates Caecina’s wish to play the ejected party from proof that he held possession. The closing discussion explains why an injury action or criminal prosecution would not supply the restitution sought. **Outcome limit:** Greenidge expressly states that there is no positive evidence that Cicero won. The client’s later gratitude cannot, by itself, establish the verdict. [Text, pp. 556–568](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/556/mode/2up). ## Appendix III. The Conditions of the Provocatio — pp. 569–572 This appendix contests Zumpt’s view that confession or manifest guilt removes the right of appeal and permits summary punishment by a magistrate. Greenidge tests the proposed exceptions against the Bacchanalian narrative, the imprisonment of Cornelius, the story of a manifest murder during the decemvirate, and Cato’s argument about the Catilinarian prisoners. His objections are specific. A compressed narrative may omit the procedural steps; an extraordinary commission does not establish ordinary practice; preventive imprisonment is not necessarily the execution of an appealable sentence; and “manifest” can affect punishment without eliminating trial. Cato’s argument belongs to the emergency treatment of supposed public enemies, not necessarily to the law of ordinary prosecution. Greenidge concludes that neither alleged exception has been established, while acknowledging that the evidence for confession is somewhat stronger. **Read with:** Book II §§2, 11, and 17. [Text, pp. 569–572](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/569/mode/2up). ## Appendix IV. On the Position of Pompeius as sole consul in 52 B.C. — pp. 573–574 Greenidge challenges Zumpt’s reconstruction that Pompeius was the only curule magistrate, was merely nominated by the interrex, and administered ordinary business through personal delegates. Examination of the known *quaesitores* proves only that one, Favonius, was not a praetor; it does not establish the absence of all praetors. The later assignments of Considius need not imply the chronology Zumpt proposes. He adds that Pompeius may have been elected by the people, that other elections could have followed, and that no source gives him dictatorial power on the proposed basis. Even a dictatorship would not, in itself, have abolished the other magistracies. **Significance:** the exceptional sole consulship should not be expanded into an unsupported reconstruction of total institutional replacement. [Text, pp. 573–574](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/573/mode/2up). ## Additional Notes — pp. 575–578 These are additions, alternative interpretations, and qualifications made during production of the book. They must be read as part of Greenidge’s final published argument. In particular, the notes on the oath, interdiction, and Milo’s trial modify how confidently several passages in the main text can be used. The following nine annotations preserve every entry listed in the supplied contents. [Text, pp. 575–578](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/575/mode/2up). ### Page 13, note 1 — additional note on p. 575 The Tarentine municipal fragment supplies another example of two methods for enforcing administrative obligations. For misuse of public money, the magistrate has the action and right of exaction; for unauthorized destruction of buildings, any eligible person wishing to act may pursue the penalty. The addition supports the introduction’s distinction between enforcement initiated by an official and enforcement entrusted to an individual, even within administrative law. [Text, p. 575](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/575/mode/2up). ### Page 58 — additional note on p. 575 Greenidge revises the interpretation of the reciprocal summons in the ritual cited from *Pro Murena*. He proposes that *unde* and *inde* carry a causal sense, while *ibi* supplies the location. The reply thus asserts a summons on the same ground on which the opponent has summoned the speaker, rather than describing all three terms as spatial directions. This is a philological adjustment to the reconstruction of the legal exchange. [Text, p. 575](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/575/mode/2up). ### Page 102 — additional note beginning on p. 575, continuing on p. 576 The Tarentine fragment also adds evidence for relatively early remodelling of particular municipal constitutions. If its proposed date shortly after the citizenship legislation of 90 BCE is correct, developed municipal institutions existed before Caesar’s later municipal enactment, at least in individual towns. Greenidge notes the magistracies, electoral assembly, and decurions mentioned by the text. **Explicit limit:** the fragment does not directly establish the town’s civil or criminal jurisdiction; it concerns enforcement of administrative provisions. The note therefore modifies chronology without proving comprehensive uniformity. [Text, pp. 575–576](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/575/mode/2up). ### Page 115, note 3 — additional note on p. 576 Greenidge adds an alternative to his interpretation of a Sicilian rule for selecting judges. The intended principle might have been that the judge shared the defendant’s nationality. He still prefers the inference that the unqualified reference to judges points to persons drawn from the *conventus*, because elsewhere the defendant-nationality rule is expressed more clearly. **Effect:** the main text’s proposed Roman composition should be treated as an inference with an acknowledged alternative. [Text, p. 576](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/576/mode/2up). ### Page 262, note 4 — additional note on p. 576 Strachan-Davidson suggests that Quintilian’s language about relieving the judge of his burden refers to an extraordinary imperial judge, not the ordinary private *iudex*. If so, the passage supplies no direct evidence for ordinary Ciceronian procedure. Greenidge discusses whether the principle might nevertheless extend more broadly, but concludes that the centumviral anecdote on pp. 262–263 is the remaining specific basis for an inference about the oath in ordinary adjudication. **Effect:** this note substantially reduces the direct evidential support for the main chapter’s reconstruction. [Text, p. 576](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/576/mode/2up). ### Page 319, note 2 — additional note on p. 577 Greenidge records Mommsen’s interpretation of *improbe factum* in the third Valerian law. On that interpretation, violation of the protection of appeal strips the act of its official character: the magistrate is treated as an ordinary offender, potentially guilty of murder, rather than merely answerable for a political misuse of office. This is presented as an alternative explanation of the sanction, with references to Mommsen’s *Strafrecht*, not as newly discovered statutory wording. [Text, p. 577](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/577/mode/2up). ### Page 356, note 3 — additional note on p. 577 Mommsen’s suggestion that the lot determined which duumvir pronounced sentence, rather than who became duumvir, would simplify the reconstruction of Rabirius’ trial. But it makes Metellus Celer an unlikely nominating praetor: Greenidge reasons that a man opposed to the proceedings would hardly have directly appointed Caesar, their instigator. **Effect:** appointment, sortition, and pronouncement are distinct operations; the evidence does not securely fix their combination. [Text, p. 577](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/577/mode/2up). ### Page 363 — additional note on p. 577, identifying line 21 Greenidge corrects the potentially misleading description of an annual tribunician “bill.” Cicero calls the annual declaration an edict. Greenidge argues that two situations must be distinguished: when a permanent court’s conviction already carries interdiction, an official need only declare the persons affected; where no such popular or statutory interdiction exists, some formal resolution of the plebs seems necessary. His governing distinction is that a magistrate may **declare** interdiction but cannot, on his own authority, **create** it. **Effect:** the note qualifies repeated statements in the main text, not just the single passage named in the contents. [Text, p. 577](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/577/mode/2up). ### Page 395 — additional note on p. 578 The five-day reconstruction of Milo’s trial rests on the dates April 4–8 and a particular interpretation of Asconius’ account of inspecting lots and selecting the jury. Greenidge acknowledges that the narrative appears to describe only four days and that its relation to Plancus’ public meeting creates difficulty. He suggests the possibility of an omitted interval and observes that such an interval would have helped advocates prepare arguments from the evidence. **Effect:** both the timetable and the proposed practical explanation remain conditional; the note directs readers to A. C. Clark’s discussion. [Text, p. 578](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/578/mode/2up). ## Index of Subjects — begins p. 579; extends through p. 591 The index is a substantive finding aid to the book’s dispersed arguments, with entries for institutions, procedural acts, statutes, sanctions, evidence, and legal terms. It distinguishes references to the main page from those to a note. Entries such as *Actio*, *Iudicium*, *Lex*, *Intercessio*, and *Vadimonium* gather discussions that are split between historical exposition, the Ciceronian system, and the speech appendices. English entries also redirect readers to the operative Latin terminology, as with account-books and bail. **Use:** consult it when a speech presents one technical word whose full significance cannot be recovered from a single chapter. Its inclusion of late additional-note references helps prevent reliance on the unrevised argument alone. It is an index to Greenidge’s discussion, not an independent dictionary of Roman law. [Text, pp. 579–591](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/579/mode/2up). ## Index to Passages in Cicero — begins p. 592; extends through p. 599 This reverse index maps Ciceronian loci to the pages where Greenidge cites or discusses them. It groups material by works, including rhetorical writings, speeches, and correspondence; the same passage can lead to several locations. The preface explains that the extensive citation of difficult passages was planned with this index in view. **Use:** begin here when reading a particular Ciceronian passage, then consult the connected procedural chapter and, for the four civil speeches, the relevant appendix. The index also makes visible how widely the book draws on incidental remarks outside forensic speeches. **Limit:** being indexed means that a passage is cited or discussed; it does not certify that it directly proves the institution for which Greenidge uses it. [Text, pp. 592–599](https://archive.org/details/legalprocedureof00greeuoft/page/592/mode/2up). ## Reading the whole volume critically The volume is most useful when its institutional chapters and case commentaries are read together. The civil book supplies the significance of formulae, possession, representation, and security; the appendices show that identifying the correct legal category does not resolve disputed facts or remove the ambiguities of an advocate’s account. The criminal book supplies the sequence and authority of proceedings; it also explains why a speech’s emotional appeals, treatment of testimony, and references to previous hearings belong to a specific trial structure. Several controls are especially important when citing it: - **Continuity is an argument.** Gaius and imperial jurists can illuminate Republican procedure, but their later date remains visible. The note on the oath shows Greenidge reconsidering precisely this issue. - **A procedural permission is not a factual judgment.** A granted formula, interdict, or initial possession order does not necessarily establish the truth of the applicant’s allegations. - **Do not merge remedies.** Ownership, possession, compensation, punishment, and restoration after condemnation can require different proceedings. - **Do not merge forms of authority.** A praetor, private judge, criminal jury, popular assembly, provincial governor, household head, and pontifical college do not act on the same constitutional basis. - **Do not turn a speech into a verdict.** Reconstructed winning arguments and a client’s subsequent gratitude are not independent evidence of the court’s decision. - **Read the additional notes with the chapters.** They qualify municipal chronology, Sicilian jury composition, oath evidence, appeal sanctions, duumviral selection, interdiction, and Milo’s trial timetable. ## Coverage and verification statement The guide supplies **78 annotated contents entries**, counting the structural headings as well as all numbered and lettered entries: Introduction (1); Book I and its two parts (3); Part I entries (7); Part II entries (27); Book II and its sections (20); appendices and their four speech subdivisions (8); Additional Notes and their nine individual entries (10); and the two indexes (2). The source’s main numbered sequence ends at p. 599. The blank p. 526, imprint material, and publisher’s advertisements are not unannotated contents entries. The preface is discussed separately above because it explains the method, although it is not an item on the supplied contents pages. Verification establishes coverage of the listed items and source support for the summarized content. It does **not** establish that every historical conclusion in Greenidge is correct, that every ancient citation has been independently checked, or that his 1901 reconstructions remain accepted today.