Caesar World · 凯撒世界

Alexandrian War · 亚历山大里亚战记

Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Continuation in the Caesarian corpus. The author is uncertain; this reader does not assign the work securely to Caesar or Hirtius.

Chapter alignment only; no sentence or word correspondence asserted.

No sentence-level or word-level alignment is asserted.

Open interactive reader

Edition attribution and source XML

Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University; [Pseudo-]Caesar: Alexandrian, African and Spanish Wars. Way, A. G., editor. William Heinemann Ltd.: London; Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, 1955 (printing). · Original XML · CC BY-SA 4.0

Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University; [Pseudo-]Caesar: Alexandrian, African and Spanish Wars. Way, A. G., translator. William Heinemann Ltd.: London; Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, 1955 (printing). · Original XML · CC BY-SA 4.0

1 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:1

Bello Alexandrino conflato Caesar Rhodo atque ex Syria Ciliciaque omnem classem arcessit; Creta sagittarios, equites ab rege Nabataeorum Malcho evocat; tormenta undique conquiri et frumentum mitti, auxilia adduci iubet. Interim munitiones cotidie operibus augentur atque omnes oppidi partes, quae minus esse firmae videntur, testudinibus ac musculis aptantur; ex aedificiis autem per foramina in proxima aedificia arietes immittuntur, quantumque aut ruinis deicitur aut per vim recipitur loci, in tantum munitiones proferuntur. Nam incendio fere tuta est Alexandrea, quod sine contignatione ac materia sunt aedificia et structuris ac fornicibus continentur tectaque sunt rudere aut pavimentis. Caesar maxime studebat ut, quam angustissimam partem oppidi palus a meridie interiecta efficiebat, hanc operibus vineisque agendis ab reliqua parte urbis excluderet, illud spectans primum ut, cum in duas partis esset urbis divisa acies, uno consilio atque imperio administraretur, deinde ut laborantibus succurri atque ex altera oppidi parte auxilium ferri posset, in primis vero ut aqua pabuloque abundaret, quarum alterius rei copiam exiguam, alterius nullam omnino facultatem habebat; quod utrumque large palus praebere poterat.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:1

WHEN the Alexandrian war flared up, Caesar summoned every fleet from Rhodes and Syria and Cilicia: from Crete he raised archers, and cavalry from Malchus, king of the Nabataeans, and ordered artillery to be procured, corn despatched, and auxiliary troops mustered from every quarter. Meanwhile the entrenchments were daily extended by additional works, and all those sectors of the town which appeared to be not strong enough were provided with shelters and mantlets; battering-rams, moreover, were introduced from one building into the next through holes, and the entrenchments were extended to cover all the ground laid bare by demolitions or gained by force of arms. For Alexandria is well-nigh fire-proof, because its buildings contain no wooden joinery and are held together by an arched construction and are roofed with rough-cast or tiling. Caesar was particularly anxious that, by bringing to bear his siege-works and pent-houses, he should isolate from the rest of the city that narrowest part of the town which was most constricted by the barrier of marshland lying to the south: his object being first that, since his army was divided between two sectors of the city, it should be controlled by a single strategy and command secondly, that if they got into difficulties in one sector of the town, assistance and support could be brought from the other sector. But above all his object was to secure himself abundance of water and fodder: of which, as regards the former, he had but a scanty supply, and, as regards the latter, no stocks whatever and the marshland could afford him bountiful supplies of both.

2 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:2

Neque vero Alexandrinis in gerendis negotiis cunctatio ulla aut mora inferebatur. Nam in omnis partis, per quas fines Aegypti regnumque pertinet, legatos conquisitoresque dilectus habendi causa miserant magnumque numerum in oppidum telorum atque tormentorum convexerant et innumerabilem multitudinem adduxerant. Nec minus in urbe maximae armorum erant institutae officinae. Servos praeterea puberes armaverant; quibus domini locupletiores victum cotidianum stipendiumque praebebant. Hae multitudine disposita munitiones semotarum partium tuebantur; veteranas cohortis vacuas in celeberrimis urbis locis habebant, ut quacumque regione pugnaretur integris viribus ad auxilium ferendum opponi possent. Omnibus viis atque angiportis triplicem vallum obduxerant—erat autem quadrato exstructus saxo neque minus XL pedes altitudinis habebat—quaeque partes urbis inferiores erant, has altissimis turribus denorum tabulatorum munierant. Praeterea alias ambulatorias totidem tabulatorum confixerant subiectisque eas rotis funibus iumentisque obiectis deiectis plateis in quamcumque erat visum partem movebant.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:2

Not indeed that this occasioned any hesitation or delay on the part of the Alexandrians in concerting their measures. They had in fact despatched emissaries and recruiting officers throughout the entire length and breadth of the territory and kingdom of Egypt for the purpose of holding a levy, and had conveyed into the town a large quantity of weapons and artillery and mustered a countless host. In the city too, no less, vast arms factories had been established. They had, moreover, armed the adult slaves, and these the wealthier owners furnished with their daily food and pay. This numerous force they deployed to guard the fortifications of outlying areas; while they kept their veteran cohorts unemployed in the most frequented quarters of the city so that, no matter in what district fighting occurred, they could be thrown in as fresh and lusty reinforcements. All the streets and alleys were walled off by a triple barricade, built of rectangular stone blocks and not less than forty feet high while as for the lower quarters of the city, these were fortified with very lofty towers, each ten stories high. Besides these there were other towers which they had contrived—mobile ones of the like number of stories: and these, being mounted on wheels with ropes and drought animals attached, they moved along the level streets to any area they saw fit.

3 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:3

Urbs fertilissima et copiosissima omnium rerum apparatus suggerebat. Ipsi homines ingeniosi atque acutissimi quae a nobis fieri viderant ea sollertia efficiebant ut nostri illorum opera imitati viderentur, et sua sponte multa reperiebant unoque tempore et nostras munitiones infestabant et suas defendebant. Atque haec principes in consiliis contionibusque agitabant: populum Romanum paulatim in consuetudinem eius regni occupandi venire. Paucis annis ante A. Gabinium cum exercitu fuisse in Aegypto; Pompeium se ex fuga eodem recepisse; Caesarem venisse cum copiis, neque morte Pompei quicquam profectum quo minus apud se Caesar commoraretur. Quem si non expulissent, futuram ex regno provinciam: idque agendum mature: namque eum interclusum tempestatibus propter anni tempus recipere transmarina auxilia non posse.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:3

Highly productive and abundantly supplied as it was, the city furnished equipment of all kinds. The people themselves were clever and very shrewd, and no sooner had they seen what was being done by us than they would reproduce it with such cunning that it seemed it was our men who had copied their works. Much also they invented on their own account, and kept assailing our entrenchments while simultaneously defending their own. In their councils and public meetings the arguments which their leaders kept driving home were as follows: the Roman people were gradually acquiring a habit of seizing that kingdom; a few years earlier Aulus Gabinius had been in Egypt with an army; Pompeius too had resorted thither in his flight Caesar had now come with his forces, and the death of Pompeius had had no effect in dissuading Caesar from staying on among them. If they failed to drive him out, their kingdom would become a Roman province: and this driving out they must do betimes for cut off as he now was by storms owing to the season of the year, he could not receive reinforcements from overseas.

4 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:4

Interim dissensione orta inter Achillan, qui veterano exercitui praeerat, et Arsinoen, regis Ptolomaei minorem filiam, ut supra demonstratum est, cum uterque utrique insidiaretur et summam imperi ipse obtinere vellet, praeoccupat Arsinoe per Ganymeden eunuchum, nutricium suum, atque Achillan interficit. Hoc occiso sine ullo socio et custode ipsa omne imperium obtinebat: exercitus Ganymedi traditur. Is suscepto officio largitionem in militem auget; reliqua pari diligentia administrat.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:4

Meanwhile a quarrel had arisen—as related above—between Achillas, who commanded the veteran army, and Arsinoe, the younger daughter of king Ptolemaeus and with each party plotting against the other and anxious to obtain the supreme power for himself, Arsinoe, acting through the eunuch Ganymedes, her tutor, struck the first blow and killed Achillas. After his murder she herself exercised complete control without any consort or guardian, while the army was entrusted to Ganymedes. On undertaking this duty the latter increased the soldiers’ bounty and performed the rest of his functions with consistent thoroughness.

5 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:5

Alexandria est fere tota suffossa specusque habet a Nilo pertinentia, quibus aqua in privatas domos inducitur, quae paulatim spatio temporis liquescit ac subsidit. Hac uti domini aedificiorum atque eorum familiae consuerunt: nam quae flumine Nilo fertur adeo est limosa ac turbida ut multos variosque morbos efficiat sed ea plebes ac multitudo contenta est necessario, quod fons urbe tota nullus est. Hoc tamen flumen in ea parte erat urbis quae ab Alexandrinis tenebatur. Quo facto est admonitus Ganymedes posse nostros aqua intercludi; qui distributi munitionum tuendarum causa vicatim ex privatis aedificiis specubus ac puteis extracta aqua utebantur.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:5

Practically the whole of Alexandria is undermined with subterranean conduits running from the Nile, by which water is conducted into private houses which Mater in course of time gradually settles down and becomes clear. This is what is normally used by the owners of mansions and their households for what the Nile brings down is so muddy and turbid that it gives rise to many different diseases: yet the rank and file of the common sort are perforce content with the latter, inasmuch as there is not one natural spring in the whole city. The main stream in question, however, was in that quarter of the city which was held by the Alexandrians. This circumstance suggested to Ganymedes the possibility that the water supply could be cut off from our troops; who, posted as they were in various quarters of the town to guard our entrenchments, were using water drawn from conduits and cisterns in private buildings.

6 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:6

Hoc probato consilio magnum ac difficile opus aggreditur. Intersaeptis enim specubus atque omnibus urbis partibus exclusis quae ab ipso tenebantur, aquae magnam vim ex mari rotis ac machinationibus exprimere contendit: hanc locis superioribus fundere in partem Caesaris non intermittebat. Quam ob causam salsior paulo praeter consuetudinem aqua trahebatur ex proximis aedificiis magnamque hominibus admirationem praebebat, quam ob rem id accidisset: nec satis sibi ipsi credebant, eum se inferiores eiusdem generis ac saporis aqua dicerent uti atque ante consuessent, vulgoque inter se conferebant et degustando quantum inter se differrent aquae cognoscebant. Parvo vero temporis spatio haec propior bibi omnino non poterat, illa inferior corruptior iam salsiorque reperiebatur.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:6

This plan being once approved, Ganymedes embarked upon a serious and difficult task. Having first blocked up the conduits and sealed off all quarters of the city occupied by himself, he then made haste to draw off a vast quantity of water out of the sea by means of mechanical water-wheels; and this he steadily poured from higher ground into Caesar’s area. For which reason the water drawn from the nearest buildings was a little more brackish than usual, and occasioned no little wonder among men as to why this had come about. Nor could they quite believe the evidence of their own ears when their neighbours lower down said that the water they were using was of the same kind and taste as they had previously been accustomed to; and they were openly discussing the matter amongst themselves and, by tasting samples, learning how markedly the waters differed. However, in a short space of time the water nearer the contamination was entirely undrinkable, while that lower down was found to be relatively impure and brackish.

7 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:7

Quo facto dubitatione sublata tantus incessit timor ut ad extremum periculi omnes deducti viderentur atque alii morari Caesarem dicerent quin navis conscendere iuberet, alii multo gravius extimescerent, quod neque celari Alexandrini possent in apparanda fuga, cum tam parvo spatio distarent ab ipsis, neque illis imminentibus atque insequentibus ullus in navis receptus daretur. Erat autem magna multitudo oppidanorum in parte Caesaris, quam domiciliis ipsorum non moverat, quod ea se fidelem palam nostris esse simulabat et descivisse a suis videbatur: at mihi si defendendi essent Alexandrini neque fallaces esse neque temerarii, multa oratio frustra absumeretur; cum vero uno tempore et natio eorum et natura cognoscatur, aptissimum esse hoc genus ad proditionem dubitare nemo potest.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:7

This circumstance dispelled their doubts, and so great was the panic that took hold upon them that it seemed that they were all reduced to a most hazardous plight, and some asserted that Caesar was being slow in giving orders to embark. Others were much more seriously alarmed, on the ground that, in making their preparations for a withdrawal, it was impossible to keep the Alexandrians in the dark, being as they were so short a distance away from them; and with their foes on top of them and pursuing them, no chance was afforded them of retreating to their ships. There was, however, a large number of townsfolk in Caesar’s sector, whom Caesar had not evacuated from their homes, because they openly affected loyalty to our side and appeared to have deserted their own folk. Yet, as far as I am concerned, had I now the task of championing the Alexandrians and proving them to be neither deceitful nor foolhardy, it would be a case of many words spent to no purpose: indeed when one gets to know both the breed and its breeding there can be no doubt whatever that as a race they are extremely prone to treachery.

8 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:8

Caesar suorum timorem consolatione et ratione minuebat. Nam puteis fossis aquam dulcem reperiri posse adfirmabat: omnia enim litora naturaliter aquae dulcis venas habere. Quod si alia esset litoris Aegypti natura atque omnium reliquorum, tamen, quoniam mare libere tenerent, neque hostes classem haberent, prohiberi sese non posse quo minus cotidie navibus aquam peterent vel a sinistra parte a Paratonio vel a dextra ab insula, quae diversae navigationes numquam uno tempore adversis ventis praecluderentur. Fugae vero nullum esse consilium non solum eis qui primam dignitatem haberent, sed ne eis quidem qui nihil praeterquam de vita cogitarent. Magno negotio impetus hostium adversos ex munitionibus sustinere: quibus relictis nec loco nec numero pares esse posse. Magnam autem moram et difficultatem ascensum in navis habere, praesertim ex scaphis summam esse contra in Alexandrinis velocitatem locorumque et aedificiorum notitiam. Hos praecipue in victoria insolentis praecursuros et loca excelsiora atque aedificia occupaturos: ita fuga navibusque nostros prohibituros. Proinde eius consili obliviscerentur atque omni ratione esse vincendum cogitarent.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:8

By encouragement and reasoning Caesar allayed his men’s alarm, declaring that sweet water could be found in wells and trenches, inasmuch as all seashores naturally possessed veins of sweet water. But if the nature of the sea-shore of Egypt was different from all others, none the less, since they held unfettered command of the sea, while their enemies had no fleet, they could not be prevented from seeking water daily in their ships, either from Paratonium on their left, or the island on their right—voyages which, being in opposite directions, would never be prevented by contrary winds at one and the same time. As for retreating, there was no sound policy in that, not merely for those who held the chief responsibility, but not even for those whose sole concern was for their own lives. They were hard put to it to contain the enemies’ frontal attacks from their entrenchments: once abandon those and they could be no match for them either in vantage ground or numbers. Moreover, boarding ships, especially from pinnaces, involved considerable delay and difficulty; while set against this the Alexandrians had the greatest mobility and knowledge of the ground and buildings. These people above all, overweening as they became in victory, would dash ahead and seize the higher ground and the buildings and thus prevent our men from retreating and gaining their ships. Accordingly, they should put that policy out of their minds and reflect that, at all costs, they must win the day.

9 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:9

Hae oratione apud suos habita atque omnium mentibus excitatis dat centurionibus negotium ut reliquis operibus intermissis ad fodiendos puteos animum conferant neve quam partem nocturni temporis intermittant. Quo suscepto negotio atque omnium animis ad laborem incitatis magna una nocte vis aquae dulcis inventa est. Ita operosis Alexandrinorum machinationibus maximisque conatibus non longi temporis labore occursum est. Eo biduo legio XXXVII. ex dediticiis Pompeianis militibus cum frumento, armis, telis, tormentis imposita in navis a Domitio Calvino ad litora Africae paulo supra Alexandream delata est. Hae naves Euro, qui multos dies continenter flabat, portum capere prohibebantur; sed loca sunt egregia omni illa regione ad tenendas ancoras. Hi cum diu retinerentur atque aquae inopia premerentur, navigio actuario Caesarem faciunt certiorem.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:9

Having harangued his men to this effect and put fresh heart into them all, he briefed his centurions as follows: they Mere to interrupt their other tasks and turn their attention to digging wells, continuing without any cessation all through the night. Whereupon, the business being once undertaken with unanimous enthusiasm for the task, in the course of that one night a great quantity of sweet water was discovered. Tims the laborious machinations and supreme efforts of the Alexandrians were countered by a few hours’ work. In the course of the following day the Thirty-Seventh legion, part of the surrendered remnants of Pompeius’ troops, after being embarked by Domitius Calvinus with corn, arms, weapons and artillery, made the coast of Africa a little beyond Alexandria. An East wind, which blew continuously for many days, prevented this Meet from gaining harbour; but the ground throughout all that area gives excellent hold for anchors. And as they were weather-bound for a long time, and hard put to it for lack of water, they informed Caesar by means of a fast boat.

10 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:10

Caesar, ut per se consilium caperet quid faciendum videretur, navem conscendit atque omnem classem se sequi iussit nullis nostris militibus impositis, quod, cum longius paulo discederet, munitiones nudare nolebat. Cumque ad eum locum accessissent, qui appellatur Chersonensus, aquandique causa remiges in terram exposuissent, non nulli ex eo numero, cum longius a navibus praedatum processissent, ab equitibus hostium sunt excepti. Ex his cognoverunt Caesarem ipsum in classe venisse nec ullos milites in navibus habere. Qua re comperta magnam sibi facultatem fortunam obtulisse bene gerendae rei crediderunt. Itaque navis omnis quas paratas habuerant ad navigandum propugnatoribus instruxerunt Caesarique redeunti eum classe occurrerunt. Qui duabus de causis eo die dimicare nolebat, quod et nullos milites in navibus habebat et post horam X. diei res agebatur, nox autem allatura videbatur maiorem fiduciam illis, qui locorum notitia confidebant; sibi etiam hortandi suos auxilium defuturum, quod nulla satis idonea esset hortatio quae neque virtutem posset notare neque inertiam. Quibus de causis navis quas potuit Caesar ad terram detrahit, quem in locum illos successuros non existimabam

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:10

In order to take some personal decision as to what he thought ought to be done, Caesar boarded a ship and ordered his whole fleet to follow him. He did not embark any of our troops, since, as he was going somewhat too far afield, he was loth to leave our entrenchments unmanned. On their arriving at that place which is called Chersonensus, and putting the rowers ashore to fetch water, some of their number, bent on plunder, advanced rather too far from the ships and were picked up by enemy cavalry. From them the enemy learned that Caesar himself had arrived with his fleet, without any troops on board. This intelligence prompted the belief among them that fortune had put in their way a great opportunity for scoring a success. Accordingly, they manned with combat troops all the ships they had got in readiness for sailing, and encountered Caesar as he was returning with his fleet. Now there were two reasons why Caesar was loth to fight an action that day: he had no troops on board; and it was now after the tenth hour as the matter now stood, and on the other hand nightfall would, he thought, inspire greater confidence in the enemy, who were relying on their local knowledge. In his own case, also, he would be denied the advantage of encouraging his men, since no encouragement was quite to the point where it was impossible to single out for comment either bravery or slackness. For these reasons Caesar withdrew to land what ships he could, at a point where he supposed that the enemy would not follow them.

11 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:11

Erat una navis Rhodia in dextro Caesaris cornu longe ab reliquis collocata. Hanc conspicati hostes non tenuerunt sese, magnoque impetu IIII ad eam constratae naves et complures apertae contenderunt. Cui coactus est Caesar ferre subsidium, ne turpem in conspectu hostium contumeliam acciperet, quamquam, si quid gravius illis accidisset, merito casurum iudicabat. Proelium commissum est magna contentione Rhodiorum; qui cum in omnibus dimicationibus et scientia et virtute praestitissent, tum maxime illo tempore totum onus sustinere non recusabant, ne quod suorum culpa detrimentum acceptum videretur. Ita proelium secundissimum est factum. Capta est una hostium quadriremis, depressa est altera, duae omnibus epibatis nudatae magna praeterea multitudo in reliquis navibus propugnatorum est interfecta. Quod uisi nox proelium diremisset, tota classe hostium Caesar potitus esset. Hac calamitate perterritis hostibus adverso vento leniter flante navis onerarias Caesar remulco victricibus suis navibus Alexandrini, deducit.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:11

There was one Rhodian ship on Caesar’s right wing stationed far apart from the rest. As soon as the enemy caught sight of it they could not restrain themselves, and four decked ships and several open ones dashed madly towards it. This vessel Caesar was obliged to succour, to prevent the disgrace of sustaining rough treatment in full view of the enemy; though, if any serious mischance should overtake its crew, he reckoned they would deserve it. Battle was joined, with hard fighting on the part of the Rhodians and though in every fray they had excelled both in seamanship and valour, on this present occasion above all they bore the whole brunt unflinchingly, lest it should seem their fault if any defeat were sustained. And so a highly successful action was fought. One enemy quadrireme was captured, a second was sunk, and two stripped of all their marines in addition, a large number of combat troops was killed aboard the other vessels. If night had not put an end to the action, Caesar would have become master of the entire enemy fleet. This catastrophe utterly demoralised the enemy, and Caesar returned to Alexandria with his victorious fleet, towing the merchant-ships against a gentle head wind.

12 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:12

Eo detrimento adeo sunt fracti Alexandrini, cum iam non virtute propugnatorum, sed scientia classiariorum se victos viderent, ut vix ex aedificiis defendi posse se comederent, quibus et superioribus locis sublevabantur, et materiam cunctam obicerent, quod nostrae classis oppugnationem etiam ad terram verebantur. Idem, postea quam Ganymedes in concilio confirmavit sese et eas quae essent amissae restituturum et numerum adaucturum, magna spe et fiducia veteres reficere navis accuratiusque huic rei studere atque inservire instituerunt. Ac tametsi amplius CX navibus longis in portu navalibusque amiserant, non tamen reparandae classis cogitationem deposuerunt. Videbant enim non auxilia Caesari, non commeatus supportari posse, si classe ipsi valerent; praeterea nautici homines urbis et regionis maritimae cotidianoque usu a pueris exercitati ad naturale ac domesticum bonum refugere cupiebant et quantum parvulis navigiis profecissent sentiebant; itaque omni studio ad parandam classem incubuerunt.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:12

So shattered were the Alexandrians by this reverse—for they saw that now it was not the bravery of combat troops but the seamanship of sailors that had caused their defeat—that they scarcely trusted their ability to defend themselves from the buildings, from which, as well as from their higher positions, they derived support, and used all their timber in building barricades, fearing as they did that our fleet would attack them even ashore. Nevertheless, after Ganymedes had declared in the council that he would not only make good the losses they had sustained but also increase the number of their ships, their hopes and confidence ran high and they began to repair their old ships and to devote greater care and more earnest attention to this matter. And though they had lost more than a hundred and ten warships in the harbour and docks, yet they did not abandon the idea of re-equipping their fleet. They saw in fact that neither troop reinforcements nor supplies could be conveyed to Caesar if they themselves had a strong fleet apart from which, the men of the city and the coastal district, seamen as they were and trained as such from boyhood by daily practice, were anxious to resort to this their natural and native gift, and were aware how successful they had been with their humble little vessels. Consequently they threw themselves whole-heartedly into the task of equipping a fleet.

13 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:13

Erant omnibus ostiis Nili custodiae exigendi portorii causa dispositae naves veteres erant in occultis regiae navalibus, quibus multis annis ad navigandum non erant usi: has reficiebant, illas Alexandream revocabant. Deerant remi: porticus, gymnasia, publica aedificia detegebant, asseres remorum usum obtinebant; aliud naturalis sollertia, aliud urbis copia sumministrabat. Postremo non longam navigationem parabant, sed praesentis temporis necessitati serviebant et in ipso portu confligendum videbant. Itaque paucis diebus contra omnium opinionem quadriremis XXII, quinqueremis V confecerunt; ad has minores apertasque compluris adiecerunt et in portu periclitati remigio quid quaeque earum efficere posset idoneos milites imposuerunt seque ad confligendum omnibus rebus paraverunt. Caesar Rhodias navis VIIII habebat—nam decem missis una in cursu litore Aegyptio defecerat—, Ponticas VIII, Lycias V, ex Asia XII. Ex his erant quinqueremes et quadriremes decem, reliquae infra hanc magnitudinem et pleraeque apertae. Tamen virtute militum confisus cognitis hostium copiis se ad dimicandum parabat.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:13

There were guardships posted at all the mouths of the Nile to levy customs dues, and in secret royal dockyards there were old ships which had not seen service afloat for many years. These last they proceeded to repair, while the guardships they recalled to Alexandria. There was a shortage of oars: the roofs of colonnades, gymnasia and public buildings were dismantled, and their beams made to serve as oars. In one ease it was natural ingenuity that helped to bridge the gap, in another the city’s resources. In fine it was no lengthy voyaging for which they were preparing; but perceiving that the conflict must take place in the harbour itself they obeyed the dictates of the moment. In a few days, therefore, they surprised everyone by completing 22 quadriremes and 5 quinqueremes, to which they added a considerable number of smaller, open craft; and then, after trying out in the harbour by rowing what each of them could do, they manned them with suitable troops and prepared themselves at all points for the conflict. Caesar had 9 Rhodian ships (10 had been sent, but one had been lost during a voyage, on the coast of Egypt), 8 Pontic, 5 Lycian and 12 from Asia. These included 10 quinqueremes and quadriremes, while the rest were smaller craft and most of them un-decked. None the less, though informed of the enemies’ forces. Caesar proceeded with his preparations for an action, confident in the valour of his troops.

14 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:14

Postquam eo ventum est ut sibi uterque eorum confideret, Caesar Pharon classe circumvehitur adversasque navis hostibus constituit: in dextro cornu Rhodias collocat, in sinistro Ponticas. Inter has spatium CCCC passuum relinquit, quod satis esse ad explicandas navis videbatur. Post hunc ordinem reliquas navis subsidio distribuit quae quamque earum sequatur et cui subveniat constituit atque imperat. Non dubitanter Alexandrini classem producunt atque instruunt: in fronte collocant XXII, reliquas subsidiarias in secundo ordine constituunt. Magnum praeterea numerum minorum navigiorum et scapharum producunt eum malleolis ignibusque, si quid ipsa multitudo et clamor et flamma nostris terroris adferre possent. Erant inter duas classis vada transitu angusto, quae pertinent ad regionem Africae—sic enim praedicant, partem esse Alexandreae dimidiam Africae—satisque diu inter ipsos est exspectatum ab utris transeundi fieret initium, propterea quod ei qui intrassent et ad explicandam classem et ad receptum, si durior accidisset casus, impeditiores fore videbantur.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:14

Now that the stage was reached when each side was self-confident, Caesar sailed round Pharos with his fleet and drew up his ships facing the enemy. On his right wing he posted the Rhodian ships, on his left the Pontic ones, leaving a gap of 400 paces between them—a distance which he regarded as adequate for deploying his vessels. Behind this line he arranged his remaining ships in reserve, deciding which should follow each of the former vessels and which ship each should support, and giving orders accordingly. Nor were the Alexandrians hesitant to bring up and array their fleet; posting 22 ships in front, and the remainder in a second line in reserve. Besides these they brought up a large number of smaller craft and pinnaces, equipped with incendiary missiles and combustibles, in the hope that sheer numbers and the shouts and flames might have some effect in intimidating our men. Between the two fleets lay shoals with a narrow intersecting channel (these shoals belong to the region of Africa—in fact they say that half Alexandria is part of Africa); and for quite a long time there was a pause among the actual combatants as they waited to see which side was to begin the passage, inasmuch as it seemed that those who once entered the channel would be more restricted both in deploying their fleet and, if things fared badly, in withdrawing.

15 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:15

Rhodiis navibus praeerat Euphranor, animi magnitudine ae virtute magis cum nostris hominibus quam cum Graecis comparandus. Hic ob novissimam scientiam atque animi magnitudinem delectus est ab Rhodiis qui imperium classis obtineret. Qui ubi cessare Caesarem animum advertit, Videris milli, inquit, Caesar, vereri, si haec vada primis navibus intrans, ne prius dimicare cogaris quam reliquam classem potueris explicare. Nobis rem committe: nos proelium sustinebimus—neque tuum iudicium fallemus—dum reliqui subsequantur. Hos quidem diutius in nostro conspectu gloriari magno nobis et dedecori et dolori est. Caesar illum adhortatus atque omnibus laudibus prosecutus dat signum pugnae. Progressas ultra vadum IIII Rhodias navis circumsistunt Alexandrini atque in eas impetum faciunt. Sustinent illi atque arte sollertiaque se explicant; ac tantum doctrina potuit ut in dispari numero nulla transversa hosti obiceretur, nullius remi detergerentur, sed semper venientibus adversae occurrerent. Interim sunt reliquae subsecutae. Tum necessario discessum ab arte est propter angustias loci, atque omne certamen in virtute constitit. Neque vero Alexandreae fuit quisquam aut nostrorum aut oppidanorum, qui aut in opere aut in pugna occupatum animum haberent, quin altissima tecta peteret atque ex omni prospectu locum spectaculo caperet precibusque et votis victoriam suis ab dis immortalibus exposceret.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:15

The commander of the Rhodian squadron was Euphranor, a man who in point of personality and bravery deserved comparison with our people rather than with the Greeks. Thanks to the great fame which his professional skill and forceful personality enjoyed, the Rhodians chose him to command their fleet. When he perceived Caesar’s hesitation, he said: It seems to me, Caesar, that you are afraid that, if you once sail into these shoals with your leading flotilla, you may be forced to fight before you can deploy the rest of your fleet. Leave it to us: we shall bear the brunt of the fighting—we won’t let you down—until the others can come up with us. Certainly for these fellows to go on boasting yonder in our sight is a sore disgrace and mortification to us. Caesar offered him encouragement and paid him every tribute of praise, and then gave the signal for battle. Four Rhodian ships advanced beyond the shoals to be at once surrounded and attacked by the Alexandrians. The Rhodians bore up and by skill and dexterity deployed their line; and of such powerful effect was their training that despite the odds not one of them exposed its broadside to the enemy, not one had its oars swept away, but they always met the oncoming foe head-on. Meanwhile the remaining ships came up with them. Then through lack of sea room skill had perforce to be sacrificed and the whole struggle devolved on courage. And indeed there was not one man in Alexandria, either of our troops or of the townsfolk, whose attention was bespoken with either work or fighting, but he made for the loftiest roof-tops and from out of all the vantage points chose one from which to view that spectacle, and besought the immortal gods with prayers and vows to grant victory to his side.

16 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:16

Minime autem par erat prodi certamen. Nostris enim pulsis neque terra neque mari effugium dabatur victis, omniaque victoribus erant futura in incerto; cum illi, si superassent navibus, omnia tenerent, si inferiores fuissent, reliquam tamen fortunam periclitarentur. Simul illud grave ac miserum videbatur, perpaucos de summa rerum ae de salute omnium decertare; quorum si qui aut animo aut virtute cessisset, reliquis etiam esset cavendum, quibus pro se pugnandi facultas non fuisset. Haec superioribus diebus saepenumero Caesar suis exposuerat, ut hoc maiore animo contenderem, quod omnium salutem sibi commendatam viderent. Eadem suum quisque contubernalem, amicum, notum prosequens erat obtestatus, ne suam atque omnium falleret opinionem, quorum iudicio delectus ad pugnam proficisceretur. Itaque hoc animo est decertatum, ut neque maritimis nauticisque sollertia atque ars praesidium ferret, neque numero navium praestantibus multitudo prodesset, neque electi ad virtutem e tanta multitudine viri virtuti nostrorum possent adaequare. Capitur hoc proelio quinqueremis una et biremis eum defensoribus remigibusque, et deprimuntur tres, nostris incolumibus omnibus. Reliquae propinquam fugam ad oppidum capiunt; quas protexerunt ex molibus atque aedificiis imminentibus et nostros adire propius prohibuerunt.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:16

The issues involved in the struggle were by no means equal. On our side no chance of escape either by land or sea was presented in the event of repulse and defeat, while victory would in no way settle the question; whereas in their case, if their fleet should gain the upper hand, they would hold all the cards, while if they were beaten, it would still be left to them to try their luck again. At the same time it seemed a grievous shame that the supreme issue and the salvation of all should be decided by the rival exertions of so few; and if any one of these wavered in purpose or courage, the others too, who had had no chance of fighting to defend themselves, would have to look out for themselves. These considerations Caesar had repeatedly explained to his men in recent days, that they might fight with the greater resolution because they saw that the safety of all was entrusted to themselves. It was by these same arguments too that every man, as he escorted his messmate, friend or acquaintance, implored him not to prove false to the estimate which not only he himself had formed of him, but all those others likewise, to whose decision he owed it that he was now going forth as one of the chosen combatants. Consequently such was the resolute spirit with which the battle was contested that the Alexandrians, albeit a maritime and seafaring folk, derived no assistance from their dexterity and skill, nor did they benefit from their superiority in number of ships, nor could their men, though chosen for their bravery from so vast a multitude, match the bravery of our men. In this battle one quinquereme and a bireme were captured with their combat crews and rowers, and three were sunk, all our ships being unharmed. The rest of their ships fled to the nearby town, where the townsmen, from stations on the moles and adjacent buildings, protected them and prevented our men from approaching at all close.

17 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:17

Hoc ne sibi saepius accidere posset, omni ratione Caesar contendendum existimavit ut insulam molemque ad insulam pertinentem in suam redigeret potestatem. Perfectis enim magna ex parte munitionibus in oppido et insulam et urbem uno tempore temptari posse confidebat. Quo capto consilio cohortis X et levis armaturae electos, quosque idoneos ex equitibus Gallis arbitrabatur, in navigia minora scaphasque imponit; alteram insulae partem distinendae manus causa constratis navibus aggreditur, praemiis magnis propositus qui primus insulam cepisset. Ae primo impetum nostrorum pariter sustinuerunt: uno enim tempore et ex tectis aedificiorum propugnabant et litora armati defendebant, quo propter asperitatem loci non facilis nostris aditus dabatur, et scaphis navibusque longis quinque mobiliter et scienter angustias loci tuebantur. Sed ubi primum locis cognitis vadisque pertemptatis pauci nostri in litore constiterunt atque hos sunt alii subsecuti constanterque in eos qui in litore aequo institerant impetum fecerunt, omnes Pharitae terga verterunt. His pulsis custodia portus relicta navis ad litora et vicum applicarunt seque ex navibus ad tuenda aedificia eiecerunt.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:17

To prevent the possibility of this kind of thing occurring to him too frequently, Caesar thought that he ought at all costs to make an effort to gain control of the island and the mole extending to it. For as his entrenchments in the town were in the main completed, he was confident that a simultaneous attempt could be made against both island and city. Having formed this plan, he embarked in smaller craft and pinnaces ten cohorts, some picked light-armed troops and such of his Gallic cavalry as he deemed suitable; and, to distract the enemy garrison, he launched an attack with decked ships upon the other side of the island, offering large rewards to the first to capture it. At first the islanders held off our troops’ attack, simultaneously fighting back from the roofs of buildings, and with equal success defending the beaches with armed parties—and there the roughness of the ground did not afford our troops an easy approach—and guarding the narrow waters with pinnaces and five warships displaying both speed and skill. But as soon as our men had become acquainted with the ground and tried out the shallows, a few got a footing on the beach, others followed in their wake, and a determined attack was launched upon those of the enemy who were drawn up against us on the level foreshore; whereupon the men of Pharos all turned tail. Following their rout the enemy abandoned their defence of the harbour, brought their ships to the built-up area by the water-front, and hastily disembarked to defend the buildings.

18 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:18

Neque vero diutius ea munitione se continere potuerunt, etsi erat non dissimile atque Alexandreae genus aedificiorum, ut minora maioribus conferantur, turresque editae et coniunctae muri locum obtinebant, neque nostri aut scalis aut cratibus aut reliquis rebus parati venerant ad oppugnandum. Sed terror hominibus montem consiliumque eripit et membra debilitat: ut tum accidit. Qui se in aequo loco ac plano pares esse confidebant, idem perterriti fuga suorum et caede paucorum XXX pedum altitudine in aedificiis consistere ausi non sunt seque per molem in mare praecipitaverunt et DCCC passuum intervallum ad oppidum enataverunt. Multi tamen ex his capti interfectique sunt; sed numerus captivorum omnino fuit sex milium.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:18

They could not, however, hold on so very long with the defences these afforded, though the buildings were of a type not unlike those of Alexandria—to employ a flattering comparison—with a continuous line of lofty towers taking the place of a wall; and our troops had not come equipped with ladders or wicker screens or any other equipment for assault. But panic robs men of their sense and reason and palsies their limbs and so it happened then. The very men who on level and unbroken ground were confident they were a match for us, none the less, utterly demoralised now by the flight of their fellows and the slaughter of a few, did not venture to take up a position on buildings thirty feet high, but at various points along the mole dived into the sea and swam the intervening 800 paces to the safety of the town. Many of these, notwithstanding, were captured or killed; indeed, the number of captives amounted all told to six thousand.

19 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:19

Caesar praeda militibus concessa aedificia diripi iussit castellumque ad pontem, qui propior erat Pharo, communivit atque ibi praesidium posuit. Hunc fuga Pharitae reliquerant; artiorem illum propioremque oppido Alexandrini tuebantur. Sed eum postero die simili ratione aggreditur, quod his obtentis duobus omnem navigiorum excursum et repentina latrocinia sublatum iri videbatur. Iamque eos qui praesidio eum locum tenebant tormentis ex navibus sagittisque depulerat atque in oppidum redegerat et cohortium trium instar in terram exposuerat—non enim pluris consistere angustiae loci patiebantur—; reliquae copiae in navibus stationem obtinebant. Quo facto imperat pontem adversus hostem praevallari et, qua exitus navibus erat fornice exstructo, quo pons sustinebatur, lapidibus oppleri atque obstrui. Quorum altero opere effecto, ut nulla omnino scapha egredi posset, altero instituto omnes Alexandrinorum copiae ex oppido se eiecerunt et contra munitiones pontis latiore loco constiterunt, eodemque tempore quae consueverant navigia per pontis ad incendia onerariarum emittere ad molem constituerunt. Pugnabatur a nobis ex ponte, ex mole ab illis ex area, quae erat adversus pontem, et ex navibus contra molem.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:19

After granting his soldiers leave to plunder, Caesar ordered the buildings to be demolished. Near the bridge—the one closer to Pharos—he fortified a redoubt, and posted a garrison there. This bridge the inhabitants of Pharos had abandoned in their flight; while the other one, which was narrower and closer to the town, was guarded by the Alexandrians. However, on the next day he attacked it from a similar motive, because the possession of these two bridges seemed likely to do away with all the sallies and sudden forays of the enemies’ ships. And by now he had dislodged the members of its garrison with artillery and arrows shot from his ships, had driven them back into the town, and put ashore approximately three cohorts—the confined space would not afford a footing for more—while the rest of his forces remained at their posts aboard the ships. At this stage he ordered the bridge to be screened by a rampart on the side facing the enemy, and the opening for the passage of ships—formed by an arch which supported the bridge—to be filled up and blocked with stones. The latter task being completed, so that not a single pinnace could come out, and the former one being under way, all the Alexandrians’ forces burst out of the town and took post in a fairly open position over against our fortifications of the bridge; while at the same time they drew up near the mole the vessels which they had been in the habit of sending out under the bridges to set fire to our transports. And so the battle proceeded, with us fighting from the bridge and the mole, and with them from the area facing the bridge and from their ships opposite the mole.

20 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:20

In his rebus occupato Caesare militesque hortante remigum magnus numerus et classiariorum ex longis navibus nostris in molem se eiecit. Pars eorum studio spectandi ferebatur, pars etiam cupiditate pugnandi. Hi primum navigia hostium lapidibus ac fundis a mole repellebant ac multum proficere multitudine telorum videbantur. Sed postquam ultra eum locum ab latere eorum aperto ausi sunt egredi ex navibus Alexandrini pauci, ut sine signis certisque ordinibus, sine ratione prodierant, sic temere in navis refugere coeperunt. Quorum fuga incitati Alexandrini plures ex navibus egrediebantur nostrosque acrius perturbatos insequebantur. Simul qui in navibus longis remanserant scalas rapere navisque a terra repellere properabant, ne hostes navibus potientur. Quibus omnibus rebus perturbati milites nostri cohortium trium quae in ponte ac prima mole constiterant, eum post se clamorem exaudirent, fugam suorum viderent, magnam vim telorum adversi sustinerent, veriti ne ab tergo circumvenirentur et discessu navium omnino reditu intercluderentur munitionem in ponte institutam reliquerunt et magno cursu incitati ad navis contenderunt. Quorum pars proximas nacta navis multitudine hominum atque onere depressa est, pars resistens et dubitans quid esset capiendum consili ab Alexandrinis interfecta est; non nulli feliciore exitu expeditas ad ancoram navis consecuti incolumes discesserunt, pauci allevatis scutis et animo ad conandum nisi ad proxima navigia adnatarunt.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:20

While Caesar was occupied with this situation, and as he was encouraging the troops, a large number of rowers and seamen left our warships and suddenly landed on the mole. Some were inspired by their anxiety to watch the fray, others also by the desire to take part in it. They began by driving back the enemy vessels from the mole with stones and slings, and it seemed that their heavy volleys of missiles were having great effect. But when a few Alexandrians ventured to disembark beyond that point, on the side of their unprotected flank, then, just as they had advanced in no set order or formation and without any particular tactics, so now they began to retire haphazardly to the ships. Encouraged by their retreat, more of the Alexandrians disembarked and pursued our flustered men more hotly. At the same time those who had stayed aboard the warships made haste to seize the gang-planks and ease the ships away from land, to prevent the enemy from gaining possession of them. All this thoroughly alarmed our troops of the three cohorts which had taken post on the bridge and the tip of the mole; and as they heard the clamour behind them, and saw the retreat of their comrades, and sustained a heavy frontal barrage of missiles, they feared they might be surrounded in rear and have their retreat entirely cut off by the departure of their ships and so they abandoned the entrenchment they had begun at the bridge, and doubled frantically to the ships. Some of them gained the nearest ships, only to be capsized by the weight of so many men: some were killed by the Alexandrians as they put up a forlorn and bewildered resistance; some proved luckier in reaching ships at anchor cleared for action, and so got away safely; and a few, holding their shields above them and steeling their resolution to the task, swam off to ships near by.

21 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:21

Caesar quoad potuit cohortando suos ad pontem ac munitiones continere, eodem in periculo versatus est; postquam universos cedere animadvertit, in suum navigium se recepit. Quo multitudo hominum insecuta cum irrumperet neque administrandi neque repellendi a terra facultas daretur, fore quod accidit suspicatus sese ex navigio eiecit atque ad eas quae longius constiterant navis adnatavit. Hinc suis laborantibus subsidio scaphas mittens non nullos conservavit. Navigium quidem eius multitudine depressum militum una cum hominibus interiit. Hoc proelio desiderati sunt ex numero legionariorum militum circiter CCCC et paulo ultra eum numerum classiarii et remiges. Alexandrini eo loco castellum magnis munitionibus multisque tormentis confirmarunt atque egestis ex mari lapidibus libere sunt usi postea ad mittenda navigia.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:21

So long as by words of encouragement Caesar was able to keep his men at the bridge and its emplacements, he too was involved in the same danger; but when he perceived that they were all retreating, he withdrew to his own vessel. As a large number of men followed him and kept forcing their way aboard it, and as no opportunity was afforded either of navigating it or easing it off shore, anticipating what actually happened he dived from the vessel and swam to those ships which were hove to farther off. From them he sent pinnaces to the help of his men who were in difficulties, and saved not a few. His vessel was in fact capsized by the large number of troops, and foundered with the men on board. In this battle the losses among the legionary troops amounted to approximately 400, with a slightly larger number of seamen and rowers. The Alexandrians reinforced the redoubt there with strong entrenchments and many pieces of artillery and removed the stones from the sea, subsequently making free use of the opening to despatch their vessels.

22 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:22

Hoc detrimento milites nostri tantum afuerunt ut perturbarentur, ut incensi atque incitati magnas accessiones fecerint in operibus hostium expugnandis. In proeliis cotidianis, quandocumque fors obtulerat, procurrentibus et erumpentibus Alexandrinis, manum conserendi potestate facta multum proficiebat Caesar voluntate optima et ardentibus studiis militum; nec divulgata Caesaris hortatio subsequi legionum aut laborem aut pugnandi poterat cupiditatem, ut magis deterrendi et continendi a periculosissimis essent dimicationibus quam incitandi ad pugnandum.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:22

This reverse, so far from dismaying our troops, fired and stimulated them to carry out large-scale sallies in the course of storming the enemy’s defence-works. Every day encounters took place, and whenever a chance, offered itself and the Alexandrians burst out in a frontal sally and gave Caesar an opportunity of engaging battle, he achieved considerable success, thanks to the excellent morale and ardent enthusiasm of his troops; nor could his widespread words of encouragement keep pace with the legions’ exertions or their eagerness for fighting, so that they had to be deterred and held back from the most hazardous encounters rather than be spurred on to fight.

23 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:23

Alexandrini eum Romanos et secundis rebus confirmari et adversis incitari viderent neque ullum belli tertium casum nossent quo possent esse firmiores, ut coniectura consequi possumus, aut admoniti a regis amicis qui in Caesaris erant praesidiis, aut suo priore consilio per occultos nuntios regi probato legatos ad Caesarem miserunt, ut dimitteret regem transireque ad suos pateretur: paratam enim omnem multitudinem esse, confectam taedio puellae, fiduciario regno, dominatione crudelissima Ganymedis, facere id quod rex imperasset; quo si auctore in Caesaris fidem amicitiamque venturi essent, nullius periculi timorem multitudini fore impedimento quo minus se dederent.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:23

The Alexandrians saw that the Romans were heartened by successes and stimulated by reverses, nor were they aware of any third vicissitude of war which could make them yet more steadfast. And so, whether it was they were warned by the king’s friends who were in Caesar’s camp, or whether they were acting on some previous plan of their own made known to the king by secret despatches and approved by him, —we can only guess at their motive—they sent envoys to Caesar requesting him to release the king and allow him to go over to his own side. The whole population, they said, being tired and wearied of the girl, of the delegation of the kingship, and of the utterly remorseless tyranny of Ganymedes, were ready to do the king’s bidding and if, at his instance, they were to enter into a loyal friendship with Caesar, then no danger would intimidate or prevent the population from submitting.

24 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:24

Caesar etsi fallacem gentem semperque alia cogitantem, alia simulantem bene cognitam habebat, tamen petentibus dare veniam utile esse statuit, quod, si quo pacto sentirent ea quae postularent, mansurum in fide dimissum regem credebat, sin, id quod magis illorum naturae conveniebat, ducem ad bellum gerendum regem habere vellent, splendidius atque honestius se contra regem quam contra convenarum ac fugitivorum manum bellum esse gesturum. Itaque regem cohortatus ut consuleret regno paterno, parceret praeclarissimae patriae, quae turpibus incendiis et ruinis esset deformata, civis suos primum ad sanitatem revocaret, deinde conservaret, fidem populo Romano sibique praestaret, cum ipse tantum ei crederet ut ad hostis armatos eum mitteret, dextra dextram tenens dimittere coepit adulta iam aetate puerum. At regius animus disciplinis fallacissimis eruditus, ne a gentis suae moribus degeneraret, flens orare contra Caesarem coepit ne se dimitteret: non enim sibi regnum ipsum conspectu Caesaris esse iucundius. Compressis pueri lacrimis Caesar ipse commotus celeriter, si illa sentiret, fore eum secum adfirmans ad suos dimisit. Ille, ut ex carceribus in liberum cursum emissus, adeo contra Caesarem acriter bellum gerere coepit ut lacrimas quas in colloquio proiecerat gaudio videretur profudisse. Accidisse hoc complures Caesaris legati, amici, centuriones militesque laetabantur, quod nimia bonitas eius fallaciis pueri elusa esset. Quasi vero id Caesar bonitate tantum adductus ae non prudentissimo consilio fecisset.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:24

Though Caesar was well aware that they were a deceitful race, always pretending something different from their real intentions, yet he decided that it was expedient to satisfy their plea for clemency, since, if their demands in any way reflected their feelings, then he believed the king would remain loyal when released but if, on the other hand, they wanted to have the king to lead them with a view to waging the war—and that was more in keeping with their character—then he thought there would be greater honour and distinction for him in waging war against a king than against a motley collection of refugees. Accordingly, he urged the king to take thought for the kingdom of his fathers, to have pity on his most illustrious country, shamefully scarred as it was by fire and desolation, to recall his citizens to sanity first and then to preserve them therein, and to prove his loyalty to the Roman people and to Caesar, inasmuch as Caesar himself had such faith in him that he was sending him to join an enemy under arms. Then, grasping his right hand in his own, Caesar made to take leave of the boy—already grown to manhood. But the royal mind, schooled in all the lessons of utter deceit, was loth to fall short of the customary standards of his race and so with tears he proceeded to beseech Caesar to the opposite effect not to send him away: his very kingdom, he declared, was not more pleasing to him than the sight of Caesar. Checking the lad’s tears, albeit not unmoved himself, Caesar declared that, if that was the way he felt, they would speedily be reunited, and so sent him back to his people. Like a horse released from the starting-gate and given his head, the king proceeded to wage war against Caesar so energetically that the tears he had shed at their conference seemed to have been tears of joy. Not a few of Caesar’s officers and friends and many of the centurions and soldiers were delighted at this turn of events, inasmuch as Caesar’s over-generosity had, they felt, been made fun of by the deceitful tricks of a boy. As if indeed it was merely generosity and not the most far-sighted strategy which had led him to do it!

25 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:25

Cum duce assumpto Alexandrini nihilo se firmiores factos aut languidiores Romanos animadverterent cedentibusque militibus regis aetatem atque infirmitatem magnum dolorem acciperent neque se quicquam proficere viderent, rumoresque exsisterent magna Caesari praesidia terrestri itinere ex Syria Ciliciaque adduci, quod nondum auditum Caesari erat, commeatum, qui mari nostris supportabatur, intercipere statuerunt. Itaque expeditis navigiis locis idoneis ad Canopum in statione dispositis navibus insidiabantur nostris commeatuque. Quod ubi Caesari nuntiatum est, universam classem iubet expediri atque instrui. Praeficit huic Tiberium Neronem. Proficiscuntur in ea classe Rhodiae naves atque in his Euphranor, sine quo nulla umquam dimicatio maritima, nulla etiam parum feliciter confecta erat. At fortuna, quae plerumque eos quos plurimis beneficiis ornavit ad duriorem casum reservat, superiorum temporum dissimilis Euphranorem prosequebatur. Nam eum ad Canopum ventum esset instructaque utrimque classis conflixisset et sua consuetudine Euphranor primus proelium commisisset et quadriremem hostium perforasset ac demersisset, proximam longius insecutus parum celeriter insequentibus reliquis circumventus est ab Alexandrinis. Cui subsidium nemo tulit, sive quod in ipso satis praesidi pro virtute ac felicitate eius putarent esse, sive quod ipsi sibi timebant. Ita, qui unus ex omnibus eo proelio bene rem gessit, solus cum sua quadriremi victrice perit.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:25

Having got themselves a leader, the Alexandrians observed no greater degree of resolution in themselves or of listlessness in the Romans: in addition, the fun which the soldiers made of the king’s youthfulness and irresolution caused great resentment, and they saw they were making no headway. As, moreover, rumours were current that large reinforcements for Caesar were on their way overland from Syria and Cilicia—intelligence which had not yet come to Caesar’s ears—they decided to intercept a convoy of supplies which was being conveyed to our troops by sea. Accordingly they stationed some lightly armed vessels on guard at suitable points near Canopus, and lay in wait for our ships and supplies. When Caesar was informed of this he ordered his entire fleet to be got ready and equipped, putting Tiberius Nero in command. Included in this fleet when it set out were the Rhodian ships, and aboard them Euphranor, without whom no naval action had ever been fought, and none even that was not a resounding victory. Fortune, however, very often reserves for a harsher fate those upon whom she has showered her most prolific blessings; and so too the fortune that now attended Euphranor was different from that of former times. For when they reached Canopus and each side had drawn up its fleet and entered the conflict, Euphranor, following his normal custom, was the first to join battle but when he had holed and sunk one enemy quadrireme, he pursued the next one too far; and as the other ships were not quick enough in following his lead, he was surrounded by the Alexandrians. No one brought him assistance, either because they thought that, considering his courage and his good luck, he was quite able to take care of himself, or because they were afraid for their own sakes. And so the one and only man who was successful in that battle perished alone along with his victorious quadrireme.

26 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:26

Sub idem tempus Mithridates Pergamenus, magnae nobilitatis domi scientiaeque in bello et virtutis, fidei dignitatisque in amicitia Caesaris, missus in Syriam Ciliciamque initio belli Alexandrini ad auxilia arcessenda, eum magnis copiis, quas celeriter et propensissima civitatium voluntate et sua diligentia confecerat, itinere pedestri, quo coniungitur Aegyptus Syriae, Pelusium adducit: idque oppidum firmo praesidio occupatum Achillae propter opportunitatem loci—namque tota Aegyptus maritimo accessu Pharo, pedestri Pelusio velut claustris munita existimatur—, repente magnis circumdatum copiis multiplici praesidio pertinaciter propugnantibus et copiarum magnitudine, quas integras vulneratis defessisque subiciebat, et perseverantia constantiaque oppugnandi quo die est aggressus in suam redegit potestatem praesidiumque ibi suum collocavit. Inde re bene gesta Alexandream ad Caesarem contendit omnisque eas regiones per quas iter faciebat auctoritate ea quae plerumque adest victori pacarat atque in amicitiam Caesaris redegerat.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:26

Round about the same time Mithridates of Pergamum approached Pelusium. A man of high standing in his own country and of great experience and valour in war, as well as a very loyal and valued friend of Caesar, he had been sent into Syria and Cilicia at the outbreak of the Alexandrian war to fetch reinforcements; and now, accompanied by large forces which he had speedily raised, thanks both to the very helpful attitude adopted by the states and to his own conscientious efforts, he arrived at Pelusium by the overland route which links Egypt with Syria. This town had been occupied by a strong garrison of Achillas on account of the tactical importance of the place for Pharos and Pelusium are regarded as the keys, as it were, to the defence of the whole of Egypt, Pelusium guarding the overland approach, as Pharos defends the seaward one. Mithridates now suddenly surrounded it with large forces and, despite the obstinate defence put up by its numerous garrison, thanks both to the large number of fresh troops which he kept throwing in to replace the wounded and exhausted and to the stubborn and unremitting nature of his assault, he reduced it to submission on the same day he started to attack it, and then posted a garrison of his own in it. Whereupon, having achieved this success, he marched to join Caesar in Alexandria, peacefully subduing, meanwhile, and winning over to friendship with Caesar, by that authority which normally belongs to the victor, all those districts along his line of march.

27 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:27

Locus est fere regionum illarum nobilissimus non ita longe ab Alexandrea, qui nominatur Delta; quod nomen a similitudine litterae cepit: nam pars quaedam fluminis Nili derivata duobus itineribus paulatim medium inter se spatium relinquens diversissimo ad litus intervallo mari coniungitur. Cui loco cum appropinquare Mithridaten rex cognovisset, et transeundum ei flumen sciret, magnas adversus eum copias misit, quibus vel superari delerique Mithridaten vel sine dubio retineri posse credebat. Quem ad modum autem optabat eum vinci, sic satis habebat interclusum a Caesare a se retineri. Quae primae copiae flumen a Delta transire et Mithridati occurrere potuerunt, proelium commiserunt festinantes praeripere subsequentibus victoriae societatem. Quorum impetum Mithridates magna cum prudentia consuetudine nostra castris vallatis sustinuit; eum vero incaute atque insolenter succedere cos munitionibus videret, eruptione undique facta magnum numerum eorum interfecit. Quod nisi locorum notitia reliqui se texissent partimque in navis quibus flumen transierant recepissent, funditus deleti essent. Qui ut paulum ab illo timore se recrearunt, adiuncti eis qui subsequebantur rursus oppugnare Mithridaten coeperunt.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:27

Not so very far from Alexandria lies what is perhaps the best known spot in those parts. It is called Delta, and took its name from its resemblance to the letter; for a certain section of the river Nile splits up into two channels which diverge gradually but are separated by a very wide interval at the coast, where the river joins the sea. When the king learned that Mithridates was approaching this spot, and knew that he must cross the river, he despatched large forces against him, by which he believed Mithridates could either be beaten and destroyed, or else undoubtedly held in check. However, desirous as he was for his defeat, he was quite as content to cut him off from Caesar and hold him in check. The first of his forces to succeed in crossing the river from Delta and meeting Mithridates joined battle in eager haste to forestall those following up behind, and so rob them of the chance to participate in victory. Mithridates contained their attack with great discretion, fortifying his camp after our regular fashion; but when he saw them coming up to the entrenchments with a contemptuous recklessness, he made a general sally and killed a large number of them. And had not the remainder employed their knowledge of the district to find cover for themselves, and some retired to the ships in which they had crossed the river, they would have been completely wiped out. When they had recovered a little from the resulting panic, they joined forces with their comrades following up behind, and proceeded to a new attack on Mithridates.

28 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:28

Mittitur a Mithridate nuntius Caesari qui rem gestam perferret. Cognoscit ex suis eadem haec accidisse rex. Ita paene sub idem tempus et rex ad opprimendum Mithridaten proficiscitur et Caesar ad recipiendum. Celeriore fluminis Nili navigatione rex est usus, in quo magnam et paratam classem habebat. Caesar eodem itinere uti noluit, ne navibus in flumine dimicaret, sed circumvectus est eo mari, quod Africae partis esse dicitur, sicuti supra demonstravimus; prius tamen regis copiis occurrit, quam is Mithridaten aggredi posset, eumque ad se victorem incolumi exercitu recepit. Consederat eum copiis rex loco natura munito, quod erat ipse excelsior planitie ex omnibus partibus subiecta; tribus autem ex lateribus variis genere munitionibus tegebatur: unum latus erat adiectum flumini Nilo, alterum editissimo loco ductum, ut partem castrorum obtineret, tertium palude cingebatur.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:28

A messenger was despatched by Mithridates to Caesar to bring him tidings of the action. The king learned of these same events from his own people. Accordingly at practically the same time the king set forth to crush Mithridates, and Caesar to relieve him. The king had recourse to the quicker method of transport, namely sailing up the river Nile, in which he had a large fleet in readiness. Caesar was unwilling to use the same route, so as not to fight a naval action in the river. Instead, he sailed round by that sea which is said to belong to part of Africa, as I have explained earlier. Yet in spite of this he came up with the king’s forces before the latter could attack Mithridates, and so rescued the victorious Mithridates with his army intact. The king had encamped with his forces in a naturally strong position, since in itself the position was higher than the plateau which lay beneath it on all sides; moreover, on three sides it was covered by defences of diverse types: one side abutted the river Nile; a second ran along very high ground and formed one face of his camp; while the third was encircled by a marsh.

29 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:29

Inter castra et Caesaris iter flumen intercedebat angustum altissimis ripis, quod in Nilum influebat, aberat autem ab regis castris milia passuum circiter VII. Rex cum hoc itinere venire Caesarem comperisset, equitatum omnem expeditosque delectos pedites ad id flumen misit qui transitu Caesarem prohiberent et eminus ex ripis proelium impar inirent: nullum enim processum virtus habebat aut periculum ignavia subibat. Quae res incendit dolore milites equitesque nostros, quod tam diu pari proelio cum Alexandrinis certaretur. Itaque eodem tempore equites Germani dispersi vada fluminis quaerentes partim demissioribus ripis flumen tranarunt, et legionarii magnis arboribus excisis, quae longitudine utramque ripam contingerent, proiectis eis repentinoque aggere iniecto flumen transierunt. Quorum impetum adeo pertimuerunt hostes ut in fuga spem salutis collocarent: sed id frustra: namque ex ea fuga pauci ad regem refugerunt paene omni reliqua multitudine interfecta.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:29

Between the camp and Caesar’s line of march ran a narrow river with very high banks, which flowed into the Nile and was some seven miles distant from the king’s camp. When the king learned that Caesar was coming by this route, he despatched all his cavalry and a picked force of light-armed infantry to this river to prevent Caesar from crossing it and to engage at long range from its banks—an unfair engagement, for the spot could neither afford scope for valour nor involve cowardice in any risk. These tactics filled our infantry and cavalry with burning resentment at the thought that for so long their struggle with the Alexandrians should prove a drawn battle. And so, at the same time as scattered groups of German cavalry, looking for places to ford the river, swam across it at some points where the banks were lower, simultaneously the legionary troops, having felled lofty trees tall enough to reach from bank to bank, hurled them forward and crossed the river on a causeway hastily thrown on top. So terrified were the enemy by their attack, that they pinned their hopes of deliverance to flight: in vain, however: for few survived that rout to take refuge with the king, and practically all the remainder were killed.

30 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:30

Caesar re praeclarissime gesta, cum subitum adventum suum iudicaret magnum terrorem Alexandrinis iniecturum, protinus victor ad castra regis pertendit. Haec cum et opere magno vallata et loci natura munita animadverteret confertamque armatorum multitudinem collocatam in vallo videret, laesos itinere ac proeliando milites ad oppugnanda castra succedere noluit. Itaque non magno intervallo relicto ab hoste castra posuit. Postero die castellum, quod rex in proximo vico non longe a suis castris munierat bracchiisque cum opere castrorum coniunxerat vici obtinendi causa, Caesar aggressus omnibus copiis expugnat, non quo id minore numero militum consequi difficile factu putaret, sed ut ab ea victoria perterritis Alexandrum protinus castra regis oppugnaret. Itaque eo cursu, quo refugientis Alexandrinos ex castello in castra sunt milites insecuti, munitionibus successerunt acerrimeque eminus proeliari coeperunt. Duabus ex partibus aditus oppugnationis nostris dabatur: una, quam liberum accessum habere demonstravi, altera, quae mediocre intervallum inter castra et flumen Nilum habebat. Maxima et electissima multitudo Alexandrinorum defendebat eam partem, quae facillimum aditum habebat; plurimum proficiebam in repellendis vulnerandisque nostris, qui regione fluminis Nili propugnabant: diversis enim telis nostri figebantur, adversi ex vallo castrorum, aversi ex flumine, in quo multae naves instructae funditoribus et sagittairis nostros impugnabant.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:30

After this most notable success Caesar forthwith pushed forward triumphantly to the king’s camp, holding the view that his sudden approach would strike great terror into the hearts of the Alexandrians. But when he observed that this camp was strongly entrenched as well as protected by its natural position, and saw the serried mass of armed men posted at the rampart, he was unwilling to let his soldiers, weary as they were with marching and fighting, advance to attack the camp. Accordingly he pitched camp at no great distance from the enemy. In a nearby hamlet, not far distant from the king’s camp, there was a fort which the king had built and linked with bastions to the main defences of his camp so as to hold the hamlet. This fort Caesar attacked and took by storm on the following day with all his forces; not that he thought it would be difficult to gain that objective by using a smaller number of soldiers, but in order that, with the Alexandrians thoroughly unnerved as a result, he might go straight on from that victory to attack the king’s camp. And so, having chased the retreating Alexandrians from the fort into their camp, our troops carried on their charge right up to the fortifications, where they proceeded to fight at long range very briskly. On two sides our men were afforded an opening for assault: the first was the one which, as I have explained, allowed unimpeded approach; the second comprised the moderate-sized space between the camp and the river Nile. The largest and most carefully picked contingent of the Alexandrians was defending that side which afforded the easiest approach; but the defenders in the area of the river Nile were the most successful in repelling and wounding our men: for the latter were being hit by missiles coming from opposite directions—from the rampart of the camp ahead of them, and from the river behind them, where many ships manned with slingers and archers were engaging our men.

31 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:31

Caesar cum videret milites acrius proeliari non posse nec tamen multum profici propter locorum difficultatem, cumque animum adverteret excelsissimum locum castrorum relictum esse ab Alexandrinis, quod et per se munitus esset et studio partim pugnandi partim spectandi decucurrissent in eum locum in quo pugnabatur, cohortis illo circumire castra et summum locum aggredi iussit eisque Carfulenum praefecit, et animi magnitudine et rei militaris scientia virum praestantem. Quo ut ventum est, paucis defendentibus munitionem, nostris contra militibus acerrime pugnantibus, diverso clamore et proelio perterriti Alexandrini trepidantes in omnis partis castrorum discurrere coeperunt. Quorum perturbatione nostrorum animi adeo sunt incitati ut paene eodem tempore ex omnibus partibus, primi tamen editissimum castrorum locum caperent; ex quo decurrentes magnam multitudinem hostium in castris interfecerunt. Quod periculum plerique Alexandrini fugientes acervatim se de vallo praecipitarunt in eam partem quae flumini erat adiuncta. Horum primis in ipsa fossa munitionis magna ruina oppressis ceteri faciliorem fugam habuerunt. Constat fugisse ex castris regem ipsum receptumque in navem multitudine corum qui ad proximas navis adnatabant demerso navigio perisse.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:31

Now Caesar saw that, while it was impossible for his soldiers to fight with any greater gallantry, yet little headway was being made on account of the difficulty of the ground; he also noted that the highest sector of their camp had been abandoned by the Alexandrians, not only because of its natural strength, but also because, in their eagerness in some cases to fight, in others to look on, its defenders had rushed down to the sector where the fighting was going on consequently he ordered some cohorts to proceed thither, skirting the camp, and storm the height, putting in command of them Carfulenus, a man of exceptional personality and experience in the field. When they arrived there our men fought with the greatest gallantry against those few of the enemy who were defending the entrenchment; whereupon the Alexandrians, panic-stricken by the shouting and fighting on both sides of them, began to rush about in confusion hither and thither throughout the camp. This utter bewilderment of theirs fired the spirits of our troops to such a pitch that they captured the camp almost simultaneously in all sectors, though its highest point was the first to capitulate and from that point our men rushed down and killed a vast multitude of the enemy in the camp. In their efforts to escape this danger most of the Alexandrians hurled themselves en masse from the rampart into the area adjoining the river; the first of these were crushed by their heavy fall in the actual trench of the fortification, but the rest found it easier to escape. It is established that the king himself fled from the camp and then, after being taken aboard a ship along with a large number of his men who were swimming to the nearest ships, perished when as a result of the numbers the vessel capsized.

32 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:32

Re felicissime celerrimeque gesta Caesar magnae victoriae fiducia proximo terrestri itinere Alexandream eum equitibus contendit atque ea parte oppidi victor introiit quae praesidio hostium tenebatur. Neque eum consilium suum fefellit quin hostes eo proelio audito nihil iam de bello essent cogitaturi. Dignum adveniens fructum virtutis et animi magnitudinis tulit: omnis enim multitudo oppidanorum armis proiectis munitionibusque suis relictis, veste ea sumpta qua supplices dominantis deprecari censuerunt, sacrisque omnibus prolatis quorum religione precari offensos natosque animos regum erant soliti, advenienti Caesari occurrerunt seque ei dediderunt. Caesar in fidem receptos consolatus per hostium munitiones in suam partem oppidi magna gratulatione venit suorum, qui non tantum bellum ipsum ac dimicationem sed etiam talem adventum eius felicem fuisse laetabantur.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:32

This signal victory, the outcome of a most speedy and successful action, filled Caesar with such confidence that he hastened with his cavalry to Alexandria by the nearest overland route, and entered it triumphantly by that quarter of the town which was held by the enemy garrison. Nor was he mistaken in his own conclusion that, as soon as they heard of that battle, the enemy would cease to think any longer in terms of war. On his arrival he reaped the well-earned fruits of valour and magnanimity: for the entire population of townsfolk threw down their arms, abandoned their fortifications, assumed that garb in which suppliants are used to placate tyrants with earnest prayers, and brought forth all the sacred emblems by the sanctity of which they had been wont to conjure the embittered and wrathful hearts of their kings: even so did they hasten to meet Caesar on his arrival and surrendered themselves to him. Caesar took them formally under his protection and consoled them then, passing through the enemy fortifications, he came to his own quarter of the town amid loud cheers of congratulation from his own troops, who rejoiced at the happy issue, not only of the war itself and the fighting, but also of his arrival under such circumstances.

33 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:33

Caesar Aegypto atque Alexandrea potitus reges constituit quos Ptolomaeus testamento scripserat atque obtestatus erat populum Romanum ne mutarentur. Nam maiore ex duobus pueris, rege, amisso minori tradidit regnum maiorique ex duabus filiis, Cleopatrae, quae manserat in fide praesidiisque eius; minorem. Arsinoen, cuius nomine diu regnasse impotenter Ganymeden docuimus, deducere ex regno statuit, ne qua rursus nova dissensio, prius quam diuturnitate confirmarentur regibus imperia, per homines seditiosos nasceretur. Legiones ibi veterana sexta secum reducta ceteras reliquit, quo firmius esset eorum regum imperium, qui neque amorem suorum habere poterant, quod fideliter permanserant in Caesaris amicitia, neque vetustatis auctoritatem, paucis diebus reges constituti. Simul ad imperi nostri dignitatem utilitatemque publicam pertinere existimabat, si permanerent in fide reges, praesidiis eos nostris esse tutos; si essent ingrati, posse isdem praesidiis coerceri. Sic rebus omnibus confectis et collocatis ipse profectus est in Syriam.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:33

Having made himself master of Egypt and Alexandria, Caesar appointed as kings those whose names Ptolemaeus had written down in his will with an earnest appeal to the Roman people that they should not be altered. The elder of the two boys— the late king—being now no more, Caesar assigned the kingdom to the younger one and to Cleopatra, the elder of the two daughters, who had remained his loyal adherent whereas Arsinoe, the younger daughter, in whose name, as we have shewn, Ganymedes had long been exercising an unbridled sway, he determined to remove from the realm, to prevent any renewed dissensions coming into being among factious folk before the dominion of the royal pair could be consolidated by the passage of time. The veteran Sixth legion he took away with him: all the others he left there, the more to bolster up the dominion of the said rulers, who could enjoy neither the affection of their people, inasmuch as they had remained throughout staunch friends of Caesar, nor the authority of a long-established reign, it being but a few days since they came to the throne. At the same time he deemed it conducive to the dignity of our empire and to public expediency that, if the rulers remained loyal, they should be protected by our troops: whereas if they proved ungrateful, those same troops could hold them in check. Having thus completed all his dispositions, he set out in person for Syria.

34 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:34

Dum haec in Aegypto geruntur, rex Deiotarus ad Domitium Calvinum, cui Caesar Asiam finitimasque provincias administrandas tradiderat, venit oratum ne Armeniam minorem, regnum suum, neve Cappadociam, regnum Ariobarzanis, possideri vastarique pateretur a Pharnace; quo malo nisi liberarentur, imperata se facere pecuniamque promissam Caesari non posse persolvere. Domitius, non tantum ad explicandos sumptus rei militaris cum pecuniam necessariam esse iudicaret, sed etiam turpe populo Romano et C. Caesari victori sibique infame esse statueret regna sociorum atque amicorum ab externo rege occupari, nuntios confestim ad Pharnacem misit, Armenia Cappadociaque decederet neve occupatione belli civilis populi Romani ius maiestatemque temptaret. Hanc denuntiationem cum maiorem vim habituram existimaret, si propius eas regiones cum exercitu accessisset, ad legiones profectus unam ex tribus. XXXVI., secum ducit, duas in Aegyptum ad Caesarem mittit litteris eius evocatas; quarum altera bello Alexandrino non occurrit, quod itinere terrestri per Syriam erat missa. Adiungit Cn. Domitius legioni XXXVI. duas ab Deiotaro, quas ille disciplina atque armatura nostra compluris annos constitutas habebat, equitesque C. totidemque ab Ariobarzane sumit. Mittit P. Sestium ad C. Plaetorium quaestorem, ut legionem adduceret quae ex tumultuariis militibus in Ponto confecta erat, Quantumque Patisium in Ciliciam ad auxilia arcessenda. Quae copiae celeriter omnes iussu Domiti Comana convenerunt.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:34

While these events were taking place in Egypt, king Deiotarus came to Domitius Calvinus, to whom Caesar had assigned the government of Asia and the neighbouring provinces, to beg him not to allow Lesser Armenia, his own kingdom, or Cappadocia, the kingdom of Ariobarzanes, to be occupied and over-run by Pharnaces: for unless they were liberated from this scourge, he could not carry out his instructions and pay out the money he had promised to Caesar. As Domitius not only considered the money to be indispensable for defraying military expenses, but also decided it was a shameful affront to the Roman people and to the triumphant C. Caesar as well as a slight to himself that the kingdoms of their allies and friends should be seized by a foreign king, he forthwith sent a deputation to Pharnaces, bidding him withdraw from Armenia and Cappadocia and not assail the rights and majesty of the Roman people by resorting to civil war. In the belief that this warning would have greater force if he approached closer to that area with an army, he set out for his legions; then, taking with him one of the three, the Thirty-Sixth, he sent to Caesar in Egypt the two which the latter had called for in his despatch. One of these two did not arrive in time for the Alexandrian war, as it was sent by the overland route through Syria. Cn. Domitius reinforced the Thirty-Sixth legion with two from Deiotarus, which the latter had had for several years, having built them up on our system of discipline and armament; he also added to it 100 horsemen, and took a like number from Ariobarzanes. He sent P. Sestius to C. Plaetorius, the quaestor, with instructions to bring the legion which had been formed from the hastily improvised forces in Pontus and Quintus Patisius to Cilicia to muster auxiliary troops. All these forces speedily assembled at Comana according to the orders of Domitius.

35 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:35

Interim legati a Pharnace responsa referunt: Cappadocia se decessisse. Armeniam minorem recepisse, quam paternis nomine iure obtinere deberet. Denique eius regni causa integra Caesari servaretur: paratum enim se facere quod is statuisset. Cn. Domitius eum animadverteret eum Cappadocia decessisse non voluntate adductum sed necessitate, quod facilius Armeniam defendere posset subiectam suo regno quam Cappadociam longius remotam, quodque omnis tris legiones adducturum Domitium putasset, ex quibus cum duas ad Caesarem missas audisset, audacius in Armenia substitisse, perseverare coepit, ut eo quoque regno decederet; neque enim aliud ius esse Cappadociae atque Armeniae, nec iuste cum postulare ut in Caesaris adventum res integra differetur; id enim esse integrum quod ita esset ut fuisset. His responsis datis eum eis copiis quas supra scripsi profectus est in Armeniam locisque superioribus iter facere instituit: nam ex Ponto a Comanis iugum editum silvestre est, pertinens in Armeniam minorem, quo Cappadocia finitur ab Armenia cuius itineris has esse certas opportunitates vidit, quod in locis superioribus nullus impetus repentinus accidere hostium poterat, et quod Cappadocia his iugis subiecta magnam commeatus copiam erat sumministratura.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:35

Meantime the envoys brought back this reply from Pharnaces: he had withdrawn from Cappadocia, but had recovered Lesser Armenia, which he ought to possess by due right of inheritance from his father. In short, the issue touching that kingdom should be kept open for Caesar’s decision for he was ready to do what Caesar should decide. Now Cn. Domitius observed that he had withdrawn from Cappadocia not from free choice but of necessity, since he could defend Armenia next door to his own kingdom more easily than the more distant Cappadocia, and also because he had supposed that Domitius would bring up all three legions and that when he heard that two of those legions had been sent to Caesar, this had heightened his rash resolve to stay on in Armenia. Consequently Domitius proceeded to insist that Pharnaces should withdraw from that kingdom also: as far as legal right went, there was no difference between Cappadocia and Armenia, nor had he any right to demand that the question should be left open pending Caesar’s arrival; a matter was open when it remained just as it had been. Having given him this reply Domitius set out for Armenia with the forces I have recorded above, and began by marching along the higher ground. From Comana in Pontus there is, in fact, a lofty, wooded ridge which extends into Lesser Armenia and forms the boundary between Cappadocia and Armenia. This route, as he saw, offered definite advantages, namely that on the higher ground no sudden enemy attack could develop, and that, as Cappadocia adjoined this ridge, it was likely to assist him by affording an abundance of supplies.

36 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:36

Compluris interim legationes Pharnaces ad Domitium mittit quae de pace agerent regiaque munera Domitio ferrent. Ea constanter omnia aspernabatur nec sibi quicquam fore antiquius quam dignitatem populi Romani et regna sociorum reciperare legatis respondebat. Magnis et continuis itineribus confectis cum adventaret ad Nicopolim, quod oppidum positum in Armenia minore est plano ipso loco, montibus tamen altis ab duobus lateribus obiectis satis magno intervallo ab oppido remotis, castra posuit longe a Nicopoli circiter milia passuum VII. Quibus ex castris cum locus angustus atque impeditus esset transeundus, Pharnaces in insidiis delectos pedites omnisque paene disposuit equites, magnam autem multitudinem pecoris intra eas fauces dissipati iussit paganosque et oppidanos in his locis obversari, ut sive amicus Domitius eas angustias transiret, nihil de insidiis suspicaretur, cum in agris et pecora et homines animum adverteret versari tamquam amicorum adventu, sive inimicus ut in hostium finis veniret, praeda diripienda milites dissiparentur dispersique caederentur.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:36

Meanwhile Pharnaces sent several embassies to Domitius to discuss peace and to take princely gifts for Domitius. All these he firmly rejected and replied to the envoys that as far as he was concerned nothing should take precedence over the prestige of the Roman people and the recovery of the kingdoms of its allies. Then, after completing an uninterrupted succession of long marches, he began to approach Nicopolis, a town in Lesser Armenia which is actually situated in the plain, though it is hemmed in on two sides by high mountains at a fairish distance. Here he pitched camp roughly seven miles from Nicopolis. From this camp he had to traverse a narrow and confined defile: and for this reason Pharnaces arrayed the pick of his infantry and practically all his cavalry in an ambush, giving orders, moreover, that a large number of cattle should be pastured at various points within this gorge, and that the peasants and burghers should go about openly in that area. His object in so doing was that, if Domitius should pass through that defile as a friend, he might have no suspicions of an ambush, as he would observe both men and beasts moving about the countryside, as if friends were in the offing; while if he should come in no friendly spirit, treating it as enemy territory, his troops might become scattered in the process of plundering and so be cut down piecemeal.

37 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:37

Haec cum administraret, numquam tamen intermittebat legatos de pace atque amicitia mittere ad Domitium, cum hoc ipso crederet facilius eum decipi posse. At contra spes pacis Domitio in isdem castris morandi attulit causam. Ita Pharnaces, amissa proximi temporis occasione cum vereretur ne cognoscerentur insidiae, suos in castra revocavit. Domitius postero die propius Nicopolim accessit castraque oppido contulit. Quae dum muniunt nostri, Pharnaces aciem instruxit more suo atque instituto. In fronte enim simplici derecta acie cornua trinis firmabantur subsidiis; eadem ratione haec media collocabantur acie duobus dextra sinistraque intervallis simplicibus ordinibus instructis. Perfecit inceptum castrorum opus Domitius parte copiarum pro vallo constituta.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:37

While making these dispositions he still constantly continued sending delegations to Domitius to talk of peace and friendship, as he believed that by these self-same tactics Domitius could the more readily be duped. But on the other hand Domitius’ hopes of peace afforded him a motive for tarrying in the camp, where he was. Consequently, as Pharnaces had now lost his immediate opportunity and was afraid that his ambush might be discovered, he recalled his troops to camp. On the morrow Domitius advanced nearer Nicopolis and pitched his camp over against the town. While our troops were fortifying it, Pharnaces drew up his line of battle according to his own established custom. This, in fact, was formed with its front as a single straight line, with each of the wings reinforced by three supporting-lines and on the same principle support lines were also posted in the centre, while in the two spaces, on the right hand and the left, single ranks were drawn up. Having once begun the task of fortifying his camp, Domitius completed it, with part of his forces posted in front of the rampart.

38 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:38

Proxima nocte Pharnaces interceptis tabellariis, qui de Alexandrinis rebus litteras ad Domitium ferebant, cognoscit Caesarem magno in periculo versari flagitarique ab Domitio ut quam primum Caesari subsidia mitteret propiusque ipse Alexandream per Syriam accederet. Qua cognita re Pharnaces victoriae loco ducebat, si trahere tempus posset, eum discedendum Domitio celeriter putaret. Itaque ab oppido, qua facillimum accessum et aequissimum ad dimicandum nostris videbat, fossas duas delectas non ita magno medio intervallo relicto IIII pedum altitudinis in eum locum deduxit quo longius constituerat suam non producere aciem. Inter has fossas aciem semper instruebat, equitatum autem omnem ab lateribus extra fossam collocabat; qui neque aliter utilis esse poterat et multum numero anteibat nostrum equitatum.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:38

The following night Pharnaces intercepted some couriers who were carrying despatches to Domitius concerning the situation at Alexandria. From them he learned that Caesar was in a very dangerous position, and that an urgent request was being made to Domitius that he should send Caesar reinforcements as soon as possible and himself advance through Syria closer to Alexandria. On learning this, Pharnaces saw himself virtually victorious if he could spin out the time, as he thought that Domitius must speedily withdraw. Accordingly, from that side of the town which he saw offered our men the easiest and most favourable line of approach to do battle, he carried two straight trenches, four feet deep and spaced not so very far apart, as far as the point beyond which he had decided not to advance his own battle line. Between these trenches he consistently drew up his line, while posting all his cavalry on the flanks outside the trench for otherwise they could not be of any use, and they far outnumbered our cavalry.

39 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:39

Domitius autem, eum Caesaris magis periculo quam suo commoveretur neque se tuto discessurum arbitraretur, si condiciones quas reiecerat rursus appeteret aut sine causa discederet, ex propinquis castris in aciem exercitum eduxit: XXXVI. legionem in dextro cornu collocavit, Ponticam in sinistro, Deiotari legiones in mediam aciem contulit, quibus tamen angustissimum intervallum frontis reliquit reliquis cohortibus in subsidiis collocatis. Sic utrimque acie instructa processum est ad dimicandum.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:39

Domitius, however, was more disturbed by Caesar’s peril than by his own; and as he thought that he would not be safe in withdrawing, if he made a fresh attempt to secure the terms he had rejected or if he withdrew for no good reason, he deployed his army from its nearby camp into battle formation. He posted the Thirty-Sixth legion on the right wing and the Pontic one on the left, while the legions of Deiotarus he concentrated in the centre, leaving them, however, a very narrow frontage and posting his remaining cohorts behind them in support. The lines being thus arrayed on either side, they proceeded to battle.

40 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:40

Signo sub idem tempus ab utroque dato concurritur: acriter varioque pugnatur. Nam XXXVI. legio, cum extra fossam in equites regis impetum fecisset, adeo secundum proelium fecit ut moenibus oppidi succederet fossamque transiret aversosque hostis aggrederetur. At Pontica ex altera parte legio, cum paulum aversa hostibus cessisset, fossam autem circumire ac transcendere conata esset, ut aperto latere aggrederetur hostem, in ipso transitu fossae confixa et oppressa est. Deiotari vero legiones vix impetum sustinuerunt. Ita victrices regiae copiae cornu suo dextro mediaque acie convenerunt se ad XXXVI. legionem. Quae tamen fortiter vincentium impetum sustinuit, magnis copiis hostium circumdata praesentissimo animo pugnans in orbem se recepit ad radices montium: quo Pharnaces insequi propter iniquitatem loci noluit. Ita Pontica legione paene tota amissa, magna parte Deiotari militum interfecta XXXVI. legio in loca se superiora contulit non amplius CCL desideratis. Ceciderunt eo proelio splendida atque inlustres viri non nulli, equites Romani. Quo tamen incommodo Domitius accepto reliquias exercitus dissipati collegit itineribusque tutis per Cappadociam se in Asiam recepit.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:40

The signal to attack was given almost simultaneously on both sides: then came the charge, with hotly contested and fluctuating fighting. Thus the Thirty-Sixth legion launched an attack on the king’s cavalry outside the trench and fought so successful an action that it advanced up to the walls of the town, crossed the trench, and attacked the enemy in rear. The Pontic legion, however, on the other Hank, drew back a little from the enemy, and attempted, moreover, to go round or cross the trench, so as to attack the enemy’s exposed flank but in the actual crossing of the trench it was pinned down and overwhelmed. The legions of Deiotarus, indeed, offered scarcely any resistance to the attack. Consequently the king’s forces, victorious on their own right wing and in the centre of the line, now turned upon the Thirty-Sixth legion. The latter, nevertheless, bore up bravely under the victors’ attack and, though surrounded by large enemy forces, yet with consummate presence of mind formed a circle and so made a fighting withdrawal to the foothills, where Pharnaces was loth to pursue it owing to the hilly nature of the ground. And so, with the Pontic legion an almost total loss and a large proportion of the troops of Deiotarus killed, the Thirty-Sixth legion retired to higher ground with losses not exceeding 250 men. There fell in that battle not a few Roman knights—brilliant and distinguished men. After sustaining this defeat Domitius none the less collected the remnants of his scattered army and withdrew by safe routes through Cappadocia into Asia.

41 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:41

Pharnaces rebus secundis elatus, eum de Caesare ea quae optabat speraret, Pontum omnibus copiis occupavit ibique et victor et crudelissimus rex, eum sibi fortunam paternam feliciore eventu destinaret, multa oppida expugnavit, bona civium Romanorum Ponticorumque diripuit, supplicia constituit in eos qui aliquam formae atque aetatis commendationem habebant ea quae morte essent miseriora. Pontumque nullo defendente paternum regnum gloriam se recepisse obtinebat.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:41

Elated by this success and confident that his wishes for Caesar’s defeat would be granted, Pharnaces seized Pontus with all his forces. There he played the role of victor and utterly ruthless tyrant and, promising himself his father’s fortune though with a happier ending, he took many towns by storm, plundered the property of Roman and Pontic citizens, and decreed for those who in respect of youth and beauty had anything to commend them such punishments as proved more pitiful than death. Thus he held unchallenged sway over Pontus, boasting that he had recovered the kingdom of his father.

42 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:42

Sub idem tempus in Illyrico est incommodum acceptum, quae provincia superioribus mensibus retenta non tantum sine ignominia sed etiam cum laude erat. Namque eo missus aestate cum duabus legionibus Q. Cornificius, Caesaris quaestor, pro praetore, quamquam erat provincia minime copiosa ad exercitus alendos et finitimo bello ac dissensionibus confecta et vastata, tamen prudentia ac diligentia sua, quod magnam curam suscipiebat ne quo temere progrederetur, et recepit et defendit. Namque et castella complura locis editis posita, quorum opportunitas castellanos impellebat ad decursiones faciendas et bellum inferendum, expugnavit eaque praeda milites donavit, quae etsi erat tenuis, tamen in tanta provinciae desperatione erat grata, praesertim virtute parta, et cum Octavius ex fuga Pharsalici proeli magna classe in illum se sinum contulisset, paucis navibus Iadertinorum, quorum semper in rem publicam singulare constiterat officium, dispersis Octavianis navibus erat potitus, ut vel classe dimicare posset adiunctis captivis navibus sociorum. Cum diversissima parte orbis terrarum Cn. Pompeium Caesar victor sequeretur complurisque adversarios in Illyricum propter Macedoniae propinquitatem se reliquiis ex fuga collectis contulisse audiret, litteras ad Gabinium mittit, uti cum legionibus tironum, quod nuper erant conscriptae, proficisceretur in Illyricum coniunctisque copiis cum Q. Cornificio, si quod periculum provinciae inferretur, depelleret; sin ea non magnis copiis tuta esse posset, in Macedoniam legiones adduceret. Omnem enim illam partem regionemque vivo Cn. Pompeio bellum instauraturam esse credebat.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:42

Round about the same time a set-back was sustained in Illyricum, a province which during the previous months had been firmly held not merely without incurring disgrace but even with distinction. To this province there had been sent out in the summer a quaestor of Caesar’s, Q. Cornificius, as pro-praetor and although the province was not at all abundantly stocked for supporting armies and was exhausted and wasted by war upon its borders and by rebellions, vet by his far-sighted and careful policy, taking great pains not to make an ill-considered advance in any quarter, he recovered and defended it. For example, he successfully stormed several mountain strongholds, the commanding position of which prompted their occupants to carry on a predatory warfare, and presented his troops with the resulting booty which, paltry though it was, was none the less welcome—considering the very meagre prospects of the province—especially since it was the prize of valour. Again, when in the course of his flight from the battle of Pharsalia Octavius took refuge with a large fleet upon that coast, Cornificius, with the aid of a few ships of the men of Iadera—those devoted supporters of the commonwealth, who were unsurpassed in their constant loyalty—made himself master of Octavius’ scattered ships, and was accordingly enabled by the addition of these vessels to those of his allies to go into action with something like a fleet. And when in quite a different quarter of the globe Caesar was victoriously pursuing Cn. Pompeius, and heard that several of his opponents had collected the remnants of the fugitives and taken refuge in Illyricum on account of its proximity to Macedonia, lie sent despatches to Gabinius, bidding him set out for Illyricum with the legions of recruits which had recently been raised: there he was to join forces with Q. Cornificius and repulse any dangerous move that might be made against the province: if on the other hand no large forces were needed to ensure the safety of the province, he was to lead his legions into Macedonia. It was in fact his belief that the whole of that neighbourhood and area would revive the war, so long as Cn. Pompeius was alive.

Edition note

18 B. C.

43 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:43

Gabinius ut in Illyricum venit hiberno tempore anni ac difficili sive copiosiorem provinciam existimans sive multum fortunae victoris Caesaris tribuens sive virtute et scientia sua confisus, qua saepe in bellis periclitatus magnas res et secundas ductu ausuque suo gesserat, neque provinciae facultatibus sublevabatur, quae partim erat exinanita partim infidelis, neque navibus intercluso mari tempestatibus commeatus supportari poterat magnisque difficultatibus coactus non ut volebat sed ut necesse erat bellum gerebat. Ita cum durissimis tempestatibus propter inopiam castella aut oppida expugnare cogeretur, crebro incommoda accipiebat adeoque est a barbaris contemptus ut Salonam se recipiens in oppidum maritimum, quod cives Romani fortissimi fidelissimi incolebant, in agmine dimicare sit coactus. Quo proelio duobus milibus militum amplius amissis, centurionibus XXXVIII, tribunis IIII, cum reliquis copiis Salonam se recepit summaque ibi difficultate rerum omnium pressus paucis mensibus morbo periit. Cuius et infelicitas vivi et subita mors in magnam spem Octavium adduxit provinciae potiendae quem tamen diutius in rebus secundis et fortuna, quae plurimum in bellis potest, diligentiaque Cornifici et virtus Vatini versari passa non est.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:43

When Gabinius came to Illyricum in the difficult winter season,—whether it was he thought the province was more abundantly supplied, or whether he set great store by Caesar’s winning luck, or whether he trusted in his own courage and skill, which had many a time enabled him, when surrounded by the hazards of war, to score great successes by his personal leadership and initiative—anyway he derived no support from the resources of the province, bled white as it partly was, and partly disloyal, nor could supplies be conveyed to him by ship, since stormy weather had interrupted navigation. As a result of these considerable difficulties he was forced to conduct the campaign, not as he wished, but as necessity dictated. And so, as lack of supplies forced him to storm towns or strongholds in very adverse weather, he frequently sustained reverses, and was held by the natives in such contempt that, while retreating on Salona, a coastal town occupied by very gallant and loyal Roman citizens, he was forced to fight an action on the march. In this battle he lost more than two thousand soldiers, thirty-eight centurions and four tribunes: with what was left of his forces he retired to Salona, where, under the stress of overwhelming difficulties of every kind, he fell sick and died within a few months. His chequered fortune while alive and his sudden death inspired Octavius with high hopes of securing possession of the province luck, however, which is a very potent factor in war, as well as the carefulness of Cornificius and the courage of Vatinius, did not allow Octavius to pursue his successful career much longer.

Edition note

Jan. 47.

44 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:44

Vatinius Brundisi eum esset, cognitis rebus quae gesta erant in Illyrico, cum crebris litteris Cornifici ad auxilium provinciae ferendum evocaretur et M. Octavium audiret cum barbaris foedera percussisse compluribusque locis nostrorum militum oppugnare praesidia partim classe per se partim pedestribus copiis per barbaros, etsi gravi valetudine adfectus vix corporis viribus animum sequebatur, tamen virtute vicit incommodum naturae difficultatesque et hiemis et subitae praeparationis. Nam eum ipse paucas in portu navis longas haberet, litteras in Achaiam ad Q. Calenum misit, uti sibi classem mitteret. Quod cum tardius fieret quam periculum nostrorum flagrabat, qui sustinere impetum Octavi non poterant, navibus actuariis, quarum numerus erat satis magnus, magnitudo nequaquam satis iusta ad proeliandum, rostra imposuit. His adiunctis navibus longis et numero classis aucto militibus veteranis impositis, quorum magnam copiam habebat ex omnibus legionibus, qui numero aegrorum relicti erant Brundisi, cum exercitus in Graeciam transportaretur, profectus est in Illyricum maritimasque non nullas civitates, quae defecerant Octavioque se tradiderant, partim recipiebat, partim remanentis in suo consilio praetervehebatur nec sibi ullius rei moram necessitatemque iniungebat quin quam celerrime posset ipsum Octavium persequeretur. Hunc oppugnantem Epidaurum terra marique, ubi nostrum erat praesidium, adventu suo discedere ab oppugnatione coegit praesidiumque nostrum recepit.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:44

When Vatinius was at Brundisium he learned of what had been going on in Illyricum; moreover, frequent despatches from Cornificius kept summoning him to bring aid to the province, and he heard that M. Octavius had concluded treaties with the natives and in several places was attacking the garrisons of our troops, in some cases in person with his fleet, in others with land forces, employing native troops. So, although he was afflicted by a serious illness and his bodily strength barely enabled him to obey his will, yet by courage he overcame his physical handicap, as well as the difficulties both of winter and the sudden mobilisation. Thus, as he himself had few warships in harbour, he sent despatches to Q. Calenus in Achaia, requesting him to send him a fleet but as this proved too slow a business—our troops were in no position to withstand Octavius’ attack, and their critical situation urgently demanded something speedier—he fitted beaks to some fast boats, of which he had a sufficient number, though their size was by no means adequate for fighting purposes. With these added to his warships, and his fleet thereby numerically increased, he put on board some veteran troops, of which he had an abundant supply from all the legions—they had been on the sick list and had been left behind at Brundisium when the army was being shipped to Greece—and so set out for Illyricum. Now there were not a few coastal communities there which had revolted and surrendered to Octavius: some of these he recovered, others he by-passed when they remained steadfast to their policy; nor would he allow anything, however pressing, to embarrass or delay him from pursuing Octavius himself with all the speed of which he was capable. While the latter was assaulting Epidaurus by land and sea, where there was a garrison of ours, Vatinius forced him by his approach to abandon his assault, and so relieved our garrison.

45 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:45

Octavius cum Vatinium classem magna ex parte conlectam ex naviculis actuariis habere cognosset, confisus sua classe substitit ad insulam Tauridem; qua regione Vatinius insequens navigabat, non quo Octavium ibi restitisse sciret, sed quod eum longius progressum insequi decreverat. Cum propius Tauridem accessisset distensis suis navibus, quod et tempestas erat turbulenta et nulla suspicio hostis, repente adversam ad se venientem navem antemnis ad medium malum demissis instructam propugnatoribus animum advertit. Quod ubi conspexit, celeriter vela subduci demittique antemnas iubet et milites armari et vexillo sublato, quo pugnandi dabat signum, quae primae naves subsequebantur idem ut facerent significabas Parabant se Vatiniani repente oppressi; parati deinceps Octaviam ex portu procedebant. Instruitur utrimque acies, ordine disposita magis Octaviana, paratior militum animis Vatiniana.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:45

When Octavius learned that Vatinius had a fleet which was in the main made up of small, fast boats, having full confidence in his own fleet he hove to off the island of Tauris. In this area Vatinius was cruising in pursuit, not from any knowledge that Octavius had hove to there, but because the latter had gained a fairly good start, and he had resolved to pursue him. On approaching closer to Tauris with his ships strung out, since the weather was rough and he had no suspicion of the enemy, he suddenly observed a ship bearing down upon him, its yard-arms lowered to mid-mast, and manned with combat troops. When he saw this, he promptly ordered the sails to be reefed, the yardarms lowered, and the troops to stand to; and then, by hoisting the pennant, which was his method of giving the signal for action, he signalled the leading ships astern of him to do the same. The Vatinians being thus suddenly taken unawares proceeded to man ship: the Octavians, their ships already manned, came sailing out of the harbour one after another. Line of battle was formed on either side, that of Octavius being superior in formation, that of Vatinius in the morale of the troops.

Edition note

March 47.

46 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:46

Vatinius cum animum adverteret neque navium se magnitudine neque numero parem esse fortuitae dimicationi, fortunae rem committere maluit. Itaque primus sua quinqueremi in quadriremem ipsius Octavi impetum fecit. Celerrime fortissimeque contra illo remigante naves adversae rostris concurrerunt adeo vehementer ut navis Octaviana rostro discusso ligno contineretur. Committitur acriter reliquis locis proelium concurriturque ad duces maxime: nam cum suo quisque auxilium ferret, magnum comminus in angusto mari proelium factum est. Quantoque coniunctis magis navibus confligendi potestas dabatur, tanto superiores erant Vatiniani; qui admiranda virtute ex suis navibus in hostium navis transilire non dubitabant et dimicatione aequata longe superiores virtute rem feliciter gerebant. Deprimitur ipsius Octavi quadriremis, multae praeterea capiuntur aut rostris perforatae merguntur; propugnatores Octaviani partim in navibus iugulantur, partim in mare praecipitantur. Ipse Octavius se in scapham confert; in quam plures cum confugerent, depressa scapha vulneratus tamen adnatat ad suum myoparonem. Eo receptus, eum proelium nox dirimeret, tempestate magna velis profugit. Sequuntur hunc suae naves non nullae, quas casus ab illo periculo vindicarat.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:46

When Vatinius observed that neither in the size nor the number of his ships was he. a match for a chance engagement, he chose rather to trust to luck. And so he attacked first, charging with his own quinquereme the quadrireme which was the flagship of Octavius. The latter rowed forward against him with the utmost speed and bravery, and the two ships ran together with their beaks head-on so violently that Octavius’ ship had its beak smashed away and was locked to the other by its timbers. Elsewhere a fierce engagement took place, with particularly sharp fighting near the leaders; for with each individual captain trying to support his own leader, a great battle developed at close range in the narrow sea. The more closely interlocked the ships—whenever the opportunity was afforded for such fighting—the more marked was the superiority of the Vatinians; for they displayed admirable courage in leaping without hesitation from their own ships on to those of the enemy, and where the fighting was on equal terms their markedly superior courage brought them success. Octavius’ own quadrireme was sunk, and many besides were either captured or else rammed, holed and sunk: some of his combat troops were cut down on the ships, others dived overboard. Octavius himself took refuge in a pinnace; and when too many others sought safety in it and it capsized, wounded as he was he swam to his own light galley. There he was taken safely aboard and, when night put an end to the action, took to flight, sailing in a stiff squall. He was followed by not a few of his own ships, which chance had delivered from that hazard.

47 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:47

At Vatinius re bene gesta receptui cecinit suisque omnibus incolumibus in eum se portum victor recepit, quo ex portu classis Octavi ad dimicandum processerat. Capit ex eo proelio penterem unam, triremis duas, dicrotas VIII complurisque remiges Octavianos posteroque ibi die, dum suas captivasque navis reficeret, consumpto post diem tertium contendit in insulam Issam, quod eo se recepisse ex fuga credebat Octavium. Erat in ea nobilissimum regionum earum oppidum coniunctissimumque Octavio. Quo ut venit, oppidani supplices se Vatinio dediderunt, comperitque ipsum Octavium parvis paucisque navigiis vento secundo regionem Graeciae petisse, inde ut Siciliam, deinde Africam caperet. Ita brevi spatio re praeclarissime gesta, provincia recepta et Cornificio reddita, classe adversariorum ex illo toto sinu expulsa victor se Brundisium incolumi exercitu et classe recepit.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:47

Vatinius, on the other hand, rounded off this success by sounding the retreat and withdrew triumphantly with his entire force intact to the harbour from which Octavius’ fleet had advanced to do battle. As a result of that action he captured one quinquereme, two triremes, eight two-banked galleys and a large number of Octavius’ rowers. The next day he spent there in refitting his own and the captured vessels; and on the day following he hastened to the island of Issa, in the belief that Octavius had taken refuge there in the course of his flight. In it there was a town—the best known one in those parts, and one which was on the most friendly terms with Octavius. On the arrival of Vatinius there the townsfolk threw themselves upon his mercy, and he learned that Octavius himself with a few small vessels had set course with a following wind in the direction of Greece, intending to make for Sicily next and then Africa. Thus in a short space of time Vatinius had achieved a most notable success, recovering the province and restoring it to Cornificius, and driving his opponents’ fleet away from the whole of that coast. Whereupon he withdrew in triumph to Brundisium with his army and fleet unharmed.

48 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:48

Eis autem temporibus quibus Caesar ad Dyrrachium Pompeium obsidebat et Palaepharsali rem feliciter gerebat Alexandreaeque eum periculo magno tum etiam maiore periculi fama dimicabat, Q. Cassius Longinus, in Hispania pro praetore provinciae ulterioris obtinendae causa relictus, sive consuetudine naturae suae sive odio quod in illam provinciam susceperat quaestor ex insidiis ibi vulneratus, magnas odi sui fecerat accessiones, quod vel ex conscientia sua, eum de se mutuo sentire provinciam crederet, vel multis signis et testimoniis eorum qui difficulter odia dissimulabant animum advertere poterat, et compensare offensionem provinciae exercitus amore cupiebat. Itaque, eum primum in unum locum exercitum conduxit, sestertios centenos militibus est pollicitus, nec multo post, cum in Lusitania Medobregam oppidum montemque Herminium expugnasset, quo Medobregenses confugerant, ibique imperator esset appellatus, sestertiis centenis milites donavit. Multa praeterea et magna praemia singulis concedebat quae speciosum reddebant praesentem exercitus amorem, paulatim tamen et occulte militarem disciplinam severitatemque minuebant.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:48

Now during the period when Caesar was besieging Pompeius at Dyrrachium, and achieving success at Old Pharsalus, and was engaged at Alexandria in operations which involved great risk, though rumour made it out to be still greater, Q. Cassius Longinus had been left behind in Spain as propraetor to govern the further province. Whether it was due to his own natural disposition, or because he had formed a hatred for that province from having as quaestor been treacherously wounded there, he had greatly added to his unpopularity; which fact he was in a position to observe equally from his own intuition—believing as he did that the province reciprocated his own sentiments—and from the manifold signs and indications afforded by those who found difficulty in concealing their feelings of hate and now he was anxious to offset the dislike felt by the province with the affection of his army. Consequently, as soon as he had mustered the army all together, he promised the soldiers one hundred sesterces apiece and not long afterwards in Lusitania, after successfully storming the town of Medobrega and then Mount Herminius, on which the townsfolk had taken refuge, and being hailed there as Imperator, he presented the soldiers each with 100 sesterces. In addition he granted many large rewards to individuals; and though these gifts inspired in the army a semblance of affection for the moment, yet they gradually and insidiously undermined strict military discipline.

49 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:49

Cassius legionibus in hiberna dispositis ad ius dicendum Cordubam se recepit contractumque in ea aes alienum gravissimis oneribus provinciae constituit exsolvere et ut largitionis postulat consuetudo, per causam liberalitatis speciosam plura largitori quaerebantur. Pecuniae locupletibus imperabantur, quas Longinus sibi expensas ferri non tantum patiebatur sed etiam cogebat, in gregem locupletium simultatem causa tenues coiciebantur, neque ullum genus quaestus aut magni et evidentis aut minimi et sordidi praetermittebatur quo domus et tribunal imperatoris vacaret. Nemo erat, qui modo aliquam iacturam facere posset, quin aut vadimonio teneretur aut in reos referretur. Ita magna etiam sollicitudo periculorum ad iacturas et detrimenta rei familiaris adiungebatur.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:49

Having settled his legions in winter quarters. Cassius proceeded to Corduba to administer justice, and resolved to lay a very heavy impost on the province and so defray the debts he had incurred in it. And so, as the habit of bribery necessitates, open-handedness was the plausible excuse for seeking yet further contributions to the source of bribery. Wealthy men were ordered to furnish sums of money, and these Longinus not merely allowed but even compelled to be debited to his own account: poor men were precipitated into conflict with the wealthy class to promote dissensions; and no kind of profit, either large and obvious, or quite insignificant and mean, was overlooked, none with which the commander-in-chief was not involved privately and officially. There was not one man—provided only he had something to lose—but he was either held on bail or duly entered in the lists of the accused. Thus there was also a very uneasy presentiment of danger in addition to the sacrifices and losses of personal possessions.

50 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:50

Quibus de causis accidit ut, cum Longinus imperator eadem faceret quae fecerat quaestor, similia rursus de morte eius provinciales consilia inirent. Horum odium confirmabant non nulli familiares eius qui, cum in illa societate versarentur rapinarum, nihilo minus oderant eum cuius nomine peccabant, sibique quod rapuerant acceptum referebant, quod interciderat aut erat interpellatum Cassio assignabant. Quintam legionem novam conscribit. Augetur odium et ex ipso dilectu et sumptu additae legionis. Complentur equitum III milia maximisque ornantur impensis: nec provinciae datur ulla requies.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:50

For these reasons it so fell out that, since Longinus as commander-in-chief was employing the same tactics he had used as quaestor, the provincials once again embarked upon similar plans for his assassination. Their hatred was intensified by some of his friends who, although they were employed in that plundering partnership, none the less hated the man in whose name they did wrong, and so, while putting down to their own credit whatever they had gained by their plundering, attributed to Cassius whatever came to nothing or was foiled. He enrolled a new legion—the Fifth. Hatred increased as a result of the actual levy and the expense of the extra legion. The cavalry were brought up to a strength of three thousand and equipped at the greatest expense. No respite was given to the province.

51 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:51

Interim litteras accepit a Caesare, ut in Africam exercitum traiceret perque Mauretaniam ad finis Numidiae perveniret, quod magna Cn. Pompeio Iuba miserat auxilia maioraque missurus existimabatur. Quibus litteris acceptis insolenti voluptate efferebatur, quod sibi novarum provinciarum et fertilissimi regni tanta oblata esset facultas. Itaque ipse in Lusitaniam proficiscitur ad legiones arcessendas auxiliaque adducenda; certis hominibus dat negotium ut frumentum navesque C praepararentur pecuniaeque describerentur atque imperarentur, ne qua res cum redisset moraretur. Reditus eius fuit celerior omnium opinione: non enim labor aut vigilantia cupienti praesertim aliquid Cassio deerat.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:51

Meanwhile he received despatches from Caesar bidding him bring an army across to Africa and, passing through Mauretania, come to the territory of Numidia for Juba had sent large reinforcements for Cn. Pompeius and would, it was thought, send larger ones. When Cassius received these despatches he was in transports of immoderate delight at the thought of his being offered so magnificent a chance of new provinces and a highly fertile kingdom. And so he set out in person for Lusitania to summon the legions and fetch auxiliaries, allotting certain men the task of organising in advance supplies of corn and 100 ships, as well as assessing and levying contributions of money, so as to avoid any delay on his return. His return proved more expeditious than anyone expected: for there was no lack of energy or vigilance in Cassius, especially when he coveted something.

52 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:52

Exercitu coacto in unum locum castris ad Cordubam positis pro contione militibus exponit quas res Caesaris iussu gerere deberet, polliceturque eis, eum in Mauretaniam traiecisset, sestertios centenos se daturum; quintam fore in Hispania legionem. Ex contione se Cordubam recepit eoque ipso die tempore postmeridiano, cum in basilicam iret, quidam Minucius Silo cliens L. Racili libellum, quasi aliquid ab eo postularet, ut miles ei tradit, deinde post Racilium—nam is latus Cassi tegebat—, quasi responsum peteret, celeriter dato loco eum se insinuasset, sinistra corripit aversum dextraque bis ferit pugione. Clamore sublato fit a coniuratis impetus universis. Munatius Flaccus proximum gladio traicit lictorem; hoc interfecto Q. Cassium legatum vulnerat. Ibi T. Vasius et L. Mercello simili confidentia Flaccum, municipem suum, adiuvant: erant enim omnes Italicenses. Ad ipsum Longinum L. Licinius Squillus involat iacentemque levibus sauciat plagis.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:52

He then assembled his army at a single rendezvous and pitched camp near Corduba. There at a parade he explained to his troops the scheme it was his duty to carry out on Caesar’s instructions, and promised to give them 100 sesterces apiece when lie had crossed over into Mauretania. The Fifth legion, he explained, would be in Spain. Then, after the parade, he returned to Corduba. That same afternoon, when he was entering the judgment hall, a certain Minucius Silo, who was a client of L. Racilius and was dressed as a soldier, handed him a note, as if he had some petition to make of him; then, following behind Racilius—who was walking beside Cassius—as though he were waiting for an answer, he quickly wormed his way in between them when the chance offered, seized Longinus from behind with his left hand and with his right stabbed him twice with a dagger. No sooner was the alarm raised than all the conspirators joined in the attack. Munatius Flaccus ran the nearest lictor through with his sword, killed him and then wounded Q. Cassius, Longinus’ deputy. Thereupon T. Vasius and M. Mercello displayed a like audacity in going to the help of Flaccus, their fellow-townsman; for they all hailed from Italica. L. Licinius Squillus rushed up to Longinus himself and inflicted minor wounds upon him as he lay prostrate.

53 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:53

Concurritur ad Cassium defendendum: semper enim Berones complurisque evocatos cum telis secum habere consuerat. A quibus ceteri intercluduntur qui ad caedem faciendam subsequebantur; quo in numero fuit Calpurnius Salvianus et Manilius Tusculus. Minucius inter saxa quae iacebant in itinere fugiens opprimitur et relato domum Cassio ad eum deducitur. Racilius in proximam se domum familiaris sui conferti dum certum cognosceret confectusne Cassius esset. L. Laterensis, cum id non dubitaret, accurrit laetus in castra militibusque vernaculis et secundae legionis, quibus odio sciebat praecipue Cassium esse, gratulatio; tollitur a multitudine in tribunal, praetor appellatur. Nemo enim aut in provincia natus, ut vernaculae legionis milites, aut diuturnitate iam factus provincialis, quo in numero erat secunda legio, non cum omni provincia consenserat in odio Cassi: nam legionem XXX. et XXI. paucis mensibus in Italia scriptas Caesar attribuerat Longino, quinta legio nuper ibi erat confecta.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:53

On all sides there was a rush to defend Cassius; for it was his constant habit to have with him a numerous armed bodyguard of Beronians and ex-soldiers. These intercepted all the other would-be assassins who were following up behind, and among them Calpurnius Salvianus and Manilius Tusculus. Minucius was caught as he sought to escape through the stones which were lying in the street, and was escorted to Cassius, who had now been carried home. Racilius took refuge in a friend’s house near by, until he should learn for certain whether Cassius was done for. L. Laterensis had no doubt about it, and so hastened joyfully into the camp and congratulated the native troops and those of the Second legion, who, as he knew, cherished a particular hatred for Cassius: and there the mob hoisted him on to the platform and hailed him as praetor. There was in fact no man, either born in the province, like the troops of the native legion, or else by this time qualified as a provincial by virtue of long residence—and the Second legion came into this category—who had not shared in the hatred which the entire province felt towards Cassius for the Thirtieth and Twenty-First legions, which Caesar had allotted to Longinus, had been enrolled in Italy within the last few months, while the Fifth legion had been raised in the province but recently.

54 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:54

Interim nuntiatur Laterensi vivere Cassium. Quo nuntio dolore magis permotus quam animo perturbatus reficit se celeriter et ad Cassium visendum proficiscitur. Re cognita XXX. legio signa Cordubam infert ad auxilium ferendum imperatori suo. Facit hoc idem XXI. Subsequitur has V. Cum duae legiones reliquae essent in castris, secundam, veriti ne soli relinquerentur atque ex eo quid sensissent iudicaretur, secuti sunt factum superiorum. Permansit in sententia legio vernacula nec ullo timore de gradu deiecta est.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:54

Meanwhile the tidings reached Laterensis that Cassius was alive. Not so much disconcerted as grievously disappointed by these tidings, he quickly recovered himself and set out to visit Cassius. On learning of the facts the Thirtieth legion advanced to Corduba to bring aid to their commander-in-chief: the Twenty-First did likewise; and the Fifth followed their lead. Now that there were but two remaining legions in camp, the men of the Second were afraid that they might be the only ones left behind, and that the nature of their sentiments might be inferred from this circumstance: consequently they followed the example of the previous legions. The native legion remained steadfast in its attitude, and nothing could intimidate it or make it budge.

55 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:55

Cassius eos qui nominati erant conscii caedis iubet comprehendi: legiones in castra remittit quinque cohortibus tricesimae retentis. Indicio Minuci cognoscit L. Racilium et L. Laterensem et Annium Scapulam, maximae dignitatis et gratiae provincialem hominem sibique tam familiarem quam Laterensem et Racilium, in eadem fuisse coniuratione, nec diu moratur dolorem suum quin eos interfici iubeat. Minucium libertis tradit excruciandum, item Calpurnium Salvianum, qui profitetur indicium coniuratorumque numerum auget, vere, ut quidam existimant, ut non nulli queruntur, coactus. Isdem cruciatibus adfectus L. Mercello. . . . Squillus nominat pluris; quos Cassius interfici iubet exceptis eis qui se pecunia redemerunt. Nam palam HS LX eum Calpurnio paciscitur et cum Q. Sestio L. Qui si maxime nocentes sunt multati, tamen periculum vitae dolorque vulnerum pecuniae remissus crudelitatem eum avaritia certasse significabas

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:55

Cassius ordered the arrest of those who had been named as privy to the murderous plot and, retaining five cohorts of the Thirtieth legion, sent the rest back to camp. From the evidence of Minucius he learned that L. Racilius and L. Laterensis and Annius Scapula—the last a provincial of the highest standing and influence, with whom he was on as intimate a footing as with Racilius and Laterensis—had all been involved in that same conspiracy and it was not long before he gave expression to his indignation by ordering their execution. Minucius he handed over to his freedmen for torture: likewise Calpurnius Salvianus, who made a formal deposition in which he named a larger number of conspirators—truthfully, according to the belief of certain people under duress, as some complain. Similar torture was applied to L. Mercello: . . . Squillus mentioned more names. Cassius ordered their execution, except for those who bought themselves off. For example, he openly made a bargain in fact with Calpurnius for sixty thousand sesterces, and with Q. Sestius for fifty thousand. And if their extreme guilt earned them a corresponding fine, yet the fact that the peril of death and the pain of torture was remitted for cash showed how in Cassius cruelty had vied with greed.

56 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:56

Aliquot post diebus litteras a Caesare missas accipit, quibus cognoscit Pompeium in acie victum amissis copiis fugisse. Qua re cognita mixtam dolore voluptatem capiebat: victoriae nuntius laetitiam exprimebat, confectum bellum licentiam temporum intercludebat. Sic erat dubius animus utrum nihil timere an omnia licere mallet. Sanatis vulneribus arcessit omnis qui sibi pecunias expensas tulerant, acceptasque eas iubet referri; quibus parum videbatur imposuisse oneris, ampliorem pecuniam imperat. Equitum autem Romanorum dilectum instituit; quos ex omnibus conventibus coloniisque conscriptos transmarina militia perterritos ad sacramenti redemptionem vocabat. Magnum hoc fuit vectigal, maius tamen creabat odium. His rebus confectis totum exercitum lustrat legiones quas in Africam ducturus erat et auxilia mittit ad traiectum. Ipse classem quam parabat ut inspiceret, Hispalim accedit ibique moratur, propterea quod edictum tota provincia proposuerat, quibus pecunias imperasset neque contulissent, se adirent. Quae evocatio vehementer omnis turbavit.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:56

Several days later he received despatches sent by Caesar, from which he learned that Pompeius had been beaten in the field, lost his forces, and fled. This intelligence inspired in him mixed feelings—of disappointment and pleasure: the news of victory could not but make him happy: the completion of the war put an end to the present licence. Consequently he could not make up his mind whether he would rather have nothing to fear or nothing barred. When his wounds were healed he summoned all those who had booked sums of money as debited to his account and ordered the said sums to be entered up as repaid and where he seemed to have imposed too light a burden, he ordered the man to pay a greater sum. Moreover, he held a levy of Roman knights. These were conscripted from all the corporations and colonies and, as they were thoroughly scared of military service overseas, he invited them to purchase their discharge. This proved a great source of profit, but the hatred it produced was still greater. This done, he reviewed his entire army and then despatched to the point of embarkation the legions he intended to take into Africa, with their auxiliary troops. He himself proceeded to Hispalis to inspect the fleet he was building up and there he tarried awhile, since he had published a decree throughout the province that those who had been ordered to contribute, but had not yet contributed sums of money, must come before him. This summons disturbed them all profoundly.

57 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:57

Interim L. Titius, qui eo tempore tribunus militum in legione vernacula fuerat, nuntiat eam a legione XXX., quam Q. Cassius legatus simul ducebat, eum ad oppidum Ilipam castra haberet, seditione facta centurionibus aliquot occisis qui signa tolli non patiebantur, discessisse et ad secundam legionem contendisse, quae ad fretum alio itinere ducebatur. Cognita re noctu eum V cohortibus unetvicesimanorum egreditur, mane pervenit Naevam. Ibi eum diem, ut quid ageretur perspiceret, moratus Carmonem contendit. Hic, cum legio XXX. et XXI. et cohortes IIII ex V. legione totusque convenisset equitatus, audit IIII cohortis a vernaculis oppressas ad Obuculam eum his ad secundam pervenisse legionem omnisque ibi se coniunxisse et T. Thorium Italicensem ducem delegisse. Celeriter habito consilio M. Marcellum quaestorem Cordubam, ut eam in potestate retineret, Q. Cassium legatum Hispalim mittit. Paucis ei diebus affertur conventum Cordubensem ab eo defecisse Marcellumque aut voluntate aut necessitate adductum—namque id varie nuntiabatur—consentire cum Cordubensibus duas cohortis legionis V., quae fuerant Cordubae in praesidio, idem facere. Cassius his rebus incensus movet castra et postero die Segoviam ad flumen Singiliense venit. Ibi habita contione militum temptat animos; quos cognoscit non sua sed Caesaris absentis causa sibi fidissimos esse nullumque periculum deprecaturos, dum per eos Caesari provincia restitueretur.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:57

Meanwhile L. Titius brought tidings of the native legion, in which he had been at the time a military tribune: his report ran that while it was encamped near the town of Ilipa a mutiny had broken out, and several centurions who had refused to let them strike camp had been killed the legion had then parted company with the Thirtieth legion—this was also under command of Q. Cassius, the governor’s deputy—and made haste to join the Second legion, which was being taken to the straits by another route. On learning of the matter Longinus left by night with five cohorts of the Twenty-First legion, and early in the morning arrived at Naeva. There he waited that day, in order to get a clear view of what was taking place: then he marched to Carmo. Here he was joined by the Thirtieth legion and the Twenty-First, with four cohorts of the Fifth and his entire cavalry force, and then heard that four cohorts had been overpowered by the native troops, and in company with the latter had made contact with the second legion near Obucula, where they had all joined forces and chosen T. Thorius, a native of Italica, as their leader. He promptly held a consultation and despatched the quaestor, M. Marcellus, to Covduba, to retain control of it, and Q. Cassius, his deputy, to Hispalis. Within a few days news was brought to him that the corporation of Corduba had revolted from him, and that Marcellus, either of his own free will, or under compulsion—reports varied on this point—was hand in glove with the men of Corduba and that the two cohorts of the Fifth legion which had formed the garrison force of Corduba were taking a similar line. Incensed by these reports Cassius struck camp, and on the morrow came to Segovia on the river Singilis. There he held a parade and sounded the temper of his troops, learning thereby that it was not for his own sake, but for the sake of the absent Caesar that they were entirely loyal to himself, and that there was no hazard they would not face without a murmur, so be they were the means of restoring the province to Caesar.

58 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:58

Interim Thorius ad Cordubam veteres legiones adducit ac, ne dissensionis initium natum seditiosa militum suaque natura videretur, simul ut contra Q. Cassium, qui Caesaris nomine maioribus viribus uti videbatur, aeque potentem opponeret dignitatem, Cn. Pompeio se provinciam reciperare velle palam dictitabat. Et forsitan etiam hoc fecerit odio Caesaris et amore Pompei, cuius nomen multum poterat apud eas legiones quas M. Varro obtinuerat. Sed id qua mente, communis erat coniectura: certe hoc prae se Thorius ferebat; milites adeo fatebantur, ut Cn. Pompei nomen in scutis inscriptum haberent. Frequens legionibus conventus obviam prodit, neque tantum virorum sed etiam matrum familias ac praetextatorum, deprecaturque ne hostili adventu Cordubam diriperent: nam se contra Cassium consentire cum omnibus; contra Caesarem ne facere cogerentur orare.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:58

Meanwhile Thorius led his veteran legions towards Corduba. To avoid the impression that the quarrel had originally arisen from any natural tendency to mutiny on his own part or on that of his troops, and at the same time to counter Q. Cassius—who, as it appeared, was operating in the name of Caesar with forces more powerful than his own—with no less weighty an authority, he kept openly asserting that it was for Cn. Pompeius that he wished to recover the province. And it may even be that he did so wish, owing to his hatred for Caesar and affection for Pompey, the hitter’s name carrying great weight with those legions which M. Varro had held. But what his motive was in this was a matter for general conjecture. At any rate that was what Thorius gave out; and his troops acknowledged it to the extent that they had the name of Cn. Pompeius carved on their shields. A vast concourse of citizens came forth to meet the legions, not only of men but also of matrons and youths, beseeching them not to approach Corduba as enemies and plunder it: they themselves in fact shared in the universal antagonism against Cassius and they prayed they might not be compelled to act against Caesar.

59 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:59

Tantae multitudinis precibus et lacrimis exercitus commotus eum videret ad Cassium persequendum nihil opus esse Cn. Pompei nomine et memoria tamque omnibus Caesarianis quam Pompeianis Longinum esse in odio neque se, conventum neque M. Marcellum contra Caesaris causam posse perducere, nomen Pompei ex scutis detraxerunt, Marcellum, qui se Caesaris causam defensurum profitebatur, ducem asciverunt praetoremque appellarunt et conventum sibi adiunxerunt castraque ad Cordubam posuerunt. Cassius eo biduo circiter IIII milia passuum a Corduba citra flumen Baetim in oppidi conspectu loco excelso facit castra: litteras ad regem Bogudcm in Mauretaniam et ad M. Lepidum proconsulem in Hispaniam citeriorem mittit, subsidio sibi provinciaeque Caesaris causa quam primum veniret. Ipse hostili modo Cordubensium agros vastat, aedificia incendit.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:59

The tears and entreaties of this vast multitude had no little effect upon the army; it saw too that to punish Cassius it had no need of the name and memory of Cn. Pompeius that Longinus was equally hateful to all the adherents of Caesar as he was to those of Pompey; and that it could induce neither the citizen corporation of Corduba nor Marcellus to act contrary to Caesar’s interest. Accordingly they removed Pompey’s name from their shields, adopted Marcellus, who professed his intention to champion Caesar’s cause, as their leader and hailed him as praetor, made common cause with the citizen corporation, and pitched their camp near Corduba. Within two days Cassius pitched camp on his side of the river Baetis some four miles distant from Corduba, in a lofty position in sight of the town. He sent despatches to king Bogud in Mauretania and to M. Lepidus, the pro-consul, in Hither Spain, urging each to come as soon as possible to the aid of himself and the province, in the interest of Caesar. He himself laid waste in hostile fashion the territory of Corduba and set buildings ablaze.

60 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:60

Cuius rei deformitate atque indignitate legiones quae Marcellum sibi ducem ceperant ad eum concurrerunt, ut in aciem educerentur orant, priusque confligendi sibi potestas fieret quam eum tanta contumelia nobilissimae carissimaeque possessiones Cordubensium in conspectu suo rapinis, ferro flammaque consumerentur. Marcellus cum confligere miserrimum putaret, quod et victoris et victi detrimentum ad eundem Caesarem esset redundaturum neque suae potestatis esset, legiones Baetim traducit aciemque instruit. Cum Cassium contra pro suis castris aciem instruxisse loco superiore videret, causa interposita, quod is in aequum non descenderet, Marcellus militibus persuadet ut se recipiant in castra. Itaque copias reducere coepit. Cassius, quo bono valebat Marcellumque infirmum esse sciebat, aggressus equitatu legionarios se recipientis compluris novissimos in fluminis ripis interfecit. Cum hoc detrimento quid transitus fluminis viti difficultatisque haberet cognitum esset, Marcellus castra Baetim transfert, crebroque uterque legiones in aciem educit; neque tamen confligitur propter locorum difficultates.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:60

The hideous and outrageous character of this action led the legions which had taken Marcellus for their leader to rush to him in a body and beg him that they might be led out to battle and granted an opportunity of engaging the enemy before those most illustrious and beloved possessions of the people of Corduba should suffer the grievous ignominy of being consumed before their very eyes by plunder, fire and sword. Though Marcellus thought it a thousand pities to engage, since the loss sustained by victor and vanquished alike would in either case have repercussions on Caesar, and it lay outside his power to control it, yet he took his legions across the Baetis and drew up his line. On seeing that Cassius had drawn up his line facing him on higher ground in front of his own camp. Marcellus prevailed upon his troops to withdraw to their camp, putting them off with the excuse that the enemy refused to come down into the plain. And so he proceeded to withdraw his forces. Cassius employed his excellent cavalry—in which arm he was strong, and knew Marcellus to be weak—to attack the retreating legionaries, and killed quite a number of their rearguard on the banks of the river. Made aware by this loss of the drawback and difficulty involved in crossing the river. Marcellus transferred his camp to the other side of the Baetis. Now both commanders frequently led out their legions to battle; there was, however, no engagement owing to the difficult nature of the ground.

61 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:61

Erat copiis pedestribus multo firmior Marcellus habebat enim veteranas multisque proeliis expertas legiones. Cassius fidei magis quam virtuti legionum confidebat. Itaque, eum castra castris collata essent et Marcellus locum idoneum castello cepisset quo prohibere aqua Cassianos posset, Longinus, veritus ne genere quodam obsidionis clauderetur in regionibus alienis sibique infestis, noctu silentio ex castris proficiscitur celerique itinere Uliam contendit, quod sibi fidele esse oppidum credebat. Ibi adeo coniuncta ponit moenibus castra ut et loci natura—namque Ulia in edito monte posita est—et ipsa munitione urbis undique ab oppugnatione tutus esset. Hunc Marcellus insequitur et quam proxime potest Uliam castra castris confert locorumque cognita natura, quo maxime rem deducere volebat, necessitate est deductus ut neque confligeret—cuius si rei facultas esset, resistere incitatis militibus non poterat— neque vagari Cassium latius pateretur, ne plures civitates ea paterentur quae passi erant Cordubenses. Castellis idoneis locis collocatis operibusque in circuitu oppidi continuatis Uliam Cassiumque munitionibus clausit. Quae prius quam perficerentur, Longinus omnem suum equitatum emisit; quem magno sibi usu fore credebat, si pabulari frumentarique Marcellum non pateretur, magno autem fore impedimento, si clausus obsidione et inutilis necessarium consumeret frumentum.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:61

Marcellus was much stronger in infantry forces; for the legions he had were veteran ones, tested in many campaigns. Cassius relied on the loyalty rather than the valour of his legions. Consequently when the two camps had been pitched over against one another and Marcellus had selected a position suitable for a stronghold which might enable him to prevent the enemy troops from getting water, Longinus was afraid of being shut up by a virtual blockade in territory controlled by others and hostile to himself; and so he silently set out from his camp by night and marched swiftly to Ulia, a town which he believed to be loyal to himself. There he pitched his camp so close to the walls of the town that not only its natural position—for Ulia is situated on a lofty mountain—but also the actual fortification of the city made him safe on all sides from assault. Marcellus pursued him and pitched his camp over against the enemy camp as close to Ulia as he could. When he had appreciated the nature of the ground, he had inevitably to resort to the very tactics to which above all he wanted to resort, namely refraining from an engagement—and had there been an opportunity for engaging he could not have held in check his excited troops—and at the same time not allowing Cassius to roam too far afield, to prevent more communities from suffering the fate of the inhabitants of Corduba. By siting strongholds at suitable points and carrying his field-works in a continuous ring round the town, he hemmed in Ulia and Cassius with entrenchments. But before these could be completed, Longinus sent out his entire cavalry force, in the belief that it would stand him in very good stead if it stopped Marcellus from collecting fodder and corn, whereas it would prove a great handicap if, shut up by blockade and rendered useless, it used up precious corn.

62 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:62

Paucis diebus Q. Cassi litteris acceptis rex Bogus cum copiis venit adiungitque ei legioni quam secum adduxerat compluris cohortis auxiliarias Hispanorum. Namque ut in civilibus dissensionibus accidere consuevit, ita temporibus illis in Hispania non nullae civitates rebus Cassi studebant, plures Marcellum fovebant. Accedit cum copiis Bogus ad exteriores Marcelli munitiones. Pugnatur utrimque acriter, crebroque id accidit fortuna saepe ad utrumque victoriam transferente; nec tamen umquam ab operibus depellitur Marcellus.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:62

Within a few days king Bogud, having received Q. Cassius’ despatches, arrived with his forces he had brought one legion with him, and to this he now added several auxiliary cohorts of Spanish troops. For, as usually happens in civil wars, some states in Spain at that time were supporters of Cassius, though a larger number warmly espoused the cause of Marcellus. Bogud and his forces came up to the outer entrenchments of Marcellus: sharp fighting-broke out between the two sides, and this recurred at frequent intervals, with the tide of fortune often turning from one side to the other. Marcellus, however, was never dislodged from his field-works.

63 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:63

Interim Lepidus ex citeriore provincia eum cohortibus legionariis XXXV magnoque numero equitum et reliquorum auxiliorum venit ea mente Uliam, ut sine ullo studio contentiones Cassi Marcellique componeret. Huic venienti sine dubitatione Marcellus se credit atque offert; Cassius contra suis se tenet praesidiis, sive eo quod plus sibi iuris deberi quam Marcello existimabat, sive eo quod ne praeoccupatus animus Lepidi esset obsequio adversarii verebatur. Ponit ad Uliam castra Lepidus neque habet a Marcello quicquam divisi. Ne pugnetur interdicit; ad exeundum Cassium invitat fidemque suam in re omni interponit. Cum diu dubitasset Cassius quid sibi faciendum quidve Lepido esset credendum, neque ullum exitum consili sui reperiret si permaneret in sententia, postulat uti munitiones disicerentur sibique liber exitus daretur. Non tantum indutiis factis sed prope iam pace constituta opera cum complanarent custodiaeque munitionum essent deductae, auxilia regis in id castellum Marcelli quod proximum erat regis castris, neque opinantibus omnibus—si tamen in omnibus fuit Cassius: nam de huius conscientia dubitabatur—, impetum fecerunt complurisque ibi milites oppresserunt. Quod nisi celeriter indignatione et auxilio Lepidi proelium esset diremptum, maior calamitas esset accepta.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:63

Meanwhile Lepidus came to Ulia from the nearer province with thirty-five legionary cohorts and a large number of cavalry and other auxiliary troops, his object being to resolve, quite impartially, the dispute between Cassius and Marcellus. On his arrival Marcellus without hesitation put himself confidently into Lepidus’ hands. Cassius, on the other hand, remained within his own defences, either because he thought that a greater measure of justice was due to himself than to Marcellus, or else because he was afraid that Lepidus’ attitude might have been biased by the deference shewn him by his opponent. Lepidus pitched his camp near Ulia, in complete accord with Marcellus. He refused to allow any fighting, invited Cassius to come out, and pledged his word to every offer he made. For a long time Cassius was in doubt as to what he should do or what confidence he should place in Lepidus; but as he could find no solution to his policy if he remained steadfast in his decision, he demanded that the entrenchments should be demolished and that he himself should be granted leave to depart unmolested. Not only had a truce been made, but by now a peaceful settlement had been all but arranged, and they were dismantling the fieldworks and the sentries manning the entrenchments had been withdrawn, when, though nobody expected it—if indeed nobody included Cassius, for there was some doubt as to his complicity—the king’s auxiliary forces launched an attack upon the stronghold of Marcellus nearest the king’s camp, and overpowered a number of troops in it. And had not Lepidus in righteous anger promptly lent his assistance to break up that fray, a greater disaster would have been sustained.

64 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:64

Cum iter Cassio patefactum esset, castra Marcellus cum Lepido coniungit. Lepidus eodem tempore Marcellusque Cordubam cum suis, Cassius proficiscitur Carmonem. Sub idem tempus Trebonius proconsul ad provinciam obtinendam venit. De cuius adventu ut cognovit Cassius, legiones quas secum habuerat equitatumque in hiberna distribuit: ipse omnibus suis rebus celeriter correptis Malacam contendit ibique adverso tempore navigandi navis conscendit, ut ipse praedicabat, ne se Lepido et Trebonio et Marcello committeret, ut amici eius dictitabant, ne per eam provinciam minore cum dignitate iter faceret cuius magna pars ab eo defecerat, ut ceteri existimabant, ne pecunia illa ex infinitis rapinis confecta in potestatem cuiusquam veniret. Progressus secunda ut hiberna tempestate cum in Hiberum flumen noctis vitandae causa se contulisset, inde paulo vehementiore tempestate, nihilo periculosius se navigaturum credens, profectus, adversis fluctibus occurrentibus ostio fluminis, in ipsis faucibus, cum neque flectere navem propter vini fluminis neque directam tantis fluctibus tenere posset, demersa nave periit.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:64

Now that the way lay open to Cassius, Marcellus joined his camp to that of Lepidus. Lepidus and Marcellus then set out with their forces simultaneously for Corduba, Cassius for Carmo. Round about the same time Trebonius came to govern the province as pro-consul. When Cassius learned of his coming he posted the legions under his command and the cavalry to their various winter-quarters; as for himself, he hurriedly grabbed all his belongings and hastened to Malaca, where he embarked, although the season was unfavourable for navigation. His object, as lie personally averred, was to avoid committing himself to Lepidus, Trebonius and Marcellus: as his friends asserted, to avoid the relative humiliation of travelling through a province a great part of which had revolted from him: as everyone else believed, to avoid letting that money of his—the proceeds of innumerable robberies—fall into the hands of anyone else. At first he made some headway in weather which, considering it was winter, was favourable but after he had taken shelter in the river Ebro to avoid sailing by night, the weather then became somewhat stormier; believing, however, that he would run no greater risk if he sailed, he set forth: but what with the swell rolling in head on against the river mouth, and the strong current preventing him from putting about just as the huge waves made it impossible to hold on straight ahead, his ship sank in the very mouth of the river, and so he perished.

Edition note

Feb. 47.

65 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:65

Cum in Syriam Caesar ex Aegypto venisset atque ab eis qui Roma venerant ad eum cognosceret litterisque urbanis animadverteret multa Romae male et inutiliter administrari neque ullam partem rei publicae satis commode geri, quod et contentionibus tribuniciis perniciosae seditiones orirentur et ambitione atque indulgentia tribunorum militum et qui legionibus praeerant multa contra morem consuetudinemque militarem fierent, quae dissolvendae disciplinae severitatisque essent, eaque omnia flagitare adventum suum videret, tamen praeferendum existimabat, quas in provincias legionesque venisset, eas ita relinquere constitutas ut domesticis dissensionibus liberarentur, iura legesque acciperent, externorum hostium metum deponerent. Haec in Syria, Cilicia, Asia celeriter se confecturum sperabat, quod hae provinciae nullo bello premebantur; in Bithynia ae Ponto plus oneris videbat sibi impendere. Non excessisse enim Ponto Pharnacen audiebat neque excessurum putabat, eum secundo proelio vehementer esset inflatus quod contra Domitium Calvinum fecerat. Commoratus fere in omnibus civitatibus quae maiore sunt dignitate, praemia bene meritis et viritim et publice tribuit, de controversiis veteribus cognoscit ae statuit; reges, tyrannos, dynastas provinciae finitimos, qui omnes ad eum concurrerant, receptos in fidem condicionibus impositis provinciae tuendae ac defendendae dimittit et sibi et populo Romano amicissimos.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:65

On his arrival in Syria Egypt Caesar learned from those who had joined him there from Rome, as well as from information contained in despatches from the city, that there was much that was bad and unprofitable in the administration at Rome, and that no department of the government was being really efficiently conducted; for rivalries among the tribunes, it was said, were producing dangerous rifts, and the flattering indulgence shewn to their troops by the military tribunes and legionary commanders was giving rise to many practices opposed to military custom and usage which tended to undermine strict discipline. All this, as he saw, urgently demanded his presence: yet, for all that, he thought it more important to leave all the provinces and districts he visited organised in such a way that they would be immune from internal disagreements, would accept a legal constitution, and lay aside their fears of aggression from without. This he was confident he would speedily achieve in Syria, Cilicia and Asia, as these provinces had no war afflicting them: in Bithynia and Pontus he had, as he saw, a heavier task impending. For he heard that Pharnaces had not evacuated Pontus, and he did not expect him to do so, exceedingly puffed up as he was by the successful battle he had fought against Domitius Calvinus. He spent some time in practically all the more important states of Syria, bestowing rewards both upon individuals and communities where they deserved them, and holding official inquiries and giving his ruling in questions of long-standing dispute: while as for the kings, sovereigns and rulers who, as neighbours of the province, had one and all flocked to him, he formally took them under his protection and then, on condition that they undertook to watch over and guard the province, he dismissed them as very loyal friends both to himself and the Roman people.

66 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:66

Paucis diebus in ea provincia consumptis Sextum Caesarem, amicum et necessarium suum, legionibus Syriaeque praeficit; ipse eadem classe qua venerat proficiscitur in Ciliciam. Cuius provinciae civitates omnis evocat Tarsum, quod oppidum fere totius Ciliciae nobilissimum fortissimumque est. Ibi rebus omnibus provinciae et finitimarum civitatium constitutis cupiditate proficiscendi ad bellum gerendum non diutius moratur, magnisque itineribus per Cappadociam confectis biduum Mazacae commoratus Comana venit, vetustissimum et sanctissimum in Cappadocia Bellonae templum, quod tanta religione colitur ut sacerdos eius deae maiestate, imperio, potentia secundus a rege consensu gentis illius habeatur. Id homini nobilissimo Lycomedi Bithyno adiudicavit, qui regio Cappadocum genere ortus iure minime dubio, vetustate; tamen propter adversam fortunam maiorum suorum mutationemque generis intermisso sacerdotium id repetebat. Fratri autem Ariobarzanis Ariarathi, eum bene meritus uterque eorum de re publica esset, ne aut regni hereditas Ariarathen sollicitaret aut heres regni terreret Ariobarzanen, partem Armeniae minoris concessit, eumque Ariobarzani attribuit qui sub eius imperio ac dicione esset. Ipse iter inceptum simili velocitate conficere coepit.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:66

After spending a few days in that province he posted Sextus Caesar, his friend and kinsman, to command the legions and govern Syria: he himself set out for Cilicia in the same fleet in which he had arrived. He then summoned all the states of this latter province to forgather at Tarsus—perhaps the most famous and strongest township in the whole of Cilicia. There he settled all the affairs of the province and its neighbouring states; but when he had done so, his eagerness to set out and prosecute the war admitted no further delay; and so, after traversing Cappadocia by forced marches and staying two days at Mazaca, he reached Comana, where is the shrine of Bellona—the most ancient and holiest in Cappadocia. This shrine is worshipped with such reverence that the priest of that goddess is held by common consent of the nation to rank next to the king in majesty, dominion and influence. This priesthood he awarded to Lycomedes, a Bithynian of very noble descent, who sought it by right of inheritance; for he was sprung from the royal Cappadocian house, his claim in this respect being, in point of legal right, by no means in doubt, though, in long passing of time, because of the chequered fortunes of his ancestors and changes in the royal line of descent, continuity had been broken. As for Ariobarzanes and his brother Ariarathes, both of them had deserved well of the Republic; and so, to prevent Ariarathes from being tempted to claim his inheritance to the kingdom, or, as heir to it, from intimidating Ariobarzanes, Caesar granted him part of Lesser Armenia and allowed Ariobarzanes to treat him as his vassal. Whereupon Caesar himself proceeded to complete the remainder of his journey with similar despatch.

67 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:67

Cum propius Pontum finisque Gallograeciae accessisset, Deiotarus, tetrarches Gallograeciae tum quidem paene totius, quod ei neque legibus neque moribus concessum esse ceteri tetrarchae contendebant, sine dubio autem rex Armeniae minoris ab senatu appellatus, depositis regiis insignibus neque tantum privato vestitu sed etiam reorum habitu supplex ad Caesarem venit oratum ut sibi ignosceret, quod in ea parte positus terrarum quae nulla praesidia Caesaris habuisset exercitibus imperiisque coactus in Cn. Pompei castris fuisset: neque enim se debuisse iudicem esse controversiarum populi Romani, sed parere praesentibus imperiis.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:67

When Caesar approached closer to Pontus and the boundaries of Gallograecia, he was met by Deiotarus. Although the latter’s position at that time as tetrarch of practically the whole of Gallograecia was disputed by all his fellow tetrarchs as inadmissible both by law and by tradition, he was, however, indisputably hailed as king of Lesser Armenia by the Senate; and now he laid aside his royal insignia and, dressed not merely as a private person but actually in the garb of defendants in the courts, he came to Caesar as a suppliant to beg his pardon for having been on the side of Cn. Pompeius. He explained that, situated as he was in a part of the world which had had no garrisons of Caesar’s to protect it, he had been compelled to do so by orders backed by armed force for it had been no business of his to act as judge in the disputes of the Roman people, but only to obey the commands of the moment.

68 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:68

Contra quem Caesar, eum plurima sua commemorasset officia quae consul ei decretis publicis tribuisset, eumque defensionem eius nullam posse excusationem eius imprudentiae recipere coarguisset, quod homo tantae prudentiae ac diligentiae scire potuisset quis urbem Italiamque teneret, ubi senatus populusque Romanus, ubi res publica esset, quis denique post L. Lentulum, C. Marcellum consul esset, tamen se concedere id factum superioribus suis beneficiis, veteri hospitio atque amicitiae, dignitati aetatique hominis, precibus eorum qui frequentes concurrissent hospites atque amici Deiotari ad deprecandum, de controversiis tetrarcharum postea se cogniturum esse dixit, regium vestitum ei restituit. Legionem autem eam quam ex genere civium suorum Deiotarus armatura disciplinaque nostra constitutam habebat equitatumque omnem ad bellum gerendum adducere iussit.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:68

In his reply Caesar reminded him of all the many loyal services he himself as consul had rendered to him by official decrees, and went on to point out that his apology could not be accepted as any excuse for his unwisdom; a man, in fact, as wise and careful as he was could have known who was master of Rome and Italy, what was the attitude of the Senate and the Roman people and the position taken up by the government, who in short was consul after L. Lentulus and C. Marcellus. Nevertheless, he continued, I make allowance for that action of yours in view of your past generosity towards myself, our long-standing ties of hospitality and friendship, your rank and age, and the entreaties of all those guests and friends of yours who have flocked in crowds to entreat for your pardon. As for the matters in dispute between the tetrarchs, I shall examine into them later. He then bade Deiotarus resume his royal garb, but ordered him to bring that legion of his, which was raised from the ranks of his own countrymen but in equipment and training organised on our pattern, together with all his cavalry, for the prosecution of the war.

69 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:69

Cum in Pontum venisset copiasque omnis in unum locum coegisset, quae numero atque exercitatione bellorum mediocres erant—excepta enim legione sexta, quam secum abduxerat Alexandrea veteranam multis laboribus periculisque functam multisque militibus partim difficultate itinerum ae navigationum partim crebritate bellorum adeo deminutam, ut minus mille hominibus in ea esset, reliquae erant tres legiones, una Deiotari, duae quae in eo proelio quod Cn. Domitium fecisse cum Pharnace scripsimus fuerant—, legati a Pharnace missi Caesarem adeunt atque imprimis deprecantis ne eius adventus hostilis; esset: facturum enim omnia Pharnacen quae imperata essent. Maximeque commemorabant nulla Pharnacen auxilia contra Caesarem Pompeio dare voluisse, cum Deiotarus, qui dedisset, tamen ei satisfecisset.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:69

On his arrival in Pontus Caesar mustered his whole force at a single rendezvous. It was but a modest force both numerically and in practical experience in the field; for apart from the Sixth legion, which he had brought with him from Alexandria—and this, being a veteran one with a long record of hazardous and strenuous achievements, had lost so many men, due partly to the difficulties of transit both by land and sea, partly to the frequency of its campaigns, and was now so much below strength as to comprise less than one thousand troops—apart from the Sixth, the remainder of the force consisted of three legions—one belonging to Deiotarus, and the two which had taken part in that engagement which Cn. Domitius fought with Pharnaces, as I have related. Whereupon envoys sent by Pharnaces approached Caesar and first and foremost entreated him not to approach their country in any hostile spirit, since Pharnaces would carry out all his instructions. In particular they reminded Caesar that Pharnaces had refused to provide Pompeius with any auxiliary troops for use against Caesar; whereas Deiotarus, who had provided them, had none the less given him satisfaction.

70 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:70

Caesar respondit se fore aequissimum Pharnaci, si quae polliceretur repraesentaturus esset. Monuit autem, ut solebat, mitibus verbis legatos, ne aut Deiotarum sibi obicerent aut nimis eo gloriarentur beneficio, quod auxilia Pompeio non missisent. Nam se neque libentius facere quicquam quam supplicibus ignoscere neque provinciarum publicas iniurias condonare eis posse qui fuissent in se officiosi. Quin id ipsum quod commemorarent officium fuisse utilius Pharnaci, qui providisset ne vinceretur, quam sibi cui di immortales victoriam tribuissent. Itaque se magnas et gravis iniurias civium Romanorum qui in Ponto negotiati essent, quoniam in integrum restituere non posset, concedere Pharnaci. Nam neque interfectis amissam vitam neque exsectis virilitatem restituere posse; quod quidem supplicium gravius morte cives Romani subissent. Ponto vero decederet confestim familiasque publicanorum remitteret ceteraque restitueret sociis civibusque Romanis quae penes eum essent. Si fecisset, iam tune sibi mitteret munera ac dona quae bene rebus gestis imperatores ab amicis accipere consuessent. Miserat enim Pharnaces coronam auream. His responsis datis legatos remisit.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:70

Caesar replied that he would be scrupulously fair to Pharnaces if the latter intended to carry out his promises. He warned the envoys,however,in his usual tactful language, not to tax him with the case of Deiotarus or pride themselves unduly on their good services in having refused to send Pompeius auxiliary troops. For whereas nothing gave him greater pleasure than granting pardon when it was humbly entreated, yet it was impossible for him to condone public outrages against the provinces in the ease of those who had been loyal towards himself. In point of fact. he went on, that very act of loyalty which you call to mind proved more expedient to Pharnaces, who thereby had the foresight to avoid defeat, than to myself, for whose victory the immortal gods were responsible. As for the great and serious outrages perpetrated against Roman citizens engaged in trade in Pontus, since it is not in my power to set them to rights, I accordingly forgive Pharnaces. I cannot, in fact, restore to murdered men the life they have lost, nor to the mutilated their manhood and such indeed is the punishment—worse than death—that Roman citizens have undergone. Pharnaces, however, must withdraw forthwith from Pontus, release the household slaves of the tax-gatherers, and make all other such restitution as lies in his power to the allies and Roman citizens. If he does this, then—and not before—shall he send me the tributes and gifts which triumphant commanders are in the habit of receiving from their friends. (Pharnaces had, in fact, sent him a golden crown.) Such was the reply with which the envoys were sent back.

71 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:71

At Pharnaces liberaliter omnia pollicitus, cum festinantem ac praecurrentem Caesarem speraret libentius etiam crediturum suis promissis quam res pateretur, quo celerius honestiusque ad res magis necessarias proficisceretur—nemini enim erat ignotum plurimis de causis ad urbem Caesarem revocari—, lentius agere, decedendi diem postulare longiorem, pactiones interponere, in summa frustrari coepit. Caesar cognita calliditate hominis, quod aliis temporibus natura facere consueverat tunc necessitate fecit adductus, ut celerius omnium opinione manum consereret.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:71

All this Pharnaces graciously promised to do. However, as he hoped that Caesar’s impetuous haste would lead him to trust his own assurances still more readily than the circumstances justified, so that he might tackle more urgent matters with the greater expedition and propriety—for everyone was aware that there were many reasons demanding Caesar’s return to Rome—in this hope, then, he began to take a more leisurely line, to demand a later date for his withdrawal,to propose agreements by way of causing delay—in fine,he proceeded to cheat. Realising the fellow’s cunning, Caesar was now of necessity constrained to adopt the very tactics which on other occasions it had been his natural habit to employ—namely to come to grips more promptly than anyone expected.

72 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:72

Zela est oppidum in Ponto positum, ipsum ut in plano loco satis munitum: tumulus enim naturalis, velut manu factus, excelsiore undique fastigio sustinet murum. Circumpositi sunt huic oppido magni multique intercisi vallibus colles; quorum editissimus unus, qui propter victoriam Mithridatis et infelicitatem Triari detrimentumque exercitus nostri magnam in illis partibus habet nobilitatem, superioribus locis atque itineribus paene coniunctus est oppido nec multo longius milibus passuum III abest ab Zela. Hunc locum Pharnaces veteribus paternorum felicium castrorum refectis operibus copiis suis omnibus occupavit.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:72

Zela is a town situated in Pontus, with adequate natural defences, considering its position in a plain: for its battlements are reared upon a hillock—a natural one for all its artificial appearance—whose summit is loftier than all the terrain surrounding it. Encircling this town are many considerable hills, intersected by valleys; and one of these—a very lofty one—which enjoys no little fame in those parts thanks to the victory of Mithridates, and the misfortune of Triarius and defeat of our army, is all but linked to the town by tracks along the higher ground, and is little more than three miles distant from Zela. Here Pharnaces repaired the ancient works of his father’s once prosperous camp, and occupied the position with his entire forces.

73 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:73

Caesar cum ab hoste milia passuum V castra posuisset videretque eas vallis quibus regia castra munirentur eodem intervallo sua castra munituras, si modo ea loca hostes priores non cepissent, quae multo erant propiora regis castris, aggerem comportari iubet intra munitiones. Quo celeriter collato proxima nocte vigilia quarta legionibus omnibus expeditis impedimentisque in castris relictis prima luce neque opinantibus hostibus eum ipsum locum cepit, in quo Mithridates secundum proelium adversus Triarium fecerat. Huc omnem comportatum aggerem ex castris per servitia aggeri iussit, ne quis ab opere miles discederet, eum spatio non amplius passuum mille intercisa vallis castra hostium divideret ab opere incepto Caesaris castrorum.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:73

Caesar pitched his camp five miles distant from the enemy and as he now saw that that valley by which the king’s camp was protected would, if its width separated them, equally afford protection to a camp of his own, provided only that the enemy did not anticipate him in capturing the ground in question, which was much nearer the king’s camp, he ordered materials for a rampart to be carted within the entrenchments. This was speedily collected. The following night he left camp at the fourth watch with all his legions in light order and the heavy baggage left behind in camp, and surprised the enemy at dawn by capturing that very position where Mithridates once fought his successful action against Triarius. To this spot he ordered the slaves to bring from the camp all the accumulated material for the rampart, so that none of his troops should quit their work of fortification, since the intervening valley which separated the enemy’s camp from the emplacements which Caesar had begun was not more than a mile wide.

74 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:74

Pharnaces, eum id repente prima luce animadvertisset, copias suas omnis pro castris instruxit. Quas interposita tanta locorum iniquitate consuetudine magis pervulgata militari credebat instrui Caesar vel ad opus suum tardandum, quo plures in armis tenerentur, vel ad ostentationem regiae fiduciae, ne munitione magis quam manu defendere locum Pharnaces videretur. Itaque deterritus non est quo minus prima acie pro vallo instructa reliqua pars exercitus opus faceret. At Pharnaces impulsus sive loci felicitate sive auspiciis et religionibus inductus, quibus obtemperasse eum postea audiebamus, sive paucitate nostrorum qui in armis erant comperta, cum more operis cotidiani magnam illam servorum multitudinem quae aggerem portabat militem esse credidisset, sive etiam fiducia veterani exercitus sui, quem bis et vicies in acie conflixisse et vicisse legati eius gloriabantur, simul contemptu exercitus nostri, quem pulsum a se. Domitio duce sciebat, inito consilio dimicandi descendere praerupta valle coepit. Cuius aliquamdiu Caesar irridebat inanem ostentationem et eo loco militum coartationem, quem in locum nemo sanus hostis subiturus esset: cum interim Pharnaces eodem gradu quo in praeruptam descenderat vallem ascendere adversus arduum collem instructis copiis coepit.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:74

On suddenly observing this situation at dawn, Pharnaces drew up all his forces in front of his camp. In view of the highly uneven character of the intervening ground Caesar supposed that it was the king’s normal military practice more than anything that occasioned this deployment; or else his object was to delay Caesar’s own work of fortification, through the necessity of keeping more men standing to arms or again it might be intended as a display of confidence on the king’s part, to shew that it was not on fortification so much as on armed force that Pharnaces relied to defend his position. Accordingly, Caesar was not deterred from keeping the remainder of his army engaged on the work of fortification, deploying only the front line in front of the palisade. Pharnaces, however, took it into his head to engage. Whether it was the lucky associations of the spot that drove him to take this course, or whether it was his scrupulous observance of omens, to which, as we afterwards heard, he gave careful heed, that so prompted him; or maybe it was the small number of our troops which, according to his information, were standing to arms (for he had supposed that that vast gang of slaves which transported the material for the rampart, as though it was their daily employment, was in fact composed of troops); or maybe even it was his confidence in that veteran army of his, which, as his envoys boasted, had fought and conquered upon two and twenty battle-fields, coupled with a contempt for our army, which he knew had been routed by himself when Domitius led it: anyway, having decided to engage, he began the descent down the steep ravine. For some little time Caesar laughed contemptuously at this empty bravado on the part of the king, and at his troops packed closely on ground which no enemy in his senses would be likely to set foot on; while in the meantime Pharnaces with his forces in battle array proceeded to climb the steep hill-side confronting him at the same steady pace at which he had descended the sheer ravine.

75 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:75

Caesar incredibili eius vel temeritate vel fiducia commotus neque opinans imparatusque oppressus eodem tempore milites ab opere revocat, arma capere iubet, legiones opponit aciemque instruit; cuius rei subita trepidatio magnum terrorem attulit nostris. Nondum ordinibus instructis falcatae regiae quadrigae permixtos milites perturbant; quae tamen celeriter multitudine telorum opprimuntur. Insequitur has acies hostium, et clamore sublato confligitur multum adiuvante natura loci, plurimum deorum immortalium benignitate qui cum omnibus casibus bellicis intersunt, tum praecipue eis quibus nihil ratione potuit administrari.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:75

This incredible foolhardiness or confidence on the part of the king disconcerted Caesar, who was not expecting it and was caught unprepared. Simultaneously he recalled the troops from their work of fortification, ordered them to stand to arms, deployed his legions to meet the attack, and formed line of battle; and the sudden excitement to which all this gave rise occasioned considerable panic among our troops. Disorganised as our men were, and as yet in no regular formation, the king’s chariots armed with scythes threw them into confusion; but these chariots were speedily overwhelmed by a mass of missiles. In their wake came the enemy line: the battle cry was raised and the conflict joined, our men being greatly helped by the nature of the ground but above all by the blessing of the immortal gods. For just as the gods play a part in all the chance vicissitudes of war, so above all do they do so in those where human strategy has proved quite powerless to avail.

76 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:76

Magno atque acri proelio comminus facto, dextro cornu, quo veterana legio sexta erat collocata, initium victoriae natum est. Ab ea parte cum in proclive detruderentur hostes, multo tardius, sed tamen isdem dis adiuvantibus sinistro cornu mediaque acie totae profligantur copiae regis. Quae quam facile subierant iniquum locum, tam celeriter gradu pulsae premebantur loci iniquitate. Itaque multis militibus partim interfectis partim suorum ruina oppressis, qui velocitate effugere poterant, armis tamen proiectis vallem transgressi nihil ex loco superiore inermi proficere poterant. At nostri victoria elati subire iniquum locum munitionesque aggredi non dubitarunt. Defendentibus autem eis cohortibus castra quas Pharnaces praesidio reliquerat, celeriter castris hostium sunt potiti. Interfecta multitudine omni suorum aut capta Pharnaces eum paucis equitibus profugit cui nisi castrorum oppugnatio facultatem attulisset liberius profugiendi, vivus in Caesaris potestatem adductus esset.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:76

Heavy and bitter hand-to-hand fighting took place and it was on the right wing, where the veteran Sixth legion was posted that the first seeds of victory were sown. As the enemy were being thrust back down the slope on this wing, so too on the left wing and in the centre—much more slowly, but thanks nevertheless to the same divine assistance—the entire forces of the king were being crushed. The ease with which they had climbed the uneven ground was now matched by the speed with which, once dislodged from their footing, the unevenness of the ground enabled them to be driven back. Consequently, after sustaining many casualties—some killed, some knocked out by their comrades’ falling on top of them—those whose nimbleness did enable them to escape none the less threw away their arms and so, after crossing the valley, they could not make any effective stand from the higher ground, unarmed as they now were. Our men, on the contrary, elated by their victory, did not hesitate to climb the uneven ground and storm the entrenchments. Moreover, despite the resistance of those enemy cohorts which Pharnaces had left to guard his camp, they promptly won possession of it. With his entire forces either killed or captured Pharnaces took to flight with a few horsemen and had not our storming of his camp afforded him a freer opportunity for flight, he would have been brought alive into Caesar’s hands.

77 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:77

Tali victoria totiens victor Caesar incredibili est laetitia adfectus, quod maximum bellum tanta celeritate confecerat, quodque subiti periculi recordatione laetior victoria facilis ex difficillimis rebus acciderat. Ponto recepto praeda omni regia militibus condonata postero die eum expeditis equitibus ipse proficiscitur, legionem sextam decedere ad praemia atque honores accipiendos in Italiam iubet, auxilia Deiotari domum remittit, duas legiones eum Caelio Viniciano in Ponto relinquit.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:77

Such a victory transported Caesar—for all the many past victories to his credit—with incredible delight, inasmuch as he had brought a very serious war to so speedy a conclusion, and because an easy victory, which delighted him the more when he recalled the sudden risk it had involved, had transpired out of a very difficult situation. Having thus recovered Pontus and made a present to his troops of all the royal plunder, he himself set out on the following day with his cavalry in light order; instructing the Sixth legion to leave for Italy to receive its rewards and honours, sending home the auxiliary troops of Deiotarus, and leaving two legions in Pontus with Caelius Vinicianus.

78 · Pseudo-Caesar; authorship disputed

Original

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-lat1:78

Ita per Gallograeciam Bithyniamque in Asiam iter facit omniumque earum provinciarum de controversiis cognoscit et statuit: iura in tetrarchas, reges, civitates distribuit. Mithridaten Pergamenum, a quo rem feliciter celeriterque gestam in Aegypto supra scripsimus, regio genere ortum, disciplinis etiam regiis educatum—nam eum Mithridates, rex Asiae totius, propter nobilitatem Pergamo parvulum secum asportaverat in castra multosque retinuerat annos—regem Bosphori constituit, qui sub imperio Pharnacis fuerat, provinciasque populi Romani a barbaris atque inimicis regibus interposito amicissimo rege munivit. Eidem tetrarchian Gallograecorum iure gentis et cognationis adiudicavit occupatam et possessam paucis ante annis a Deiotaro. Neque tamen usquam diutius moratus est quam necessitas urbanarum seditionum pati videbatur. Rebus felicissime celerrimeque confectis in Italiam celerius omnium opinione venit.

Translation

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0428.phi001.perseus-eng1:78

Thus he marched through Gallograecia and Bithynia into Asia, holding investigations and giving his formal ruling on matters of dispute in all those provinces, and assigning due prerogatives to tetrarchs, kings and states. Now Mithridates of Pergamum, whose speedy and successful action in Egypt I have described above, was not merely of royal birth but also of royal training and upbringing; for Mithridates, king of all Asia, had carried him off to cam]) with him from Pergamum on the score of his noble birth when he was quite young, and had kept him there for many years; for which reasons Caesar now appointed him king of Bosphorus, which had formerly been under control of Pharnaces, and, by thus creating a buffer state ruled by a most friendly king, he secured the provinces of the Roman people from barbarian and unfriendly kings. To the same Mithridates he awarded, by right of racial affinity and kinship, the tetrarchy of Gallograecia which had been seized and occupied a few years earlier by Deiotarus. Nowhere, however, did he delay any longer than the urgency of unsettled conditions at Rome appeared to warrant; and when he had accomplished his tasks with the greatest success and expedition, he arrived in Italy more quickly than anyone expected.