Speeches · 演说： Prosecution Of The Stepmother For Poisoning The First Tetralogy: Anonymous Prosecution for Murder The Second Tetralogy: Prosecution for Accidental Homicide The Third Tetralogy: Prosecution for Murder Of One Who Pleads That He Was Acting in Self-Defence On the Murder of Herodes On the Choreutes
Prosecution Of The Stepmother For Poisoning · urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0028.tlg001 · Greek: Φαρμακείας κατὰ τῆς μητρυιᾶς — tlg0028.tlg001.perseus-grc2 · English: Prosecution Of The Stepmother For Poisoning — trans. Kenneth John Maidment — tlg0028.tlg001.perseus-eng2
§ 1
νέος μὲν καὶ ἄπειρος δικῶν ἔγωγε ἔτι, δεινῶς δὲ καὶ ἀπόρως ἔχει μοι περὶ τοῦ πράγματος, ὦ ἄνδρες, τοῦτο μὲν εἰ ἐπισκήψαντος τοῦ πατρὸς ἐπεξελθεῖν τοῖς αὑτοῦ φονεῦσι μὴ ἐπέξειμι, τοῦτο δὲ εἰ ἐπεξιόντι ἀναγκαίως ἔχει οἷς ἥκιστα ἐχρῆν ἐν διαφορᾷ καταστῆναι, ἀδελφοῖς ὁμοπατρίοις καὶ μητρὶ ἀδελφῶν.
Not only am I still too young to know anything of courts of law, gentlemen; but I am also faced with a terrible dilemma. On the one hand, how can I disregard my father’s solemn injunction to bring his murderers to justice? On the other hand, if I obey it, I shall inevitably find myself ranged against the last persons with whom I should quarrel, my half-brothers and their mother.
§ 2
ἡ γὰρ τύχη καὶ αὐτοὶ οὗτοι ἠνάγκασαν ἐμοὶ πρὸς τούτους αὐτοὺς τὸν ἀγῶνα καταστῆναι, οὓς εἰκὸς ἦν τῷ μὲν τεθνεῶτι τιμωροὺς γενέσθαι, τῷ δʼ ἐπεξιόντι βοηθούς. νῦν δὲ τούτων τἀναντία γεγένηται· αὐτοὶ γὰρ οὗτοι καθεστᾶσιν ἀντίδικοι καὶ φονῆς, ὡς καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ ἡ γραφὴ λέγει.
Circumstances for which the defence have only themselves to blame have made it necessary that my charge should be directed against them, and them alone. One would have expected them to seek vengeance for the dead and support the prosecution; but as it is, the opposite is the case; they are themselves my opponents and the murderers, as both I and my indictment state.
§ 3
δέομαι δʼ ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἐὰν ἐπιδείξω ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς καὶ προβουλῆς τὴν τούτων μητέρα φονέα οὖσαν τοῦ ἡμετέρου πατρός, καὶ μὴ ἅπαξ ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλάκις ἤδη ληφθεῖσαν τὸν θάνατον τὸν ἐκείνου ἐπʼ αὐτοφώρῳ μηχανωμένην, τιμωρῆσαι πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς ὑμετέροις, οὓς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν καὶ τῶν προγόνων διαδεξάμενοι κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐκείνοις περὶ τῆς καταψηφίσεως δικάζετε, δεύτερον δʼ ἐκείνῳ τῷ τεθνηκότι, καὶ ἅμα ἐμοὶ μόνῳ ἀπολελειμμένῳ βοηθῆσαι.
Gentlemen, I have one request. If I prove that my opponents’ mother murdered our father by malice aforethought, after being caught not merely once, but repeatedly, in the act of seeking his life, then first avenge the outrage against your laws, that heritage from the gods and your forefathers which enables you to sentence the guilty even as they did; and secondly avenge the dead man, and in so doing give me, a lonely orphan, your aid.
§ 4
ὑμεῖς γάρ μοι ἀναγκαῖοι. οὓς γὰρ ἐχρῆν τῷ μὲν τεθνεῶτι τιμωροὺς γενέσθαι, ἐμοὶ δὲ βοηθούς, οὗτοι τοῦ μὲν τεθνεῶτος φονῆς γεγένηνται, ἐμοὶ δʼ ἀντίδικοι καθεστᾶσι. πρὸς τίνας οὖν ἔλθῃ τις βοηθούς, ἢ ποῖ τὴν καταφυγὴν ποιήσεται ἄλλοθι ἢ πρὸς ὑμᾶς καὶ τὸ δίκαιον;
For you are my kin; those who should have avenged the dead and supported me are his murderers and my opponents. So where is help to be sought, where is a refuge to be found, save with you and with justice?
§ 5
θαυμάζω δʼ ἔγωγε καὶ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ, ἥντινά ποτε γνώμην ἔχων ἀντίδικος καθέστηκε πρὸς ἐμέ, καὶ εἰ νομίζει τοῦτο εὐσέβειαν εἶναι, τὸ τὴν μητέρα μὴ προδοῦναι. ἐγὼ δʼ ἡγοῦμαι πολὺ ἀνοσιώτερον εἶναι ἀφεῖναι τοῦ τεθνεῶτος τὴν τιμωρίαν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῦ μὲν ἐκ προβουλῆς ἀκουσίως ἀποθανόντος, τῆς δὲ ἑκουσίως ἐκ προνοίας ἀποκτεινάσης.
I am at a loss indeed to understand the feelings which have led my brother to range himself against me. Does he imagine that his duty as a son consists simply in loyalty to his mother? To my mind, it is a far greater sin to neglect the avenging of the dead man; and the more so since he met his doom as the involuntary victim of a plot, whereas she sent him to it by deliberately forming that plot.
§ 6
καὶ οὐ τοῦτό γʼ ἐρεῖ, ὡς εὖ οἶδεν ὅτι οὐκ ἀπέκτεινεν ἡ μήτηρ αὐτοῦ τὸν πατέρα τὸν ἡμέτερον· ἐν οἷς μὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ ἐξουσία ἦν σαφῶς εἰδέναι παρὰ τῆς βασάνου, οὐκ ἠθέλησεν· ἐν οἷς δʼ οὐκ ἦν πυθέσθαι, τοῦτʼ αὐτὸ προὐθυμήθη. καίτοι αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐχρῆν, ὃ καὶ ἐγὼ προὐκαλούμην, προθυμηθῆναι, ὅπως τὸ πραχθὲν ᾖ ἀληθῶς ἐπεξελθεῖν.
Further, it is not for my brother to say that he is quite sure his mother did not murder our father for when he had the chance of making sure, by torture, he refused it; he showed readiness only for those modes of inquiry which could yield no certainty. Yet he ought to have been ready to do what I in fact challenged him to do, so that an honest investigation of the facts might have been possible;
§ 7
μὴ γὰρ ὁμολογούντων τῶν ἀνδραπόδων οὗτός τʼ εὖ εἰδὼς ἂν ἀπελογεῖτο καὶ ἀντέσπευδε πρὸς ἐμέ, καὶ ἡ μήτηρ αὐτοῦ ἀπήλλακτο ἂν ταύτης τῆς αἰτίας. ὅπου δὲ μὴ ἠθέλησεν ἔλεγχον ποιήσασθαι τῶν πεπραγμένων, πῶς περί γʼ ὧν οὐκ ἠθέλησε πυθέσθαι, ἐγχωρεῖ αὐτῷ περὶ τούτων εἰδέναι; [πῶς οὖν περὶ τούτων, ὦ δικάζοντες, αὐτὸν εἰκὸς εἰδέναι, ὧν γε τὴν ἀλήθειαν οὐκ εἴληφε;]
because then, if the slaves had admitted nothing, he would have confronted me with a vigorous defence based on certainty, and his mother would have been cleared of the present charge. But after refusing to inquire into the facts, how can he possibly be certain of what he refused to find out? [How, then, is it to be expected, gentlemen of the jury, that he should be sure of facts about which he has not learned the truth?]
§ 8
τί ποτε ἀπολογήσεσθαι μέλλει μοι; ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τῆς τῶν ἀνδραπόδων βασάνου εὖ ᾔδει ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τʼ ἦν αὐτῇ σωθῆναι, ἐν δὲ τῷ μὴ βασανισθῆναι ἡγεῖτο τὴν σωτηρίαν εἶναι· τὰ γὰρ γενόμενα ἐν τούτῳ ἀφανισθῆναι ᾠήθησαν. πῶς οὖν εὔορκα ἀντομωμοκὼς ἔσται φάσκων εὖ εἰδέναι, ὃς οὐκ ἠθέλησε σαφῶς πυθέσθαι ἐμοῦ ἐθέλοντος τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ βασάνῳ χρήσασθαι περὶ τούτου τοῦ πράγματος;
What reply does he mean to make to me? He was fully aware that once the slaves were examined under torture his mother was doomed; and he thought that her life depended upon the avoiding of such an examination, as he and his companions imagined that the truth would in that event be lost to sight. How, then, is he going to remain true to his oath as defendant, if he claims to be in full possession of the facts after refusing to make certain of them by accepting my offer of a perfectly impartial investigation of the matter by torture?
§ 9
τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἠθέλησα μὲν τὰ τούτων ἀνδράποδα βασανίσαι, ἃ συνῄδει καὶ πρότερον τὴν γυναῖκα ταύτην, μητέρα δὲ τούτων, τῷ πατρὶ τῷ ἡμετέρῳ θάνατον μηχανωμένην φαρμάκοις, καὶ τὸν πατέρα εἰληφότα ἐπʼ αὐτοφώρῳ, ταύτην τε οὐκ οὖσαν ἄπαρνον, πλὴν οὐκ ἐπὶ θανάτῳ φάσκουσαν διδόναι ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ φίλτροις.
In the first place, I was ready to torture the defendants’ slaves, who knew that this woman, my opponents’ mother, had planned to poison our father on a previous occasion as well, that our father had caught her in the act, and that she had admitted everything— save that it was not to kill him, but to restore his love that she alleged herself to be giving him the potion.
§ 10
διὰ οὖν ταῦτα ἐγὼ βάσανον τοιαύτην ἠθέλησα ποιήσασθαι περὶ αὐτῶν, γράψας ἐν γραμματείῳ ἃ ἐπαιτιῶμαι τὴν γυναῖκα ταύτην. βασανιστὰς δὲ αὐτοὺς τούτους ἐκέλευον γίγνεσθαι ἐμοῦ παρόντος, ἵνα μὴ ἀναγκαζόμενοι ἃ ἐγὼ ἐπερωτῴην λέγοιεν—ἀλλʼ ἐξήρκει μοι τοῖς ἐν τῷ γραμματείῳ χρῆσθαι· καὶ αὐτό μοι τοῦτο τεκμήριον δίκαιον γενέσθαι, ὅτι ὀρθῶς καὶ δικαίως μετέρχομαι τὸν φονέα τοῦ πατρός—εἰ δὲ ἄπαρνοι γίγνοιντο ἢ λέγοιεν μὴ ὁμολογούμενα, ἡ βάσανος ἀναγκάζοι τὰ γεγονότα κατηγορεῖν· αὕτη γὰρ καὶ τοὺς τὰ ψευδῆ παρεσκευασμένους λέγειν τἀληθῆ κατηγορεῖν ποιήσει.
Owing, then, to the nature of the slaves’ evidence, I proposed to have their story tested under torture after making a written note of my charges against this woman; and I told the defence to conduct the examination themselves in my presence, so that the slaves might not give forced answers to questions put by me. I was satisfied to have the written questions used; and that in itself should afford a presumption in my favour that my search for my father’s murderer is honest and impartial. Should the slaves resort to denial or make inconsistent statements, my intention was that the torture should force from them the charges which the facts demanded: for torture will make even those prepared to lie confine their charges to the truth.
§ 11
καίτοι εὖ οἶδά γʼ, εἰ οὗτοι πρὸς ἐμὲ ἐλθόντες, ἐπειδὴ τάχιστα αὐτοῖς ἀπηγγέλθη ὅτι ἐπεξίοιμι τοῦ πατρὸς τὸν φονέα, ἠθέλησαν τὰ ἀνδράποδα ἃ ἦν αὐτοῖς παραδοῦναι, ἐγὼ δὲ μὴ ἠθέλησα παραλαβεῖν, αὐτὰ ἂν ταῦτα μέγιστα τεκμήρια παρείχοντο ὡς οὐκ ἔνοχοί εἰσι τῷ φόνῳ. νῦν δʼ, ἐγὼ γάρ εἰμι τοῦτο μὲν ὁ θέλων αὐτὸς βασανιστὴς γενέσθαι, τοῦτο δὲ τούτους αὐτοὺς κελεύων ἀντʼ ἐμοῦ βασανίσαι, ἐμοὶ δήπου εἰκὸς ταὐτὰ ταῦτα τεκμήρια εἶναι ὡς εἰσὶν ἔνοχοι τῷ φόνῳ.
I am quite sure, though, that had the defence approached me with an offer of their slaves directly they learned that I intended to proceed against my father’s murderer, only to meet with a refusal of the offer, they would have produced that refusal as affording the strongest presumption of their innocence of the murder. As it is, it was I who in the first place volunteered to conduct the examination personally, and in the second told the defence to conduct it themselves in my stead. Surely, then, it is only logical that this corresponding offer and refusal should afford a presumption in my favour that they are guilty of the murder.
§ 12
εἰ γὰρ τούτων ἐθελόντων διδόναι εἰς βάσανον ἐγὼ μὴ ἐδεξάμην, τούτοις ἂν ἦν ταῦτα τεκμήρια. τὸ αὐτὸ οὖν τοῦτο καὶ ἐμοὶ γενέσθω, εἴπερ ἐμοῦ θέλοντος ἔλεγχον λαβεῖν τοῦ πράγματος αὐτοὶ μὴ ἠθέλησαν δοῦναι. δεινὸν δʼ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ εἶναι, εἰ ὑμᾶς μὲν ζητοῦσιν αἰτεῖσθαι ὅπως αὐτῶν μὴ καταψηφίσησθε, αὐτοὶ δὲ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἠξίωσαν δικασταὶ γενέσθαι δόντες βασανίσαι τὰ αὑτῶν ἀνδράποδα.
Had I refused an offer of theirs to hand over their slaves for torture, the refusal would have afforded a presumption in their favour. The presumption, then, should similarly be in my favour, if I was ready to discover the truth of the matter, while they refused to allow me to do so. In fact, it is amazing to me that they should try to persuade you not to find them guilty, after refusing to decide their case for themselves by handing over their slaves for torture.
§ 13
περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων οὐκ ἄδηλον ὅτι αὐτοὶ ἔφευγον τῶν πραχθέντων τὴν σαφήνειαν πυθέσθαι· ᾔδεσαν γὰρ οἰκεῖον σφίσι τὸ κακὸν ἀναφανησόμενον, ὥστε σιωπώμενον καὶ ἀβασάνιστον αὐτὸ ἐᾶσαι ἐβουλήθησαν. ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὑμεῖς γε, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἔγωγʼ εὖ οἶδα, ἀλλὰ σαφὲς ποιήσετε. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν μέχρι τούτου· περὶ δὲ τῶν γενομένων πειράσομαι ὑμῖν διηγήσασθαι τὴν ἀλήθειαν· δίκη δὲ κυβερνήσειεν.
In the matter of the slaves, then, it is quite clear that the defence were themselves anxious to avoid ascertaining the facts. The knowledge that the crime would prove to lie at their own door made them desirous of leaving it wrapped in silence and uninvestigated. But you will not do this, gentlemen, as I know full well; you will bring it into the light. Enough, though; I will now try to give you a true statement of the facts: and may justice guide me.
§ 14
ὑπερῷόν τι ἦν τῆς ἡμετέρας οἰκίας, ὃ εἶχε Φιλόνεως ὁπότʼ ἐν ἄστει διατρίβοι, ἀνὴρ καλός τε κἀγαθὸς καὶ φίλος τῷ ἡμετέρῳ πατρί· καὶ ἦν αὐτῷ παλλακή, ἣν ὁ Φιλόνεως ἐπὶ πορνεῖον ἔμελλε καταστῆσαι. ταύτην οὖν [πυθομένη] ἡ μήτηρ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ ἐποιήσατο φίλην.
There was an upper room in our house occupied by Philoneos, a highly respected friend of our father’s, during his visits to Athens. Now Philoneos had a mistress whom he proposed to place in a brothel. My brother’s mother made friends with her;
§ 15
αἰσθομένη δʼ ὅτι ἀδικεῖσθαι ἔμελλεν ὑπὸ τοῦ Φιλόνεω, μεταπέμπεται, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἦλθεν, ἔλεξεν αὐτῇ ὅτι καὶ αὐτὴ ἀδικοῖτο ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ ἡμετέρου· εἰ οὖν ἐθέλει πείθεσθαι, ἔφη ἱκανὴ εἶναι ἐκείνῃ τε τὸν Φιλόνεων φίλον ποιῆσαι καὶ αὑτῇ τὸν ἐμὸν πατέρα, εἶναι φάσκουσα αὑτῆς μὲν τοῦτο εὕρημα, ἐκείνης δʼ ὑπηρέτημα.
and on hearing of the wrong intended by Philoneos, she sends for her, informing her on her arrival that she herself was also being wronged by our father. If the other would do as she was told, she said, she herself knew how to restore Philoneos’ love for her and our father’s for herself. She had discovered the means; the other’s task was to carry out her orders.
§ 16
ἠρώτα οὖν αὐτὴν εἰ ἐθελήσει διακονῆσαί οἱ, καὶ ἣ ὑπέσχετο τάχιστα, ὡς οἶμαι. μετὰ ταῦτα ἔτυχε τῷ Φιλόνεῳ ἐν Πειραιεῖ ὄντα ἱερὰ Διὶ Κτησίῳ, ὁ δὲ πατὴρ ὁ ἐμὸς εἰς Νάξον πλεῖν ἔμελλεν. κάλλιστον οὖν ἐδόκει εἶναι τῷ Φιλόνεῳ τῆς αὐτῆς ὁδοῦ ἅμα μὲν προπέμψαι εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ τὸν πατέρα τὸν ἐμὸν φίλον ὄντα ἑαυτῷ, ἅμα δὲ θύσαντα τὰ ἱερὰ ἑστιᾶσαι ἐκεῖνον.
She asked if she was prepared to follow her instructions, and, I imagine, received a ready assent. Later, Philoneos happened to have a sacrifice to perform to Zeus Ctesius in Peiraeus, while my father was on the point of leaving for Naxos. So Philoneos thought that it would be an excellent idea to make one journey of it by seeing my father as far as Peiraeus, offering the sacrifice, and entertaining his friend.
§ 17
ἡ οὖν παλλακὴ τοῦ Φιλόνεω ἠκολούθει τῆς θυσίας ἕνεκεν. καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἦσαν ἐν τῷ Πειραιεῖ, οἷον εἰκός, ἔθυεν. καὶ ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ ἐτέθυτο τὰ ἱερά, ἐντεῦθεν ἐβουλεύετο ἡ ἄνθρωπος ὅπως ἂν αὐτοῖς τὸ φάρμακον δοίη, πότερα πρὸ δείπνου ἢ ἀπὸ δείπνου. ἔδοξεν οὖν αὐτῇ βουλευομένῃ βέλτιον εἶναι μετὰ δεῖπνον δοῦναι, τῆς Κλυταιμνήστρας ταύτης [τῆς τούτου μητρὸς] ταῖς ὑποθήκαις ἅμα διακονοῦσαν.
Philoneos’ mistress accompanied him to attend the sacrifice. On reaching Peiraeus, Philoneos of course carried out the ceremony. When the sacrifice was over, the woman considered how to administer the draught: should she give it before or after supper? Upon reflection, she decided that it would be better to give it afterwards, thereby carrying out the suggestion of this Clytemnestra here.
§ 18
καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα μακρότερος ἂν εἴη λόγος περὶ τοῦ δείπνου ἐμοί τε διηγήσασθαι ὑμῖν τʼ ἀκοῦσαι· ἀλλὰ πειράσομαι τὰ λοιπὰ ὡς ἐν βραχυτάτοις ὑμῖν διηγήσασθαι, ὡς γεγένηται ἡ δόσις τοῦ φαρμάκου. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἐδεδειπνήκεσαν, οἷον εἰκός, ὁ μὲν θύων Διὶ Κτησίῳ κἀκεῖνον ὑποδεχόμενος, ὁ δʼ ἐκπλεῖν τε μέλλων καὶ παρʼ ἀνδρὶ ἑταίρῳ αὑτοῦ δειπνῶν, σπονδάς τʼ ἐποιοῦντο καὶ λιβανωτὸν ὑπὲρ αὑτῶν ἐπετίθεσαν.
Now it would take too long for me to furnish or for you to listen to a detailed description of the meal so I shall try to give you as brief an account as I can of the administration of the poison which followed. After supper was over, the two naturally set about pouring libations and sprinkling some frankincense to secure the favour of heaven, as the one was offering sacrifice to Zeus Ctesius and entertaining the other, and his companion was supping with a friend and on the point of putting out to sea.
§ 19
ἡ δὲ παλλακὴ τοῦ Φιλόνεω τὴν σπονδὴν ἅμα ἐγχέουσα ἐκείνοις εὐχομένοις ἃ οὐκ ἔμελλε τελεῖσθαι, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἐνέχει τὸ φάρμακον. καὶ ἅμα οἰομένη δεξιὸν ποιεῖν πλέον δίδωσι τῷ Φιλόνεῳ, ἴσως ὡς, εἰ δοίη πλέον, μᾶλλον φιλησομένη ὑπὸ τοῦ Φιλόνεω· οὔπω γὰρ ᾔδει ὑπὸ τῆς μητρυιᾶς τῆς ἐμῆς ἐξαπατωμένη, πρὶν ἐν τῷ κακῷ ἤδη ἦν· τῷ δὲ πατρὶ τῷ ἡμετέρῳ ἔλασσον ἐνέχει.
But Philoneos’ mistress, who poured the wine for the libation, while they offered their prayers—prayers never to be answered, gentlemen—poured in the poison with it. Thinking it a happy inspiration, she gave Philoneos the larger draught; she imagined perhaps that if she gave him more, Philoneos would love her the more: for only when the mischief was done did she see that my stepmother had tricked her. She gave our father a smaller draught.
§ 20
καὶ ἐκεῖνοι ἐπειδὴ ἀπέσπεισαν, τὸν ἑαυτῶν φονέα μεταχειριζόμενοι ἐκπίνουσιν ὑστάτην πόσιν. ὁ μὲν οὖν Φιλόνεως εὐθέως παραχρῆμα ἀποθνῄσκει, ὁ δὲ πατὴρ ὁ ἡμέτερος εἰς νόσον ἐμπίπτει, ἐξ ἧς καὶ ἀπώλετο εἰκοσταῖος. ἀνθʼ ὧν ἡ μὲν διακονήσασα καὶ χειρουργήσασα ἔχει τὰ ἐπίχειρα ὧν ἀξία ἦν, οὐδὲν αἰτία οὖσα—τῷ γὰρ δημοκοίνῳ τροχισθεῖσα παρεδόθη—, ἡ δʼ αἰτία τε ἤδη καὶ ἐνθυμηθεῖσα ἕξει, ἐὰν ὑμεῖς τε καὶ οἱ θεοὶ θέλωσιν.
So they poured their libation, and, grasping their own slayer, drained their last drink on earth. Philoneos expired instantly; and my father was seized with an illness which resulted in his death twenty days later. In atonement, the subordinate who carried out the deed has been punished as she deserved, although the crime in no sense originated from her: she was broken on the wheel and handed over to the executioner; and the woman from whom it did originate, who was guilty of the design, shall receive her reward also, if you and heaven so will.
§ 21
σκέψασθε οὖν ὅσῳ δικαιότερα ὑμῶν δεήσομαι ἐγὼ ἢ ὁ ἀδελφός. ἐγὼ μέν γε τῷ τεθνεῶτι ὑμᾶς κελεύω καὶ τῷ ἠδικημένῳ τὸν ἀΐδιον χρόνον τιμωροὺς γενέσθαι· οὗτος δὲ τοῦ μὲν τεθνεῶτος πέρι οὐδὲν ὑμᾶς αἰτήσεται, ὃς ἄξιος καὶ ἐλέου καὶ βοηθείας καὶ τιμωρίας παρʼ ὑμῶν τυχεῖν, ἀθέως καὶ ἀκλεῶς πρὸ τῆς εἱμαρμένης ὑφʼ ὧν ἥκιστα ἐχρῆν τὸν βίον ἐκλιπών,
Now mark the justice of my request as compared with my brother’s. I am bidding you avenge once and for all time him who has been wrongfully done to death; but my brother will make no plea for the dead man, although he has a right to your pity, your help, and your vengeance, after having had his life cut short in so godless and so miserable a fashion by those
§ 22
ὑπὲρ δὲ τῆς ἀποκτεινάσης δεήσεται ἀθέμιτα καὶ ἀνόσια καὶ ἀτέλεστα καὶ ἀνήκουστα καὶ θεοῖς καὶ ὑμῖν, δεόμενος ὑμῶν μὴ τιμωρῆσαι ἃ αὐτὴ ἑαυτὴν οὐκ ἔπεισε μὴ κακοτεχνῆσαι. ὑμεῖς δʼ οὐ τῶν ἀποκτεινάντων ἐστὲ βοηθοί, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐκ προνοίας ἀποθνῃσκόντων, καὶ ταῦτα ὑφʼ ὧν ἥκιστα ἐχρῆν αὐτοὺς ἀποθνῄσκειν. ἤδη οὖν ἐν ὑμῖν ἐστι τοῦτʼ ὀρθῶς διαγνῶναι, ὃ καὶ ποιήσατε.
who should have been the last to commit such a deed. No, he will appeal for the murderess; he will make an unlawful, a sinful, an impossible request, to which neither heaven nor you can listen. He will ask you to refrain from punishing a crime which the guilty woman could not bring herself to refrain from committing. But you are not here to champion the murderers: you are here to champion the victims willfully murdered, murdered moreover by those who should have been the last to commit such a deed. Thus it now rests with you to reach a proper verdict; see that you do so.
§ 23
δεήσεται δʼ ὑμῶν οὗτος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῆς μητρὸς τῆς αὑτοῦ ζώσης, τῆς ἐκεῖνον διαχρησαμένης ἀβούλως τε καὶ ἀθέως, ὅπως δίκην μὴ δῷ, ἂν ὑμᾶς πείθῃ, ὧν ἠδίκηκεν· ἐγὼ δʼ ὑμᾶς ὑπὲρ τοῦ πατρὸς τοὐμοῦ τεθνεῶτος αἰτοῦμαι, ὅπως παντὶ τρόπῳ δῷ· ὑμεῖς δέ, ὅπως διδῶσι δίκην οἱ ἀδικοῦντες, τούτου γε ἕνεκα καὶ δικασταὶ ἐγένεσθε καὶ ἐκλήθητε.
My brother will appeal to you in the name of his mother who is alive and who killed her husband with out thought and without scruple; he hopes that if he is successful, she will escape paying the penalty for her crime. I, on the other hand, am appealing to you in the name of my father who is dead, that she may pay it in full; and it is in order that judgement may come upon wrongdoers for their misdeeds that you are yourselves constituted and called judges.
§ 24
καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν ἐπεξέρχομαι [λέγων], ἵνα δῷ δίκην ὧν ἠδίκηκε καὶ τιμωρήσω τῷ τε πατρὶ τῷ ἡμετέρῳ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς ὑμετέροις· ταύτῃ καὶ ἄξιόν μοι βοηθῆσαι ὑμᾶς ἅπαντας, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγω· οὗτος δὲ τἀναντία, ὅπως ἡ τοὺς νόμους παριδοῦσα μὴ δῷ δίκην ὧν ἠδίκηκε, ταύτῃ βοηθὸς καθέστηκε.
I am prosecuting to ensure that she pays for her crime and to avenge our father and your laws wherein you should support me one and all, if what I say is true. My brother, on the contrary, is defending this woman to enable one who has broken the laws to avoid paying for her misdeeds.
§ 25
καίτοι πότερον δικαιότερον τὸν ἐκ προνοίας ἀποκτείναντα δοῦναι δίκην ἢ μή; καὶ πότερον δεῖ οἰκτεῖραι μᾶλλον τὸν τεθνεῶτα ἢ τὴν ἀποκτείνασαν; ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι τὸν τεθνεῶτα· καὶ γὰρ ἂν δικαιότερον καὶ ὁσιώτερον καὶ πρὸς θεῶν καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων γίγνοιτο ὑμῖν. ἤδη οὖν ἐγὼ ἀξιῶ, ὥσπερ κἀκεῖνον ἀνελεημόνως καὶ ἀνοικτίστως αὕτη ἀπώλεσεν, οὕτω καὶ αὐτήν ταύτην ἀπολέσθαι ὑπό τε ὑμῶν καὶ τοῦ δικαίου.
Yet which is the more just: that a willful murderer should be punished, or that he should not? Which has a better claim to pity, the murdered man or the murderess? To my mind, the murdered man: because in pitying him you would be acting more justly and more righteously in the eyes of gods and men. So now I ask that just as this woman put her husband to death without pity and without mercy, so she may herself be put to death by you and by justice;
§ 26
ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἑκουσίως καὶ βουλεύσασα τὸν θάνατον ἀπέκτεινεν, ὁ δʼ ἀκουσίως καὶ βιαίως ἀπέθανε. πῶς γὰρ οὐ βιαίως ἀπέθανεν, ὦ ἄνδρες; ὅς γʼ ἐκπλεῖν ἔμελλεν ἐκ τῆς γῆς τῆσδε, παρά τε ἀνδρὶ φίλῳ αὑτοῦ εἱστιᾶτο· ἡ δὲ πέμψασα τὸ φάρμακον καὶ κελεύσασα ἐκείνῳ δοῦναι πιεῖν ἀπέκτεινεν ἡμῶν τὸν πατέρα. πῶς οὖν ταύτην ἐλεεῖν ἄξιόν ἐστιν ἢ αἰδοῦς τυγχάνειν παρʼ ὑμῶν ἢ ἄλλου του; ἥτις αὐτὴ οὐκ ἠξίωσεν ἐλεῆσαι τὸν ἑαυτῆς ἄνδρα, ἀλλʼ ἀνοσίως καὶ αἰσχρῶς ἀπώλεσεν.
for she was the willful murderess who compassed his death: he was the victim who involuntarily came to a violent end. I repeat, gentlemen, a violent end; for he was on the point of sailing from this country and was dining under a friend’s roof, when she, who had sent the poison, with orders that a draught be given him, murdered our father. What pity, then, what consideration, does a woman who refused to pity her own husband, who killed him impiously and shamefully, deserve from you or anyone else?
§ 27
οὕτω δέ τοι καὶ ἐλεεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις παθήμασι μᾶλλον προσήκει ἢ τοῖς ἑκουσίοις καὶ ἐκ προνοίας ἀδικήμασι καὶ ἁμαρτήμασι. καὶ ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνον αὕτη οὔτε θεοὺς οὔθʼ ἥρωας οὔτʼ ἀνθρώπους αἰσχυνθεῖσα οὐδὲ δείσασʼ ἀπώλεσεν, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὴ ὑφʼ ὑμῶν καὶ τοῦ δικαίου ἀπολομένη, καὶ μὴ τυχοῦσα μήτʼ αἰδοῦς μήτʼ ἐλέου μήτʼ αἰσχύνης μηδεμιᾶς παρʼ ὑμῶν, τῆς δικαιοτάτης ἂν τύχοι τιμωρίας.
Involuntary accidents deserve such pity: not deliberately planned crimes and acts of wickedness. Just as this woman put her husband to death without respecting or fearing god, hero, or human being, so she would in her turn reap her justest reward were she herself put to death by you and by justice, without finding consideration, sympathy, or respect.
§ 28
θαυμάζω δὲ ἔγωγε τῆς τόλμης τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ καὶ τῆς διανοίας, τὸ διομόσασθαι ὑπὲρ τῆς μητρὸς εὖ εἰδέναι μὴ πεποιηκυῖαν ταῦτα. πῶς γὰρ ἄν τις εὖ εἰδείη οἷς μὴ παρεγένετο αὐτός; οὐ γὰρ δήπου μαρτύρων γʼ ἐναντίον οἱ ἐπιβουλεύοντες τοὺς θανάτους τοῖς πέλας μηχανῶνταί τε καὶ παρασκευάζουσιν, ἀλλʼ ὡς μάλιστα δύνανται λαθραιότατα καὶ ὡς ἀνθρώπων μηδένα εἰδέναι·
I am astounded at the shameless spirit shown by my brother. To think that he swore in his mother’s defence that he was sure of her innocence! How could anyone be sure of what he did not witness in person? Those who plot the death of their neighbors do not, I believe, form their plans and make their preparations in front of witnessess; they act as secretly as possible and in such a way that not a soul knows;
§ 29
οἱ δʼ ἐπιβουλευόμενοι οὐδὲν ἴσασι, πρίν γʼ ἤδη ἐν αὐτῷ ὦσι τῷ κακῷ καὶ γιγνώσκωσι τὸν ὄλεθρον ἐν ᾧ εἰσί. τότε δέ, ἐὰν μὲν δύνωνται καὶ φθάνωσι πρὶν ἀποθανεῖν, καὶ φίλους καὶ ἀναγκαίους τοὺς σφετέρους αὐτῶν καλοῦσι καὶ μαρτύρονται, καὶ λέγουσιν αὐτοῖς ὑφʼ ὧν ἀπόλλυνται, καὶ ἐπισκήπτουσι τιμωρῆσαι σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἠδικημένοις·
while their victims are aware of nothing until they are already trapped and see the doom which has descended upon them. Then, if they are able and have time before they die, they summon their friends and relatives, call them to witness, tell them who the murderers are, and charge them to take vengeance for the wrong;
§ 30
ἃ κἀμοὶ παιδὶ ὄντι ὁ πατήρ, τὴν ἀθλίαν καὶ τελευταίαν νόσον νοσῶν, ἐπέσκηπτεν. ἐὰν δὲ τούτων ἁμαρτάνωσι, γράμματα γράφουσι, καὶ οἰκέτας τοὺς σφετέρους αὐτῶν ἐπικαλοῦνται μάρτυρας, καὶ δηλοῦσιν ὑφʼ ὧν ἀπόλλυνται. κἀκεῖνος ἐμοὶ νέῳ ἔτι ὄντι ταῦτα ἐδήλωσε καὶ ἐπέστειλεν, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐ τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ δούλοις.
just as my father charged me, young as I was, during his last sad illness. Failing this, they make a statement in writing, call their slaves to witness, and reveal their murderers to them. My father told me, and laid his charge upon me, gentlemen, not upon his slaves, young though I still was.
§ 31
ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν διήγηται καὶ βεβοήθηται τῷ τεθνεῶτι καὶ τῷ νόμῳ· ἐν ὑμῖν δʼ ἐστὶ σκοπεῖν τὰ λοιπὰ πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ δικάζειν τὰ δίκαια. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς τοῖς κάτω μέλειν οἳ ἠδίκηνται.
I have stated my case; I have championed the dead man and the law. It is upon you that the rest depends; it is for you to weigh the matter and give a just decision. The gods of the world below are themselves, I think, mindful of those who have been wronged.
The First Tetralogy: Anonymous Prosecution for Murder · urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0028.tlg002 · Greek: Τετραλογία Α΄ — tlg0028.tlg002.perseus-grc2 · English: The First Tetralogy: Anonymous Prosecution for Murder — trans. Kenneth John Maidment — tlg0028.tlg002.perseus-eng2
§ 1.1
ὁπόσα μὲν τῶν πραγμάτων ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων ἐπιβουλεύεται, οὐ χαλεπὰ ἐλέγχεσθαί ἐστιν· ἂν δʼ οἱ ἱκανῶς μὲν πεφυκότες, ἔμπειροι δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων ὄντες, ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τῆς ἡλικίας καθεστῶτες ἐν ᾧ κράτιστοι φρονεῖν αὑτῶν εἰσι, πράσσωσι, χαλεποὶ καὶ γνωσθῆναι καὶ ἐλεγχθῆναί
When a crime is planned by an ordinary person, it is not hard to expose; but to detect and expose criminals who are naturally able, who are men of experience, and who have reached an age when their faculties are at their best, is no easy matter.
§ 1.2
εἰσι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ κινδύνου ἐκ πολλοῦ τὴν ἀσφάλειαν ὧν ἐπιβουλεύουσι σκοποῦντες, οὐ πρότερον ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἢ πάσης ὑποψίας φυλακὴν ποιήσωνται. γιγνώσκοντας οὖν ὑμᾶς χρὴ ταῦτα, κἂν ὁτιοῦν εἰκὸς παραλάβητε, σφόδρα πιστεύειν αὐτῷ. ἡμεῖς δʼ οἱ ἐπεξερχόμενοι τὸν φόνον οὐ τὸν αἴτιον ἀφέντες τὸν ἀναίτιον διώκομεν·
The enormous risk makes them devote a great deal of thought to the problem of executing the crime in safety, and they take no steps until they have completely secured themselves against suspicion. With these facts in mind, you must place implicit confidence in any and every indication from probability presented to you.
§ 1.3
σαφῶς γὰρ οἴδαμεν ὅτι πάσης τῆς πόλεως μιαινομένης ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ, ἕως ἂν διωχθῇ, τό τʼ ἀσέβημα ἡμέτερον γίγνεται, τῆς θʼ ὑμετέρας ἁμαρτίας ἡ ποινὴ εἰς ἡμᾶς τοὺς μὴ δικαίως διώκοντας ἀναχωρεῖ. ἅπαντος δὲ τοῦ μιάσματος ἀναχωροῦντος εἰς ἡμᾶς, ὡς ἂν δυνώμεθα σαφέστατα ἐξ ὧν γιγνώσκομεν πειρασόμεθα ὑμῖν δηλοῦν ὡς ἀπέκτεινε τὸν ἄνδρα.
We, on the other hand, who are seeking satisfaction for the murder, are not letting the guilty escape and bringing the innocent into court; we know very well that as the whole city is defiled by the criminal until he is brought to justice, the sin becomes ours and the punishment for your error falls upon us, if our prosecution is misdirected. Thus, as the entire defilement falls upon us, we shall try to show you as conclusively as our knowledge allows that the defendant killed the dead man.
§ 1.4
Οὔτε γὰρ κακούργους εἰκὸς ἀποκτεῖναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν τὸν ἔσχατον κίνδυνον περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς κινδυνεύων ἑτοίμην καὶ κατειργασμένην τὴν ὠφέλειαν ἀφῆκεν· ἔχοντες γὰρ [ἂν] τὰ ἱμάτια ηὑρέθησαν. οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ παροινήσας οὐδεὶς διέφθειρεν αὐτόν· ἐγιγνώσκετο γὰρ ἂν ὑπὸ τῶν συμποτῶν. οὐδὲ μὴν οὐδʼ ἐκ λοιδορίας· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀωρὶ τῶν νυκτῶν οὐδʼ ἐν ἐρημίᾳ ἐλοιδοροῦντο. οὐδὲ μὴν ἄλλου στοχαζόμενος ἔτυχε τούτου· οὐ γὰρ ἂν σὺν τῷ ἀκολούθῳ διέφθειρεν αὐτόν.
Malefactors are not likely to have murdered him, as nobody who was exposing his life to a very grave risk would forgo the prize when it was securely within his grasp; and the victims were found still wearing their cloaks. Nor again did anyone in liquor kill him: the murderer’s identity would be known to his boon companions. Nor again was his death the result of a quarrel; they would not have been quarrelling at the dead of night or in a deserted spot. Nor did the criminal strike the dead man when intending to strike someone else; he would not in that case have killed master and slave together.
§ 1.5
ἀπολυομένης δὲ τῆς ὑποψίας ἁπάσης αὐτὸς ὁ θάνατος ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς ἀποθανόντα μηνύει αὐτόν. ἐπιθέσθαι δὲ τίνα μᾶλλον εἰκός ἐστιν ἢ τὸν μεγάλα μὲν κακὰ προπεπονθότα, ἔτι δὲ μείζονα ἐπίδοξον ὄντα πάσχειν; ἔστι δʼ ὁ διωκόμενος οὗτος· ἐκ παλαιοῦ γὰρ ἐχθρὸς ὢν αὐτοῦ πολλὰς μὲν καὶ μεγάλας γραφὰς διώξας οὐδεμίαν εἷλεν,
As all grounds for suspecting that the crime was unpremeditated are removed, it is clear from the circumstances of death themselves that the victim was deliberately murdered. Now who is more likely to have attacked him than a man who had already suffered cruelly at his hands and who was expecting to suffer more cruelly still? That man is the defendant. He was an old enemy of the other, and indicted him on several serious charges without success.
§ 1.6
ἔτι δὲ μείζους καὶ πλείους διωχθεὶς οὐδεπώποτʼ ἀποφυγὼν ἱκανὸν μέρος τῶν ὄντων ἀποβέβληκε, τὰ δʼ ἄγχιστα ἱερῶν κλοπῆς δυοῖν ταλάντοιν γεγραμμένος ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ, συνειδὼς μὲν αὑτῷ τὸ ἀδίκημα, ἔμπειρος δʼ ὢν τῆς τούτου δυνάμεως, μνησικακῶν δὲ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν, εἰκότως μὲν ἐπεβούλευσεν, εἰκότως δʼ ἀμυνόμενος τὴν ἔχθραν ἀπέκτεινε τὸν ἄνδρα.
On the other hand, he has himself been indicted on charges still more numerous and still more grave, and not once has he been acquitted, with the result that he has lost a good deal of his property. Further, he had recently been indicted by the dead man for embezzling sacred monies, the sum to be recovered being assessed at two talents; he knew himself to be guilty, experience had taught him how powerful his opponent was, and he bore him a grudge for the past; so he naturally plotted his death: he naturally sought protection against his enemy by murdering him.
§ 1.7
ἥ τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τῆς τιμωρίας ἀμνήμονα τῶν κινδύνων καθίστη αὐτόν, ὅ τε φόβος τῶν ἐπιφερομένων κακῶν ἐκπλήσσων θερμότερον ἐπιχειρεῖν ἐπῇρεν. ἤλπιζέ τε τάδε μὲν δράσας καὶ λήσειν ἀποκτείνας αὐτὸν καὶ ἀποφεύξεσθαι τὴν γραφήν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπεξιέναι οὐδένα, ἀλλʼ ἐρήμην αὐτὴν ἔσεσθαι·
Thirst for revenge made him forget the risk, and the overpowering fear of the ruin which threatened him spurred him to all the more reckless an attack. In taking this step he hoped not only that his guilt would remain undiscovered, but that he would also escape the indictment;
§ 1.8
εἴ τε καὶ ἁλοίη, τιμωρησαμένῳ κάλλιον ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ ταῦτα πάσχειν, ἢ ἀνάνδρως μηδὲν ἀντιδράσαντα ὑπὸ τῆς γραφῆς διαφθαρῆναι. σαφῶς δʼ ᾔδει ἁλωσόμενος αὐτήν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τόνδε τὸν ἀγῶνα ἐνόμισεν ἀσφαλέστερον εἶναι.
nobody, he thought, would proceed with the suit, and judgement would go by default; while in the event of his losing his case after all, he considered it better to have revenged himself for his defeat than, like a coward, to be ruined by the indictment without retaliating. And he knew very well that he would lose it, or he would not have thought the present trial the safer alternative.
§ 1.9
τὰ μὲν βιασάμενα ταῦτά ἐστιν ἀσεβῆσαι αὐτόν. μάρτυρες δʼ εἰ μὲν πολλοὶ παρεγένοντο, πολλοὺς ἂν παρεσχόμεθα· ἑνὸς δὲ τοῦ ἀκολούθου παραγενομένου, οἳ τούτου ἤκουον μαρτυρήσουσιν. ἔμπνους γὰρ ἔτι ἀρθείς, ἀνακρινόμενος ὑφʼ ἡμῶν, τοῦτον μόνον ἔφη γνῶναι τῶν παιόντων αὐτούς. ἐξελεγχόμενος δʼ ὑπό τε τῶν εἰκότων ὑπό τε τῶν παραγενομένων, οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ οὔτε δικαίως οὔτε συμφερόντως ἀπολύοιτʼ ἂν ὑφʼ ὑμῶν.
Such are the motives which drove him to sin as he did. Had there been eyewitnesses in large numbers, we should have produced them in large numbers; but as the dead man’s attendant was alone present, those who heard his statement will give evidence; for he was still alive when picked up, and in reply to our questions stated that the only assailant whom he had recognized was the defendant. Inferences from probability and eyewitnesses have alike proved the defendant’s guilt: so both justice and expediency absolutely forbid you to acquit him.
§ 1.10
οἵ τε γὰρ ἐπιβουλεύοντες ἀνεξέλεγκτοι ἂν εἶεν, εἰ μήθʼ ὑπὸ τῶν παραγενομένων μήθʼ ὑπὸ τῶν εἰκότων ἐξελέγχονται· ἀσύμφορόν θʼ ὑμῖν ἐστὶ τόνδε μιαρὸν καὶ ἄναγνον ὄντα εἴς τε τὰ τεμένη τῶν θεῶν εἰσιόντα μιαίνειν τὴν ἁγνείαν αὐτῶν, ἐπί τε τὰς αὐτὰς τραπέζας ἰόντα συγκαταπιμπλάναι τοὺς ἀναιτίους· ἐκ γὰρ τούτων αἵ τʼ ἀφορίαι γίγνονται δυστυχεῖς θʼ αἱ πράξεις καθίστανται.
Not only would it be impossible to convict deliberate criminals if they are not to be convicted by eyewitnesses and by such inferences; but it is against all your interests that this polluted wretch should profane the sanctity of the divine precincts by setting foot within them, or pass on his defilement to the innocent by sitting at the same tables as they. It is this that causes dearth and public calamity.
§ 1.11
οἰκείαν οὖν χρὴ τὴν τιμωρίαν ἡγησαμένους, αὐτῷ τούτῳ τὰ τούτου ἀσεβήματα ἀναθέντας, ἰδίαν μὲν τὴν συμφοράν, καθαρὰν δὲ τὴν πόλιν καταστῆσαι.
And so you must hold the avenging of the dead a personal duty; you must visit the defendant with retribution for the sin which was his alone; you must see that none but he suffers, and that the stain of guilt is removed from the city.
§ 2.1
οὔ μοι δοκῶ ἁμαρτάνειν ἀτυχέστατον ἐμαυτὸν ἡγούμενος εἶναι τῶν πάντων ἀνθρώπων. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων οἱ δυστυχοῦντες, ὁπόταν μὲν ὑπὸ χειμῶνος πονῶσιν, εὐδίας γενομένης παύονται· ὅταν δὲ νοσήσωσιν, ὑγιεῖς γενόμενοι σῴζονται· ἐὰν δέ τις ἄλλη συμφορὰ καταλαμβάνῃ αὐτούς, τὰ ἐναντία ἐπιγιγνόμενα ὀνίνησιν.
I am not far wrong, I think, in regarding myself as the most unlucky man alive. Others meet with misfortune. They may be buffeted by a tempest; but calm weather returns and they are buffeted no longer. They may fall ill; but they recover their health and are saved. Or some other mishap may overtake them; but it is followed by its opposite which brings relief.
§ 2.2
ἐμοὶ δὲ ζῶν τε ἅνθρωπος ἀνατροπεὺς τοῦ οἴκου ἐγένετο, ἀποθανών τε, κἂν ἀποφύγω, ἱκανὰς λύπας καὶ φροντίδας προσβέβληκεν. εἰς τοῦτο γὰρ βαρυδαιμονίας ἥκω ὥστε οὐκ ἀρκοῦν μοί ἐστιν ἐμαυτὸν ὅσιον καὶ δίκαιον παρέχοντα μὴ διαφθαρῆναι, ἀλλὰ κἂν μὴ τὸν ἀποκτείναντα εὑρὼν ἐξελέγξω, ὃν οἱ τιμωροῦντες αὐτῷ ἀδύνατοι εὑρεῖν εἰσιν, αὐτὸς καταδοχθεὶς φονεὺς εἶναι ἀνοσίως ἁλώσομαι.
With me this is not so. Not only did this man make havoc of my house during his lifetime; but he has caused me distress and anxiety in plenty since his death, even if I escape sentence; for so luckless is my lot that a godfearing and an honest life is not enough to save me. Unless I also find and convict the murderer, whom the dead man’s avengers cannot find, I shall myself be deemed guilty of murder and suffer an outrageous sentence of death.
§ 2.3
καὶ ἐμὲ ὡς δεινὸν μὲν παγχάλεπόν φασιν ἐλέγχεσθαι εἶναι, ὡς δʼ ἠλίθιον ἐξ αὐτῶν ὧν ἔπραξα φανερὸν εἶναι ἐργασάμενον τὸ ἔργον. εἰ γὰρ νῦν διὰ τῆς ἔχθρας τὸ μέγεθος εἰκότως ὑφʼ ὑμῶν καταδοκοῦμαι, πρὶν ἐργάσασθαι εἰκότερον ἦν προειδότα τὴν νῦν ὑποψίαν εἰς ἐμὲ ἰοῦσαν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἴ τινα ἔγνων ἐπιβουλεύοντα αὐτῷ, διακωλύειν μᾶλλον ἢ αὐτὸν ἐργασάμενον εἰς ἑκουσίους καὶ προδήλους ὑποψίας ἐμπεσεῖν· ἔκ τε γὰρ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔργου φανερὸς γενόμενος ἀπωλλύμην, λαθών τε σαφῶς ᾔδη τήνδε τὴν ὑποψίαν εἰς ἐμὲ ἰοῦσαν.
Now the prosecution allege that it is very difficult to prove my guilt because of my astuteness. Yet in maintaining that my actions themselves prove me to be the criminal, they are assuming me to be a simpleton. For if the bitterness of my feud is a natural ground for your deeming me guilty today, it was still more natural for me to foresee before committing the crime that suspicion would settle upon me as it has done. I was more likely to go to the length of stopping anyone else whom I knew to be plotting the murder than deliberately to incur certain suspicion by committing it myself; for if, on the one hand, the crime in itself showed that I was the murderer, I was doomed; while if, on the other hand, I escaped detection, I knew very well that suspicion would fall on me as it has done.
§ 2.4
ἄθλια μὲν οὖν πάσχω μὴ ἀπολογεῖσθαι μόνον βιαζόμενος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἀποκτείναντας φανεροὺς καταστῆσαι· ὅμως δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἐπιχειρητέον· οὐδὲν γὰρ πικρότερον τῆς ἀνάγκης ἔοικεν εἶναι. ἔχω δὲ οὐδαμῶς ἄλλως ἐλέγχειν ἢ ἐξ ὧν τοὺς ἄλλους ὁ κατήγορος ἀπολύων αὐτὸν τὸν θάνατόν φησι μηνύειν ἐμὲ τὸν φονέα ὄντα. εἰ γὰρ τούτων ἀναιτίων δοκούντων εἶναι ἐν ἐμοὶ τἀδίκημα φανεῖται, τούτων ὑπόπτων ὄντων ἐγὼ εἰκότως ἂν καθαρὸς δοκοίην εἶναι.
My plight is indeed hapless; I am forced not only to defend myself, but to reveal the criminals as well. Still, I must attempt this further task; nothing, it seems, is more relentless than necessity. I can expose the criminals, I may say, only by following the principle used by my accuser, who establishes the innocence of every one else and then asserts that the circumstances of death in themselves show the murderer to be me. If the apparent innocence of every one else is to fasten the crime upon me, it is only logical for me to be held guiltless, should others be brought under suspicion.
§ 2.5
ἔστι δὲ οὐκ ἀπεικός, ὡς οὗτοί φασιν, ἀλλὰ εἰκὸς ἀωρὶ τῶν νυκτῶν πλανώμενον ἐπὶ τοῖς ἱματίοις διαφθαρῆναι. τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐκδυθῆναι οὐδὲν σημεῖόν ἐστιν· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἔφθησαν περιδύσαντες αὐτόν, ἀλλά τινας προσιόντας φοβηθέντες ἀπέλιπον, ἐσωφρόνουν καὶ οὐκ ἐμαίνοντο τὴν σωτηρίαν τοῦ κέρδους προτιμῶντες.
It is not, as the prosecution maintain, unlikely that a man wandering about at the dead of night should be murdered for his clothing; nothing is more likely. The fact that he was not stripped indicates nothing. If the approach of passers-by startled his assailants into quitting him before they had had time to strip him, they showed sense, not madness, in preferring their lives to their spoils.
§ 2.6
εἰ δὲ μὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἱματίοις διεφθάρη, ἀλλʼ ἑτέρους ἰδὼν ἄλλο τι κακὸν ποιοῦντας, ἵνα μὴ μηνυτὴς τοῦ ἀδικήματος γένηται, ἀπέθανεν ὑπʼ αὐτῶν, τίς οἶδε; τοὺς δὲ μὴ πολὺ ἧσσον ἐμοῦ μισοῦντας αὐτόν—ἦσαν δὲ πολλοί—πῶς οὐκ εἰκὸς ἦν ἐμοῦ μᾶλλον διαφθεῖραι αὐτόν; ἐκείνοις μὲν γὰρ φανερὰ ἦν ἡ ὑποψία εἰς ἐμὲ ἰοῦσα, ἐγὼ δὲ ὑπὲρ ἐκείνων ὑπαίτιος ἐσόμενος σαφῶς ᾔδη.
Further, he may not in fact have been murdered for his clothing; he may have seen others engaged in some quite different outrage and have been killed by them to prevent his giving information of the crime; who knows? Again, were not those who hated him almost as much as I did—and there were a great many—more likely to have murdered him than I? It was plain to them that suspicion would fall on me; while I knew very well that I should bear the blame for them.
§ 2.7
τοῦ δὲ ἀκολούθου ἡ μαρτυρία πῶς ἀξία πιστεύεσθαί ἐστιν; ὑπό τε γὰρ τοῦ κινδύνου ἐκπεπληγμένον αὐτὸν οὐκ εἰκὸς ἦν τοὺς ἀποκτείναντας γνῶναι, ὑπό τε τῶν κυρίων ἀναγιγνωσκόμενον ἐπινεῦσαι ἦν εἰκός. ἀπιστουμένων δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δούλων ἐν ταῖς μαρτυρίαις—οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐβασανίζομεν αὐτούς—πῶς δίκαιον τούτῳ μαρτυροῦντι πιστεύσαντας διαφθεῖραί με;
Why, moreover, should the evidence of the attendant be allowed any weight? In his terror at the peril in which he stood, there was no likelihood of his recognizing the murderers. On the other hand, it was likely enough that he would obediently confirm any suggestions made by his masters. We distrust the evidence of slaves in general, or we should not torture them; so what justification have you for putting me to death on the evidence of this one?
§ 2.8
εἰ δέ τις τὰ εἰκότα ἀληθέσιν ἴσα ἡγεῖται καταμαρτυρῆσαί μου, ταὐτὸν ἀντιλογισάσθω ὅτι με εἰκότερον ἦν τὴν ἀσφάλειαν τῆς ἐπιβουλῆς τηροῦντα φυλάξασθαι καὶ μὴ παραγενέσθαι τῷ ἔργῳ μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦτον σφαττόμενον ὀρθῶς γνῶμαι.
Further, whoever allows probability the force of fact when it testifies to my guilt must on the same principle bear the following in mind as evidence of my innocence; it was more likely that, with an eye to carrying out my plot in safety, I should take the precaution of not being present at the scene of the crime than that the slave should recognize me distinctly just as his throat was being cut.
§ 2.9
ὡς δὲ τόνδε τὸν κίνδυνον οὐκ ἀσφαλέστερον τοῦ ἀπὸ τῆς γραφῆς ἡγούμην εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πολλαπλάσιον, εἰ μὴ παρεφρόνουν, διδάξω. ἁλοὺς μὲν γὰρ τὴν γραφὴν τῆς μὲν οὐσίας ᾔδη ἐκστησόμενος, τοῦ δὲ σώματος καὶ τῆς πόλεως οὐκ ἀπεστερούμην, περιγενόμενος δὲ καὶ λειφθείς, κἂν ἔρανον παρὰ τῶν φίλων συλλέξας, οὐκ ἂν εἰς τὰ ἔσχατα κακὰ ἦλθον· ἐὰν δὲ νῦν καταληφθεὶς ἀποθάνω, ἀνόσια ὀνείδη τοῖς παισὶν ὑπολείψω, ἢ φυγὼν γέρων καὶ ἄπολις ὢν ἐπὶ ξενίας πτωχεύσω.
I will now show that, unless I was mad, I must have thought the danger in which I now stand far greater, instead of less, than the danger to be expected from the indictment. If I was convicted on the indictment, I knew that I should be stripped of my property; but I did not lose my life or civic rights. I should still have been alive, still left to enjoy those rights and even though I should have had to obtain a loan of money from my friends, my fate would not have been the worst possible. On the other hand, if I am found guilty today and put to death, my children will inherit from me an insufferable disgrace; if instead I go into exile, I shall become a beggar in a strange land, an old man without a country.
§ 2.10
οὕτω μὲν ἃ κατηγόρηταί μου, πάντα ἄπιστά ἐστιν· ἀπολύεσθαι δὲ ὑφʼ ὑμῶν, εἰ καὶ εἰκότως μὲν ὄντως δὲ μὴ ἀπέκτεινα τὸν ἄνδρα, πολὺ μᾶλλον δίκαιός εἰμι. ἐγώ τε γὰρ φανερὸν ὅτι μεγάλα ἀδικούμενος ἠμυνόμην· οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἰκότως ἐδόκουν ἀποκτεῖναι αὐτόν· τούς τε ἀποκτείναντας καὶ οὐ τοὺς αἰτίαν ἔχοντας ἀποκτεῖναι ὀρθῶς ἂν καταλαμβάνοιτε.
Thus not one of the charges brought against me has any foundation. But even if the probabilities, as distinct from the facts, point to me as the murderer, it is acquittal that I deserve from you far more than anything else; since first, it is clear that if I struck back, it was only because I was being deeply wronged; had that not been so, it would never have been thought likely that I was the murderer; and secondly, it is the murderers, not those accused of the murder, whom it is your duty to convict.
§ 2.11
ἐκ δὲ παντὸς τρόπου ἀπολυόμενος τῆς αἰτίας ἔγωγε οὔτε εἰς τὰ τεμένη εἰσιὼν τὴν ἁγνείαν τῶν θεῶν μιανῶ, οὔτε ὑμᾶς πείθων ἀπολῦσαί με ἀνόσια πράσσω. οἱ δὲ διώκοντες μὲν ἐμὲ τὸν ἀναίτιον, τὸν δʼ αἴτιον ἀφιέντες, τῆς τε ἀφορίας αἴτιοι γίγνονται, ὑμᾶς τε ἀσεβεῖς εἰς τοὺς θεοὺς πείθοντες καταστῆναι πάντων ὧν ἐμὲ ἄξιόν φασι παθεῖν εἶναι δίκαιοί εἰσι τυγχάνειν.
As I am completely cleared of the charge, it is not I who will profane the sanctity of the gods when I set foot within their precincts, any more than it is I who am sinning against them in urging you to acquit me. It is those who are prosecuting an innocent man like myself, while they let the criminal escape, to whom dearth is due; it is they who deserve in full the penalty which they say should be inflicted upon me, for urging you to become guilty of impiety.
§ 2.12
τούτους μὲν οὖν τούτων ἀξίους ὄντας ἀπίστους ἡγεῖσθε· ἐμὲ δὲ ἔκ γε τῶν προειργασμένων γνώσεσθε οὔτε ἐπιβουλεύοντα οὔτε τῶν οὐ προσηκόντων ὀρεγόμενον, ἀλλὰ τἀναντία τούτων πολλὰς μὲν καὶ μεγάλας εἰσφορὰς εἰσφέροντα, πολλὰ δὲ τριηραρχοῦντα, λαμπρῶς δὲ χορηγοῦντα, πολλοῖς δὲ ἐρανίζοντα, μεγάλας δὲ ὑπὲρ πολλῶν ἐγγύας ἀποτίνοντα, τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν οὐ δικαζόμενον ἀλλʼ ἐργαζόμενον κεκτημένον, φιλοθύτην δὲ καὶ νόμιμον ὄντα. τοιούτου δὲ ὄντος μου μηδὲν ἀνόσιον μηδὲ αἰσχρὸν καταγνῶτε.
If this is the treatment which the prosecution deserve, you must put no faith in them. I myself, on the other hand, as you will see by examining my past life, do not form plots or covet what does not belong to me. On the contrary, I have made several substantial payments to the Treasury, I have more than once served as Trierarch, I have furnished a brilliant chorus, I have often advanced money to friends, and I have frequently paid large sums under guarantees given for others; my wealth has come not from litigation, but from hard work; and I have been a religious and law-abiding man. If my character is such as this, you must not deem me guilty of anything sinful or dishonorable.
§ 2.13
εἰ δὲ ὑπὸ ζῶντος ἐδιωκόμην, οὐκ ἂν μόνον ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπελογούμην, ἀλλʼ αὐτόν τε τοῦτον καὶ τοὺς τούτῳ μὲν βοηθοῦντας, παρʼ ἐμοῦ δὲ ὠφελεῖσθαι ζητοῦντας ἐφʼ οἷς κατηγορεῖταί μου, ἀπέδειξα ἂν ἀδικοῦντας. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐπιεικέστερον ἢ δικαιότερον παρήσω· δέομαι δʼ ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες, τῶν μεγίστων κριταὶ καὶ κύριοι, ἐλεήσαντας τὴν ἀτυχίαν μου ἰατροὺς γενέσθαι αὐτῆς, καὶ μὴ συνεπιβάντας τῇ τούτων ἐπιθέσει περιιδεῖν ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως διαφθαρέντα με ὑπʼ αὐτῶν.
Were my enemy alive and prosecuting me, I should not be resting content with a defense; I should have shown what a scoundrel he was himself and what scoundrels are those who, while professedly his champions, seek in fact to enrich themselves at my expense over the charge which I am facing. However, more out of decency than in fairness to myself, I shall refrain. Instead, I entreat you, gentlemen, you who are empowered to decide the most critical of issues; take pity on my misfortune and remedy it; do not join my opponents in their attack; do not allow them to make an end of me without regard to justice or the powers above.
§ 3.1
ἥ τε ἀτυχία ἀδικεῖται ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ, ἣν προϊστάμενος τῆς κακουργίας ἀφανίσαι τὴν αὑτοῦ μιαρίαν ζητεῖ· ὑπό τε ὑμῶν οὐκ ἄξιος ἐλεεῖσθαί ἐστιν, ἀκούσιον μὲν τῷ παθόντι περιθεὶς τὴν συμφοράν, ἑκουσίως δὲ αὐτὸς εἰς τοὺς κινδύνους καταστάς. ὡς μὲν οὖν ἀπέκτεινε τὸν ἄνδρα, ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ λόγῳ ἀπεδείξαμεν· ὡς δὲ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπελογήθη, νῦν πειρασόμεθα ἐλέγχοντες.
It is an outrage to misfortune that he should use it to cloak his crime, in the hope of concealing his defilement. Neither does he deserve your pity he did not consult his victim’s wishes in bringing doom upon him: whereas he did consult his own before exposing himself to danger. We proved in our first speech that he is the murderer; we shall now endeavor to show by examination that his defense was unsound.
§ 3.2
εἴτε γὰρ προσιόντας τινὰς προϊδόντες οἱ ἀποκτείναντες αὐτοὺς ἀπολιπόντες ᾤχοντο φεύγοντες πρότερον ἢ ἀπέδυσαν, οἱ ἐντυχόντες ἂν αὐτοῖς, εἰ καὶ τὸν δεσπότην τεθνεῶτα ηὗρον, τόν γε θεράποντα, ὃς ἔμπνους ἀρθεὶς ἐμαρτύρει, ἔτι ἔμφρονα εὑρόντες, σαφῶς ἀνακρίναντες τοὺς ἐργασαμένους ἤγγειλαν ἂν ἡμῖν, καὶ οὐχ οὗτος ἂν τὴν αἰτίαν εἶχεν· εἴτε ἄλλοι τινὲς ἕτερόν τι τοιοῦτον κακουργοῦντες ὀφθέντες ὑπʼ αὐτῶν, ἵνα μὴ γνωσθῶσι διέφθειραν αὐτούς, ἅμα τῷ τούτων φόνῳ τὸ κακούργημα ἂν ἐκηρύσσετο καὶ εἰς τούτους ἂν ἡ ὑποψία ἧκεν.
Assume that the murderers hurried off, leaving their victims before they had stripped them, because they noticed the approach of passers-by. Then even if the persons who came upon them found the master dead, they would have found the slave still conscious, as he was picked up alive and gave evidence. They would have questioned him closely and have informed us who the criminals were; so that the defendant would not have been accused. Or assume, on the other hand, that others, who had been seen by the two committing some similar outrage, had murdered them to keep the matter dark. Then news of that outrage would have been published at the same time as the news of the present murder, and suspicion would have fallen on those concerned in it.
§ 3.3
οἵ τε ἧσσον κινδυνεύοντες τῶν μᾶλλον ἐν φόβῳ ὄντων οὐκ οἶδʼ ὅπως ἂν μᾶλλον ἐπεβούλευσαν αὐτῷ· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ὅ τε φόβος ἥ τε ἀδικία ἱκανὴ ἦν παῦσαι τῆς προμηθίας, τοῖς δὲ ὅ τε κίνδυνος ἥ τε αἰσχύνη μείζων οὖσα τῆς διαφορᾶς, εἰ καὶ διενοήθησαν ταῦτα πρᾶξαι, ἀρκοῦσα ἦν σωφρονίσαι τὸ θυμούμενον τῆς γνώμης.
Again, how persons whose position was not so serious should have plotted against the dead man sooner than persons who had more to fear, I fail to understand. The fears and sense of injury of the second were enough to put an end to caution; whereas with the first the risk and disgrace involved, to which their resentment could not blind them, were sufficient to sober the anger in their hearts, even if they had intended to do the deed.
§ 3.4
οὐκ ὀρθῶς δὲ τὴν τοῦ ἀκολούθου μαρτυρίαν ἄπιστον λέγουσιν εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ ταῖς τοιαύταις μαρτυρίαις βασανίζονται, ἀλλʼ ἐλεύθεροι ἀφίενται· ὁπόταν δὲ ἢ κλέψαντες ἀπαρνῶνται ἢ συγκρύπτωσι τοῖς δεσπόταις, τότε βασανίζοντες ἀξιοῦμεν τἀληθῆ λέγειν αὐτούς.
The defense are wrong when they say that the evidence of the slave is not to be trusted; where evidence of this sort is concerned, slaves are not tortured; they are given their freedom. It is when they deny a theft or conspire with their masters to keep silence that we believe them to tell the truth only under torture.
§ 3.5
οὐδὲ μὴν ἀπογενέσθαι ἢ παραγενέσθαι εἰκότερον αὐτόν ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ ἀπεγένετο, τὸν μὲν κίνδυνον τὸν αὐτὸν ἔμελλε καὶ παρὼν κινδυνεύειν—πᾶς γὰρ αὐτῶν ληφθεὶς τοῦτον ἂν τὸν ἐπιβουλεύσαντα ἤλεγχεν ὄντα—τὸ δʼ ἔργον ἧσσον πράσσειν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὅστις τῶν παρόντων οὐκ ἂν ὀκνηρότερος εἰς τὴν πρᾶξιν ἦν.
Again, the probabilities are not in favor of his having been absent from the scene of the crime rather than present at it. In remaining absent he was going to run the same risks as he would run if present, as any of his confederates if caught would have shown that it was he who had originated the plot. And not only that; he was going to dispatch the business on hand less satisfactorily, as not one of the criminals taking part would have felt the same enthusiasm for the deed.
§ 3.6
ὡς δʼ οὐκ ἐλάσσω ἀλλὰ πολὺ μείζω τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς γραφῆς κίνδυνον ἢ τόνδε ἡγεῖτο εἶναι, διδάξω. τὸ μὲν ἁλῶναι καὶ ἀποφυγεῖν ἀμφοτέρας τὰς διώξεις ἐν ἴσαις ἐλπίσι θῶμεν αὐτῷ εἶναι. μὴ παραχθῆναι δὲ τὴν γραφὴν οὐδεμίαν ἐλπίδα εἶχε τούτου γε ζῶντος· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐπείθετο αὐτῷ· εἰς δὲ τόνδε τὸν ἀγῶνα ἥξειν οὐκ ἤλπισε· λήσειν γὰρ ἐδόκει ἀποκτείνας αὐτόν.
Further, he did not believe the danger threatened by the indictment to be less serious than that in which he now stands, but much more so, as I will prove to you. Let us assume that his expectations of conviction or acquittal were the same in the one suit as in the other. Now he had no hope of the indictment being dropped as long as his enemy was alive; his entreaties would never have been listened to. But he did not, on the other hand, expect to be involved in the present trial, as he thought that he could commit the murder without being found out.
§ 3.7
ἀξιῶν δὲ διὰ τὸ φανερὰν εἶναι τὴν ὑποψίαν αὐτῷ μὴ καταδοκεῖσθαι ὑφʼ ὑμῶν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀξιοῖ. εἰ γὰρ τοῦτον ἐν τοῖς μεγίστοις κινδύνοις ὄντα ἱκανὴ ἦν ἡ ὑποψία ἀποτρέψαι τῆς ἐπιθέσεως, οὐδείς γʼ ἂν ἐπεβούλευσεν αὐτῷ· πᾶς γὰρ ἄν τις τῶν ἧσσον κινδυνευόντων, τὴν ὑποψίαν μᾶλλον τοῦ κινδύνου φοβούμενος, ἧσσον ἢ οὗτος ἐπέθετο αὐτῷ.
Again, in claiming an acquittal on the ground that he could foresee that he would be suspected, he is arguing falsely. If the defendant, whose position was desperate could be deterred from violence by the knowledge that suspicion would fall on himself, nobody at all would have planned the crime. Every one who stood in less danger than he would have been more frightened by the certainty of being suspected than by that danger, and would therefore have been less ready than he to use violence.
§ 3.8
αἱ δʼ εἰσφοραὶ καὶ χορηγίαι εὐδαιμονίας μὲν ἱκανὸν σημεῖόν ἐστι, τοῦ δὲ μὴ ἀποκτεῖναι τἀναντία· περὶ γὰρ αὐτῆς τῆς εὐδαιμονίας τρέμων μὴ ἀποστερηθῇ, εἰκότως μὲν ἀνοσίως δὲ ἀπέκτεινε τὸν ἄνδρα. φάσκων δὲ οὐ τοὺς εἰκότως ἀλλʼ ὄντως ἀποκτείναντας φονέας εἶναι, περὶ μὲν τῶν ἀποκτεινάντων ὀρθῶς λέγει, εἴπερ ἐγένετο φανερὸν ἡμῖν τίνες ἦσαν οἱ ἀποκτείναντες αὐτόν· μὴ δεδηλωμένων δὲ τῶν ἀποκτεινάντων, ὑπὸ τῶν εἰκότων ἐλεγχόμενος οὗτος ἂν καὶ οὐδεὶς ἕτερος ὁ ἀποκτείνας αὐτὸν εἴη. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ μαρτύρων ἀλλὰ κρυπτόμενα πράσσεται τὰ τοιαῦτα.
His contributions to the Treasury and his provision of choruses may be satisfactory evidence of his wealth; but they are anything but evidence of his innocence. It was precisely his fear of losing his wealth which drove him to commit the murder; though an unscrupulous crime, it was to be expected of him. He objects that murderers are not those who were to be expected to commit murder, but those who actually did so. Now he would be quite right, provided that those who did commit it were known to us; but as they are not, proof must be based on what was to be expected; and that shows that the defendant, and the defendant alone, is the murderer. Crimes of this kind are committed in secret, not in front of witnesses.
§ 3.9
οὕτω δὲ φανερῶς ἐκ τῆς αὑτοῦ ἀπολογίας ἐλεγχθεὶς διαφθείρας αὐτόν, οὐδὲν ἕτερον ὑμῶν δεῖται ἢ τὴν αὑτοῦ μιαρίαν εἰς ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐκτρέψαι. ἡμεῖς δὲ ὑμῶν δεόμεθα μὲν οὐδέν, λέγομεν δʼ ὑμῖν, εἰ μήτε ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων μήτε ἐκ τῶν μαρτυρουμένων οὗτος νῦν ἐλέγχεται, οὐκ ἔστιν ἔτι τῶν διωκομένων ἔλεγχος οὐδείς.
As he has been proved guilty of the murder so conclusively from his own defense, he is simply asking you to transfer his own defilement to yourselves. We make no requests; we merely remind you that if neither inferences from probability nor the evidence of witnesses prove the defendant guilty today, there remains no means of proving any defendant guilty.
§ 3.10
σαφῆ μὲν γὰρ τὸν θάνατον γιγνώσκοντες, φανερῶς δὲ τὰ ἴχνη τῆς ὑποψίας εἰς τοῦτον φέροντα, πιστῶς δὲ τοῦ ἀκολούθου μαρτυροῦντος, πῶς ἂν δικαίως ἀπολύοιτε αὐτόν; ἀδίκως δʼ ἀπολυομένου τούτου ὑφʼ ὑμῶν, ἡμῖν μὲν προστρόπαιος ὁ ἀποθανὼν οὐκ ἔσται, ὑμῖν δὲ ἐνθύμιος γενήσεται.
As you see, there is no doubt about the circumstances of the murder; suspicion points plainly to the defendant; and the evidence of the slave is to be trusted so how can you in fairness acquit him? And if you acquit him unfairly, it is not upon us that the dead man’s curse will lie; it is upon you that he will bring disquiet.
§ 3.11
ταῦτα οὖν εἰδότες βοηθεῖτε μὲν τῷ ἀποθανόντι, τιμωρεῖσθε δὲ τὸν ἀποκτείναντα, ἁγνεύετε δὲ τὴν πόλιν. τρία γὰρ ἀγαθὰ πράξετε· ἐλάσσους μὲν τοὺς ἐπιβουλεύοντας καταστήσετε, πλείους δὲ τοὺς τὴν εὐσέβειαν ἐπιτηδεύοντας, ἀπολύσεσθε δʼ αὐτοὶ τῆς ὑπὲρ τούτου μιαρίας.
So with this in mind come to the victim’s aid, punish his murderer, and cleanse the city. Do this, and you will do three beneficial things; you will reduce the number of deliberate criminals; you will increase that of the godfearing; and you will yourselves be rid of the defilement which rests upon you in the defendant’s name.
§ 4.1
ἰδοὺ ἐγὼ τῇ τε ἀτυχίᾳ, ἣν οὐ δικαίως αἰτιῶμαι, ὡς οὗτοί φασιν, ἑκὼν ἐμαυτὸν ἐγχειρίζω, τῇ τε τούτων ἔχθρᾳ, δεδιὼς μὲν τὸ μέγεθος τῆς διαβολῆς αὐτῶν, πιστεύων δὲ τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ γνώμῃ τῇ τε ἀληθείᾳ τῶν ἐξ ἐμοῦ πραχθέντων. ἀποστερούμενος δὲ ὑπʼ αὐτῶν μηδὲ τὰς παρούσας ἀτυχίας ἀνακλαύσασθαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἀπορῶ εἰς ἥντινα ἄλλην σωτηρίαν χρή με καταφυγεῖν.
See, I have chosen to place myself at the mercy of the misfortune which you have been told that I blame unfairly, and at the mercy of my enemies here; for much as I am alarmed by their wholesale distortion of the facts, I have faith in your judgement and in the true story of my conduct; though if the prosecution deny me even the right of lamenting before you the misfortunes which have beset me, I do not know where to fly for refuge,
§ 4.2
καινότατα γὰρ δή, εἰ χρὴ καινότατα μᾶλλον ἢ κακουργότατα εἰπεῖν, διαβάλλουσί με. κατήγοροι γὰρ καὶ τιμωροὶ φόνου προσποιούμενοι εἶναι, ὑπεραπολογούμενοι τῆς ἀληθοῦς ὑποψίας ἁπάσης, διὰ τὴν ἀπορίαν τοῦ ἀποκτείναντος αὐτόν, ἐμὲ φονέα φασὶν εἶναι· δρῶντες δὲ τἀναντία ὧν προστέτακται αὐτοῖς, φανερὸν ὅτι ἀδίκως ἐμὲ μᾶλλον ἀποκτεῖναι ζητοῦσιν ἢ τὸν φονέα τιμωρεῖσθαι.
so utterly startling—or should I say villainous?—are the methods which are being used to misrepresent me. They pretend that they are prosecuting to avenge a murder; yet they defend all the true suspects, and then assert that I am a murderer because they cannot find the criminal. The fact that they are flatly disregarding their appointed duty shows that their object is not so much to punish the murderer as to have me wrongfully put to death.
§ 4.3
ἐμὲ δὲ προσῆκεν οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ πρὸς τὴν μαρτυρίαν τοῦ ἀκολούθου ἀπολογηθῆναι· οὐ γὰρ μηνυτὴς οὐδʼ ἐλεγκτὴρ τῶν ἀποκτεινάντων εἰμί, ἀλλὰ διωκόμενος ἀποκρίνομαι. ὅμως δὲ περιεργαστέον, ἵνα ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου τούτους τε ἐπιβουλεύοντάς μοι ἐμαυτόν τε ἀπολυόμενον ἐπιδείξω τῆς ὑποψίας.
I myself ought simply to be replying to the evidence of the attendant, for I am not here to inform you of the murderers or prove them guilty; I am answering a charge which has been brought against me. However, in order to make it completely clear that the prosecution have designs upon my life and that no suspicion can attach itself to me, I must, quite unnecessarily, go further.
§ 4.4
τὴν μὲν οὖν ἀτυχίαν ᾗ με διαβάλλουσιν, εἰς εὐτυχίαν αἰτοῦμαι μεταστῆναι· ἀξιῶ δʼ ὑμᾶς ἀπολύσαντάς με μακαρίσαι μᾶλλον ἢ καταλαβόντας ἐλεῆσαι. φασὶ δὲ τῶν μὲν ἐντυχόντων παιομένοις αὐτοῖς οὐδένα ὅντινα οὐκ εἰκότερον εἶναι σαφῶς πυθόμενον τοὺς διαφθείραντας αὐτοὺς εἰς οἶκον ἀγγεῖλαι ἢ ἀπολιπόντα οἴχεσθαι.
I ask only that my misfortune, which is being used to discredit me, may turn to good fortune; and I call upon you to acquit and congratulate me rather than condemn and pity me. According to the prosecution, those who came up during the assault were one and all more likely to inquire exactly who the murderers were and carry the news to the victims’ home than to take to their heels and leave them to their fate.
§ 4.5
ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδένα οὕτω θερμὸν καὶ ἀνδρεῖον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι δοκῶ, ὅντινα οὐκ ἂν ἀωρὶ τῶν νυκτῶν νεκροῖς ἀσπαίρουσι συντυχόντα πάλιν ὑποστρέψαντα φεύγειν μᾶλλον ἢ πυνθανόμενον τοὺς κακούργους περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς κινδυνεῦσαι. τούτων δὲ μᾶλλον ἃ εἰκὸς ἦν δρασάντων, οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἱματίοις διαφθείραντες αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἂν ἔτι εἰκότως ἀφίοιντο, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀπήλλαγμαι τῆς ὑποψίας.
But I, for my part, do not believe that there exists a human being so reckless or so brave that, on coming upon men writhing in their death agony in the middle of the night, he would not turn round and run away rather than risk his life by inquiring after the malefactors responsible. Now since it is more likely that the passers-by behaved in a natural manner, you cannot logically continue to treat the footpads who murdered the pair for their clothing as innocent, any more than suspicion can still attach itself to me.
§ 4.6
εἰ δὲ ἐκηρύσσοντο ἢ μὴ ἄλλοι τινὲς κακοῦργοι ἅμα τῷ τούτων φόνῳ, τίς οἶδεν; οὐδενὶ γὰρ ἐπιμελὲς ἦν σκοπεῖν ταῦτα. ἀφανοῦς δὲ ὄντος τοῦ κηρύγματος, οὐδὲ ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν κακούργων ἄπιστον διαφθαρῆναι αὐτόν.
As to whether or not proclamation of some other outrage was made at the time of the murder, who knows? Nobody felt called upon to inquire and as the question is an open one, it is quite possible to suppose that the malefactors concerned in such an outrage committed the murder.
§ 4.7
τοῦ δὲ θεράποντος πῶς χρὴ πιστοτέραν τὴν μαρτυρίαν ἢ τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἡγεῖσθαι; οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀτιμοῦνταί τε καὶ χρήμασι ζημιοῦνται, ἐὰν μὴ τἀληθῆ δοκῶσι μαρτυρῆσαι· ὁ δὲ οὐκ ἔλεγχον παρασχὼν οὐδὲ βάσανον—ποῦ δίκην δώσει; ἢ τίς ἔλεγχος ἔσται; ἀκινδύνως τε οὗτός γε μέλλων μαρτυρεῖν, οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν ἔπαθεν ὑπὸ τῶν κυρίων ἐχθρῶν μοι ὄντων πεισθεὶς καταψεύδεσθαί μου· ἐγώ τε ἀνόσιʼ ἂν πάσχοιμι, εἰ μὴ πιστῶς καταμαρτυρηθεὶς διαφθαρείην ὑφʼ ὑμῶν.
Why, moreover, should the evidence of the slave be thought more trustworthy than that of free men? Free men are disfranchised and fined, should their evidence be considered false; whereas this slave, who gave us no opportunity of either cross-examining or torturing him—when can he be punished? Nay, when can he be cross-examined? He could make a statement in perfect safety; so it is only natural that he was induced to lie about me by his masters, who are enemies of mine. On the other hand, it would be nothing short of impious were I put to death by you on evidence which was untrustworthy.
§ 4.8
μὴ παραγενέσθαι δέ με τῷ φόνῳ ἀπιστότερον ἢ παραγενέσθαι φασὶν εἶναι. ἐγὼ δʼ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων ἀλλʼ ἔργῳ δηλώσω οὐ παραγενόμενος. ὁπόσοι γὰρ δοῦλοί μοι ἢ δοῦλαί εἰσι, πάντας παραδίδωμι βασανίσαι· καὶ ἐὰν μὴ φανῶ ταύτῃ τῇ νυκτὶ ἐν οἴκῳ καθεύδων ἢ ἐξελθών ποι, ὁμολογῶ φονεὺς εἶναι. ἡ δὲ νὺξ οὐκ ἄσημος· τοῖς γὰρ Διιπολείοις ὁ ἀνὴρ ἀπέθανε.
According to the prosecution, it is harder to believe that I was absent from the scene of the crime than that I was present at it. But I myself, by using not arguments from probability but facts, will prove that I was not present. All the slaves in my possession, male or female, I hand over to you for torture; and if you find that I was not at home in bed that night, or that I left the house, I agree that I am the murderer. The night can be identified, as the murder was committed during the Diipoleia.
§ 4.9
περὶ δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, ἧς ἕνεκα τρέμοντά μέ φασιν εἰκότως ἀποκτεῖναι αὐτόν, πολὺ τἀναντία ἐστί. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀτυχοῦσι νεωτερίζειν συμφέρει· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν μεταβολῶν ἐπίδοξος ἡ δυσπραγία μεταβάλλειν αὐτῶν ἐστι· τοῖς δʼ εὐτυχοῦσιν ἀτρεμίζειν καὶ φυλάσσειν τὴν παροῦσαν εὐπραγίαν. μεθισταμένων γὰρ τῶν πραγμάτων δυστυχεῖς ἐξ εὐτυχούντων καθίστανται.
As regards my wealth, my fears for which are said to have furnished a natural motive for the murder, the facts are precisely the opposite. It is the unfortunate who gain by arbitrary methods, as they expect changes to cause a change in their own sorry plight. It pays the fortunate to safeguard their prosperity by living peaceably, as change turns their good fortune into bad.
§ 4.10
ἐκ δὲ τῶν εἰκότων προσποιούμενοί με ἐλέγχειν, οὐκ εἰκότως ἀλλʼ ὄντως φονέα μέ φασι τοῦ ἀνδρὸς εἶναι. τὰ δὲ εἰκότα ἄλλα πρὸς ἐμοῦ μᾶλλον ἀποδέδεικται ὄντα. ὅ τε γὰρ καταμαρτυρῶν μου ἄπιστος ἐλήλεγκται ὤν, ὅ τε ἔλεγχος οὐκ ἔστι· τά τε τεκμήρια ἐμά, οὐ τούτων ὄντα ἐδήλωσα· τά τε ἴχνη τοῦ φόνου οὐκ εἰς ἐμὲ φέροντα, ἀλλʼ εἰς τοὺς ἀπολυομένους ἀποδέδεικται ὑπʼ αὐτῶν. πάντων δὲ τῶν κατηγορηθέντων ἀπίστων ἐλεγχθέντων, οὐκ ἐὰν ἀποφύγω οὐκ ἔστιν ἐξ ὧν ἐλεγχθήσονται οἱ κακουργοῦντες, ἀλλʼ ἐὰν καταληφθῶ, οὐδεμία ἀπολογία τοῖς διωκομένοις ἀρκοῦσά ἐστιν.
Again, although the prosecution pretend to base their proof of my guilt on inferences from probability, they assert not that I am the probable, but that I am the actual murderer. Moreover, those inferences have in fact been proved to be in my favor rather than theirs—for not only has the witness for the prosecution been proved untrustworthy, but he cannot be cross-examined. Similarly, I have shown that the presumptions are in my favor and not in favor of the prosecution and the trail of guilt has been proved to lead not to me, but to those whom the prosecution are treating as innocent. Thus the charges made against me have been shown without exception to be unfounded. But it does not follow that there is no way of convicting criminals, if I am acquitted; it does follow that there is no way of effectively defending persons accused, if I am sentenced.
§ 4.11
οὕτω δὲ ἀδίκως διώκοντές με, αὐτοὶ μὲν ἀνοσίως ἀποκτεῖναι ζητοῦντες καθαροί φασιν εἶναι, ἐμὲ δέ, ὃς εὐσεβεῖν ὑμᾶς πείθω, ἀνόσια δρᾶν λέγουσιν. ἐγὼ δὲ καθαρὸς ὢν πάντων τῶν ἐγκλημάτων ὑπὲρ μὲν ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπισκήπτω αἰδεῖσθαι τὴν τῶν μηδὲν ἀδικούντων εὐσέβειαν, ὑπὲρ δὲ τοῦ ἀποθανόντος ἀναμιμνῄσκων τὴν ποινὴν παραινῶ ὑμῖν μὴ τὸν ἀναίτιον καταλαβόντας τὸν αἴτιον ἀφεῖναι· ἀποθανόντος γὰρ ἐμοῦ οὐδεὶς ἔτι τὸν αἴτιον ζητήσει.
You see how unjustifiably my accusers are attacking me. Yet notwithstanding the fact that it is they who are endeavoring to have me put to death in so impious a fashion, they maintain that they themselves are guiltless; according to them, it is I who am acting impiously—I, who am urging you to show yourselves godfearing men. But as I am innocent of all their charges, I adjure you on my own behalf to respect the righteousness of the guiltless, just as on the dead man’s behalf I remind you of his right to vengeance and urge you not to let the guilty escape by punishing the innocent; once I am put to death, no one will continue the search for the criminal.
§ 4.12
ταῦτα οὖν σεβόμενοι ὁσίως καὶ δικαίως ἀπολύετέ με, καὶ μὴ μετανοήσαντες τὴν ἁμαρτίαν γνῶτε· ἀνίατος γὰρ ἡ μετάνοια τῶν τοιούτων ἐστίν.
Respect these considerations, and satisfy heaven and justice by acquitting me. Do not wait until remorse proves to you your mistake; remorse in cases such as this has no remedy.
The Second Tetralogy: Prosecution for Accidental Homicide · urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0028.tlg003 · Greek: Τετραλογία Β΄ — tlg0028.tlg003.perseus-grc2 · English: The Second Tetralogy: Prosecution for Accidental Homicide — trans. Kenneth John Maidment — tlg0028.tlg003.perseus-eng2
§ 1.1
τὰ μὲν ὁμολογούμενα τῶν πραγμάτων ὑπό τε τοῦ νόμου κατακέκριται ὑπό τε τῶν ψηφισαμένων, οἳ κύριοι πάσης τῆς πολιτείας εἰσίν· ἐὰν δέ τι ἀμφισβητήσιμον ᾖ, τοῦτο ὑμῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες πολῖται, προστέτακται διαγνῶναι. οἶμαι μὲν οὖν οὐδὲ ἀμφισβητήσειν πρὸς ἐμὲ τὸν διωκόμενον· ὁ γὰρ παῖς μου ἐν γυμνασίῳ ἀκοντισθεὶς διὰ τῶν πλευρῶν ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ μειρακίου παραχρῆμα ἀπέθανεν.
Cases in which the facts are agreed upon are settled in advance either by the law or by the statutes of the Assembly, which between them control every branch of civic life. But should matter for dispute occur, it is your task, gentlemen, to give a decision. However, I do not imagine that any dispute will in fact arise between the defendant and myself. My son was struck in the side by a javelin thrown by yonder lad in the gymnasium, and died instantly.
§ 1.2
ἑκόντα μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐπικαλῶ ἀποκτεῖναι, ἄκοντα δέ. ἐμοὶ δὲ οὐκ ἐλάσσω τοῦ ἑκόντος ἄκων τὴν συμφορὰν κατέστησε. τῷ δὲ ἀποθανόντι αὐτῷ μὲν οὐδὲν ἐνθύμιον, τοῖς δὲ ζῶσι προσέθηκεν. ὑμᾶς δὲ ἀξιῶ ἐλεοῦντας μὲν τὴν ἀπαιδίαν τῶν γονέων, οἰκτίροντας δὲ τὴν ἄωρον τοῦ ἀποθανόντος τελευτήν, εἴργοντας ὧν ὁ νόμος εἴργει τὸν ἀποκτείναντα μὴ περιορᾶν ἅπασαν τὴν πόλιν ὑπὸ τούτου μιαινομένην.
I accuse him not of killing my son deliberately, but of killing him by accident—though the loss which I have suffered is not thereby lessened. But if he has not caused the dead boy himself disquiet, he has caused disquiet to the living; and I ask you to pity that dead boy’s childless parents: to show your sorrow for his own untimely end: to forbid his slayer to set foot where he is forbidden to set foot by the law: and to refuse to allow him to defile the whole city.
§ 2.1
νῦν δὴ φανερόν μοι ὅτι αὐταὶ αἱ συμφοραὶ καὶ χρεῖαι τούς τε ἀπράγμονας εἰς ἀγῶνας καταστῆναι τούς τε ἡσυχίους τολμᾶν τά τε ἄλλα παρὰ φύσιν λέγειν καὶ δρᾶν βιάζονται. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἥκιστα τοιοῦτος ὢν καὶ βουλόμενος εἶναι, εἰ μὴ πολύ γε ἔψευσμαι, ὑπʼ αὐτῆς τῆς συμφορᾶς ἠναγκάσθην νῦν παρὰ τὸν ἄλλον τρόπον ὑπὲρ πραγμάτων ἀπολογεῖσθαι, ὧν ἐγὼ χαλεπῶς μὲν τὴν ἀκρίβειαν ἔγνων, ἔτι δὲ ἀπορωτέρως διάκειμαι ὡς χρὴ ὑμῖν ἑρμηνεῦσαι ταῦτα.
I now see that sheer misfortune and necessity can force those who hate litigation to appear in court and those who love peace to show boldness and generally belie their nature in word and deed; for I myself, who, unless I am sorely mistaken, am very far from finding or wanting to find such a task congenial, have today been forced by sheer misfortune to depart from my habits and appear as defendant in a case in which I found it hard enough to arrive at the exact truth, but which leaves me still more perplexed when I consider how I should present it to you.
§ 2.2
ὑπὸ δὲ σκληρᾶς ἀνάγκης βιαζόμενος, καὶ αὐτὸς εἰς τὸν ὑμέτερον ἔλεον, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, καταπεφευγὼς δέομαι ὑμῶν, ἐὰν ἀκριβέστερον ἢ ὡς σύνηθες ὑμῖν δόξω εἰπεῖν, μὴ διὰ τὰς προειρημένας τύχας δυσχερῶς ἀποδεξαμένους μου τὴν ἀπολογίαν δόξῃ καὶ μὴ ἀληθείᾳ τὴν κρίσιν ποιήσασθαι· ἡ μὲν γὰρ δόξα τῶν πραχθέντων πρὸς τῶν λέγειν δυναμένων ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ ἀλήθεια πρὸς τῶν δίκαια καὶ ὅσια πρασσόντων.
I am driven by pitiless necessity: and I, like my opponents, gentlemen of the jury, seek refuge in your sympathy. I beg of you: if my arguments appear more subtle than those generally presented to you, do not allow the circumstances already mentioned so to prejudice you against my defence as to make you base your verdict upon apparent fact instead of upon the truth; apparent fact puts the advantage with the clever speaker, but truth with the man who lives in justice and righteousness.
§ 2.3
ἐδόκουν μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε ταῦτα παιδεύων τὸν υἱὸν ἐξ ὧν μάλιστα τὸ κοινὸν ὠφελεῖται, ἀμφοῖν τι ἡμῖν ἀγαθὸν ἀποβήσεσθαι· συμβέβηκε δέ μοι πολὺ παρὰ γνώμην τούτων. τὸ γὰρ μειράκιον οὐχ ὕβρει οὐδὲ ἀκολασίᾳ, ἀλλὰ μελετῶν μετὰ τῶν ἡλίκων ἀκοντίζειν ἐν τῷ γυμνασίῳ ἔβαλε μέν, οὐκ ἀπέκτεινε δὲ οὐδένα κατά γε τὴν ἀλήθειαν ὧν ἔπραξεν, ἄλλου δʼ εἰς αὑτὸν ἁμαρτόντος εἰς ἀκουσίους αἰτίας ἦλθεν.
In training my son in those pursuits from which the state derives most benefit I imagined that both of us would be rewarded; but the result has sadly belied my hopes. For the lad—not from insolence or wantonness, but while at javelin-practice in the gymnasium with his fellows—made a hit, it is true, but killed no one, if one considers his true part in the matter: he accidentally incurred the blame for the error of another which affected that other’s own person.
§ 2.4
εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀκόντιον ἔξω τῶν ὅρων τῆς αὑτοῦ πορείας ἐπὶ τὸν παῖδα ἐξενεχθὲν ἔτρωσεν αὐτόν, οὐδεὶς ἂν ἡμῖν λόγος ὑπελείπετο μὴ φονεῦσιν εἶναι· τοῦ δὲ παιδὸς ὑπὸ τὴν τοῦ ἀκοντίου φορὰν ὑποδραμόντος καὶ τὸ σῶμα προστήσαντος, ὁ μὲν ἐκωλύθη τοῦ σκοποῦ τυχεῖν, ὁ δὲ ὑπὸ τὸ ἀκόντιον ὑπελθὼν ἐβλήθη, καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν οὐχ ἡμετέραν οὖσαν προσέβαλεν ἡμῖν.
Had the boy been wounded because the javelin had traveled in his direction outside the area appointed for its flight, we should be left unable to show that we had not caused his death. But he ran into the path of the javelin and placed his person in its way. Hence my son was prevented from hitting the target: while the boy, who moved into the javelin’s path, was struck, thereby causing us to be blamed for what we did not do.
§ 2.5
διὰ δὲ τὴν ὑποδρομὴν βληθέντος τοῦ παιδός, τὸ μὲν μειράκιον οὐ δικαίως ἐπικαλεῖται, οὐδένα γὰρ ἔβαλε τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ σκοποῦ ἀφεστώτων· ὁ δὲ παῖς εἴπερ ἑστὼς φανερὸς ὑμῖν ἐστι μὴ βληθείς, ἑκουσίως δʼ ὑπὸ τὴν φορὰν τοῦ ἀκοντίου ὑπελθών, ἔτι σαφεστέρως δηλοῦται διὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ ἁμαρτίαν ἀποθανών· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐβλήθη ἀτρεμίζων καὶ μὴ διατρέχων.
It was because he ran in front of the javelin that the boy was struck. The lad is therefore accused without just cause, as he did not strike anyone standing clear of the target. At the same time, since it is plain to you that the boy was not struck while standing still, but was struck only after deliberately moving into the path of the javelin, you have still clearer proof that his death was due to an error on his own part. Had he stood still and not run across, he would not have been struck.
§ 2.6
ἀκουσίου δὲ τοῦ φόνου ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ὑμῖν ὁμολογουμένου γενέσθαι, ἐκ τῆς ἁμαρτίας, ὁποτέρου αὐτῶν ἐστίν, ἔτι γε σαφέστερον ἂν ὁ φονεὺς ἐλεγχθείη. οἵ τε γὰρ ἁμαρτάνοντες ὡς ἂν ἐπινοήσωσί τι δρᾶσαι, οὗτοι πράκτορες τῶν ἀκουσίων εἰσίν· οἵ τε ἑκούσιόν τι δρῶντες ἢ πάσχοντες, οὗτοι τῶν παθημάτων αἴτιοι γίγνονται.
Both sides are agreed, as you see, that the boy’s death was accidental; so by discovering which of the two was guilty of error, we should prove still more conclusively who killed him. For it is those guilty of error in carrying out an intended act who are responsible for accidents: just as it is those who voluntarily do a thing or allow it to be done to them who are responsible for the effects suffered.
§ 2.7
τὸ μὲν τοίνυν μειράκιον περὶ οὐδένα οὐδὲν ἥμαρτεν. οὔτε γὰρ ἀπειρημένον ἀλλὰ προστεταγμένον ἐξεμελέτα, οὔτε ἐν γυμναζομένοις ἀλλʼ ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀκοντιζόντων τάξει ἠκόντιζεν, οὔτε τοῦ σκοποῦ ἁμαρτών, εἰς τοὺς ἀφεστῶτας ἀκοντίσας, τοῦ παιδὸς ἔτυχεν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ὀρθῶς ὡς ἐπενόει δρῶν ἔδρασε μὲν οὐδὲν ἀκούσιον, ἔπαθε δὲ διακωλυθεὶς τοῦ σκοποῦ τυχεῖν.
Now the lad, on his side, was not guilty of error in respect of anyone: in practising he was not doing what he was forbidden but what he had been told to do, and he was not standing among those engaged in gymnastics when he threw the javelin, but in his place among the other throwers: nor did he hit the boy because he missed the target and sent his javelin instead at those standing clear. He did everything correctly, as he intended; and thus he was not the cause of any accident, but the victim of one, in that he was prevented from hitting the target.
§ 2.8
ὁ δὲ παῖς βουλόμενος προδραμεῖν, τοῦ καιροῦ διαμαρτὼν ἐν ᾧ διατρέχων οὐκ ἂν ἐπλήγη, περιέπεσεν οἷς οὐκ ἤθελεν, ἀκουσίως δὲ ἁμαρτὼν εἰς ἑαυτὸν οἰκείαις συμφοραῖς κέχρηται, τῆς δʼ ἁμαρτίας τετιμωρημένος ἑαυτὸν ἔχει τὴν δίκην, οὐ συνηδομένων μὲν οὐδὲ συνεθελόντων ἡμῶν, συναλγούντων δὲ καὶ συλλυπουμένων. τῆς δὲ ἁμαρτίας εἰς τοῦτον ἡκούσης, τό τʼ ἔργον οὐχ ἡμέτερον ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐξαμαρτόντος ἐστί, τό τε πάθος εἰς τὸν δράσαντα ἐλθὸν ἡμᾶς μὲν ἀπολύει τῆς αἰτίας, τὸν δὲ δράσαντα δικαίως ἅμα τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ τετιμώρηται.
The boy, on the other hand, who wished to run forward, missed the moment at which he could have crossed without being hit, with results which he by no means desired. He was accidentally guilty of an error which affected his own person, and has thus met with a disaster for which he had himself alone to thank. He has punished himself for his error, and is therefore duly requited; not that we rejoice at or approve of it—far from it: we feel both sympathy and sorrow. It is thus the dead boy who proves to have been guilty of error; so the act which caused his death is to be attributed not to us, but to him, the party guilty of error: just as the recoiling of its effects upon the agent not only absolves us from blame, but has caused the agent to be punished as he deserved directly his error was committed.
§ 2.9
ἀπολύει δὲ καὶ ὁ νόμος ἡμᾶς, ᾧ πιστεύων, εἴργοντι μήτε ἀδίκως μήτε δικαίως ἀποκτείνειν, ὡς φονέα με διώκει. ὑπὸ μὲν γὰρ τῆς αὐτοῦ τοῦ τεθνεῶτος ἁμαρτίας ὅδε ἀπολύεται μηδὲ ἀκουσίως ἀποκτεῖναι αὐτόν· ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ διώκοντος οὐδʼ ἐπικαλούμενος ὡς ἑκὼν ἀπέκτεινεν, ἀμφοῖν ἀπολύεται τοῖν ἐγκλημάτοιν, μήτʼ ἄκων μήθʼ ἑκὼν ἀποκτεῖναι.
Furthermore, our innocence is attested by the law upon which my accuser relies in charging me with the boy’s death, the law which forbids the taking of life whether wrongfully or otherwise. For the fact that the victim himself was guilty of error clears the defendant here of having killed him by accident: while his accuser does not even suggest that he killed him deliberately. Thus he is cleared of both charges, of killing the boy by accident and of killing him deliberately.
§ 2.10
ἀπολυόμενος δὲ ὑπό τε τῆς ἀληθείας τῶν πραχθέντων ὑπό τε τοῦ νόμου καθʼ ὃν διώκεται, οὐδὲ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἕνεκα δίκαιοι τοιούτων κακῶν ἀξιοῦσθαί ἐσμεν. οὗτός τε γὰρ ἀνόσια πείσεται τὰς οὐ προσηκούσας φέρων ἁμαρτίας, ἐγώ τε μᾶλλον μὲν οὐδέν, ὁμοίως δὲ τούτῳ ἀναμάρτητος ὤν, εἰς πολλαπλασίους τούτου συμφορὰς ἥξω· ἐπί τε γὰρ τῇ τούτου διαφθορᾷ ἀβίωτον τὸ λειπόμενον τοῦ βίου διάξω, ἐπί τε τῇ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπαιδίᾳ ζῶν ἔτι κατορυχθήσομαι.
Not only do the true facts of the case and the law under which he is being prosecuted attest my son’s innocence; but our manner of life is equally far from justifying such harsh treatment of us. Not only will it be an outrage, if my son is to bear the blame for errors which he did not commit; but I myself, who am equally innocent, though assuredly not more so, will be visited with woes many times more bitter. Once my son is lost, I shall pass the rest of my days longing for death: once I am left childless, mine will be a life within the tomb.
§ 2.11
ἐλεοῦντες οὖν τοῦδε μὲν τοῦ νηπίου τὴν ἀναμάρτητον συμφοράν, ἐμοῦ δὲ τοῦ γηραιοῦ καὶ ἀθλίου τὴν ἀπροσδόκητον κακοπάθειαν, μὴ καταψηφισάμενοι δυσμόρους ἡμᾶς καταστήσητε, ἀλλʼ ἀπολύοντες εὐσεβεῖτε. ὅ τε γὰρ ἀποθανὼν συμφοραῖς περιπεσὼν οὐκ ἀτιμώρητός ἐστιν, ἡμεῖς τε οὐ δίκαιοι τὰς τούτων ἁμαρτίας συμφέρειν ἐσμέν.
Have pity, then, on this child, the victim of calamity, though guilty of no error: and have pity on me, an old man in distress, stricken thus suddenly with sorrow. Do not bring a miserable fate upon us by condemning us: but show that you fear God by acquitting us. The dead boy is not unavenged for the calamity which befell him: nor ought we ourselves to share the responsibility for errors due to our accusers.
§ 2.12
τήν τε οὖν εὐσέβειαν τούτων τῶν πραχθέντων καὶ τὸ δίκαιον αἰδούμενοι ὁσίως καὶ δικαίως ἀπολύετε ἡμᾶς, καὶ μὴ ἀθλιωτάτω δύο, πατέρα καὶ παῖδα, ἀώροις συμφοραῖς περιβάλητε.
So respect the righteousness which the facts before you have revealed: respect justice: and acquit us as godly and just men should. Do not bring upon a father and a son, two of the most wretched of beings, sorrows which the years of neither can well bear.
§ 3.1
ὅτι μὲν αὐτὴ ἡ χρεία παρὰ φύσιν καὶ λέγειν καὶ δρᾶν ἅπαντας ἀναγκάζει, ἔργῳ καὶ οὐ λόγῳ δοκεῖ μοι σημαίνειν οὗτος· ἥκιστα γὰρ ἔν γε τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ἀναιδὴς καὶ τολμηρὸς ὤν, νῦν ὑπʼ αὐτῆς τῆς συμφορᾶς ἠνάγκασται λέγειν οἷα οὐκ ἄν ποτε ᾤμην ἐγὼ τοῦτον εἰπεῖν.
That sheer necessity can force all men to belie their nature in both word and deed is a fact of which the defendant seems to me to be giving very real proof. Whereas in the past he was the last to show impudence or audacity, his very misfortune has today forced him to say things which I for one would never have expected of him.
§ 3.2
ἐγώ τε γὰρ πολλῇ ἀνοίᾳ χρώμενος οὐκ ἂν ὑπέλαβον τοῦτον ἀντειπεῖν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἕνα λόγον ἀντὶ δυοῖν λέξας τὸ ἥμισυ τῆς κατηγορίας ἐμαυτὸν ἂν ἀπεστέρησα· οὗτός τε μὴ τολμῶν οὐκ ἂν προεῖχε τῷ διπλασίῳ μου, ἕνα μὲν πρὸς ἕνα λόγον ἀπολογηθείς, ἃ δὲ κατηγόρησεν ἀναποκρίτως εἰπών.
I, in my great folly, imagined that he would not reply; otherwise I would not have deprived myself of half of my opportunities as prosecutor by making only one speech instead of two; and he, but for his audacity, would not have had the twofold advantage over me of using one speech to answer the one speech for the prosecution and making his accusations when they could not be answered.
§ 3.3
τοσοῦτον δὲ προέχων ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἡμῶν, ἔτι δὲ ἐν οἷς ἔπρασσε πολλαπλάσια τούτων, οὗτος μὲν οὐχ ὁσίως δεῖται ὑμῶν εὐμενῶς τὴν ἀπολογίαν ἀποδέχεσθαι αὐτοῦ· ἐγὼ δὲ δράσας μὲν οὐδὲν κακόν, παθὼν δὲ ἄθλια καὶ δεινά, καὶ νῦν ἔτι δεινότερα τούτων, ἔργῳ καὶ οὐ λόγῳ εἰς τὸν ὑμέτερον ἔλεον καταπεφευγὼς δέομαι ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες ἀνοσίων ἔργων τιμωροί, ὁσίων δὲ διαγνώμονες, μὴ παρʼ ἔργα φανερὰ ὑπὸ πονηρᾶς λόγων ἀκριβείας πεισθέντας ψευδῆ τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῶν πραχθέντων ἡγήσασθαι·
With his great advantage over us in the matter of the speeches, and with the far greater one which his methods have given him in addition, it is outrageous that the accused should entreat you to listen kindly to his defence. I myself, on the other hand, far from causing any harm, have been the victim of cruel affliction, and am today being treated still more cruelly. It is as one who seeks more than a pretended refuge in your sympathy that I make my own request of you. You who take vengeance for unrighteous deeds and determine wherein is righteousness, do not, I beg of you, let worthless subtleties of speech induce you to disregard plain facts and treat the truth as false;
§ 3.4
ἡ μὲν γὰρ πιστότερον ἢ ἀληθέστερον σύγκειται, ἡ δʼ ἀδολώτερον καὶ ἀδυνατώτερον λεχθήσεται. τῷ μὲν οὖν δικαίῳ πιστεύων ὑπερορῶ τῆς ἀπολογίας· τῇ δὲ σκληρότητι τοῦ δαίμονος ἀπιστῶν ὀρρωδῶ μὴ οὐ μόνον τῆς χρείας τοῦ παιδὸς ἀποστερηθῶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐθέντην προσκαταγνωσθέντα ὑφʼ ὑμῶν ἐπίδω αὐτόν. εἰς τοῦτο γὰρ τόλμης καὶ ἀναιδείας ἥκει,
for such subtleties result in a tale more plausible than true, whereas the truth, when told, will be less guileful and therefore less convincing. My faith in justice, then, enables me to despise his defence. Yet my distrust of the pitiless will of fate makes me fear that I may not only lose the benefit of my child, but that I may see him convicted by you of taking his own life in addition.
§ 3.5
ὥστε τὸν μὲν βαλόντα καὶ ἀποκτείναντα οὔτε τρῶσαι οὔτε ἀποκτεῖναί φησι, τὸν δὲ οὔτε ψαύσαντα τοῦ ἀκοντίου οὔτε ἐπινοήσαντα ἀκοντίσαι, ἁπάσης μὲν γῆς ἁμαρτόντα, πάντων δὲ σωμάτων, διὰ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ πλευρῶν διαπῆξαι τὸ ἀκόντιον λέγει. ἐγὼ δὲ ἑκουσίως κατηγορῶν ἀποκτεῖναι αὐτὸν πιστότερος ἄν μοι δοκῶ εἶναι ἢ οὗτος, ὃς μήτε βαλεῖν μήτε ἀποκτεῖναί φησι τὸ μειράκιον.
For the defendant has had the audacity and shamelessness to say that he who struck and killed neither wounded nor killed, whereas he who neither touched the javelin nor had any intention of throwing it missed every other point on earth and every other person, and pierced his own side with the javelin. Why, I should myself sound more convincing, I think, were I accusing the lad of willful murder, than does the defendant in claiming that the lad neither struck nor killed.
§ 3.6
ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ καιρῷ κελευόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ παιδοτρίβου, ὃς ὑπεδέχετο τοῖς ἀκοντίζουσι τὰ ἀκόντια, ἀναιρεῖσθαι, διὰ τὴν τοῦ βαλόντος ἀκολασίαν πολεμίῳ τῷ τούτου βέλει περιπεσών, οὐδὲν οὐδʼ εἰς ἕνʼ ἁμαρτών, ἀθλίως ἀπέθανεν· ὁ δὲ περὶ τὸν τῆς ἀναιρέσεως καιρὸν πλημμελήσας, οὐ τοῦ σκοποῦ τυχεῖν ἐκωλύθη, ἀλλʼ ἄθλιον καὶ πικρὸν σκοπὸν ἐμοὶ ἀκοντίσας, ἑκὼν μὲν οὐκ ἀπέκτεινεν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἑκὼν ἢ οὔτʼ ἔβαλεν οὔτʼ ἀπέκτεινεν.
My son was bidden at that moment by the master in charge, who was taking the javelins of the throwers into his keeping, to pick them up; but thanks to the wantonness of him who cast it, he was greeted by yonder lad’s cruel weapon; though guilty of error in respect of no single person, he died a piteous death. The lad, on the other hand, who mistook the moment at which the javelins were being picked up, was not prevented from making a hit. To my bitter sorrow, he struck a target; and although he did not kill my son deliberately, there are better grounds for maintaining that he did than for asserting that he neither struck nor killed.
§ 3.7
ἀκουσίως δὲ οὐχ ἧσσον ἢ ἑκουσίως ἀποκτείναντες μου τὸν παῖδα, τὸ παράπαν δʼ ἀρνούμενοι μὴ ἀποκτεῖναι αὐτόν, οὐδʼ ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου καταλαμβάνεσθαί φασιν, ὃς ἀπαγορεύει μήτε δικαίως μήτε ἀδίκως ἀποκτείνειν. ἀλλὰ τίς ὁ βαλών; εἰς τίνʼ ὁ φόνος ἀνήκει; εἰς τοὺς θεωμένους ἢ εἰς τοὺς παιδαγωγοὺς, ὧν οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν κατηγορεῖ; οὐ γὰρ ἀφανὴς ἀλλὰ καὶ λίαν φανερὸς ἔμοιγε αὐτοῦ ὁ θάνατός ἐστιν. ἐγὼ δὲ τὸν νόμον ὀρθῶς ἀγορεύειν φημὶ τοὺς ἀποκτείναντας κολάζεσθαι· ὅ τε γὰρ ἄκων ἀποκτείνας ἀκουσίοις κακοῖς περιπεσεῖν δίκαιός ἐστιν, ὅ τε διαφθαρεὶς οὐδὲν ἧσσον ἀκουσίως ἢ ἑκουσίως βλαφθεὶς ἀδικοῖτʼ ἂν ἀτιμώρητος γενόμενος.
Although it was by accident that they killed my son, the effects were the same as those of willful murder. Yet they deny that they killed him at all, and even maintain that they are not amenable to the law which forbids the taking of life whether wrongfully or otherwise. Then who did throw the javelin? To whom is the boy’s death in fact to be attributed? To the spectators or the masters in charge—whom no one accuses at all? The circumstances of my son’s death are no mystery: to me, for one, they are only too clear; and I maintain that the law is right when it orders the punishment of those who have taken life; not only is it just that he who killed without meaning to kill should suffer punishment which he did not mean to incur; but it would also be an injustice to the victim, whose injury is not lessened by being accidental, were he deprived of vengeance.
§ 3.8
οὐ δίκαιος δὲ ἀποφυγεῖν ἐστι διὰ τὴν ἀτυχίαν τῆς ἁμαρτίας. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ μηδεμιᾶς ἐπιμελείας τοῦ θεοῦ ἡ ἀτυχία γίγνεται, ἁμάρτημα οὖσα τῷ ἁμαρτόντι συμφορὰ δικαία γενέσθαι ἐστίν· εἰ δὲ αὖ θεία κηλὶς τῷ δράσαντι προσπίπτει ἀσεβοῦντι, οὐ δίκαιον τὰς θείας προσβολὰς διακωλύειν γίγνεσθαι.
Nor does he deserve acquittal because of his misfortune in committing the error which he did. If, on the one hand, the misfortune is not due to any dispensation of heaven, then, as an error pure and simple, it is right that it should prove disastrous to him who was guilty of it; and if, on the other hand, a defilement from heaven has fallen upon the slayer by reason of some act of sin, then it is wrong for us to impede the visitation of God.
§ 3.9
ἔλεξαν δὲ καὶ ὡς οὐ πρέπει χρηστὰ ἐπιτηδεύοντας αὐτοὺς κακῶν ἀξιοῦσθαι· ἡμεῖς δὲ πῶς ἂν πρέποντα πάσχοιμεν, εἰ μηδὲν ὑποδεέστερα τούτων μελετῶντες θανάτῳ ζημιούμεθα; φάσκων δὲ ἀναμάρτητος εἶναι, καὶ ἀξιῶν τὰς συμφορὰς τῶν ἁμαρτόντων εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἰς τοὺς ἀναμαρτήτους ἐκτρέπεσθαι, ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν λέγει. ὅ τε γὰρ παῖς μου εἰς οὐδένα οὐδὲν ἁμαρτών, ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ μειρακίου ἀποθανών, ἀδικοῖτʼ ἂν ἀτιμώρητος γενόμενος· ἐγώ τε τοῦδε μᾶλλον ἀναμάρτητος ὢν δεινὰ πείσομαι, ἃ ὁ νόμος ἀποδίδωσί μοι μὴ τυχὼν παρʼ ὑμῶν.
They also maintained that it is wrong for those who have lived as honorably as they to be treated with severity. But what of us? Should we be treated aright, if we are punished with death when our life has been as praiseworthy as theirs? When he argues that he is not guilty of error and claims that the consequences must be borne by those who are, instead of being diverted to the innocent, he is pleading our case for us. Not only would it be an injustice to my son, who was killed by yonder lad, though guilty of error in respect of no one, were he deprived of vengeance; but it will be an outrage, if I myself, who am even more guiltless than he, fail to obtain from you the recompense which the law assigns me.
§ 3.10
ὡς δὲ οὐδὲ τῆς ἁμαρτίας οὐδὲ τοῦ ἀκουσίως ἀποκτεῖναι, ἐξ ὧν αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν, ἀπολύεται, ἀλλὰ κοινὰ ἀμφότερα ταῦτα ἀμφοῖν αὐτοῖν ἐστι, δηλώσω. εἴπερ ὁ παῖς διὰ τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν φορὰν τοῦ ἀκοντίου ὑπελθεῖν καὶ μὴ ἀτρέμας ἑστάναι φονεὺς αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ δίκαιος εἶναί ἐστιν, οὐδὲ τὸ μειράκιον καθαρὸν τῆς αἰτίας ἐστίν, ἀλλʼ εἴπερ τούτου μὴ ἀκοντίζοντος ἀλλʼ ἀτρέμα ἑστῶτος ἀπέθανεν ὁ παῖς. ἐξ ἀμφοῖν δὲ τοῦ φόνου γενομένου, ὁ μὲν παῖς εἰς αὑτὸν ἁμαρτὼν μᾶλλον ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ἑαυτὸν τετιμώρηται, τέθνηκε γάρ, ὁ δὲ συλλήπτωρ καὶ κοινωνὸς εἰς τοὺς οὐ προσήκοντας τῆς ἁμαρτίας γενόμενος πῶς δίκαιος ἀζήμιος ἀποφυγεῖν ἐστιν;
Further, the defence’s own statements show that the accused cannot be acquitted either of error or of accidentally taking life, but that he and my son are equally guilty of both; I will prove this. Assume that because my son moved into the path of the javelin instead of standing still, he deserves to be treated as his own slayer. Then the lad is not free from blame either; he is only innocent if he was standing still and not throwing his javelin when the boy was killed. The boy’s death was therefore due to both of them. Now the boy, whose error affected his own person, has punished himself even more harshly than that error warranted: for he has lost his life. So what right has his accomplice, who joined him in committing his unfortunate error, to escape unpunished?
§ 3.11
ἐκ δὲ τῆς αὐτῶν τῶν ἀπολογουμένων ἀπολογίας μετόχου τοῦ μειρακίου τοῦ φόνου ὄντος, οὐκ ἂν δικαίως οὐδὲ ὁσίως ἀπολύοιτε αὐτόν. οὔτε γὰρ ἡμεῖς, οἱ διὰ τὴν τούτων ἁμαρτίαν διαφθαρέντες, αὐθένται καταγνωσθέντες ὅσια ἀλλʼ ἀνόσιʼ ἂν πάθοιμεν ὑφʼ ὑμῶν· οὔθʼ οἱ θανατώσαντες ἡμᾶς μὴ εἰργόμενοι τῶν προσηκόντων †εὐσεβοῖντʼ ἂν† ὑπὸ τῶν ἀπολυσάντων τοὺς ἀνοσίους. πάσης δʼ ὑπὲρ πάντων τῆς κηλῖδος εἰς ὑμᾶς ἀναφερομένης, πολλὴ εὐλάβεια ὑμῖν τούτων ποιητέα ἐστί· καταλαβόντες μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν καὶ εἴρξαντες ὧν ὁ νόμος εἴργει καθαροὶ τῶν ἐγκλημάτων ἔσεσθε, ἀπολύσαντες δὲ ὑπαίτιοι καθίστασθε.
The accused have themselves proved by their defence that the lad had a share in the slaying. So, as just and god-fearing men, you cannot acquit him. If we, who have lost our life through the defendants’ error, were found guilty of having taken it ourselves, it would be an act not of righteousness but of wickedness on your part: and if those responsible for our death were not prohibited from setting foot where they should not, [;it would be an outrage against heaven:]; you would have acquitted persons stained with guilt. As the whole of the defilement, upon whomsoever it rests, is extended to you, you must take the greatest care. If you find him guilty and prohibit him from setting foot where the law forbids him to set foot, you will be free of the charges brought today; but if you acquit him, you become liable to them.
§ 3.12
τῆς οὖν ὑμετέρας εὐσεβείας ἕνεκα καὶ τῶν νόμων ἀπάγοντες τιμωρεῖσθε αὐτόν, καὶ αὐτοί τε μὴ μεταλάβητε τῆς τούτου μιαρίας, ἡμῖν τε τοῖς γονεῦσιν, οἳ ζῶντες κατορωρύγμεθα ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ, δόξῃ γοῦν ἐλαφροτέραν τὴν συμφορὰν καταστήσατε.
So satisfy the claims of heaven and the laws by taking him and punishing him. Do not share his blood-guilt yourselves: but let me, the parent whom he has sent to a living death, at least appear to have had my sorrow lightened.
§ 4.1
τοῦτον μὲν εἰκὸς πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ κατηγορίαν προσέχοντα τὸν νοῦν μὴ μαθεῖν τὴν ἀπολογίαν μου· ὑμᾶς δὲ χρή, γιγνώσκοντας ὅτι ἡμεῖς μὲν οἱ ἀντίδικοι κατʼ εὔνοιαν κρίνοντες τὸ πρᾶγμα εἰκότως δίκαια ἑκάτεροι αὑτοὺς οἰόμεθα λέγειν, ὑμᾶς δὲ ὁσίως ὁρᾶν προσήκει τὰ πραχθέντα·
While it is only to be expected that the preoccupation of my opponent with his speech for the prosecution should prevent his understanding my defence, the same is not true of yourselves. You should bear in mind that while we, the interested parties, take a biassed view of the case, each naturally thinking that his own version of it is fair, your duty is to consider the facts conscientiously; and so you must give your attention to me as much as you did to him:
§ 4.2
ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων γὰρ ἡ ἀλήθεια σκεπτέα αὐτῶν ἐστίν. ἐγὼ δέ, εἰ μέν τι ψεῦδος εἴρηκα, ὁμολογῶ καὶ τὰ ὀρθῶς εἰρημένα προσδιαβάλλειν ἄδικα εἶναι· εἰ δὲ ἀληθῆ μέν, λεπτὰ δὲ καὶ ἀκριβῆ, οὐκ ἐγὼ ὁ λέγων ἀλλʼ ὁ πράξας τὴν ἀπέχθειαν αὐτῶν δίκαιος φέρεσθαί ἐστι.
as it is in what is said that the true facts are to be sought. For my part, if I have told any falsehoods, I am content that you should treat the truth which I have spoken as itself a piece of equally dishonest pleading. On the other hand, if my arguments have been honest, but close and subtle, it is not I who used them, but he whose conduct made them necessary, upon whom the displeasure which they have caused should properly fall.
§ 4.3
θέλω δὲ ὑμᾶς πρῶτον μαθεῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐάν τις φάσκῃ ἀποκτεῖναι, τοῦτʼ ἔστιν, ἀλλʼ ἐάν τις ἐλεγχθῇ. οὗτος δὲ ὁμολογῶν τὸ ἔργον ὡς ἡμεῖς λέγομεν γενέσθαι, ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀποκτείναντος ἀμφισβητεῖ, ὃν ἀδύνατον ἀλλαχόθεν ἢ ἐκ τῶν πραχθέντων δηλοῦσθαι.
I would have you understand to begin with that it requires not mere assertion, but proof, to show that someone has killed someone else. Now our accuser agrees with us as to how the accident happened, but disagrees as to the person responsible; yet it is only from what happened that that person can be determined.
§ 4.4
σχετλιάζει δὲ κακῶς ἀκούειν φάσκων τὸν παῖδα, εἰ μήτε ἀκοντίσας μήτʼ ἐπινοήσας αὐθέντης ὢν ἀποδέδεικται, καὶ οὐ πρὸς τὰ λεγόμενα ἀπολογεῖται. οὐ γὰρ ἀκοντίσαι οὐδὲ βαλεῖν αὑτόν φημι τὸν παῖδα, ἀλλʼ ὑπὸ τὴν πληγὴν τοῦ ἀκοντίου ὑπελθόντα οὐχ ὑπὸ τοῦ μειρακίου ἀλλʼ ὑφʼ ἑαυτοῦ διαφθαρῆναι· οὐ γὰρ ἀτρεμίζων ἀπέθανε. τῆς δὲ διαδρομῆς αἰτίας ταύτης γιγνομένης, εἰ μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ παιδοτρίβου καλούμενος διέτρεχεν, ὁ παιδοτρίβης ἂν ἀποκτείνας αὐτὸν εἴη, εἰ δʼ ὑφʼ ἑαυτοῦ πεισθεὶς ὑπῆλθεν, αὐτὸς ὑφʼ ἑαυτοῦ διέφθαρται.
He complains bitterly, because, according to him, it is a slur upon his son’s memory that he should have been proved a slayer when he neither threw the javelin nor had any intention of doing so. That complaint is not an answer to my arguments. I am not maintaining that his son threw the javelin or struck himself. I am maintaining that since he moved within range of the javelin, his death was due not to the lad, but to himself; for he was not killed standing in his place. As this running across was his undoing, it follows that if it was at his master’s summons that he ran across, the master would be the person responsible for his death; but if he moved into the way of his own accord, his death was due to himself.
§ 4.5
θέλω δὲ μὴ πρότερον ἐπʼ ἄλλον λόγον ὁρμῆσαι, ἢ τὸ ἔργον ἔτι φανερώτερον καταστῆσαι, ὁποτέρου αὐτῶν ἐστί. τὸ μὲν μειράκιον οὐδενὸς μᾶλλον τῶν συμμελετώντων ἐστὶ τοῦ σκοποῦ ἁμαρτόν, οὐδὲ τῶν ἐπικαλουμένων τι διὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ ἁμαρτίαν δέδρακεν· ὁ δὲ παῖς οὐ ταὐτὰ τοῖς συνθεωμένοις δρῶν, ἀλλʼ εἰς τὴν ὁδὸν τοῦ ἀκοντίου ὑπελθών, σαφῶς δηλοῦται παρὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ ἁμαρτίαν περισσοτέροις ἀτυχήμασι τῶν ἀτρεμιζόντων περιπεσών. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀφεὶς οὐδὲν ἂν ἥμαρτε, μηδενὸς ὑπὸ τὸ βέλος ὑπελθόντος αὐτῷ· ὁ δʼ οὐκ ἂν ἐβλήθη μετὰ τῶν θεωμένων ἑστώς.
Before proceeding to any further argument, I wish to show still more clearly which of the two was responsible for the accident. The lad no more missed the target than any of those practising with him: nor has he rendered himself guilty of any of the acts with which he is charged owing to error on his own part. On the other hand, the boy did not do the same as the other onlookers; he moved into the javelin’s path. And this is clear proof that it was through his own error that he met with a disaster which those who stood still did not. The thrower would not have been guilty of an error in any respect, had no one moved into the path of his spear: while the boy would not have been hit, had he remained in his place among the onlookers.
§ 4.6
ὡς δʼ οὐδενὸς μᾶλλον τῶν συνακοντιζόντων μέτοχός ἐστι τοῦ φόνου, διδάξω. εἰ γὰρ διὰ τὸ τοῦτον ἀκοντίζειν ὁ παῖς ἀπέθανε, πάντες ἂν οἱ συμμελετῶντες συμπράκτορες εἶεν τῆς αἰτίας· οὗτοι γὰρ οὐ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀκοντίζειν οὐκ ἔβαλον αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μηδενὶ ὑπὸ τὸ ἀκόντιον ὑπελθεῖν· ὁ δὲ νεανίσκος οὐδὲν περισσότερον τούτων ἁμαρτών, ὁμοίως τούτοις οὐκ ἂν ἔβαλεν αὐτὸν ἀτρέμα σὺν τοῖς θεωμένοις ἑστῶτα.
Further, my son was not more concerned in the boy’s death than any one of those throwing javelins with him, as I will show. If it was owing to the fact that my son was throwing a javelin that the boy was killed, then all those practising with him must share in the guilt of the deed, as it was not owing to their failure to throw that they did not strike him, but owing to the fact that he did not move into the path of the javelin of any one of them. Similarly the young man, who was no more guilty of error than they, would not have hit the boy any more than they did, had the boy stood still with the onlookers.
§ 4.7
ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ ἁμάρτημα τοῦ παιδὸς μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ ἀφυλαξία. ὁ μὲν γὰρ οὐδένα ὁρῶν διατρέχοντα, πῶς ἂν ἐφυλάξατο μηδένα βαλεῖν; ὁ δʼ ἰδὼν τοὺς ἀκοντίζοντας εὐπετῶς ἂν ἐφυλάξατο μὴ διαδραμεῖν ἐξῆν γὰρ αὐτῷ ἀτρέμα ἑστάναι.
Again, not only was the boy guilty of the error committed; he was also to blame for the failure to take due precautions. My son saw no one running across, so how could he have taken precautions against striking anyone? The boy, on the other hand, upon seeing the throwers, might easily have guarded against running across, as he was quite at liberty to remain standing still.
§ 4.8
τὸν δὲ νόμον ὃν παραφέρουσιν, ἐπαινεῖν δεῖ. ὀρθῶς γὰρ καὶ δικαίως τοὺς ἀκουσίως ἀποκτείναντας ἀκουσίοις παθήμασι κολάζει. τὸ μὲν οὖν μειράκιον ἀναμάρτητον ὂν οὐκ ἂν δικαίως ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἁμαρτόντος κολάζοιτο· ἱκανὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ ἐστι τὰς αὑτοῦ ἁμαρτίας φέρειν· ὁ δὲ ταῖς αὑτοῦ ἁμαρτίαις διαφθαρείς, ἅμα ἥμαρτέ τε καὶ ὑφʼ ἑαυτοῦ ἐκολάσθη. κεκολασμένου δὲ τοῦ ἀποκτείναντος, οὐκ ἀτιμώρητος ὁ φόνος ἐστίν.
The law which they quote is a praiseworthy one; it is right and fair that it should visit those who have killed without meaning to do so with chastisement which they did not mean to incur. But the lad is not guilty of error; and it would therefore be unjust that he should suffer for him who is. It is enough that he should bear the consequences of his own errors. On the other hand, the boy, who perished through his own error, punished himself as soon as he had committed that error. And as the slayer has been punished, the slaying has not gone unavenged.
§ 4.9
ἔχοντός γε δὴ τὴν δίκην τοῦ φονέως, οὐκ ἐὰν ἀπολύσητε ἡμᾶς, ἀλλʼ ἐὰν καταλάβητε, ἐνθύμιον ὑπολείψεσθε. ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς τὰς αὑτοῦ ἁμαρτίας φέρων, οὐδενὶ οὐδὲν προστρόπαιον καταλείψει· ὁ δὲ καθαρὸς τῆς αἰτίας ὢν ἐὰν διαφθαρῇ, τοῖς καταλαμβάνουσι μεῖζον τὸ ἐνθύμιον γενήσεται. εἰ δὲ αὐθέντης ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων ἐπιδείκνυται, οὐχ ἡμεῖς αὐτῷ οἱ λέγοντες αἴτιοί ἐσμεν, ἀλλʼ ἡ πρᾶξις τῶν ἔργων.
The slayer has paid the penalty; so it is not by acquitting us, but by condemning us that you will leave a burden upon your consciences. The boy, who is bearing the consequence of his own error, will leave behind him nothing that calls for atonement from anyone; but if my son, who is innocent, is put to death, the conscience of those who have condemned him will be more heavily burdened than ever. If the arguments put forward prove the dead boy his own slayer, it is not we who have stated them whom he has to thank, but the fact that the accident happened as it did.
§ 4.10
ὀρθῶς δὲ τῶν ἐλέγχων ἐλεγχόντων τὸν παῖδα αὐθέντην ὄντα, ὁ νόμος ἀπολύων ἡμᾶς τῆς αἰτίας τὸν ἀποκτείναντα καταλαμβάνει. μήτε οὖν ἡμᾶς εἰς μὴ προσηκούσας συμφορὰς ἐμβάλητε, μήτε αὐτοὶ ταῖς τούτων ἀτυχίαις βοηθοῦντες ἐναντία τοῦ δαίμονος γνῶτε, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ ὅσιον καὶ δίκαιον, μεμνημένοι τοῦ πάθους, ὅτι διὰ τὸν ὑπὸ τὴν φορὰν τοῦ ἀκοντίου ὑπελθόντα ἐγένετο, ἀπολύετε ἡμᾶς· οὐ γὰρ αἴτιοι τοῦ φόνου ἐσμέν.
Since examination proves beyond doubt that the boy was his own slayer, the law absolves us from blame, and condemns him who was guilty. See, then, that we are not plunged into woes which we do not deserve, and that you yourselves do not defy the powers above by a verdict succoring my opponents in their misfortunes. Remember, as righteousness and justice require you to do, that the accident was caused by him who moved into the javelin’s path. Remember, and acquit us; for we are not guilty of his death.
The Third Tetralogy: Prosecution for Murder Of One Who Pleads That He Was Acting in Self-Defence · urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0028.tlg004 · Greek: Τετραλογία Γ΄ — tlg0028.tlg004.perseus-grc2 · English: The Third Tetralogy: Prosecution for Murder Of One Who Pleads That He Was Acting in Self-Defence — trans. Kenneth John Maidment — tlg0028.tlg004.perseus-eng2
§ 1.1
νενόμισται μὲν ὀρθῶς τὰς φονικὰς δίκας περὶ πλείστου τοὺς κρίνοντας ποιεῖσθαι διώκειν τε καὶ μαρτυρεῖν κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον, μήτε τοὺς ἐνόχους ἀφιέντας μήτε τοὺς καθαροὺς εἰς ἀγῶνα καθιστάντας.
It is very rightly laid down that in cases of murder prosecutors must take especial care to observe justice in making their charge and presenting their evidence: they must neither let the guilty escape nor bring the innocent to trial.
§ 1.2
ὅτε γὰρ ὁ θεὸς βουλόμενος ποιῆσαι τὸ ἀνθρώπινον φῦλον τοὺς πρώτους γενομένους ἔφυσεν ἡμῶν, τροφέας τε καὶ σωτῆρας παρέδωκε τὴν γῆν καὶ τὴν θάλασσαν, ἵνα μὴ σπάνει τῶν ἀναγκαίων προαποθνῄσκοιμεν τῆς γηραιοῦ τελευτῆς. ὅστις οὖν, τούτων ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀξιωθέντος τοῦ βίου ἡμῶν, ἀνόμως τινὰ ἀποκτείνει, ἀσεβεῖ μὲν περὶ τοὺς θεούς, συγχεῖ δὲ τὰ νόμιμα τῶν ἀνθρώπων.
For when God was minded to create the human race and brought the first of us into being, he gave us the earth and sea to sustain and serve us, in order that we might not die for want of the necessaries of life before old age brought us our end. Such being the value placed upon our life by God, whoever unlawfully slays his fellow both sins against the gods and confounds the ordinances of man.
§ 1.3
ὅ τε γὰρ ἀποθανών, στερόμενος ὧν ὁ θεὸς ἔδωκεν αὐτῷ, εἰκότως θεοῦ τιμωρίαν ὑπολείπει τὴν τῶν ἀλιτηρίων δυσμένειαν, ἣν οἱ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον κρίνοντες ἢ μαρτυροῦντες, συνασεβοῦντες τῷ ταῦτα δρῶντι, οὐ προσῆκον μίασμα εἰς τοὺς ἰδίους οἴκους εἰσάγονται·
For the victim, robbed of the gifts bestowed by God upon him, naturally leaves behind him the angry spirits of vengeance, God’s instruments of punishment, spirits which they who prosecute and testify without giving heed to justice bring into their own homes, defiling them with the defilement of another, because they share in the sin of him who did the deed.
§ 1.4
ἡμεῖς τε οἱ τιμωροὶ τῶν διεφθαρμένων, εἰ διʼ ἄλλην τινὰ ἔχθραν τοὺς ἀναιτίους διώκοιμεν, τῷ μὲν ἀποθανόντι οὐ τιμωροῦντες δεινοὺς ἀλιτηρίους ἕξομεν τοὺς τῶν ἀποθανόντων προστροπαίους, τοὺς δὲ καθαροὺς ἀδίκως ἀποκτείνοντες ἔνοχοι τοῦ φόνου τοῖς ἐπιτιμίοις ἐσμέν, ὑμᾶς δὲ ἄνομα δρᾶς πείθοντες καὶ τοῦ ὑμετέρου ἁμαρτήματος ὑπαίτιοι γιγνόμεθα.
And similarly, should we, the avengers of the dead, accuse innocent persons because of some private grudge, not only will our failure to avenge the murdered man cause us to be haunted by dread demons to whom the dead will turn for justice, but by wrongfully causing the death of the innocent we are liable to the penalties prescribed for murder, and because we have persuaded you to break the law, the responsibility for your mistake also becomes ours.
§ 1.5
ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν δεδιὼς ταῦτα, εἰς ὑμᾶς παράγων τὸν ἀσεβήσαντα καθαρὸς τῶν ἐγκλημάτων εἰμί· ὑμεῖς δὲ ἀξίως τῶν προειρημένων τῇ κρίσει προσέχοντες τὸν νοῦν, ἀξίαν δίκην τοῦ πάθους τῷ εἰργασμένῳ ἐπιθέντες, ἅπασαν τὴν πόλιν καθαρὰν τοῦ μιάσματος καταστήσετε.
For my part, my fear of such consequences has led me to bring the true sinner before you, and thus the stain of none of the charges which I am making rests upon me; and if you yourselves give that attention to the trial which the considerations I have put before you demand, and inflict upon the criminal a punishment proportionate to the injury which he has done, you will cleanse the entire city of its defilement.
§ 1.6
εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἄκων ἀπέκτεινε τὸν ἄνδρα, ἄξιος ἂν ἦν συγγνώμης τυχεῖν τινός· ὕβρει δὲ καὶ ἀκολασίᾳ παροινῶν εἰς ἄνδρα πρεσβύτην, τύπτων τε καὶ πνίγων ἕως τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπεστέρησεν αὐτόν, ὡς μὲν ἀποκτείνας τοῦ φόνου τοῖς ἐπιτιμίοις ἔνοχός ἐστιν, ὡς δὲ συγχέων ἅπαντα τῶν γεραιοτέρων τὰ νόμιμα οὐδενὸς ἁμαρτεῖν, οἷς οἱ τοιοῦτοι κολάζονται, δίκαιός ἐστιν.
Had he killed his victim accidentally, he would have deserved some measure of mercy. But he wantonly committed a brutal assault upon an old man when in his cups; he struck him and throttled him until he robbed him of life. So for killing him he is liable to penalties prescribed for murder: and for violating every right to respect enjoyed by the aged he deserves to suffer in full the punishment usual in such cases.
§ 1.7
ὁ μὲν τοίνυν νόμος ὀρθῶς ὑμῖν τιμωρεῖσθαι παραδίδωσιν αὐτόν· τῶν δὲ μαρτύρων ἀκηκόατε, οἳ παρῆσαν παροινοῦντι αὐτῷ. ὑμᾶς δὲ χρὴ τῇ τε ἀνομίᾳ τοῦ παθήματος ἀμύνοντας, τήν τε ὕβριν κολάζοντας ἀξίως τοῦ πάθους, τὴν βουλεύσασαν ψυχὴν ἀνταφελέσθαι αὐτόν.
Thus the law rightly hands him over to you for punishment; and you have listened to the witnesses who were present during his drunken assault. It is your duty to take vengeance for the injury which he so lawlessly inflicted: to punish such brutal violence as harshly as the harm which it has caused requires: to deprive him in his turn of a life which was used to plot another’s death.
§ 2.1
ὅτι μὲν βραχεῖς τοὺς λόγους ἐποιήσαντο, οὐ θαυμάζω αὐτῶν· οὐ γὰρ ὡς μὴ πάθωσιν ὁ κίνδυνος αὐτοῖς ἐστιν, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἐμὲ μὴ δικαίως διʼ ἔχθραν διαφθείρωσιν. ὅτι δʼ ἐξισοῦν τοῖς μεγίστοις ἐγκλήμασιν ἤθελον τὸ πρᾶγμα, οὗ ὁ ἀποθανὼν αὑτῷ αἴτιος καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐγὼ ἐγένετο, εἰκότως ἂν ἀγανακτεῖν μοι δοκῶ. ἄρχων γὰρ χειρῶν ἀδίκων, καὶ παροινῶν εἰς ἄνδρα πολὺ αὑτοῦ σωφρονέστερον, οὐχ αὑτῷ μόνον τῆς συμφορᾶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐμοὶ αἴτιος τοῦ ἐγκλήματος γέγονεν.
The fact that their speech was brief does not surprise me: because for them the danger is, not that they may come to some harm, but that they may fail to gratify their animosity by sending me to a death which I do not deserve. On the other hand, that they should want to treat the present matter, in which the victim had himself to blame more than me, as a case of the greatest gravity, gives me, I think, some excuse for indignation. By resorting to violence as he did and making a drunken assault upon a man far more in control of himself than he, he was responsible not only for the disaster which befell himself, but for the accusation which has been brought against me.
§ 2.2
οἶμαι μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε οὔτε δίκαια τούτους οὔθʼ ὅσια δρᾶν ἐγκαλοῦντας ἐμοί. τὸν γὰρ ἄρξαντα τῆς πληγῆς, εἰ μὲν σιδήρῳ ἢ λίθῳ ἢ ξύλῳ ἠμυνάμην αὐτόν, ἠδίκουν μὲν οὐδʼ οὕτως—οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ ἀλλὰ μείζονα καὶ πλείονα δίκαιοι οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀντιπάσχειν εἰσίν·—ταῖς δὲ χερσὶ τυπτόμενος ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ, ταῖς χερσὶν ἅπερ ἔπασχον ἀντιδρῶν, πότερα ἠδίκουν;
In my opinion, the prosecution are setting both God and man at defiance in accusing me. He was the aggressor; and even if I had used steel or stone or wood to beat him off, I was acting within my rights; an aggressor deserves to be answered with, not the same, but more and worse than he gave. Actually, when he struck me with his fists, I used my own to retaliate for the blows which I received. Was that unjustified?
§ 2.3
εἶεν· ἐρεῖ δέ, “ἀλλʼ ὁ νόμος εἴργων μήτε δικαίως μήτε ἀδίκως ἀποκτείνειν ἔνοχον τοῦ φόνου τοῖς ἐπιτιμίοις ἀποφαίνει σε ὄντα· ὁ γὰρ ἀνὴρ τέθνηκεν.” ἐγὼ δὲ δεύτερον καὶ τρίτον οὐκ ἀποκτεῖναί φημι. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν πληγῶν ὁ ἀνὴρ παραχρῆμα ἀπέθανεν, ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ μὲν δικαίως δʼ ἂν ἐτεθνήκει—οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ ἀλλὰ μείζονα καὶ πλείονα οἱ ἄρξαντες δίκαιοι ἀντιπάσχειν εἰσί·—
Well and good. But, he will object, the law which forbids the taking of life whether justifiably or not shows you to be liable to the penalty prescribed for murder; for the man is dead. I repeat for a second and a third time that I did not kill him. Had the man died on the spot from the blows which he received, his death would have been due to me, not but what I would have been justified—an aggressor deserves to be answered with not the same, but more and worse than he gave;
§ 2.4
νῦν δὲ πολλαῖς ἡμέραις ὕστερον μοχθηρῷ ἰατρῷ ἐπιτρεφθεὶς διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἰατροῦ μοχθηρίαν καὶ οὐ διὰ τὰς πληγὰς ἀπέθανε. προλεγόντων γὰρ αὐτῷ τῶν ἄλλων ἰατρῶν, εἰ ταύτην τὴν θεραπείαν θεραπεύσοιτο, ὅτι ἰάσιμος ὢν διαφθαρήσοιτο, διʼ ὑμᾶς τοὺς συμβούλους διαφθαρεὶς ἐμοὶ ἀνόσιον ἔγκλημα προσέβαλεν.
—but in fact he died several days later, after being placed under an incompetent physician. His death was due to the incompetence of the physician, and not to the blows which he received. The other physicians warned him that though he was not beyond cure, he would die if he followed this particular treatment. Thanks to your advice, he did die, and thereby caused an outrageous charge to be brought against myself.
§ 2.5
ἀπολύει δέ με καὶ ὁ νόμος καθʼ ὃν διώκομαι. τὸν γὰρ ἐπιβουλεύσαντα κελεύει φονέα εἶναι. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν πῶς ἂν ἐπιβουλεύσαιμι αὐτῷ ὅ τι μὴ καὶ ἐπεβουλεύθην ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ; τοῖς γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἀμυνόμενος αὐτὸν καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ δρῶν ἅπερ ἔπασχον, σαφὲς ὃτι τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπεβούλευσα καὶ ἐπεβουλεύθην.
Further, the very law under which I am being accused attests my innocence; it lays down that the guilt of a murder shall rest upon that party which acted from design. Now what designs could I have on his life which he did not also have on mine? I resisted him with his own weapons, and returned blow for blow; so it is clear that I only had the designs upon his life which he had on mine.
§ 2.6
εἰ δέ τις ἐκ τῶν πληγῶν τὸν θάνατον οἰόμενος γενέσθαι φονέα με αὐτοῦ ἡγεῖται εἶναι, ἀντιλογισάσθω ὅτι διὰ τὸν ἄρξαντα αἱ πληγαὶ γενόμεναι τοῦτον αἴτιον τοῦ θανάτου καὶ οὐκ ἐμὲ ἀποφαίνουσιν ὄντα· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἠμυνάμην μὴ τυπτόμενος ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ. ἀπολυόμενος δὲ ὑπό τε τοῦ νόμου ὑπό τε τοῦ ἄρξαντος τῆς πληγῆς, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ φονεὺς αὐτοῦ εἰμι, ὁ δὲ ἀποθανών, εἰ μὲν ἀτυχίᾳ τέθνηκεν, τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἀτυχία κέχρηται—ἠτύχησε γὰρ ἄρξας τῆς πληγῆς—εἰ δʼ ἀβουλία τινί, τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἀβουλίᾳ διέφθαρται· οὐ γὰρ εὖ φρονῶν ἔτυπτέ με.
Furthermore, if anyone thinks that his death was the result of the blows which he received and that therefore I am his murderer, let him set against that fact that it was the aggressor who was the cause of those blows, and that they therefore point to him, not to me, as the person responsible for his death; I would not have defended myself unless I had been struck by him. Thus my innocence is attested both by the law and by the fact that my opponent was the aggressor; in no way am I his murderer. As to the dead man, if his death was due to mischance, he had himself to thank for that mischance: for it consisted in his taking the offensive. Similarly, if his death was due to a loss of self-control it was through his own loss of self-control that he perished: for he was not in his right mind when he struck me.
§ 2.7
ὡς μὲν οὖν οὐ δικαίως κατηγοροῦμαι, ἐπιδέδεικταί μοι· ἐθέλω δὲ τοὺς κατηγοροῦντάς μου πᾶσιν οἷς ἐγκαλοῦσιν ἐνόχους αὐτοὺς ὄντας ἀποδεῖξαι. καθαρῷ μέν μοι τῆς αἰτίας ὄντι φόνον ἐπικαλοῦντες, ἀποστεροῦντες δέ με τοῦ βίου ὃν ὁ θεὸς παρέδωκέ μοι, περὶ τὸν θεὸν ἀσεβοῦσιν· ἀδίκως δὲ θάνατον ἐπιβουλεύοντες τά τε νόμιμα συγχέουσι φονῆς τέ μου γίγνονται· ἀνοσίως δʼ ἀποκτεῖναι ὑμᾶς με πείθοντες καὶ τῆς ὑμετέρας εὐσεβείας †αὐτοὶ φονῆς† εἰσί.
I have now proved that I am unjustly accused. But I wish to prove also that my accusers are themselves exposed to all the charges which they are bringing against me. By accusing me of murder when I am free from guilt, and by robbing me of the life which God bestowed upon me, they are sinning against God by seeking to compass my death wrongfully, they are confounding the laws of man and becoming my murderers; and by urging you to commit the sin of taking my life, [they are murdering your consciences also].
§ 2.8
τούτοις μὲν οὖν ὁ θεὸς ἐπιθείη τὴν δίκην· ὑμᾶς δὲ χρὴ τὸ ὑμέτερον σκοποῦντας ἀπολῦσαί με μᾶλλον ἢ καταλαβεῖν βούλεσθαι. ἀδίκως μὲν γὰρ ἀπολυθείς, διὰ τὸ μὴ ὀρθῶς ὑμᾶς διδαχθῆναι ἀποφυγών, τοῦ μὴ διδάξαντος καὶ οὐχ ὑμέτερον τὸν προστρόπαιον τοῦ ἀποθανόντος καταστήσω· μὴ ὀρθῶς δὲ καταληφθεὶς ὑφʼ ὑμῶν, ὑμῖν καὶ οὐ τούτῳ τὸ μήνιμα τῶν ἀλιτηρίων προστρέψομαι.
May God visit them with the punishment which they deserve. You on your side must look to your own interests and be more disposed to acquit than to condemn me. If I am acquitted unjustly, if I escape because you have not been properly informed of the facts, then it is he who failed to inform you, not you, whom I shall cause to be visited by the spirit who is seeking vengeance for the dead. But if I am wrongfully condemned by you, then it is upon you, and not upon my accuser, that I shall turn the wrath of the avenging demons.
§ 2.9
ταῦτʼ οὖν εἰδότες, τουτοισὶ τὸ ἀσέβημα τοῦτο ἀναθέντες, αὐτοί τε καθαροὶ τῆς αἰτίας γένεσθε, ἐμέ τε ὁσίως καὶ δικαίως ἀπολύετε· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν καθαρώτατοι πάντες οἱ πολῖται εἴημεν.
In this knowledge, make the prosecution bear the consequences of their sin; cleanse yourselves of guilt: and acquit me as righteousness and justice require you to do. Thus may all of us citizens best avoid defilement.
§ 3.1
τοῦτόν τε οὐ θαυμάζω ἀνόσια δράσαντα ὅμοια οἷς εἴργασται λέγειν, ὑμῖν τε συγγιγνώσκω βουλομένοις τὴν ἀκρίβειαν τῶν πραχθέντων μαθεῖν τοιαῦτα ἀνέχεσθαι ἀκούοντας αὐτοῦ, ἃ ἐκβάλλεσθαι ἄξιά ἐστι. τὸν γὰρ ἄνδρα ὁμολογῶν τύπτειν τὰς πληγὰς ἐξ ὧν ἀπέθανεν, αὐτὸς μὲν τοῦ τεθνηκότος οὔ φησι φονεὺς εἶναι, ἡμᾶς δὲ τοὺς τιμωροῦντας αὐτῷ ζῶν τε καὶ βλέπων φονέας αὑτοῦ φησιν εἶναι. θέλω δὲ καὶ τἆλλα παραπλήσια ἀπολογηθέντα τούτοις ἐπιδεῖξαι αὐτόν.
I am not surprised that the defendant, who has committed so outrageous a crime, should speak as he has acted; just as I pardon you, who are desirous of discovering the facts exactly, for tolerating such utterances from his lips as deserve to be greeted with derision. Thus, he admits that he gave the man the blows which caused his death; yet he not only denies that he himself is the dead man’s murderer, but asserts, alive and well though he is, that we, who are seeking vengeance for the victim, are his own murderers. And I wish to show that the remainder of his defense is of a similar character.
§ 3.2
εἶπε δὲ πρῶτον μέν, εἰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν πληγῶν ἀπέθανεν ὁ ἀνήρ, ὡς οὐκ ἀπέκτεινεν αὐτόν· τὸν γὰρ ἄρξαντα τῆς πληγῆς, τοῦτον αἴτιον τῶν πραχθέντων γενόμενον καταλαμβάνεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου, ἄρξαι δὲ τὸν ἀποθανόντα. μάθετε δὴ πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἄρξαι καὶ παροινεῖν τοὺς νεωτέρους τῶν πρεσβυτέρων εἰκότερόν ἐστι· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἥ τε μεγαλοφροσύνη τοῦ γένους ἥ τε ἀκμὴ τῆς ῥώμης ἥ τε ἀπειρία τῆς μέθης ἐπαίρει τῷ θυμῷ χαρίζεσθαι, τοὺς δὲ ἥ τε ἐμπειρία τῶν παροινουμένων ἥ τε ἀσθένεια τοῦ γήρως ἥ τε δύναμις τῶν νέων φοβοῦσα σωφρονίζει.
To begin with, he said that even if the man did die as a result of the blows, he did not kill him: because it is the aggressor who is to blame for what happens: it is he whom the law condemns; and the aggressor was the dead man. First, let me tell you that young men are more likely to be the aggressors and make a drunken assault than old. The young are incited by their natural arrogance, their full vigor, and the unaccustomed effects of wine to give free play to anger: whereas old men are sobered by their experience of drunken excesses, by the weakness of age, and by their fear of the strength of the young.
§ 3.3
ὡς δὲ οὐδὲ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἐναντιωτάτοις ἠμύνατο αὐτόν, αὐτὸ τὸ ἔργον σημαίνει. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀκμαζούσῃ τῇ ῥώμῃ τῶν χειρῶν χρώμενος ἀπέκτεινεν· ὁ δὲ ἀδυνάτως τὸν κρείσσονα ἀμυνόμενος, οὐδὲ σημεῖον οὐδὲν ὧν ἠμύνατο ὑπολιπών, ἀπέθανεν. εἰ δὲ ταῖς χερσὶν ἀπέκτεινε καὶ οὐ σιδήρῳ, ὅσον αἱ χεῖρες τοῦ σιδήρου οἰκειότεραι τούτῳ εἰσί, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον φονεύς ἐστιν.
Further, it was not with the same, but with vastly different weapons that the accused withstood him, as the facts themselves show. The one used hands which were in the fullness of their strength, and with them he slew; whereas the other defended himself but feebly against a stronger man, and died without leaving any mark of that defense behind him. Moreover, if it was with his hands and not with steel that the defendant slew, then the fact that his hands are more a part of himself than is steel makes him so much the more a murderer.
§ 3.4
ἐτόλμησε δὲ εἰπεῖν ὡς ὁ ἄρξας τῆς πληγῆς καὶ μὴ διαφθείρας μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀποκτείναντος φονεύς ἐστι· τοῦτον γὰρ βουλευτὴν τοῦ θανάτου φησὶ γενέσθαι. ἐγὼ δὲ πολὺ τἀναντία τούτων φημί. εἰ γὰρ αἱ χεῖρες ἃ διανοούμεθα ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν ὑπουργοῦσιν, ὁ μὲν πατάξας καὶ μὴ ἀποκτείνας τῆς πληγῆς βουλευτὴς ἐγένετο, ὁ δὲ θανασίμως τύπτων τοῦ θανάτου· ἐκ γὰρ ὧν ἐκεῖνος διανοηθεὶς ἔδρασεν, ὁ ἀνὴρ τέθνηκεν. ἔστι δὲ ἡ μὲν ἀτυχία τοῦ πατάξαντος, ἡ δὲ συμφορὰ τοῦ παθόντος. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ὧν ἔδρασεν ἐκεῖνος διαφθαρείς, οὐ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἁμαρτίᾳ ἀλλὰ τῇ τοῦ πατάξαντος χρησάμενος ἀπέθανεν· ὁ δὲ μείζω ὧν ἤθελε πράξας, τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἀτυχίᾳ ὃν οὐκ ἤθελεν ἀπέκτεινεν.
He further dared to assert that he who struck the first blow, even though he did not slay, is more truly the murderer than he who killed; for it is to the aggressor’s wilful act that the death was due, he says. But I maintain the very opposite. If our hands carry out the intentions of each of us, he who struck without killing was the wilful author of the blow alone: the willfull author of the death was he who struck and killed: for it was as the result of an intentional act on the part of the defendant that the man was killed. Again, while the victim suffered the ill-effect of the mischance, it is the striker who suffered the mischance itself; for the one met his death as the result of the other’s act, so that it was not through his own mistake, but through the mistake of the man who struck him, that he was killed; whereas the other did more than he meant to do, and he had only himself to blame for the mischance whereby he killed a man whom he did not mean to slay.
§ 3.5
ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἰατροῦ φάσκων αὐτὸν ἀποθανεῖν, θαυμάζω ὅτι [οὐχ] ὑφʼ ἡμῶν τῶν συμβουλευσάντων ἐπιτρεφθῆναί φησιν αὐτὸν διαφθαρῆναι. καὶ γὰρ ἂν εἰ μὴ ἐπετρέψαμεν, ὑπʼ ἀθεραπείας ἂν ἔφη διαφθαρῆναι αὐτόν. εἰ δέ τοι καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἰατροῦ ἀπέθανεν, ὡς οὐκ ἀπέθανεν, ὁ μὲν ἰατρὸς οὐ φονεὺς αὐτοῦ ἐστιν, ὁ γὰρ νόμος ἀπολύει αὐτόν, διὰ δὲ τὰς τούτου πληγὰς ἐπιτρεψάντων ἡμῶν αὐτῷ, πῶς ἂν ἄλλος τις ἢ ὁ βιασάμενος ἡμᾶς χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ φονεὺς εἴη ἄν;
I am surprised that, in alleging the man’s death to have been due to the physician, he should assign responsibility for it to us, upon whose advice it was that he received medical attention; for had we failed to place him under a physician, the defendant would assuredly have maintained that his death was due to neglect. But even if his death was due to the physician, which it was not, the physician is not his murderer, because the law absolves him from blame. On the other hand, as it was only owing to the blows given by the defendant that we placed the dead man under medical care at all, can the murderer be anyone save him who forced us to call in the physician?
§ 3.6
οὕτω δὲ φανερῶς ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου ἐλεγχόμενος ἀποκτεῖναι τὸν ἄνδρα, εἰς τοῦτο τόλμης καὶ ἀναιδείας ἥκει, ὥστʼ οὐκ ἀρκοῦν αὐτῷ ἐστιν ὑπὲρ τῆς αὑτοῦ ἀσεβείας ἀπολογεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡμᾶς, οἳ τὸ τούτου μίασμα ἐπεξερχόμεθα, ἀθέμιστα καὶ ἀνόσια δρᾶν φησι.
Although it has been proved so clearly and so completely that he killed the dead man, his impudence and shamelessness are such that he is not content with defending his own act of wickedness: he actually accuses us, who are seeking expiation of the defilement which rests upon him, of acting like unscrupulous scoundrels.
§ 3.7
τούτῳ μὲν οὖν πρέπει καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἔτι τούτων δεινότερα λέγειν, τοιαῦτα δεδρακότι· ἡμεῖς δὲ τόν τε θάνατον φανερὸν ἀποδεικνύντες, τήν τε πληγὴν ὁμολογουμένην ἐξ ἧς ἀπέθανε, τόν τε νόμον εἰς τὸν πατάξαντα τὸν φόνον ἀνάγοντα, ἀντὶ τοῦ παθόντος ἐπισκήπτομεν ὑμῖν, τῷ τούτου φόνῳ τὸ μήνιμα τῶν ἀλιτηρίων ἀκεσαμένους πᾶσαν τὴν πόλιν καθαρὰν τοῦ μιάσματος καταστῆσαι.
Assertions as outrageous as this, or even more so, befit one guilty of such a crime as he. We, on our side, have clearly established how the death took place: we have shown that there are no doubts about the blow which caused it: and we have proved that the law fixes the guilt of the murder upon him who gave that blow. So in the name of the victim we charge you to appease the wrath of the spirits of vengeance by putting the defendant to death, and thereby cleanse the whole city of its defilement.
§ 4.1
ὁ μὲν ἀνήρ, καταγνοὺς αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὴν σπουδὴν τῶν κατηγόρων φοβηθείς, ὑπαπέστη· ἡμῖν δὲ τοῖς φίλοις ζῶντι ἢ ἀποθανόντι εὐσεβέστερον ἀμύνειν αὐτῷ. ἄριστα μὲν οὖν αὐτὸς ἂν ὑπὲρ αὑτοῦ ἀπελογεῖτο· ἐπεὶ δὲ τάδε ἀκινδυνότερα ἔδοξεν εἶναι, ἡμῖν, οἷς μέγιστον ἂν πένθος γένοιτο στερηθεῖσιν αὐτοῦ, ἀπολογητέον.
The defendant, not because he has judged himself guilty, but because he was alarmed by the vehemence the prosecution, has withdrawn. As to us, his friends, we are discharging our sacred duty to him more fitly by aiding him while he is alive than by aiding him after he is dead. Admittedly, he himself would have pleaded his own case best; but since the present course appeared the safer, it remains for us, to whom his loss would be a very bitter grief, to defend him.
§ 4.2
δοκεῖ δέ μοι περὶ τὸν ἄρξαντα τῆς πληγῆς τὸ ἀδίκημα εἶναι. ὁ μὲν οὖν διώκων οὐκ εἰκόσι τεκμηρίοις χρώμενος τοῦτον τὸν ἄρξαντά φησιν εἶναι. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὥσπερ βλέπειν μὲν τοῖν ὀφθαλμοῖν, ἀκούειν δὲ τοῖς ὠσίν, οὕτω κατὰ φύσιν ἦν ὑβρίζειν μὲν τοὺς νέους, σωφρονεῖν δὲ τοὺς γέροντας, οὐδὲν ἂν τῆς ὑμετέρας κρίσεως ἔδει· αὐτὴ γὰρ ἂν ἡ ἡλικία τῶν νέων κατέκρινε· νῦν δὲ πολλοὶ μὲν νέοι σωφρονοῦντες, πολλοὶ δὲ πρεσβῦται παροινοῦντες, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τῷ διώκοντι ἢ τῷ φεύγοντι τεκμήριον γίγνονται.
To my mind, it is with the aggressor that the blame for the deed rests. Now the presumptions from which the prosecution argues that the defendant was the aggressor are unreasonable. If brutal violence on the part of the young and self-control on the part of the old were as natural as seeing with the eyes and hearing with the ears, then there would be no need for you to sit in judgement; the young would stand condemned by their mere age. In fact, however, many young men are self-controlled, and many old men are violent in their cups; and so the presumption which they furnish favors the defense no less than the prosecution.
§ 4.3
κοινοῦ δὲ τοῦ τεκμηρίου ἡμῖν ὄντος καὶ τούτῳ, τῷ παντὶ προέχομεν· οἱ γὰρ μάρτυρες τοῦτόν φασιν ἄρξαι τῆς πληγῆς. ἄρξαντος δὲ τούτου, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων τῶν κατηγορουμένων ἀπολύεται τῆς αἰτίας. εἴπερ γὰρ ὁ πατάξας, διὰ τὴν πληγὴν βιασάμενος ὑμᾶς ἐπιτρεφθῆναι ἰατρῷ, μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀποκτείναντος φονεύς ἐστιν, ὁ ἄρξας τῆς πληγῆς φονεὺς γίγνεται. οὗτος γὰρ ἠνάγκασε τόν τε ἀμυνόμενον ἀντιτύπτειν τόν τε πληγέντα ἐπὶ τὸν ἰατρὸν ἐλθεῖν. ἀνόσια γὰρ ἂν ὁ διωκόμενος πάθοι, εἰ μήτε ἀποκτείνας ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀποκτείναντος μήτε ἄρξας ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἄρξαντος φονεὺς ἔσται.
As the presumption supports us as much as it does the dead man, the balance is in our favor; for according to the witnesses, it was he who was the aggressor. This being so, the defendant is cleared of all the other charges brought against him as well. For once it is argued that, because it was only the blow given by the striker which obliged you to seek medical attention at all, the murderer is the striker rather than the person immediately responsible for the man’s death, it follows that the murderer was he who struck the very first blow of all: because it was he who compelled both his adversary to strike back in self-defense and the victim struck to go to the physician. It would be outrageous, were the defendant, who was neither slayer nor aggressor, to be held a murderer in place of the true slayer and the true aggressor.
§ 4.4
ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲ ὁ ἐπιβουλεύσας οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ὁ διωκόμενος τοῦ διώκοντος. εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν ἄρξας τῆς πληγῆς τύπτειν καὶ μὴ ἀποκτείνειν διενοήθη, ὁ δὲ ἀμυνόμενος ἀποκτεῖναι, οὗτος ἂν ὁ ἐπιβουλεύσας εἴη. νῦν δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀμυνόμενος τύπτειν καὶ οὐκ ἀποκτεῖναι διανοηθεὶς ἥμαρτεν, εἰς ἃ οὐκ ἐβούλετο πατάξας.
Nor again is the intention to kill to be attributed to the accused rather than to his accuser. If it had been the case that, whereas he who struck the first blow had meant not to kill, but to strike, he who was defending himself had meant to kill, then it would have been this last who was guilty of the intention to kill. As it was, he who was defending himself likewise intended to strike, not to kill; but he committed an error, and struck where he did not mean to strike.
§ 4.5
τῆς μὲν οὖν πληγῆς βουλευτὴς ἐγένετο, τὸν δὲ θάνατον πῶς ἂν ἐπεβούλευσεν, ὅς γε ἀκουσίως ἐπάταξεν; οἰκεῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἁμάρτημα τῷ ἄρξαντι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ ἀμυνομένῳ ἐστίν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἃ ἔπασχεν ἀντιδρᾶν ζητῶν, ὑπʼ ἐκείνου βιαζόμενος ἐξήμαρτεν· ὁ δὲ διὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ ἀκολασίαν πάντα δρῶν καὶ πάσχων, καὶ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῆς ἐκείνου ἁμαρτίας αἴτιος ὢν δίκαιος φονεὺς εἶναί ἐστιν.
He was thus admittedly the wilful author of the blow; how can he have killed willfully,when he struck otherwise than he intended? Further, it is with the aggressor rather than with him who was defending himself that the responsibility for the error itself rests. The one was seeking to retaliate for the blows which he was receiving, when he committed his error: he was being forced to act by his attacker; whereas with the other, it was his own lack of self-control which caused him to give and receive the blows which he did: and so, since he is responsible both for his own error and for his victim’s, he deserves the name of murderer.
§ 4.6
ὡς δὲ οὐδὲ κρεισσόνως ἀλλὰ πολὺ ὑποδεεστέρως ὧν ἔπασχεν ἠμύνετο, διδάξω. ὁ μὲν ὑβρίζων καὶ παροινῶν πάντʼ ἔδρα καὶ οὐδὲν ἠμύνατο· ὁ δὲ μὴ πάσχειν ἀλλὰ ἀπωθεῖσθαι ζητῶν, ἅ τε ἔπασχεν ἀκουσίως ἔπασχεν, ἅ τʼ ἔδρασε τὰ παθήματα βουλόμενος διαφυγεῖν ἐλασσόνως ἢ κατʼ ἀξίαν τὸν ἄρξαντα ἠμύνετο, καὶ οὐκ ἔδρα.
Again, his defense was not more vigorous than the attack made upon him, but much less so: as I will show. The one was truculent, drunken, and violent; he took the offensive throughout, and was never on the defensive at all. The other was seeking to avoid blows and repel him; the blows which he received, he received from no choice of his own and the blows which he gave were given in defense of himself against the aggressor, and much less vigorously than that aggressor deserved, because his only object was to avoid the hurt which was being done to him; he did not take the offensive at all.
§ 4.7
εἰ δὲ κρείσσων ὢν τὰς χεῖρας κρεισσόνως ἠμύνετο ἢ ἔπασχεν, οὐδʼ οὕτω δίκαιος ὑφʼ ὑμῶν καταλαμβάνεσθαί ἐστι. τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἄρξαντι πανταχοῦ μεγάλα ἐπιτίμια ἐπίκειται, τῷ δὲ ἀμυνομένῳ οὐδαμοῦ οὐδὲν ἐπιτίμιον γέγραπται.
Even supposing that his defense was more vigorous than the attack made upon him, because there was more vigor in his hands, you cannot justly condemn him. Heavy penalties are invariably provided for the aggressor: whereas no penalty is ever prescribed for him who defends himself.
§ 4.8
πρὸς δὲ τὸ μήτε δικαίως μήτε ἀδίκως ἀποκτείνειν ἀποκέκριται· οὐ γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν πληγῶν ἀλλʼ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἰατροῦ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἀπέθανεν, ὡς οἱ μάρτυρες μαρτυροῦσιν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ τύχη τοῦ ἄρξαντος καὶ οὐ τοῦ ἀμυνομένου. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀκουσίως πάντα δράσας καὶ παθὼν ἀλλοτρίᾳ τύχῃ κέχρηται· ὁ δὲ ἑκουσίως πάντα πράξας, ἐκ τῶν αὑτοῦ ἔργων τὴν τύχην προσαγόμενος, τῇ αὑτοῦ ἀτυχίᾳ ἥμαρτεν.
The objection that the taking of life, whether justifiably or not, is forbidden, has been answered; it was not to the blows, but to the physician, that the man’s death was due, as the witnesses state in their evidence. Further, it is the aggressor, and not he who was defending himself, who was responsible for the accident. The one gave and received the blows which he did from no choice of his own, and therefore the accident in which he had a part was not of his own causing. The other did what he did of his own free will, and it was by his own actions that he brought the accident upon himself; hence he had himself to blame for the mischance whereby he committed his error.
§ 4.9
ὡς μὲν οὖν οὐδενὶ ἔνοχος τῶν κατηγορημένων ὁ διωκόμενός ἐστιν, ἀποδέδεικται. εἰ δέ τις κοινὴν μὲν τὴν πρᾶξιν, κοινὴν δὲ τὴν ἀτυχίαν αὐτῶν ἡγούμενος εἶναι, μηδὲν ἀπολύσιμον μᾶλλον ἢ καταλήψιμον ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων γιγνώσκει αὐτὸν ὄντα, καὶ οὕτως ἀπολύειν μᾶλλον ἢ καταλαμβάνειν δίκαιός ἐστι. τόν τε γὰρ διώκοντα οὐ δίκαιον καταλαμβάνειν, μὴ σαφῶς διδάξαντα ὅτι ἀδικεῖται· τόν τε φεύγοντα ἀνόσιον ἁλῶναι, μὴ φανερῶς ἐλεγχθέντα ἃ ἐπικαλεῖται.
It has been shown, then, that not one of the charges made concerns the defendant; and even if both parties are thought equally responsible alike for the actual crime and for the mischance which led to it, and it is decided from the arguments put forward that there is no more reason for acquitting the defendant than for condemning him, he still has a right to be acquitted rather than condemned. Not only is it unjust that his accuser should secure his conviction without clearly showing that he has been wronged: but it is a sin that the accused should be sentenced, if the charges made against him have not been proved conclusively.
§ 4.10
οὑτωσὶ δὲ ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου τῶν ἐγκλημάτων ἀπολυομένου τοῦ ἀνδρός, ἡμεῖς ὁσιώτερον ὑμῖν ἐπισκήπτομεν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ, μὴ τὸν φονέα ζητοῦντας κολάζειν τὸν καθαρὸν ἀποκτείνειν. ὅ τε γὰρ †ἀποκτείνας τοῦ ἀποθανόντος† οὐδὲν ἧσσον τοῖς αἰτίοις προστρόπαιος ἔσται, οὗτός τε ἀνοσίως διαφθαρεὶς διπλάσιον καθίστησι τὸ μίασμα τῶν ἀλιτηρίων τοῖς ἀποκτείνασιν αὐτόν.
As the defendant has been cleared so completely of the charges made, we lay upon you in his name a more righteous behest than did our opponents: in seeking to punish the murderer, do not put him who is blameless to death. If you do, [;the slayer no less than the slain will bring the wrath of heaven upon the guilty:]; and if the defendant is put to death without scruple, he causes the defilement brought upon his slayers by the spirits of vengeance to become twofold.
§ 4.11
ταῦτα οὖν δεδιότες, τὸν μὲν καθαρὸν ὑμέτερον ἡγεῖσθε εἶναι ἀπολύειν τῆς αἰτίας, τὸν δὲ μιαρὸν τῷ χρόνῳ ἀποδόντες φῆναι τοῖς ἔγγιστα τιμωρεῖσθαι ὑπολείπετε· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν δικαιότατα καὶ ὁσιώτατα πράξαιτʼ ἄν.
Hold that defilement in fear: and consider your duty to absolve him who is guiltless. Him upon whom the stain of blood rests you may let time reveal, even as you may leave his punishment to his victim’s kin. It is thus that you will best serve justice and the will of heaven.
On the Murder of Herodes · urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0028.tlg005 · Greek: Περὶ τοῦ Ἡρῷδου φόνου — tlg0028.tlg005.perseus-grc2 · English: On the Murder of Herodes — trans. Kenneth John Maidment — tlg0028.tlg005.perseus-eng2
§ 1
ἐβουλόμην μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες, τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ λέγειν καὶ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐξ ἴσου μοι καθεστάναι τῇ τε συμφορᾷ καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς τοῖς γεγενημένοις· νῦν δὲ τοῦ μὲν πεπείραμαι πέρᾳ τοῦ προσήκοντος, τοῦ δὲ ἐνδεής εἰμι μᾶλλον τοῦ συμφέροντος.
I could have wished, gentlemen, that my powers of speech and my experience of the world were as great as the misfortune and the severities with which I have been visited. Instead, I know more of the last two than I should, and am more wanting in the first than is good for me.
§ 2
οὗ μὲν γάρ με ἔδει κακοπαθεῖν τῷ σώματι μετὰ τῆς αἰτίας τῆς οὐ προσηκούσης, ἐνταυθοῖ οὐδέν με ὠφέλησεν ἡ ἐμπειρία· οὗ δέ με δεῖ σωθῆναι μετὰ τῆς ἀληθείας εἰπόντα τὰ γενόμενα, ἐν τούτῳ με βλάπτει ἡ τοῦ λέγειν ἀδυνασία.
When I had to submit to the bodily suffering which this unwarranted charge brought with it, experience afforded me no help; while now that my life depends upon my giving a truthful account of the facts, my case is being prejudiced by my inability to speak.
§ 3
πολλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἤδη τῶν οὐ δυναμένων λέγειν, ἄπιστοι γενόμενοι τοῖς ἀληθέσιν, αὐτοῖς τούτοις ἀπώλοντο, οὐ δυνάμενοι δηλῶσαι αὐτά· πολλοὶ δὲ τῶν λέγειν δυναμένων πιστοὶ γενόμενοι τῷ ψεύδεσθαι, τούτῳ ἐσώθησαν, διότι ἐψεύσαντο. ἀνάγκη οὖν, ὅταν τις ἄπειρος ᾖ τοῦ ἀγωνίζεσθαι, ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν κατηγόρων λόγοις εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπʼ αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἔργοις καὶ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τῶν πραγμάτων.
Poor speakers have often before now been disbelieved because they spoke the truth, and the truth itself has been their undoing because they could not make it convincing: just as clever speakers have often gained credit with lies, and have owed their lives to the very fact that they lied. Thus the fate of one who is not a practised pleader inevitably depends less upon the true facts and his actual conduct than upon the version of them given by his accusers.
§ 4
ἐγὼ οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες, αἰτήσομαι ὑμᾶς, οὐχ ἅπερ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀγωνιζομένων ἀκροᾶσθαι σφῶν αὐτῶν αἰτοῦνται, σφίσι μὲν αὐτοῖς ἀπιστοῦντες, ὑμῶν δὲ προκατεγνωκότες ἄδικόν τι—εἰκὸς γὰρ ἐν ἀνδράσι γε ἀγαθοῖς καὶ ἄνευ τῆς αἰτήσεως τὴν ἀκρόασιν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς φεύγουσιν, οὗπερ καὶ οἱ διώκοντες ἔτυχον ἄνευ αἰτήσεως·—
I shall therefore ask you, gentlemen, not indeed for a hearing, as do the majority of those on trial, who lack confidence in themselves and presume you to be biassed; for with an honest jury the defence is naturally assured of a hearing even without appealing for it, seeing that that same jury accorded the prosecution a hearing unasked—
§ 5
τάδε δὲ δέομαι ὑμῶν, τοῦτο μὲν ἐάν τι τῇ γλώσσῃ ἁμάρτω, συγγνώμην ἔχειν μοι, καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι ἀπειρίᾳ αὐτὸ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀδικίᾳ ἡμαρτῆσθαι, τοῦτο δὲ ἐάν τι ὀρθῶς εἴπω, ἀληθείᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ δεινότητι εἰρῆσθαι. οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον οὔτʼ ἔργῳ ἁμαρτόντα διὰ ῥήματα σωθῆναι, οὔτʼ ἔργῳ ὀρθῶς πράξαντα διὰ ῥήματα ἀπολέσθαι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ῥῆμα τῆς γλώσσης ἁμάρτημά ἐστι, τὸ δʼ ἔργον τῆς γνώμης.
no, my request of you is this. If, on the one hand, I make any mistake in speaking, pardon me and treat it as due to inexperience rather than dishonesty; and if, on the other hand, I express a point well, treat it as due to truthfulness rather than skill. For it is no more right that mere words should be the undoing of a man who is in fact innocent than that they should be the salvation of a man who is in fact guilty; the tongue is to blame for a word whereas the will is to blame for an act.
§ 6
ἀνάγκη δὲ κινδυνεύοντα περὶ αὑτῷ καί πού τι καὶ ἐξαμαρτεῖν. οὐ γὰρ μόνον τῶν λεγομένων ἀνάγκη ἐνθυμεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἐσομένων· ἅπαντα γὰρ τὰ ἐν ἀδήλῳ ἔτʼ ὄντα ἐπὶ τῇ τύχῃ μᾶλλον ἀνάκειται ἢ τῇ προνοίᾳ. ταῦτʼ οὖν ἔκπληξιν πολλὴν παρέχειν ἀνάγκη ἐστὶ τῷ κινδυνεύοντι.
Moreover, a man in personal danger is sure to make some mistake; he cannot help thinking of his fate as well as of his argument, as the decision of an issue which is still in doubt always depends more upon chance than upon human effort. Hence a man in danger is bound to be not a little distraught.
§ 7
ὁρῶ γὰρ ἔγωγε καὶ τοὺς πάνυ ἐμπείρους τοῦ ἀγωνίζεσθαι πολλῷ χεῖρον ἑαυτῶν λέγοντας, ὅταν ἔν τινι κινδύνῳ ὦσιν· ὅταν δʼ ἄνευ κινδύνων τι διαπράσσωνται, μᾶλλον ὀρθουμένους.
Even speakers with a long experience of the courts are far from being at their best, I notice, when in any danger; they are more successful when conducting a case in safety.
§ 8
ἡ μὲν οὖν αἴτησις, ὦ ἄνδρες, καὶ νομίμως καὶ ὁσίως ἔχουσα, καὶ ἐν τῷ ὑμετέρῳ δικαίῳ οὐχ ἧσσον ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐμῷ· περὶ δὲ τῶν κατηγορημένων ἀπολογήσομαι καθʼ ἕκαστον. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν, ὡς παρανομώτατα καὶ βιαιότατα εἰς τόνδε τὸν ἀγῶνα καθέστηκα, τοῦτο ὑμᾶς διδάξω, οὐ τῷ φεύγειν ἂν τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον, ἐπεὶ κἂν ἀνωμότοις ὑμῖν καὶ μὴ κατὰ νόμον μηδένα ἐπιτρέψαιμι περὶ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ ἐμοῦ διαψηφίσασθαι, ἕνεκά γε τοῦ πιστεύειν ἐμοί τε μηδὲν ἐξημαρτῆσθαι εἰς τόδε τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ ὑμᾶς γνώσεσθαι τὰ δίκαια, ἀλλʼ ἵνα ᾖ τεκμήρια ὑμῖν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πραγμάτων καὶ τῶν εἰς ἐμὲ ἡ τούτων βιαιότης καὶ παρανομία.
So much for my request, gentlemen; it breaks no law, human or divine: and it takes into account what you have a right to expect from me as much as what I have a right to expect from you. And now for the charges made, which I will answer one at a time. To begin with, I shall prove to you that the methods used to involve me in today’s proceedings were entirely illegal and arbitrary. Not that I wish to evade trial before a popular court; as far as my belief in my innocence of the present charge and in the justice of your verdict is concerned, I would place my life in your hands even if you were not on oath and I were being tried under no particular law. No, my object is to let the arbitrary and illegal behavior of the prosecution furnish you with a presumption as to the character of the rest of their case against me.
§ 9
πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ κακοῦργος ἐνδεδειγμένος φόνου δίκην φεύγω, ὃ οὐδεὶς πώποτʼ ἔπαθε τῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ ταύτῃ. καὶ ὡς μὲν οὐ κακοῦργός εἰμι οὐδʼ ἔνοχος τῷ τῶν κακούργων νόμῳ, αὐτοὶ οὗτοι τούτου γε μάρτυρες γεγένηνται. περὶ γὰρ τῶν κλεπτῶν καὶ λωποδυτῶν ὁ νόμος κεῖται, ὧν οὐδὲν ἐμοὶ προσὸν ἀπέδειξαν. οὕτως εἴς γε ταύτην τὴν ἀπαγωγὴν νομιμωτάτην καὶ δικαιοτάτην πεποιήκασιν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀποψήφισίν μου.
First, whereas an information has been lodged against me as a malefactor, I am being tried for murder: a thing which has never before happened to anyone in this country. Indeed, the prosecution have themselves borne witness to the fact that I am not a malefactor and cannot be charged under the law directed against malefactors, as that law is concerned with thieves and footpads, and they have omitted to prove my claim to either title. Thus, as far as this arrest of mine goes, they have given you every right and justification to acquit me.
§ 10
φασὶ δὲ αὖ τό γε ἀποκτείνειν μέγα κακούργημα εἶναι, καὶ ἐγὼ ὁμολογῶ μέγιστόν γε, καὶ τὸ ἱεροσυλεῖν καὶ τὸ προδιδόναι τὴν πόλιν· ἀλλὰ χωρὶς περὶ αὐτῶν ἑκάστου οἱ νόμοι κεῖνται. ἐμοὶ δὲ πρῶτον μέν, οὗ τοῖς ἄλλοις εἴργεσθαι προαγορεύουσι τοῖς τοῦ φόνου φεύγουσι τὰς δίκας, ἐνταυθοῖ πεποιήκασι τὴν κρίσιν, ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ· ἔπειτα τίμησίν μοι ἐποίησαν, ἀνταποθανεῖν τοῦ νόμου κειμένου τὸν ἀποκτείναντα, οὐ τοῦ ἐμοὶ συμφέροντος ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς λυσιτελοῦντος, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἔλασσον ἔνειμαν τῷ τεθνηκότι τῶν ἐν τῷ νόμῳ κειμένων· οὗ δʼ ἕνεκα, γνώσεσθε προϊόντος τοῦ λόγου.
They object, however, that murder is a malefaction, and a grave one. I agree, a very grave one; so is sacrilege; so is treason; but the laws which apply to each of them differ. In my case the prosecution have first of all caused the trial to be held in the one place from which those charged with murder are always debarred by proclamation, the Agora: and secondly, although it is laid down by law that a murderer shall pay with his life, they have entered a claim for damages—not as a kindness to me, but for their own benefit—and by so doing they have grudged the dead man his lawful due. Their motives you will learn in the course of my speech.
§ 11
ἔπειτα δέ, ὃ πάντας οἶμαι ὑμᾶς ἐπίστασθαι, ἅπαντα τὰ δικαστήρια ἐν ὑπαίθρῳ δικάζει τὰς δίκας τοῦ φόνου, οὐδενὸς ἄλλου ἕνεκα ἢ ἵνα τοῦτο μὲν οἱ δικασταὶ μὴ ἴωσιν εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ τοῖς μὴ καθαροῖς τὰς χεῖρας, τοῦτο δὲ ὁ διώκων τὴν δίκην τοῦ φόνου ἵνα μὴ ὁμωρόφιος γίγνηται τῷ αὐθέντῃ· σὺ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν παρελθὼν τοῦτον τὸν νόμον τοὐναντίον τοῖς ἄλλοις πεποίηκας· τοῦτο δὲ δέον σε διομόσασθαι ὅρκον τὸν μέγιστον καὶ ἰσχυρότατον, ἐξώλειαν σαυτῷ καὶ γένει καὶ οἰκίᾳ τῇ σῇ ἐπαρώμενον, ἦ μὴν μὴ ἄλλα κατηγορήσειν ἐμοῦ ἢ εἰς αὐτὸν τὸν φόνον, ὡς ἔκτεινα, ἐν ᾧ οὔτʼ ἂν κακὰ πολλὰ εἰργασμένος ἡλισκόμην ἄλλῳ ἢ αὐτῷ τῷ πράγματι, οὔτʼ ἂν πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ εἰργασμένος τούτοις ἂν ἐσωζόμην τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς·
Secondly, as of course you all know, every court judges cases of murder in the open air, and for good reasons: first, that the jurors may avoid entering the same building as those whose hands are unclean: and secondly, that he who is conducting the prosecution for murder may avoid being under the same roof as the murderer. No one but yourself has ever dreamed of evading this law. And not only that you should, as a preliminary, have taken the most solemn and binding oath known, swearing, under pain of causing yourself, your kin, and your house to perish from the earth, that you would accuse me only in connection with the murder itself, to the effect that I committed it; whereby, however numerous my crimes, I could have been condemned only on the charge before the court, and however numerous my good deeds, none of those good deeds could have gained me an acquittal.
§ 12
ἃ σὺ παρελθών,αὐτὸς σεαυτῷ νόμους ἐξευρών, ἀνώμοτος μὲν αὐτὸς ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖς, ἀνώμοτοι δὲ οἱ μάρτυρες καταμαρτυροῦσι, δέον αὐτοὺς τὸν αὐτὸν ὅρκον σοὶ διομοσαμένους καὶ ἁπτομένους τῶν σφαγίων καταμαρτυρεῖν ἐμοῦ. ἔπειτα κελεύεις τοὺς δικαστὰς ἀνωμότοις πιστεύσαντας τοῖς μαρτυροῦσι φόνου δίκην καταγνῶναι, οὓς σὺ αὐτὸς ἀπίστους κατέστησας παρελθὼν τοὺς κειμένους νόμους, καὶ ἡγῇ χρῆναι αὐτοῖς σὴν παρανομίαν κρείσσω γενέσθαι αὐτῶν τῶν νόμων.
This requirement you have evaded. You have invented laws to suit yourself. You, the prosecutor, are not on oath; nor are the witnesses, who are giving evidence against me which they should have given only after taking the same preliminary oath as yourself, their hands on the sacrifice as they did so. You bid the court, moreover, believe your witnesses, in spite of their not being on oath, and pass sentence for murder—when your own evasion of the laws of the land has destroyed the trustworthiness of those witnesses. Yes, you imagine that, in the eyes of the court, the laws themselves should have less authority than your own actions in defiance of them.
§ 13
λέγεις δὲ ὡς οὐκ ἂν παρέμεινα εἰ ἐλελύμην, ἀλλʼ ᾠχόμην ἂν ἀπιών, ὡσπερεὶ ἄκοντά με ἀναγκάσας εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὴν γῆν ταύτην. καίτοι ἐμοὶ εἰ μηδὲν διέφερε στέρεσθαι τῆσδε τῆς πόλεως, ἴσον ἦν μοι καὶ προσκληθέντι μὴ ἐλθεῖν, ἀλλʼ ἐρήμην ὀφλεῖν τὴν δίκην, τοῦτο δʼ ἀπολογησαμένῳ τὴν προτέραν ἐξεῖναι ἐξελθεῖν· ἅπασι γὰρ τοῦτο κοινόν ἐστι. σὺ δέ, ὃ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησι κοινόν ἐστιν, ἰδίᾳ ζητεῖς με μόνον ἀποστερεῖν, αὐτὸς σαυτῷ νόμον θέμενος.
You reply that if I had been allowed my freedom, I should have made off without awaiting my trial—as though you had forced me to enter this country against my will. Yet if I attached no importance to being debarred from Athens for the future, it was equally open to me either to disregard the summons to appear in court and so lose the case by default, or to avail myself of the right given to every one of leaving the country after making the first speech for the defense. You, however, for purely personal reasons, are trying to rob me, and me alone, of a privilege accorded to every Greek, by framing a law to suit yourself.
§ 14
καίτοι τούς γε νόμους οἳ κεῖνται περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, πάντας ἂν οἶμαι ὁμολογῆσαι κάλλιστα νόμων ἁπάντων κεῖσθαι καὶ ὁσιώτατα. ὑπάρχει μέν γε αὐτοῖς ἀρχαιοτάτοις εἶναι ἐν τῇ γῇ ταύτῃ, ἔπειτα τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀεὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, ὅπερ μέγιστόν ἐστι σημεῖον νόμων καλῶς κειμένων· ὁ γὰρ χρόνος καὶ ἡ ἐμπειρία τὰ μὴ καλῶς ἔχοντα ἐκδιδάσκει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. ὥστε οὐ δεῖ ὑμᾶς ἐκ τῶν τοῦ κατηγόρου λόγων τοὺς νόμους καταμανθάνειν, εἰ καλῶς ὑμῖν κεῖνται ἢ μή, ἀλλʼ ἐκ τῶν νόμων τοὺς τοῦ κατηγόρου λόγους, εἰ ὀρθῶς καὶ νομίμως ὑμᾶς διδάσκουσι τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ οὔ.
Yet it would be unanimously agreed, I think, that the laws which deal with cases such as the present are the most admirable and righteous of all laws. Not only have they the distinction of being the oldest in this country, but they have changed no more than the crime with which they are concerned; and that is the surest token of good laws, as time and experience show mankind what is imperfect. Hence you must not use the speech for the prosecution to discover whether your laws are good or bad: you must use the laws to discover whether or not the speech for the prosecution is giving you a correct and lawful interpretation of the case.
§ 15
οὕτως οἵ γε νόμοι κάλλιστα κεῖνται οἱ περὶ φόνου, οὓς οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἐτόλμησε κινῆσαι· σὺ δὲ μόνος δὴ τετόλμηκας γενέσθαι νομοθέτης ἐπὶ τὰ πονηρότερα, καὶ ταῦτα παρελθὼν ζητεῖς με ἀδίκως ἀπολέσαι. ἃ δὲ σὺ παρανομεῖς, αὐτὰ ταῦτά μοι μέγιστα μαρτύριά ἐστιν· εὖ γὰρ ᾔδεις ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἂν ἦν σοι ὃς ἐκεῖνον τὸν ὅρκον διομοσάμενος ἐμοῦ κατεμαρτύρησεν.
The laws concerned with the taking of life are thus excellent, and no one has ever before ventured to interfere with them. You alone have had the audacity to turn legislator and substitute worse for better; and the object of this arbitrary behavior of yours is to have me put to death without just cause. In fact, your infringement of the law is itself decisive evidence in my favor, because you well knew that you would find no one to testify to my guilt once he had taken that preliminary oath.
§ 16
ἔπειτα δὲ οὐχ ὡς πιστεύων τῷ πράγματι ἀναμφισβητήτως ἕνα τὸν ἀγῶνα περὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἐποιήσω, ἀλλὰ ἀμφισβήτησιν καὶ λόγον ὑπελίπου ὡς καὶ τοῖσδε τοῖς δικασταῖς ἀπιστήσων. ὥστε μηδέν μοι ἐνθάδε μηδὲ πλέον εἶναι μηδʼ ἀποφυγόντι, ἀλλʼ ἐξεῖναί σοι λέγειν ὅτι κακοῦργος ἀπέφυγον, ἀλλʼ οὐ τοῦ φόνου τὴν δίκην· ἑλὼν δʼ αὖ ἀξιώσεις με ἀποκτεῖναι ὡς τοῦ φόνου τὴν δίκην ὠφληκότα. καίτοι πῶς ἂν εἴη τούτων δεινότερα μηχανήματα, εἰ ὑμῖν μὲν ἅπαξ τουτουσὶ πείσασι κατείργασται ἃ βούλεσθε, ἐμοὶ δʼ ἅπαξ ἀποφυγόντι; ὁ αὐτὸς κίνδυνος ὑπολείπεται;
Furthermore, instead of acting like a man confident of his case and arranging that it should be tried once and indisputably, you have left yourself grounds for dispute and argument, as though you proposed to show your distrust of even the present court. The result is that even if I am acquitted today, I am no better off; you can say that it was as a malefactor that I was acquitted, not on a charge of murder. On the other hand, if you win your case, you will claim my life, on the ground that it is on a charge of murder that I have been tried and found guilty. Could any thing more unfair be devised? You and your associates have only to convince this court once, and your object is gained; whereas I, if I am acquitted once, am left in the same peril as before.
§ 17
ἔτι δὲ μάλʼ ἐδέθην, ὦ ἄνδρες, παρανομώτατα ἁπάντων ἀνθρώπων. ἐθέλοντος γάρ μου ἐγγυητὰς τρεῖς καθιστάναι κατὰ τὸν νόμου, οὕτως οὗτοι διεπράξαντο τοῦτο ὥστε μὴ ἐγγενέσθαι μοι ποιῆσαι. τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ξένων ὅτις πώποτε ἠθέλησε καταστῆσαι ἐγγυητάς, οὐδεὶς πώποτʼ ἐδέθη. καίτοι οἱ ἐπιμεληταὶ τῶν κακούργων τῷ αὐτῷ χρῶνται νόμῳ τούτῳ. ὥστε καὶ οὗτος κοινὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν ὢν ἐμοὶ μόνῳ ἐπέλιπε μὴ ἀπολῦσαι τοῦ δεσμοῦ.
Then again, gentlemen, my imprisonment was an act of illegality quite without parallel. I was ready to furnish the three sureties required by law; yet the prosecution took steps to ensure that I should be prevented from doing so. Hitherto no alien willing to furnish sureties has ever been imprisoned; and, moreover, the law concerned applies to the custodians of malefactors as it does to others. Here again, then, we have a law by which every one benefits: and it has failed to release me, and me alone, from confinement.
§ 18
τούτοις γὰρ ἦν τοῦτο συμφέρον, πρῶτον μὲν ἀπαρασκευότατον γενέσθαι με, μὴ δυνάμενον διαπράσσεσθαι αὐτὸν τἀμαυτοῦ πράγματα, ἔπειτα κακοπαθεῖν τῷ σώματι, τούς τε φίλους προθυμοτέρους ἔχειν τοὺς ἐμαυτοῦ τούτοις τὰ ψευδῆ μαρτυρεῖν ἢ ἐμοὶ τἀληθῆ λέγειν, διὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος κακοπάθειαν. ὄνειδός τε αὐτῷ τε ἐμοὶ περιέθεσαν καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς προσήκουσιν εἰς τὸν βίον ἅπαντα.
The reason was that it was to the prosecution’s advantage, first, that I should be prevented from looking after my interests in person, and so be quite unable to prepare for my trial: and secondly, that I should undergo bodily suffering, and by reason of that bodily suffering find my friends readier to tell lies as witnesses for the prosecution than the truth as witnesses for the defence. In addition to which, lifelong disgrace has been brought upon me and mine.
§ 19
οὑτωσὶ μὲν δὴ πολλοῖς ἐλασσωθεὶς τῶν νόμων τῶν ὑμετέρων καὶ τοῦ δικαίου καθέστηκα εἰς τὸν ἀγῶνα· ὅμως μέντοι γε καὶ ἐκ τούτων πειράσομαι ἐμαυτὸν ἀναίτιον ἐπιδεῖξαι. καίτοι χαλεπόν γε τὰ ἐκ πολλοῦ κατεψευσμένα καὶ ἐπιβεβουλευμένα, ταῦτα παραχρῆμα ἀπελέγχειν· ἃ γάρ τις μὴ προσεδόκησεν, οὐδὲ φυλάξασθαι ἐγχωρεῖ.
Such are the manifold respects in which I have had to submit to a loss of the rights accorded me by your laws and by justice before appearing in court. However, in spite of that disadvantage, I will try to prove my innocence: although it is hard to refute at a moment’s notice false charges so carefully framed, as one cannot prepare oneself against the unexpected.
§ 20
ἐγὼ δὲ τὸν μὲν πλοῦν ἐποιησάμην ἐκ τῆς Μυτιλήνης, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἐν τῷ πλοίῳ πλέων ᾧ Ἡρῴδης οὗτος, ὅν φασιν ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ ἀποθανεῖν· ἐπλέομεν δὲ εἰς τὴν Αἶνον, ἐγὼ μὲν ὡς τὸν πατέρα—ἐτύγχανε γὰρ ἐκεῖ ὢν τότε—ὁ δʼ Ἡρῴδης ἀνδράποδα Θρᾳξὶν ἀνθρώποις ἀπολύσων. συνέπλει δὲ τά τε ἀνδράποδα ἃ ἔδει αὐτὸν ἀπολῦσαι, καὶ οἱ Θρᾷκες οἱ λυσόμενοι. τούτων δʼ ὑμῖν τοὺς μάρτυρας παρέξομαι.
I sailed from Mytilene, gentlemen, as a passenger on the same boat as this Herodes whom, we are told, I murdered. We were bound for Aenus, I to visit my father, who happened to be there just then, and Herodes to release some slaves to certain Thracians. The slaves whom he was to release were also passengers, as were the Thracians who were to purchase their freedom. I will produce witnesses to satisfy you of this.
§ 21
Μάρτυρες ἡ μὲν πρόφασις ἑκατέρῳ τοῦ πλοῦ αὕτη· ἐτύχομεν δὲ χειμῶνί τινι χρησάμενοι, ὑφʼ οὗ ἠναγκάσθημεν κατασχεῖν εἰς τῆς Μηθυμναίας τι χωρίον, οὗ τὸ πλοῖον ὥρμει τοῦτο εἰς ὃ μετεκβάντα φασὶν ἀποθανεῖν αὐτόν , τὸν Ἡρῴδην. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὰ ταῦτα σκοπεῖτε, ὅτι οὐ τῇ ἐμῇ προνοίᾳ μᾶλλον ἐγίγνετο ἢ τύχῃ. οὔτε γὰρ πείσας τὸν ἄνδρα οὐδαμοῦ ἀπελέγχομαι σύμπλουν μοι γενέσθαι, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸς καθʼ αὑτὸν τὸν πλοῦν πεποιημένος ἕνεκα πραγμάτων ἰδίων·
Witnesses Such were our respective reasons for making the voyage. In the course of it, we happened to meet with a storm which forced us to put in at a place within the territory of Methymna, where the boat on to which Herodes transhipped, and on which the prosecution maintain that he met his end, lay at anchor. Now consider these circumstances in themselves to begin with; they were due to chance, not to any design on my part. It has nowhere been shown that I persuaded Herodes to accompany me; on the contrary, it has been shown that I made the voyage independently on business of my own.
§ 22
οὔτʼ αὖ ἐγὼ ἄνευ προφάσεως ἱκανῆς φαίνομαι τὸν πλοῦν ποιησάμενος εἰς τὴν Αἶνον, οὔτε κατασχόντες εἰς τὸ χωρίον τοῦτο ἀπὸ παρασκευῆς οὐδεμιᾶς, ἀλλʼ ἀνάγκῃ χρησάμενοι· οὔτʼ αὖ ἐπειδὴ ὡρμισάμεθα, ἡ μετέκβασις ἐγένετο εἰς τὸ ἕτερον πλοῖον οὐδενὶ μηχανήματι οὐδʼ ἀπάτῃ, ἀλλʼ ἀνάγκῃ καὶ τοῦτο ἐγίγνετο. ἐν ᾧ μὲν γὰρ ἐπλέομεν, ἀστέγαστον ἦν τὸ πλοῖον, εἰς ὃ δὲ μετέβημεν, ἐστεγασμένον· τοῦ δὲ ὑετοῦ ἕνεκα ταῦτʼ ἦν. τούτων δʼ ὑμῖν μάρτυρας παρέξομαι.
Nor again, as is clear, was I making my voyage to Aenus without good reason. Nor did we put in at this particular spot by prearrangement of any sort; we were forced to do so. And the transhipment after coming to anchor was similarly forced upon us, and not part of any plot or ruse. The boat on which we were passengers had no deck, whereas that on to which we transhipped had one and the rain was the reason for the exchange. I will produce witnesses to satisfy you of this.
§ 23
Μάρτυρες ἐπειδὴ δὲ μετεξέβημεν εἰς τὸ ἕτερον πλοῖον, ἐπίνομεν. καὶ ὁ μέν ἐστι φανερὸς ἐκβὰς ἐκ τοῦ πλοίου καὶ οὐκ εἰσβὰς πάλιν· ἐγὼ δὲ τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἐξέβην ἐκ τοῦ πλοίου τῆς νυκτὸς ἐκείνης. τῇ δʼ ὑστεραίᾳ, ἐπειδὴ ἀφανὴς ἦν ὁ ἀνήρ, ἐζητεῖτο οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἢ καὶ ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ· καὶ εἴ τῳ τῶν ἄλλων ἐδόκει δεινὸν εἶναι, καὶ ἐμοὶ ὁμοίως. καὶ εἴς τε τὴν Μυτιλήνην ἐγὼ αἴτιος ἦ πεμφθῆναι ἄγγελον, καὶ τῇ ἐμῇ γνώμῃ ἐπέμπετο.
Witnesses After crossing into the other boat, we fell to drinking. Now whereas it is established that Herodes quitted the boat and did not board it again, I did not leave the boat at all that night. Next day, when Herodes was missing, I joined in the search as anxiously as any; if anyone considered the matter serious, I did. Not only was I responsible for the dispatch of a messenger to Mytilene, that is to say, it was upon my suggestion that it was decided to send one,
§ 24
καὶ ἄλλου οὐδενὸς ἐθέλοντος βαδίζειν, οὔτε τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ πλοίου οὔτε τῶν αὐτῷ τῷ Ἡρῴδῃ συμπλεόντων, ἐγὼ τὸν ἀκόλουθον τὸν ἐμαυτοῦ πέμπειν ἕτοιμος ἦ· καίτοι οὐ δήπου γε κατʼ ἐμαυτοῦ μηνυτὴν ἔπεμπον εἰδώς. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁ ἀνὴρ οὔτε ἐν τῇ Μυτιλήνῃ ἐφαίνετο ζητούμενος οὔτʼ ἄλλοθι οὐδαμοῦ, πλοῦς τε ἡμῖν ἐγίγνετο, καὶ τἆλλʼ ἀνήγετο πλοῖα ἅπαντα, ᾠχόμην κἀγὼ πλέων. τούτων δʼ ὑμῖν τοὺς μάρτυρας παρασχήσομαι.
but when none of the passengers or the personal companions of Herodes volunteered to go, I offered to send my own attendant; and I hardly imagine that I was deliberately proposing to send someone who would inform against me. Finally, when the search had failed to reveal any trace of Herodes either at Mytilene or anywhere else and, with the return of fair sailing-weather, the rest of the boats began standing out to sea, I likewise took my departure. I will produce witnesses to prove these statements to you.
§ 25
Μάρτυρες τὰ μὲν γενόμενα ταῦτʼ ἐστίν· ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἤδη σκοπεῖτε τὰ εἰκότα. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ πρὶν ἀνάγεσθαί με εἰς τὴν Αἶνον, ὅτε ἦν ἀφανὴς ὁ ἀνήρ, οὐδεὶς ᾐτιάσατό με ἀνθρώπων, ἤδη πεπυσμένων τούτων τὴν ἀγγελίαν· οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε ᾠχόμην πλέων. ἀλλʼ εἰς μὲν τὸ παραχρῆμα κρεῖσσον ἦν τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ γεγενημένον τῆς τούτων αἰτιάσεως, καὶ ἅμα ἐγὼ ἔτι ἐπεδήμουν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐγώ τε ᾠχόμην πλέων καὶ οὗτοι ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς συνέθεσαν ταῦτα καὶ ἐμηχανήσαντο κατʼ ἐμοῦ, τότε ᾐτιάσαντο.
Witnesses Those are the facts; now draw the logical conclusions. First, in the interval before I put to sea for Aenus, when Herodes was missing, not a soul accused me, although the prosecution had already heard the news; otherwise I should never have taken my departure. For the moment the true facts of the matter were too much for any charge which they could bring; and, moreover, I was still on the island. It was not until I had resumed my voyage, and the prosecution had conspired to form this plot of theirs upon my life, that they made their accusation.
§ 26
λέγουσι δὲ ὡς ἐν μὲν τῇ γῇ ἀπέθανεν ὁ ἀνήρ, κἀγὼ λίθον αὐτῷ ἐνέβαλον εἰς τὴν κεφαλήν, ὃς οὐκ ἐξέβην τὸ παράπαν ἐκ τοῦ πλοίου. καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἀκριβῶς οὗτοι ἴσασιν. ὅπως δʼ ἠφανίσθη ὁ ἀνήρ, οὐδενὶ λόγῳ εἰκότι δύνανται ἀποφαίνειν. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἐγγύς που τοῦ λιμένος εἰκὸς ἦν τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι, τοῦτο μὲν μεθύοντος τοῦ ἀνδρός, τοῦτο δὲ νύκτωρ ἐκβάντος ἐκ τοῦ πλοίου· οὔτε γὰρ αὑτοῦ κρατεῖν ἴσως ἂν ἐδύνατο, οὔτε τῷ ἀπάγοντι νύκτωρ μακρὰν ὁδὸν ἡ πρόφασις ἂν εἰκότως ἐγίγνετο·
Their story is that it was on the shore that Herodes was killed, and that I, who did not leave the boat at all, struck him upon the head with a stone. Yet while they have detailed information of this, they cannot give any plausible account of how the man came to disappear. Clearly, the probabilities suggest that the crime was committed somewhere in the neighborhood of the harbor. On the one hand, Herodes was drunk; and on the other hand, it was at night that he left the boat. He probably would not have been in a condition to control his own movements, nor could anyone who wished to take him a long way off by night have found any plausible excuse for doing so.
§ 27
ζητουμένου δὲ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δύο ἡμέρας καὶ ἐν τῷ λιμένι καὶ ἄπωθεν τοῦ λιμένος, οὔτε ὀπτὴρ οὐδεὶς ἐφάνη οὔθʼ αἷμα οὔτʼ ἄλλο σημεῖον οὐδέν. κᾆτʼ ἐγὼ συγχωρῶ τῷ τούτων λόγῳ, παρεχόμενος μὲν τοὺς μάρτυρας ὡς οὐκ ἐξέβην ἐκ τοῦ πλοίου· εἰ δὲ καὶ ὡς μάλιστα ἐξέβην ἐκ τοῦ πλοίου, οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ εἰκὸς ἦν ἀφανισθέντα λαθεῖν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, εἴπερ γε μὴ πάνυ πόρρω ἀπῆλθεν ἀπὸ τῆς θαλάσσης.
Yet in spite of a two days’ search both in the harbor and at a distance from it, no eyewitness, no bloodstain, and no clue of any other description was found. But I will go further. I accept the prosecution’s story. I can indeed produce witnesses to prove that I did not quit the boat. But suppose as much as you please that I did quit it; it is still utterly improbable that the man should have remained undiscovered after his disappearance, if he did not go very far from the sea.
§ 28
ἀλλʼ ὡς κατεποντώθη λέγουσιν. ἐν τίνι πλοίῳ; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ λιμένος ἦν τὸ πλοῖον. πῶς ἂν οὖν οὐκ ἐξηυρέθη; καὶ μὴν εἰκός γε ἦν καὶ σημεῖόν τι γενέσθαι ἐν τῷ πλοίῳ ἀνδρὸς τεθνεῶτος ἐντιθεμένου καὶ ἐκβαλλομένου νύκτωρ. νῦν δὲ ἐν ᾧ μὲν ἔπινε πλοίῳ καὶ ἐξ οὗ ἐξέβαινεν, ἐν τούτῳ φασὶν εὑρεῖν σημεῖα, ἐν ᾧ αὐτοὶ μὴ ὁμολογοῦσιν ἀποθανεῖν τὸν ἄνδρα· ἐν ᾧ δὲ κατεποντώθη, οὐχ ηὗρον οὔτʼ αὐτὸ τὸ πλοῖον οὔτε σημεῖον οὐδέν. τούτων δʼ ὑμῖν τοὺς μάρτυρας παρασχήσομαι.
However, we are told that he was thrown into the sea. From what boat? Clearly, the boat came from the harbor itself; and in that case, why should it not have been identified? For that matter, we should also have expected to find some traces in the boat, seeing that a dead man had been placed in it and thrown overboard in the dark. The prosecution claim, indeed, to have found traces—but only in the boat on board of which he was drinking and which he quitted, the one boat on which they themselves agree that he was not murdered. The boat from which he was thrown into the sea they have not discovered; they have found neither it itself nor any trace of it. I will produce witnesses to prove these statements to you.
§ 29
Μάρτυρες ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐγὼ μὲν φροῦδος ἦ πλέων εἰς τὴν Αἶνον, τὸ δὲ πλοῖον ἧκεν εἰς τὴν Μυτιλήνην ἐν ᾧ ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ Ἡρῴδης ἐπίνομεν, πρῶτον μὲν εἰσβάντες εἰς τὸ πλοῖον ἠρεύνων, καὶ ἐπειδὴ τὸ αἷμα ηὗρον, ἐνταῦθα ἔφασαν τεθνάναι τὸν ἄνδρα· ἐπειδὴ δὲ αὐτοῖς τοῦτο οὐκ ἐνεχώρει, ἀλλʼ ἐφαίνετο τῶν προβάτων ὂν αἷμα, ἀποτραπόμενοι τούτου τοῦ λόγου συλλαβόντες ἐβασάνιζον τοὺς ἀνθρώπους.
Witnesses After I had departed for Aenus and the boat on which Herodes and I had been drinking had reached Mytilene, the prosecution first of all went on board and conducted a search. On finding the bloodstains, they claimed that this was where Herodes had met his end. But the suggestion proved an unfortunate one, as the blood turned out to be that of the animals sacrificed. So they abandoned that line, and instead seized the two men and examined them under torture.
§ 30
καὶ ὃν μὲν τότε παραχρῆμα ἐβασάνισαν, οὗτος μὲν οὐδὲν εἶπε περὶ ἐμοῦ φλαῦρον· ὃν δʼ ἡμέραις ὕστερον πολλαῖς ἐβασάνισαν, ἔχοντες παρὰ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς τὸν πρόσθεν χρόνον, οὗτος ἦν ὁ πεισθεὶς ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ καταψευσάμενος ἐμοῦ. παρέξομαι δὲ τούτων τοὺς μάρτυρας. Μάρτυρες
The first, who was tortured there and then, said nothing to damage me. The second was tortured several days later, after being in the prosecution’s company throughout the interval. It was he who was induced by them to incriminate me falsely. I will produce witnesses to confirm these facts.
§ 31
Μάρτυρες ὡς μὲν ὕστερον τοσούτῳ χρόνῳ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐβασανίσθη, μεμαρτύρηται ὑμῖν· προσέχετε δὲ τὸν νοῦν αὐτῇ τῇ βασάνῳ, οἵα γεγένηται. ὁ μὲν γὰρ δοῦλος, ᾧ ἴσως οὗτοι τοῦτο μὲν ἐλευθερίαν ὑπέσχοντο, τοῦτο δʼ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἦν παύσασθαι κακούμενον αὐτόν, ἴσως ὑπʼ ἀμφοῖν πεισθεὶς κατεψεύσατό μου, τὴν μὲν ἐλευθερίαν ἐλπίσας οἴσεσθαι, τῆς δὲ βασάνου εἰς τὸ παραχρῆμα βουλόμενος ἀπηλλάχθαι. οἶμαι δʼ ὑμᾶς ἐπίστασθαι τοῦτο, ὅτι ἐφʼ οἷς ἂν τὸ πλεῖστον μέρος τῆς βασάνου,
Witnesses You have listened to evidence for the length of the delay before the man’s examination under torture; now notice the actual character of that examination. The slave was doubtless promised his freedom: it was certainly to the prosecution alone that he could look for release from his sufferings. Probably both of these considerations induced him to make the false charges against me which he did; he hoped to gain his freedom, and his one immediate wish was to end the torture.
§ 32
πρὸς τούτων εἰσὶν οἱ βασανιζόμενοι λέγειν ὅ τι ἂν ἐκείνοις μέλλωσι χαριεῖσθαι· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἐστιν ἡ ὠφέλεια, ἄλλως τε κἂν μὴ παρόντες τυγχάνωσιν ὧν ἂν καταψεύδωνται. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐγὼ ἐκέλευον αὐτὸν στρεβλοῦν ὡς οὐ τἀληθῆ λέγοντα, ἴσως ἂν ἐν αὐτῷ τούτῳ ἀπετρέπετο μηδὲν κατʼ ἐμοῦ καταψεύδεσθαι· νῦν δὲ αὑτοὶ ἦσαν καὶ βασανισταὶ καὶ ἐπιτιμηταὶ τῶν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς συμφερόντων.
I need not remind you, I think, that witnesses under torture are biassed in favor of those who do most of the torturing; they will say anything likely to gratify them. It is their one chance of salvation, especially when the victims of their lies happen not to be present. Had I myself proceeded to give orders that the slave should be racked for not telling the truth, that step in itself would doubtless have been enough to make him stop incriminating me falsely. As it was, the examination was conducted by men who also knew what their own interests required.
§ 33
ἕως μὲν οὖν μετὰ χρηστῆς ἐλπίδος ἐγίγνωσκέ μου καταψευσάμενος, τούτῳ διισχυρίζετο τῷ λόγῳ· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐγίγνωσκεν ἀποθανούμενος, ἐνταῦθʼ ἤδη τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἐχρῆτο, καὶ ἔλεγεν ὅτι πεισθείη ὑπὸ τούτων ἐμοῦ καταψεύδεσθαι. διαπειραθέντα δʼ αὐτὸν τὰ ψευδῆ λέγειν, ὕστερον δὲ τἀληθῆ λέγοντα, οὐδέτερα ὠφέλησεν,
Now as long as he believed that he had something to gain by falsely incriminating me, he firmly adhered to that course; but on finding that he was doomed, he at once reverted to the truth and admitted that it was our friends here who had induced him to lie about me. However, neither his persevering attempts at falsehood nor his subsequent confession of the truth helped him.
§ 34
ἀλλʼ ἀπέκτειναν ἄγοντες τὸν ἄνδρα, τὸν μηνυτήν, ᾧ πιστεύοντες ἐμὲ διώκουσι, τοὐναντίον ποιήσαντες ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι τοῖς μηνυταῖς τοῖς μὲν ἐλευθέροις χρήματα διδόασι, τοὺς δὲ δούλους ἐλευθεροῦσιν· οὗτοι δὲ θάνατον τῷ μηνυτῇ τὴν δωρεὰν ἀπέδοσαν, ἀπαγορευόντων τῶν φίλων τῶν ἐμῶν μὴ ἀποκτείνειν τὸν ἄνδρα πρὶν ἂν ἐγὼ ἔλθοιμι.
They took him, took the man upon whose disclosures they are resting their case against me, and put him to death, a thing which no one else would have dreamed of doing. As a rule, informers are rewarded with money, if they are free, and with their liberty, if they are slaves. The prosecution paid for their information with death, and that in spite of a protest from my friends that they should postpone the execution until my return.
§ 35
δῆλον οὖν ὅτι οὐ τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ χρεία ἦν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ τῶν λόγων· ζῶν μὲν γὰρ ὁ ἀνὴρ διὰ τῆς αὐτῆς βασάνου ἰὼν ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ κατήγορος ἂν ἐγίγνετο τῆς τούτων ἐπιβουλῆς, τεθνεὼς δὲ τὸν μὲν ἔλεγχον τῆς ἀληθείας ἀπεστέρει διʼ αὐτοῦ τοῦ σώματος ἀπολλυμένου, τοῖς δὲ λόγοις τοῖς ἐψευσμένοις ὑπʼ ἐκείνου ὡς ἀληθέσιν οὖσιν ἐγὼ ἀπόλλυμαι. τούτων δὲ μάρτυράς μοι κάλει.
Clearly, it was not his person, but his evidence, which they required; had the man remained alive, he would have been tortured by me in the same way, and the prosecution would be confronted with their plot: but once he was dead, not only did the loss of his person mean that I was deprived of my opportunity of establishing the truth, but his false statements are assumed to be true and are proving my undoing. Call me witnesses to confirm these facts.
§ 36
Μάρτυρες ἐχρῆν μὲν γὰρ αὐτούς, ὡς ἐγὼ νομίζω, ἐνθάδε παρέχοντας τὸν μηνυτὴν αὐτὸν ἀπελέγχειν ἐμέ, καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ χρῆσθαι ἀγωνίσματι, ἐμφανῆ παρέχοντας τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ κελεύοντας βασανίζειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀποκτεῖναι. φέρε γὰρ δὴ ποτέρῳ νῦν χρήσονται τῶν λόγων; πότερα ᾧ πρῶτον εἶπεν ἢ ᾧ ὕστερον; καὶ πότερʼ ἀληθῆ ἐστιν, ὅτʼ ἔφη με εἰργάσθαι τὸ ἔργον ἢ ὅτʼ οὐκ ἔφη;
Witnesses In my opinion, they should have produced the informer himself in court, if they wished to prove me guilty. That was the issue to which they should have brought the case. Instead of putting the man to death, they ought to have produced him in the flesh and challenged me to examine him under torture. As it is, which of his statements will they use, may I ask: his first or his second? And which is true: the statement that I committed the murder or the statement that I did not?
§ 37
εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ εἰκότος ἐξετασθῆναι δεῖ τὸ πρᾶγμα, οἱ ὕστεροι λόγοι ἀληθέστεροι φαίνονται. ἐψεύδετο μὲν γὰρ ἐπʼ ὠφελείᾳ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ, ἐπειδὴ δὲ τῷ ψεύδεσθαι ἀπώλλυτο, ἡγήσατο τἀληθῆ κατειπὼν διὰ τοῦτο σωθῆναι ἄν. τῆς μὲν οὖν ἀληθείας οὐκ ἦν αὐτῷ τιμωρὸς οὐδείς· οὐ γὰρ παρὼν ἐγὼ ἐτύγχανον, ᾧπερ σύμμαχος ἦν ἡ ἀλήθεια τῶν ὑστέρων λόγων· τοὺς δὲ προτέρους λόγους τοὺς κατεψευσμένους ἦσαν οἱ ἀφανιοῦντες, ὥστε μηδέποτε εἰς τὸ ἀληθὲς καταστῆναι.
If we are to judge from probability, it is obviously the second which is the truer; he was lying to benefit himself, but on finding that those lies were proving fatal, he thought that he would be saved by telling the truth. However, he had no one to stand up for the truth, as I, who was vindicated by his second, true statement, was unfortunately not present; while there were those who were ready to put his first, his false one, beyond all reach of future correction. As a rule, it is the victim who quietly seizes an informer and then makes away with him. In this case, it is the very persons who arrested the slave in order to discover the truth who have done so;
§ 38
καὶ οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι καθʼ ὧν ἂν μηνύῃ τις, οὗτοι κλέπτουσι τοὺς μηνύοντας, κᾆτʼ ἀφανίζουσιν· αὐτοὶ δὲ οὗτοι οἱ ἀπάγοντες καὶ ζητοῦντες τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸν κατʼ ἐμοῦ μηνυτὴν ἠφάνισαν. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐγὼ τὸν ἄνδρα ἠφάνισα ἢ μὴ ἤθελον ἐκδοῦναι τούτοις ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ ἔφευγον ἔλεγχον, αὐτοῖς ἂν τούτοις ἰσχυροτάτοις εἰς τὰ πράγματα ἐχρῶντο, καὶ ἦν ταῦτα αὐτοῖς μέγιστα τεκμήρια κατʼ ἐμοῦ· νῦν δέ, ὁπότε αὐτοὶ οὗτοι προκαλουμένων τῶν φίλων τῶν ἐμῶν ταῦτʼ ἔφυγον, ἐμοὶ δήπου κατὰ τούτων εἶναι χρὴ ταὐτὰ ταῦτα τεκμήρια, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπέφερον ἣν ᾐτιῶντο.
and it is the very person who had supplied information against myself with whom they have made away. Had I myself been responsible for his disappearance, had I refused to surrender him to the prosecution or declined to establish the truth in some other way, they would have treated that very fact as most significant: it would have furnished the strongest presumption in their favor that I was guilty. So now that they themselves have declined to submit to an inquiry, in spite of a challenge from my friends to do so, that fact should in the same way furnish a presumption in my favor that the charge which they are bringing is a false one.
§ 39
ἔτι δὲ καὶ τάδε λέγουσιν, ὡς ὡμολόγει ὁ ἄνθρωπος βασανιζόμενος συναποκτεῖναι τὸν ἄνδρα. ἐγὼ δέ φημι ταῦτα μὲν οὐ λέγειν αὐτόν, ὅτι δὲ ἐξαγάγοι ἐμὲ καὶ τὸν ἄνδρα ἐκ τοῦ πλοίου, καὶ ὅτι ἤδη τεθνεῶτα αὐτὸν ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ συνανελὼν καὶ ἐνθεὶς εἰς τὸ πλοῖον καταποντώσειε.
They further allege that the slave admitted under torture that he had been my accomplice in the murder. I maintain that he did not say this; what he said was that he conducted Herodes and myself off the boat, and that after I had murdered him, he helped me pick him up and put him in the boat; then he threw him into the sea.
§ 40
καίτοι σκέψασθε ὅτι πρῶτον μέν, πρὶν ἐπὶ τὸν τροχὸν ἀναβῆναι, ὁ ἀνὴρ μέχρι τῆς ἐσχάτης ἀνάγκης τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἐχρῆτο καὶ ἀπέλυέ με τῆς αἰτίας· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸν τροχὸν ἀνέβη, τῇ ἀνάγκῃ χρώμενος ἤδη κατεψεύδετό μου, βουλόμενος ἀπηλλάχθαι τῆς βασάνου.
Also let me point out to you that at the start, before being placed on the wheel, in fact, until extreme pressure was brought to bear, the man adhered to the truth and declared me innocent. It was only when on the wheel, and when driven to it, that he falsely incriminated me, in order to put an end to the torture.
§ 41
ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐπαύσατο βασανιζόμενος, οὐκέτι ἔφη με τούτων εἰργάσθαι οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τελευταῖον ἀπῴμωξεν ἐμέ τε καὶ αὑτὸν ὡς ἀδίκως ἀπολλυμένους, οὐ χάριτι τῇ ἐμῇ—πῶς γάρ; ὅς γε κατεψεύσατο,—ἀλλʼ ἀναγκαζόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ βεβαιῶν τοὺς πρώτους λόγους ὡς ἀληθεῖς εἰρημένους.
When it was over, he ceased affirming that I had had any part in the crime; indeed, at the end he bemoaned the injustice with which both I and he were being sent to our doom: not that he was trying to do me a kindness—hardly that, after falsely accusing me as he had done; no, the truth left him no choice: he was confirming as true the declaration which he had made to begin with.
§ 42
ἔπειτα δὲ ὁ ἕτερος ἄνθρωπος, ὁ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ πλοίω πλέων καὶ παρὼν διὰ τέλους καὶ συνών μοι, τῇ αὐτῇ βασάνῳ βασανιζόμενος τοῖς μὲν πρώτοις καὶ τοῖς ὕστερον λόγοις τοῖς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου συνεφέρετο ὡς ἀληθέσιν οὖσι, διὰ τέλους γάρ με ἀπέλυε, τοῖς δʼ ἐπὶ τοῦ τροχοῦ λεγομένοις, οὓς ἐκεῖνος ἀνάγκῃ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀληθείᾳ ἔλεγε, τούτοις δὲ διεφέρετο. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐκβάντα μʼ ἔφη ἐκ τοῦ πλοίου ἀποκτεῖναι τὸν ἄνδρα, καὶ αὐτὸς ἤδη τεθνεῶτα συνανελεῖν μοι· ὁ δὲ τὸ παράπαν ἔφη οὐκ ἐκβῆναί με ἐκ τοῦ πλοίου.
Then there was the second man. He had travelled on the same boat as I: had been present throughout the voyage: and had been constantly in my company. When tortured in the same way, he confirmed the first and last statements of the other as true; for he declared me innocent from start to finish. On the other hand, the assertions made by the other upon the wheel, made not because they were the truth, but because they were wrung from him, he contradicted. Thus, while the one said that it was not until I had left the boat that I killed Herodes, and that he had himself helped me to remove the body after the murder, the other maintained that I did not leave the boat at all.
§ 43
καίτοι τὸ εἰκὸς σύμμαχόν μοί ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ δήπου οὕτω κακοδαίμων ἐγώ, ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἀποκτεῖναι τὸν ἄνδρα προὐνοησάμην μόνος, ἵνα μοι μηδεὶς συνειδείη, ἐν ᾧ μοι ὁ πᾶς κίνδυνος ἦν, ἤδη δὲ πεπραγμένου μοι τοῦ ἔργου μάρτυρας καὶ συμβούλους ἐποιούμην.
And indeed, the probabilities are in my favor; I hardly imagine myself to have been so benighted that after planning the murder on my own to ensure that no one was privy to it—for there lay my one great danger—I proceeded to furnish myself with witnesses and confederates once the crime had been committed.
§ 44
καὶ ἀπέθανε μὲν ὁ ἀνὴρ οὑτωσὶ ἐγγὺς τῆς θαλάσσης καὶ τῶν πλοίων, ὡς ὁ τούτων λόγος ἐστίν· ὑπὸ δὲ ἑνὸς ἀνδρὸς ἀποθνῄσκων οὔτε ἀνέκραγεν οὔτʼ αἴσθησιν οὐδεμίαν ἐποίησεν οὔτε τοῖς ἐν τῇ γῇ οὔτε τοῖς ἐν τῷ πλοίῳ; καὶ μὴν πολλῷ ἐπὶ πλέον γε ἀκούειν ἔστι νύκτωρ ἢ μεθʼ ἡμέραν, ἐπʼ ἀκτῆς ἢ κατὰ πόλιν· καὶ μὴν ἔτι ἐγρηγορότων φασὶν ἐκβῆναι τὸν ἄνδρα ἐκ τοῦ πλοίου.
Furthermore, Herodes was murdered very close to the sea and the boats, or so we are told by the prosecution. Was a man who was struck down by but one assailant not going to shout out or attract the attention of those on shore or on board? Moreover, sounds can be heard over much greater distances by night than by day, on a beach than in a city. Moreover, it is admitted that the passengers were still awake when Herodes left the boat.
§ 45
ἔπειτα ἐν τῇ γῇ μὲν ἀποθανόντος, ἐντιθεμένου δὲ εἰς τὸ πλοῖον, οὔτε ἐν τῇ γῇ σημεῖον οὐδὲ αἷμα ἐφάνη οὔτε ἐν τῷ πλοίῳ, νύκτωρ μὲν ἀναιρεθέντος, νύκτωρ δʼ ἐντιθεμένου εἰς τὸ πλοῖον. ἢ δοκεῖ ἂν ὑμῖν ἄνθρωπος δύνασθαι ἐν τοιούτῳ πράγματι ὢν τά τʼ ἐν τῇ γῇ ὄντα ἀναξύσαι καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ πλοίῳ ἀποσπογγίσαι, ἃ οὐδὲ μεθʼ ἡμέραν ἄν τις οἷός τʼ ἐγένετο, ἔνδον ὢν αὑτοῦ καὶ μὴ πεφοβημένος, τὸ παράπαν ἀφανίσαι; ταῦτα, ὧ ἄνδρες, πῶς εἰκότα ἐστίν;
Again, he was murdered on shore and placed in the boat; yet no trace or bloodstain was found either on shore or in the boat, in spite of the fact that it was at night that he was picked up and at night that he was placed in the boat. Do you think that any human being in such circumstances would have been able to smooth out the traces on shore and wipe away the marks on the boat, clues which a calm and collected man could not have removed successfully even by daylight? What probability is there in such a suggestion, gentlemen?
§ 46
ὅ δὲ δεῖ καὶ μάλιστα ἐνθυμεῖσθαι,—καὶ μή μοι ἄχθεσθε, ἂν ὑμᾶς πολλάκις ταὐτὰ διδάξω. μέγας γὰρ ὁ κίνδυνός ἐστι, καθʼ ὅ τι δʼ ἂν ὑμεῖς ὀρθῶς γνῶτε, κατὰ τοῦτο σῴζομαι, καθʼ ὅ τι δʼ ἂν ψευσθῆτε τἀληθοῦς, κατὰ τοῦτο ἀπόλλυμαι—μὴ οὖν ἐξέληται τοῦτο ὑμῶν μηδείς, ὅτι τὸν μηνυτὴν ἀπέκτειναν, καὶ διετείναντο αὐτὸν μὴ εἰσελθεῖν εἰς ὑμᾶς, μηδʼ ἐμοὶ ἐγγενέσθαι παρόντι ἄξαι τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ βασανίσαι αὐτόν.
One thing above all you must remember, and I hope that you will forgive me for repeatedly stressing the same point; but my danger is great, and only if you form a right judgement, am I safe; if you are misled, I am doomed. I repeat, let no one cause you to forget that the prosecution put the informer to death, that they used every effort to prevent his appearance in court and to make it impossible for me to take him and examine him under torture on my return;
§ 47
καίτοι πρὸς τούτων ἦν τοῦτο. νῦν δὲ πριάμενοι τὸν ἄνδρα, ἰδίᾳ ἐπὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἀπέκτειναν, τὸν μηνυτήν, οὔτε τῆς πόλεως ψηφισαμένης, οὔτε αὐτόχειρα ὄντα τοῦ ἀνδρός. ὃν ἐχρῆν δεδεμένον αὐτοὺς φυλάσσειν, ἢ τοῖς φίλοις τοῖς ἐμοῖς ἐξεγγυῆσαι, ἢ τοῖς ἄρχουσι τοῖς ὑμετέροις παραδοῦναι, καὶ ψῆφον περὶ αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι. νῦν δὲ αὐτοὶ καταγνόντες τὸν θάνατον τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἀπεκτείνατε· ὃ οὐδὲ πόλει ἔξεστιν, ἄνευ Ἀθηναίων οὐδένα θανάτῳ ζημιῶσαι. καὶ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων λόγων τῶν ἐκείνου τουτουσὶ κριτὰς ἠξιώσατε γενέσθαι, τῶν δὲ ἔργων αὐτοὶ δικασταὶ γίγνεσθε.
although to allow me to do so was to their own advantage. Instead, they bought the slave and put him to death, entirely on their own initiative—put the informer himself to death, without any official sanction, and without the excuse that he was guilty of the murder. They should of course have kept him in custody, or surrendered him to my friends on security, or else handed him over to the magistrates of Athens in order that his fate might be decided by a court. As it was, you sentenced him to death on your own authority and executed him, when even an allied state is denied the right of inflicting the death-penalty in such fashion without the consent of the Athenian people. You thought fit to let the present court decide the merits of his statements; but you pass judgement on his acts yourselves.
§ 48
καίτοι οὐδὲ οἱ τοὺς δεσπότας ἀποκτείναντες, ἐὰν ἐπʼ αὐτοφώρῳ ληφθῶσιν, οὐδʼ οὗτοι ἀποθνῄσκουσιν ὑπʼ αὐτῶν τῶν προσηκόντων, ἀλλὰ παραδιδόασιν αὐτοὺς τῇ ἀρχῇ κατὰ νόμους ὑμετέρους πατρίους. εἴπερ γὰρ καὶ μαρτυρεῖν ἔξεστι δούλῳ κατὰ τοῦ ἐλευθέρου τὸν φόνον, καὶ τῷ δεσπότῃ, ἂν δοκῇ, ἐπεξελθεῖν ὑπὲρ τοῦ δούλου, καὶ ἡ ψῆφος ἴσον δύναται τῷ δοῦλον ἀποκτείναντι καὶ τῷ ἐλεύθερον, εἰκός τοι καὶ ψῆφον γενέσθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ ἦν, καὶ μὴ ἄκριτον ἀποθανεῖν αὐτὸν ὑφʼ ὑμῶν. ὥστε πολλῷ ἂν ὑμεῖς δικαιότερον κρίνοισθε ἢ ἐγὼ νῦν φεύγω ὑφʼ ὑμῶν ἀδίκως.
Why, even slaves who have murdered their masters and been caught red-handed are not put to death by the victim’s own relatives; they are handed over to the authorities as the ancient laws of your country ordain. If it is a fact that a slave is allowed to give evidence that a free man is guilty of murder, if a master can seek vengeance for the murder of his slave, should he see fit, and if a court can sentence the murderer of a slave as effectively as it can the murderer of a free man, it follows that the slave in question should have had a public trial, instead of being put to death by you without a hearing. Thus it is you who deserve to be on trial far rather than I, who am being accused this day so undeservedly.
§ 49
σκοπεῖτε δή, ὦ ἄνδρες, καὶ ἐκ τοῖν λόγοιν τοῖν ἀνδροῖν ἑκατέροιν τοῖν βασανισθέντοιν τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ εἰκός. ὁ μὲν γὰρ δοῦλος δύο λόγω ἔλεγε· τοτὲ μὲν ἔφη με εἰργάσθαι τὸ ἔργον, τοτὲ δὲ οὐκ ἔφη· ὁ δὲ ἐλεύθερος οὐδέπω νῦν εἴρηκε περὶ ἐμοῦ φλαῦρον οὐδέν, τῇ αὐτῇ βασάνῳ βασανιζόμενος.
And now, gentlemen, consider further the statements of the two witnesses tortured. What are the fair and reasonable conclusions to be drawn from them? The slave gave two accounts: at one time he maintained that I was guilty, at another that I was not.
§ 50
τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἦν αὐτῷ ἐλευθερίαν προτείναντας ὥσπερ τὸν ἕτερον πεῖσαι· τοῦτο δὲ μετὰ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἐβούλετο κινδυνεύων πάσχειν ὅ τι δέοι, ἐπεὶ τό γε συμφέρον καὶ οὗτος ἠπίστατο, ὅτι τότε παύσοιτο στρεβλούμενος, ὁπότε εἴποι τὰ τούτοις δοκοῦντα. ποτέρῳ οὖν εἰκός ἐστι πιστεῦσαι, τῷ διὰ τέλους τὸν αὐτὸν ἀεὶ λόγον λέγοντι, ἢ τῷ τοτὲ μὲν φάσκοντι τοτὲ δʼ οὔ; ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄνευ βασάνου τοιαύτης οἱ τοὺς αὐτοὺς αἰεὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγους λέγοντες πιστότεροί εἰσι τῶν διαφερομένων σφίσιν αὐτοῖς.
On the other hand, in spite of similar torture, the free man has not even yet said anything to damage me. He could not be influenced by offers of freedom, as his companion had been; and at the same time he was determined to cling to the truth, cost what it might. Of course, as far as his own advantage was concerned, he knew, like the other, that the torture would be over as soon as he corroborated the prosecution. Which, then, have we more reason to believe: the witness who firmly adhered to the same statement throughout, or the witness who affirmed a thing at one moment, and denied it at the next? Why, quite apart from the torture employed, those who consistently keep to one statement about one set of facts are more to be trusted than those who contradict themselves.
§ 51
ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶν λόγων τῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου μερὶς ἑκατέροις ἴση ἂν εἴη, μὲν τὸ φάσκειν, ἐμοὶ δὲ τὸ μὴ φάσκειν· ἔκ τε ἀμφοῖν τοῖν ἀνδροῖν τοῖν βασανισθέντοιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔφησεν, ὁ δὲ διὰ τέλους ἔξαρνος ἦν. καὶ μὲν δὴ τὰ ἐξ ἴσου γενόμενα τοῦ φεύγοντός ἐστι μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ διώκοντος, εἴπερ γε καὶ τῶν ψήφων ὁ ἀριθμὸς ἐξ ἴσου γενόμενος τὸν φεύγοντα μᾶλλον ὠφελεῖ ἢ τὸν διώκοντα.
Then again, of the slave’s statements half are in favor of one side, half in favor of the other: his affirmations support my accusers, and his denials support me. [;Similarly with the combined statements of both the witnesses examined: the one affirmed, and the other consistently denied.]; But I need not point out that any equal division is to the advantage of the defence rather than the prosecution, in view of the fact that an equal division of the votes of the jury similarly benefits the defence rather than the prosecution.
§ 52
ἡ μὲν βάσανος, ὦ ἄνδρες, τοιαύτη ἐγένετο, ᾗ οὗτοι πιστεύοντες εὖ εἰδέναι φασὶν ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ ἀποθανόντα τὸν ἄνδρα. καίτοι τὸ παράπαν ἔγωγʼ ἂν εἴ τι συνῄδη ἐμαυτῷ καὶ εἴ τί μοι τοιοῦτον εἴργαστο, ἠφάνισʼ ἂν τὼ ἀνθρώπω, ὅτε ἐπʼ ἐμοὶ ἦν τοῦτο μὲν εἰς τὴν Αἶνον ἀπάγειν ἅμα ἐμοί, τοῦτο δὲ εἰς τὴν ἤπειρον διαβιβάσαι, καὶ μὴ ὑπολείπεσθαι μηνυτὰς κατʼ ἐμαυτοῦ τοὺς συνειδότας.
Such was the examination under torture on which the prosecution rely, gentlemen, when they say that they are convinced that I am the murderer of Herodes. Yet if I had had anything whatsoever on my conscience, if I had committed a crime of this kind, I should have got rid of both witnesses while I had the opportunity, either by taking them with me to Aenus or by shipping them to the mainland. I should not have left the men who knew the truth behind to inform against me.
§ 53
φασὶ δὲ γραμματείδιον εὑρεῖν ἐν τῷ πλοίῳ, ὃ ἔπεμπον ἐγὼ Λυκίνῳ, ὡς ἀποκτείναιμι τὸν ἄνδρα. καίτοι τί ἔδει με γραμματείδιον πέμπειν, αὐτοῦ συνειδότος τοῦ τὸ γραμματείδιον φέροντος; ὥστε τοῦτο μὲν σαφέστερον αὐτὸς ἔμελλεν ἐρεῖν ὁ εἰργασμένος, τοῦτο δὲ οὐδὲν ἔδει κρύπτειν αὐτόν· ἃ γὰρ μὴ οἷόν τε εἰδέναι τὸν φέροντα, ταῦτʼ ἄν τις μάλιστα συγγράψας πέμψειεν.
The prosecution further allege that they discovered on board a note stating that I had killed Herodes, which I had intended to send to Lycinus. But what need had I to send a note, when the bearer himself was my accomplice? Not only would he, as one of the murderers, have told the story more clearly in his own words, but it would have been quite unnecessary to conceal the message from him, and it is essentially messages which cannot be disclosed to the bearer that are sent in writing.
§ 54
ἔπειτα δὲ ὅ τι μὲν μακρὸν εἴη πρᾶγμα, τοῦτο μὲν ἄν τις ἀναγκασθείη γράψαι τῷ μὴ διαμνημονεύειν τὸν ἀπαγγέλλοντα ὑπὸ πλήθους. τοῦτο δὲ βραχὺ ἦν ἀπαγγεῖλαι, ὅτι τέθνηκεν ὁ ἀνήρ. ἔπειτα ἐνθυμεῖσθε ὅτι διάφορον ἦν τὸ γραμματείδιον τῷ βασανισθέντι, διάφορος δʼ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῷ γραμματειδίῳ. ὁ μὲν γὰρ βασανιζόμενος αὐτὸς ἔφη ἀποκτεῖναι, τὸ δὲ γραμματείδιον ἀνοιχθὲν ἐμὲ τὸν ἀποκτείναντα ἐμήνυεν.
Then again, an extensive message would have had to be written down, as its length would have prevented the bearer remembering it. But this one was brief enough to deliver—The man is dead. Moreover, bear in mind that the note contradicted the slave tortured, and the slave the note. The slave stated under torture that he had committed the murder himself, whereas the note when opened revealed the fact that I was the murderer.
§ 55
καίτοι ποτέρῳ χρὴ πιστεῦσαι; τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον οὐχ ηὗρον ἐν τῷ πλοίῳ ζητοῦντες τὸ γραμματείδιον, ὕστερον δέ. τότε μὲν γὰρ οὔπω οὕτως ἐμεμηχάνητο αὐτοῖς. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὁ πρότερος βασανισθεὶς οὐδὲν ἔλεγε κατʼ ἐμοῦ, τότε εἰσβάλλουσιν εἰς τὸ πλοῖον τὸ γραμματείδιον, ἵνα ταύτην ἔχοιεν ἐμοὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιφέρειν·
Which are we to believe? The prosecution discovered the note on board only during a second search, not during their first one; they had not hit on the idea at the time. It was not until the first witness had said nothing to incriminate me when tortured that they dropped the note in the boat, in order to have that, if nothing else, as a ground for accusing me.
§ 56
ἐπειδὴ δʼ ἀνεγνώσθη τὸ γραμματείδιον καὶ ὁ ὕστερος βασανιζόμενος οὐ συνεφέρετο τῷ γραμματειδίῳ, οὐκέθʼ οἷόν τʼ ἦν ἀφανίσαι τὰ ἀναγνωσθέντα. εἰ γὰρ ἡγήσαντο τὸν ἄνδρα πείσειν ἀπὸ πρώτης καταψεύδεσθαί μου, οὐκ ἄν ποτʼ ἐμηχανήσαντο τὰ ἐν τῷ γραμματειδίῳ. καί μοι μάρτυρας τούτων κάλει.
Then, once the note had been read and the second witness, when tortured, persisted in disagreeing with the note, it was impossible to spirit away the message read from it. Needless to say, had the prosecution supposed that they would induce the slave to lie about me immediately, they would never have devised the message contained in the note. Call me witnesses to confirm these facts.
§ 57
Μάρτυρες τίνος γε δὴ ἕνεκα τὸν ἄνδρα ἀπέκτεινα; οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔχθρα οὐδεμία ἦν ἐμοὶ κἀκείνῳ. λέγειν δὲ τολμῶσιν ὡς ἐγὼ χάριτι τὸν ἄνδρα ἔκτεινα. καὶ τίς πώποτε χαριζόμενος ἑτέρῳ τοῦτο εἰργάσατο; οἶμαι μὲν γὰρ οὐδένα, ἀλλὰ δεῖ μεγάλην τὴν ἔχθραν ὑπάρχειν τῷ τοῦτο μέλλοντι ποιήσειν, καὶ τὴν πρόνοιαν ἐκ πολλῶν εἶναι φανερὰν ἐπιβουλευομένην. ἐμοὶ δὲ κἀκείνῳ οὐκ ἦν ἔχθρα οὐδεμία.
Witnesses Now what was my motive in murdering Herodes? For there was not even any bad feeling between us. The prosecution have the audacity to suggest that I murdered him as a favor. But who has ever turned murderer to oblige a friend? No one, I am sure. The bitterest feeling has to exist before murder is committed, while the growth of the design is always abundantly manifest. And, as I said, between Herodes and myself there was no bad feeling.
§ 58
εἶεν, ἀλλὰ δείσας περὶ ἐμαυτοῦ μὴ αὐτὸς παρʼ ἐκείνου τοῦτο πάθοιμι; καὶ γὰρ ἂν τῶν τοιούτων ἕνεκά τις ἀναγκασθείη τοῦτο ἐργάσασθαι. ἀλλʼ οὐδέν μοι τοιοῦτον ὑπῆρκτο εἰς αὐτόν. ἀλλὰ χρήματα ἔμελλον λήψεσθαι ἀποκτείνας αὐτόν; ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἦν αὐτῷ.
Well and good. Then was it that I was afraid of being murdered by him myself? A motive of that kind might well drive a man to the deed. No, I had no such fears with regard to him. Then was I going to enrich myself by the murder? No, he had no money.
§ 59
ἀλλὰ σοὶ μᾶλλον ἐγὼ τὴν πρόφασιν ταύτην ἔχοιμʼ ἂν εἰκότως μετὰ τῆς ἀληθείας ἀναθεῖναι, ὅτι χρημάτων ἕνεκα ζητεῖς ἐμὲ ἀποκτεῖναι, μᾶλλον ἢ σὺ ἐμοὶ ἐκεῖνον· καὶ πολὺ ἂν δικαιότερον ἁλοίης σὺ φόνου ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνας ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμοὶ προσηκόντων, ἢ ἐγὼ ὑπὸ σοῦ καὶ τῶν ἐκείνου ἀναγκαίων. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ σοῦ φανερὰν τὴν πρόνοιαν εἰς ἐμὲ ἀποδείκνυμι, σὺ δʼ ἐμὲ ἐν ἀφανεῖ λόγῳ ζητεῖς ἀπολέσαι.
Indeed, it would be more intelligible and nearer the truth for me to maintain that money was at the bottom of your own attempt to secure my death than it is for you to suggest it as my motive in murdering Herodes. You yourself deserve to be convicted of murder by my relatives for killing me far more than I by you and the family of Herodes. Of your designs on my life I have clear proof: whereas you, in seeking to make an end of me, produce only a tale of which proof is impossible.
§ 60
ταῦτα μὲν ὑμῖν λέγω, ὡς αὐτῷ μοι πρόφασιν οὐδεμίαν εἶχε τἀποκτεῖναι τὸν ἄνδρα· δεῖ δέ με καὶ ὑπὲρ Λυκίνου ἀπολογήσασθαι, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὑπὲρ αὑτοῦ μόνον, ὡς οὐδʼ ἐκεῖνον εἰκότως αἰτιῶνται. λέγω τοίνυν ὑμῖν ὅτι ταὐτὰ ὑπῆρχεν αὐτῷ εἰς ἐκεῖνον ἅπερ ἐμοί· οὔτε γὰρ χρήματα ἦν αὐτῷ ὁπόθεν ἂν ἔλαβεν ἀποκτείνας ἐκεῖνον, οὔτε κίνδυνος αὐτῷ ὑπῆρχεν οὐδεὶς ὅντινα διέφευγεν ἀποθανόντος ἐκείνου.
I assure you that I personally can have had no motive for murdering Herodes; but I must apparently clear Lycinus as well as myself by showing the absurdity of the charge in his case also. I assure you that his position with regard to Herodes was the same as my own. He had no means of enriching himself by the murder; and there was no danger from which the death of Herodes released him.
§ 61
τεκμήριον δὲ μέγιστον ὡς οὐκ ἐβούλετο αὐτὸν ἀπολέσαι. ἐξὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ ἐν ἀγῶνι καὶ κινδύνῳ μεγάλῳ καταστήσαντι μετὰ τῶν νόμων τῶν ὑμετέρων ἀπολέσαι ἐκεῖνον, εἴπερ προωφείλετο αὐτῷ κακόν, καὶ τό τε ἴδιον τὸ αὑτοῦ διαπράξασθαι καὶ τῇ πόλει τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ χάριν καταθέσθαι, εἰ ἐπέδειξεν ἀδικοῦντα ἐκεῖνον, οὐκ ἠξίωσεν, ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ ἦλθεν ἐπὶ τοῦτον. καίτοι καλλίων γε ἦν ὁ κίνδυνος αὐτῷ
Further, the following consideration indicates most strikingly that he did not desire his death: had redress for some old injury been owing to Lycinus, he could have brought Herodes into court on a charge which endangered his life, and have enlisted the help of your laws in making an end of him. By proving him a criminal he could have gained both his own object and your city’s gratitude. This he did not trouble to do: he did not even attempt to institute proceedings against him, in spite of the fact that he was running a more honorable risk by bringing Herodes into court than by engaging me to murder him. Call me witnesses to confirm these facts.
§ 62
Μάρτυρες ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα μὲν ἀφῆκεν αὐτόν· οὗ δὲ ἔδει κινδυνεύειν αὐτὸν περί τε αὑτοῦ καὶ περὶ ἐμοῦ, ἐνταῦθα δʼ ἐπεβούλευεν, ἐν ᾧ γνωσθεὶς ἂν ἀπεστέρει μὲν ἐμὲ τῆς πατρίδος, ἀπεστέρει δὲ αὑτὸν ἱερῶν καὶ ὁσίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἅπερ μέγιστα καὶ περὶ πλείστου ἐστὶν ἀνθρώποις. ἔπειτα δʼ εἰ καὶ ὡς μάλιστα ἐβούλετο αὐτὸν ὁ Λυκῖνος τεθνάναι—εἶμι γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν τῶν κατηγόρων λόγον,—οὗ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἠξίου αὐτόχειρ γενέσθαι, τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον ἐγώ ποτʼ ἂν ἐπείσθην ἀντʼ ἐκείνου ποιῆσαι;
Witnesses So we are to understand that Lycinus left Herodes in peace as far as an action at law was concerned, and instead chose the one course which was bound to endanger both himself and me, that of plotting his death, notwithstanding the fact that, if discovered, he would have deprived me of my country and himself of his rights before heaven and mankind, and of all that men hold most sacred and most precious. I will go further: I will adopt the standpoint of the prosecution: I will admit as readily as you like that Lycinus did desire the death of Herodes. Does it follow that I should ever have been induced to perform in his stead a deed which he refused to commit with his own hand?
§ 63
πότερα ὡς ἐγὼ μὲν ἦ τῷ σώματι ἐπιτήδειος διακινδυνεύειν, ἐκεῖνος δὲ χρήμασι τὸν ἐμὸν κίνδυνον ἐκπρίασθαι; οὐ δῆτα· τῷ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἦν χρήματα, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἦν· ἀλλʼ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐκεῖνος τοῦτο θᾶσσον ἂν ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ ἐπείσθη κατά γε τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ ἐγὼ ὑπὸ τούτου, ἐπεὶ ἐκεῖνός γʼ ἑαυτὸν οὐδʼ ὑπερήμερον γενόμενον ἑπτὰ μνῶν δυνατὸς ἦν λύσασθαι, ἀλλʼ οἱ φίλοι αὐτὸν ἐλύσαντο. καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τῆς χρείας τῆς ἐμῆς καὶ τῆς Λυκίνου τοῦτο ὑμῖν μέγιστον τεκμήριόν ἐστιν, ὅτι οὐ σφόδρα ἐχρώμην ἐγὼ Λυκίνῳ φίλῳ, ὡς πάντα ποιῆσαι ἂν τὰ ἐκείνῳ δοκοῦντα· οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἑπτὰ μὲν μνᾶς οὐκ ἀπέτεισα ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ δεδεμένου καὶ λυμαινομένου, κίνδυνον δὲ τοσοῦτον ἀράμενος ἄνδρα ἀπέκτεινα διʼ ἐκεῖνον.
Was I, for instance, in a position to risk my life, and he in a position to hire me to do so? No, I had money, and he had none. On the contrary, the probabilities show that he would have been induced to commit the crime by me sooner than I by him; for even after suffering an execution for a debt of seven minae, he could not release himself from prison: his friends had to purchase his release. In fact, this affords the clearest indication of the relations between Lycinus and myself; it shows that my friendship with him was hardly close enough to make me willing to satisfy his every wish. I cannot suppose that I braved the enormous risk which murder involved to oblige him, after refusing to pay off seven minae for him when he was suffering the hardships of imprisonment.
§ 64
ὡς μὲν οὖν οὐκ αὐτὸς αἴτιός εἰμι τοῦ πράγματος οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνος, ἀποδέδεικται καθʼ ὅσον ἐγὼ δύναμαι μάλιστα. τούτῳ δὲ χρῶνται πλείστῳ τῷ λόγῳ οἱ κατήγοροι, ὅτι ἀφανής ἐστιν ὁ ἀνήρ, καὶ ὑμεῖς ἴσως περὶ τούτου αὐτοῦ ποθεῖτε ἀκοῦσαι. εἰ μὲν οὖν τοῦτο εἰκάζειν με δεῖ, ἐξ ἴσου τοῦτό ἐστι καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἐμοί· οὔτε γὰρ ὑμεῖς αἴτιοι τοῦ ἔργου ἐστὲ οὔτε ἐγώ· εἰ δὲ δεῖ τοῖς ἀληθέσι χρῆσθαι, τῶν εἰργασμένων τινὰ ἐρωτώντων· ἐκείνου γὰρ ἄριστʼ ἂν πύθοιντο.
I have proved, then, to the best of my ability that both Lycinus and I are innocent. However, the prosecution make endless play with the argument that Herodes has disappeared; and doubtless it is a fact which you want explained. Now if it is conjecture which is expected of me, you are just as capable of it as I am—we are both alike innocent of the crime; on the other hand, if it is the truth, the prosecution must ask one of the criminals: he would best be able to satisfy them.
§ 65
ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ τῷ μὴ εἰργασμένῳ τοσοῦτον τὸ μακρότατον τῆς ἀποκρίσεώς ἐστιν, ὅτι οὐκ εἴργασμαι· τῷ δὲ ποιήσαντι ῥᾳδία ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπόδειξις, καὶ μὴ ἀποδείξαντι εὖ εἰκάσαι. οἱ μὲν γὰρ πανουργοῦντες ἅμα τε πανουργοῦσι καὶ πρόφασιν εὑρίσκουσι τοῦ ἀδικήματος· τῷ δὲ μὴ εἰργασμένῳ χαλεπὸν περὶ τῶν ἀφανῶν εἰκάζειν. οἶμαι δʼ ἂν καὶ ὑμῶν ἕκαστον, εἴ τίς τινα ἔροιτο ὅ τι μὴ τύχοι εἰδώς, τοσοῦτον ἂν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν. εἰ δέ τις περαιτέρω τι κελεύοι λέγειν, ἐν πολλῇ ἂν ἔχεσθαι ὑμᾶς ἀπορίᾳ δοκῶ.
The utmost that I who am not guilty can reply is that I am not guilty; whereas the criminal can easily reveal the facts, or at least make a good guess. Criminals no sooner commit a crime than they invent an explanation to suit it; on the other hand, an innocent man can scarcely guess the answer to what is a mystery to him. Each of you yourselves, I am sure, if asked something which he did not happen to know, would simply reply to that effect; and if told to say more, you would find yourselves, I think, in a serious difficulty.
§ 66
μὴ τοίνυν ἐμοὶ νείμητε τὸ ἄπορον τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ μηδʼ ἂν αὐτοὶ εὐποροῖτε· μηδʼ ἐὰν εὖ εἰκάζω, ἐν τούτῳ μοι ἀξιοῦτε τὴν ἀπόφευξιν εἶναι, ἀλλʼ ἐξαρκείτω μοι ἐμαυτὸν ἀναίτιον ἀποδεῖξαι τοῦ πράγματος. ἐν τούτῳ οὖν ἀναίτιός εἰμι, οὐκ ἐὰν μὴ ἐξεύρω ὅτῳ τρόπῳ ἀφανής ἐστιν ἢ ἀπόλωλεν ἁνήρ, ἀλλʼ εἰ μὴ προσήκει μοι μηδὲν ὥστʼ ἀποκτεῖναι αὐτόν.
So do not present me with a difficulty which you yourselves would not find easy of solution. Furthermore, do not make my acquittal depend on my making plausible conjectures. Let it be enough for me to prove my innocence of the crime; and that depends not upon my discovering how Herodes disappeared or met his end, but upon my possessing no motive whatever for murdering him.
§ 67
ἤδη δʼ ἔγωγε καὶ πρότερον ἀκοῇ ἐπίσταμαι γεγονός, τοῦτο μὲν τοὺς ἀποθανόντας, τοῦτο δὲ τοὺς ἀποκτείναντας οὐχ εὑρεθέντας· οὔκουν ἂν καλῶς ἔχοι, εἰ τούτων δέοι τὰς αἰτίας ὑποσχεῖν τοὺς συγγενομένους. πολλοὶ δέ γʼ ἤδη σχόντες ἑτέρων πραγμάτων αἰτίας, πρὶν τὸ σαφὲς αὐτῶν γνωσθῆναι, προαπώλοντο.
As I know from report, there have been similar cases in the past, when sometimes the victim, sometimes the murderer, has not been traced; it would be unfair, were those who had been in their company held responsible. Many, again, have been accused before now of the crimes of others, and have lost their lives before the truth became known.
§ 68
αὐτίκα Ἐφιάλτην τὸν ὑμέτερον πολίτην οὐδέπω νῦν ηὕρηνται οἱ ἀποκτείναντες· εἰ οὖν τις ἠξίου τοὺς συνόντας ἐκείνῳ εἰκάζειν οἵτινες ἦσαν οἱ ἀποκτείναντες Ἐφιάλτην, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐνόχους εἶναι τῷ φόνῳ, οὐκ ἂν καλῶς εἶχε τοῖς συνοῦσιν. ἔπειτα οἵ γε Ἐφιάλτην ἀποκτείναντες οὐκ ἐζήτησαν τὸν νεκρὸν ἀφανίσαι, οὐδʼ ἐν τούτῳ κινδυνεύειν μηνῦσαι τὸ πρᾶγμα, ὥσπερ οἵδε φασὶν ἐμὲ τῆς μὲν ἐπιβουλῆς οὐδένα κοινωνὸν ποιήσασθαι τοῦ θανάτου, τῆς δʼ ἀναιρέσεως.
For instance, the murderers of one of your own citizens, Ephialtes, have remained undiscovered to this day; it would have been unfair to his companions to require them to conjecture who his assassins were under pain of being held guilty of the murder themselves. Moreover, the murderers of Ephialtes made no attempt to get rid of the body, for fear of the accompanying risk of publicity—unlike myself, who, we are told, took no one into my confidence when planning the crime, but then sought help for the removal of the corpse.
§ 69
τοῦτο δʼ ἐντὸς οὐ πολλοῦ χρόνου παῖς ἐζήτησεν οὐδὲ δώδεκα ἔτη γεγονὼς τὸν δεσπότην ἀποκτεῖναι. καὶ εἰ μὴ φοβηθείς, ὡς ἀνεβόησεν, ἐγκαταλιπὼν τὴν μάχαιραν ἐν τῇ σφαγῇ ὤχετο φεύγων, ἀλλʼ ἐτόλμησε μεῖναι, ἀπώλοντʼ ἂν οἱ ἔνδον ὄντες ἅπαντες· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ᾤετο τὸν παῖδα τολμῆσαί ποτε τοῦτο· νῦν δὲ συλληφθεὶς αὐτὸς ὕστερον κατεῖπεν αὑτοῦ. τοῦτο δὲ περὶ χρημάτων αἰτίαν ποτὲ σχόντες οὐκ οὖσαν, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ νῦν, οἱ Ἑλληνοταμίαι οἱ ὑμέτεροι, ἐκεῖνοι μὲν ἅπαντες ἀπέθανον ὀργῇ μᾶλλον ἢ γνώμῃ, πλὴν ἑνός, τὸ δὲ πρᾶγμα ὕστερον καταφανὲς ἐγένετο.
Once more, a slave, not twelve years old, recently attempted to murder his master. Had he had the courage to stay where he was, instead of taking to his heels in terror at his victim’s cries, leaving the knife in the wound, the entire household would have perished, as no one would have dreamed him capable of such audacity. As it was, he was caught, and later confessed his own guilt. Then again, your Hellenotamiae were once accused of embezzlement, as wrongfully as I am accused today. Anger swept reason aside, and they were all put to death save one. Later the true facts became known.
§ 70
τοῦ δʼ ἑνὸς τούτου—Σωσίαν ὄνομά φασιν αὐτῷ εἶναι—κατέγνωστο μὲν ἤδη θάνατος, ἐτεθνήκει δὲ οὔπω· καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἐδηλώθη τῷ τρόπῳ ἀπωλώλει τὰ χρήματα, καὶ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἀπήχθη ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου τοῦ ὑμετέρου παραδεδομένος ἤδη τοῖς ἕνδεκα, οἱ δʼ ἄλλοι ἐτέθνασαν οὐδὲν αἴτιοι ὄντες.
This one, whose name is said to have been Sosias, though under sentence of death, had not yet been executed. Meanwhile it was shown how the money had disappeared. The Athenian people rescued him from the very hands of the Eleven: while the rest had died entirely innocent.
§ 71
ταῦθʼ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἐγὼ οἶμαι μεμνῆσθαι τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους, τοὺς δὲ νεωτέρους πυνθάνεσθαι ὥσπερ ἐμέ. οὕτως ἀγαθόν ἐστι μετὰ τοῦ χρόνου βασανίζειν τὰ πράγματα. καὶ τοῦτʼ ἴσως ἂν φανερὸν γένοιτʼ ἂν ὕστερον, ὅτῳ τρόπῳ τέθνηκεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος. μὴ οὖν ὕστερον τοῦτο γνῶτε, ἀναίτιόν με ὄντα ἀπολέσαντες, ἀλλὰ πρότερόν γʼ εὖ βουλεύσασθε, καὶ μὴ μετʼ ὀργῆς καὶ διαβολῆς, ὡς τούτων οὐκ ἂν γένοιντο ἕτεροι πονηρότεροι σύμβουλοι.
You older ones remember this yourselves, I expect, and the younger have heard of it like myself. Thus it is wise to let time help us in testing the truth of a matter. Perhaps the circumstances of Herodes’ death will similarly come to light hereafter; so do not discover that you have put an innocent man to death when it is too late. Weigh the matter carefully while there is yet time, without anger and without prejudice: for they are the worst of counsellors;
§ 72
οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅ τι ἂν ὀργιζόμενος ἄνθρωπος εὖ γνοίη· αὐτὸ γὰρ ᾧ βουλεύεται, τὴν γνώμην, διαφθείρει τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. μέγα τοι ἡμέρα παρʼ ἡμέραν γιγνομένη γνώμην, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἐξ ὀργῆς μεταστῆσαι καὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν εὑρεῖν τῶν γεγενημένων.
it is impossible for an angry man to make a right decision, as anger destroys his one instrument of decision, his judgement. The lapse of one day after another, gentlemen, has a wondrous power of liberating the judgement from the sway of passion and of bringing the truth to light.
§ 73
εὖ δὲ ἴστε ὅτι ἐλεηθῆναι ὑφʼ ὑμῶν ἄξιός εἰμι μᾶλλον ἢ δίκην δοῦναι· δίκην μὲν γὰρ εἰκός ἐστι διδόναι τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας, ἐλεεῖσθαι δὲ τοὺς ἀδίκως κινδυνεύοντας. κρεῖσσον δὲ χρὴ γίγνεσθαι ἀεὶ τὸ ὑμέτερον δυνάμενον ἐμὲ δικαίως σῴζειν ἢ τὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν βουλόμενον ἀδίκως με ἀπολλύναι. ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ ἐπισχεῖν ἔστι καὶ τὰ δεινὰ ταῦτα ποιῆσαι ἃ οὗτοι κελεύουσιν· ἐν δὲ τῷ παραχρῆμα οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρχὴν ὀρθῶς βουλεύεσθαι.
Remember too that it is pity which I deserve from you, not punishment. Wrongdoers should be punished: those wrongfully imperilled should be pitied. You must never let your power to satisfy justice by saving my life be overridden by my enemies’ desire to outrage it by putting me to death. A delay will still allow you to take the awful step which the prosecution urge upon you; whereas haste will make a fair consideration of the case quite impossible.
§ 74
δεῖ δέ με καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀπολογήσασθαι. καίτοι γε πολλῷ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς ἦν ἐκεῖνον ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ ἀπολογήσασθαι, πατέρα ὄντα· ὁ μὲν γὰρ πολλῷ πρεσβύτερός ἐστι τῶν ἐμῶν πραγμάτων, ἐγὼ δὲ πολλῷ νεώτερος τῶν ἐκείνῳ πεπραγμένων, καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐγὼ τούτου ἀγωνιζομένου κατεμαρτύρουν ἃ μὴ σαφῶς ᾔδη, ἀκοῇ δὲ ἠπιστάμην, δεινὰ ἂν ἔφη πάσχειν ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ·
I must also defend my father although, as my father, it would have been far more natural for him to be defending me. He is far older than I, and knows what my life has been whereas I am far younger than he, and cannot know what his has been. If my accuser were on trial, and I were giving evidence against him based on hearsay instead of certain knowledge, he would protest that he was being treated monstrously;
§ 75
νῦν δὲ ἀναγκάζων ἐμὲ ἀπολογεῖσθαι ὧν ἐγὼ πολλῷ νεώτερός εἰμι καὶ λόγῳ οἶδα, ταῦτα οὐ δεινὰ ἡγεῖται εἰργάσθαι. ὅμως μέντοι καθʼ ὅσον ἐγὼ οἶδα, οὐ προδώσω τὸν πατέρα κακῶς ἀκούοντα ἐν ὑμῖν ἀδίκως. καίτοι τάχʼ ἂν σφαλείην, ἃ ἐκεῖνος ὀρθῶς ἔργῳ ἔπραξε, ταῦτʼ ἐγὼ λόγῳ μὴ ὀρθῶς εἰπών· ὅμως δʼ οὖν κεκινδυνεύσεται.
yet he sees nothing monstrous in forcing me to explain occurrences with which I am far too young to be acquainted save from hearsay. However, as a loyal son, I will use what knowledge I have to defend my father against the unwarranted abuse to which you have been listening. Possibly indeed I may fail. I may describe but faultily a life which was without fault. But none the less, I will accept that risk.
§ 76
πρὶν μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἀπόστασιν τὴν Μυτιληναίων γενέσθαι, ἔργῳ τὴν εὔνοιαν ἐδείκνυε τὴν εἰς ὑμᾶς· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἡ πόλις ὅλη κακῶς ἐβουλεύσατο ἀποστᾶσα καὶ ἥμαρτε τῆς ὑμετέρας γνώμης, μετὰ τῆς πόλεως ὅλης ἠναγκάσθη συνεξαμαρτεῖν. τὴν μὲν οὖν γνώμην ἔτι καὶ ἐν ἐκείνοις ὅμοιος ἦν εἰς ὑμᾶς, τὴν δʼ εὔνοιαν οὐκέτι ἦν ἐπʼ ἐκείνῳ τὴν αὐτὴν εἰς ὑμᾶς παρέχειν. οὔτε γὰρ ἐκλιπεῖν τὴν πόλιν εὐρόπως εἶχεν αὐτῷ· ἱκανὰ γὰρ ἦν τὰ ἐνέχυρα ἃ εἴχετο αὐτοῦ, οἵ τε παῖδες καὶ τὰ χρήματα· τοῦτο δʼ αὖ μένοντι πρὸς τὴν πόλιν αὐτῷ ἀδυνάτως εἶχεν ἰσχυρίζεσθαι.
Before the revolt of Mytilene my father gave visible proof of his devotion to your interests. When, however, the city as a whole was so ill-advised as to commit the blunder of revolting, he was forced to join the city as a whole in that blunder. Not but what even then his feelings towards you remained unchanged: although he could no longer display his devotion in the old way. It was not easy for him to leave the city, as the ties which bound him, his children, and his property, were strong ones; nor yet could he set it at defiance as long as he remained there.
§ 77
ἐπεὶ δʼ ὑμεῖς τοὺς αἰτίους τούτων ἐκολάσατε, ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἐφαίνετο ὢν ὁ ἐμὸς πατήρ, τοῖς δʼ ἄλλοις Μυτιληναίοις ἄδειαν ἐδώκατε οἰκεῖν τὴν σφετέραν αὐτῶν, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅ τι ὕστερον αὐτῷ ἡμάρτηται τῷ ἐμῷ πατρί, οὐδʼ ὅ τι οὐ πεποίηται τῶν δεόντων, οὐδʼ ἧς τινος λῃτουργίας ἡ πόλις ἐνδεὴς γεγένηται, οὔτε ἡ ὑμετέρα οὔτε ἡ Μυτιληναίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ χορηγίας χορηγεῖ καὶ τέλη κατατίθησιν.
But from the moment that you punished the authors of the revolt—of whom my father was not found to be one—and granted the other citizens of Mytilene an amnesty which allowed them to continue living on their own land, he has not been guilty of a single fault, of a single lapse from duty. He has failed neither the city of Athens nor that of Mytilene, when a public service was demanded of him; he regularly furnishes choruses, and always pays the imposts.
§ 78
εἰ δʼ ἐν Αἴνῳ χωροφιλεῖ, τοῦτο ποιεῖ οὐκ ἀποστερῶν γε τῶν εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἑαυτὸν οὐδενὸς οὐδʼ ἑτέρας πόλεως πολίτης γεγενημένος, ὥσπερ ἑτέρους ὁρῶ, τοὺς μὲν εἰς τὴν ἤπειρον ἰόντας καὶ οἰκοῦντας ἐν τοῖς πολεμίοις τοῖς ὑμετέροις, τοὺς δὲ καὶ δίκας ἀπὸ ξυμβόλων ὑμῖν δικαζομένους, οὐδὲ φεύγων τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον, τοὺς δʼ οἵους ὑμεῖς μισῶν συκοφάντας.
If Aenus is his favorite place of resort, that fact does not mean that he is evading any of his obligations towards Athens, or that he has become the citizen of another city, like those others, some of whom I see crossing to the mainland and settling among your enemies, while the rest actually litigate with you under treaty; nor does it mean that he desires to be beyond the reach of the Athenian courts. It means that he shares your own hatred of those who thrive on prosecution.
§ 79
ἃ μὲν οὖν μετὰ τῆς πόλεως ὅλης ἀνάγκῃ μᾶλλον ἢ γνώμῃ ἔπραξεν, τούτων οὐ δίκαιός ἐστιν ὁ ἐμὸς πατὴρ ἰδίᾳ δίκην διδόναι. ἅπασι γὰρ Μυτιληναίοις ἀείμνηστος ἡ τότε ἁμαρτία γεγένηται· ἠλλάξαντο μὲν γὰρ πολλῆς εὐδαιμονίας πολλὴν κακοδαιμονίαν, ἐπεῖδον δὲ τὴν ἑαυτῶν πατρίδα ἀνάστατον γενομένην. ἃ δὲ ἰδία οὗτοι διαβάλλουσι τὸν ἐμὸν πατέρα, μὴ πείθεσθε· χρημάτων γὰρ ἕνεκα ἡ πᾶσα παρασκευὴ γεγένηται ἐπʼ ἐμοὶ κἀκείνῳ. πολλὰ δʼ ἐστὶ τὰ συμβαλλόμενα τοῖς βουλομένοις τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἐφίεσθαι. γέρων μὲν ἐκεῖνος ὥστʼ ἐμοὶ βοηθεῖν, νεώτερος δʼ ἐγὼ πολλῷ ἢ ὥστε δύνασθαι ἐμαυτῷ τιμωρεῖν ἱκανῶς.
The act which my father joined his whole city in committing, which he committed not from choice but under compulsion, affords no just ground for punishing him individually. The mistake then made will live in the memory of every citizen of Mytilene. They exchanged great prosperity for great misery, and saw their country pass into the possession of others. Nor again must you be influenced by the distorted account of my father’s conduct as an individual with which you have been presented. Nothing but money is at the bottom of this elaborate attack upon him and myself; and unfortunately there are many circumstances which favor those who seek to lay hands on the goods of others; my father is too old to help me: and I am far too young to be able to avenge myself as I should.
§ 80
ἀλλʼ ὑμεῖς βοηθήσατέ μοι, καὶ μὴ διδάσκετε τοὺς συκοφάντας μεῖζον ὑμῶν αὐτῶν δύνασθαι. ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ εἰσιόντες εἰς ὑμᾶς ἃ βούλονται πράσσωσι, δεδειγμένον ἔσται τούτους μὲν πείθειν, τὸ δʼ ὑμέτερον πλῆθος φεύγειν· ἐὰν δὲ εἰσιόντες εἰς ὑμᾶς πονηροὶ μὲν αὐτοὶ δοκῶσιν εἶναι, πλέον δʼ αὐτοῖς μηδὲν γένηται, ὑμετέρα ἡ τιμὴ καὶ ἡ δύναμις ἔσται, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἔχει. ὑμεῖς οὖν ἐμοί τε βοηθεῖτε καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ.
You must help me: you must refuse to reach those who make a trade of prosecution to become more powerful than yourselves. If they achieve their purpose when they appear before you, it will be a lesson to their victims to compromise with them and avoid open court; but if by appearing before you they succeed only in gaining an evil reputation for themselves, you will enjoy the honor and the power which it is right that you should. So give me and give justice your support.
§ 81
ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἐκ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων τεκμηρίων καὶ μαρτυριῶν οἷά τε ἦν ἀποδειχθῆναι, ἀκηκόατε· χρὴ δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν σημείοις γενομένοις εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐχ ἥκιστα τεκμηραμένους ψηφίζεσθαι. καὶ γὰρ τὰ τῆς πόλεως κοινὰ τούτοις μάλιστα πιστεύοντες ἀσφαλῶς διαπράσσεσθε, τοῦτο μὲν τὰ εἰς τοὺς κινδύνους ἥκοντα, τοῦτο δὲ εἰς τὰ ἔξω τῶν κινδύνων. χρὴ δὲ καὶ εἰς τὰ ἴδια ταῦτα μέγιστα καὶ πιστότατα ἡγεῖσθαι.
Proof as complete as the presumptions and the evidence supplied by things human could make it has now been presented to you. But in cases of this nature the indications furnished by heaven must also have no small influence on your verdict. It is upon them that you chiefly depend for safe guidance in affairs of state, whether in times of crisis or tranquillity; so they should be allowed equal prominence and weight in the settlement of private questions.
§ 82
οἶμαι γὰρ ὑμᾶς ἐπίστασθαι ὅτι πολλοὶ ἤδη ἄνθρωποι μὴ καθαροὶ τὰς χεῖρας ἢ ἄλλο τι μίασμα ἔχοντες συνεισβάντες εἰς τὸ πλοῖον συναπώλεσαν μετὰ τῆς αὑτῶν ψυχῆς τοὺς ὁσίως διακειμένους τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεούς· τοῦτο δὲ ἤδη ἑτέρους ἀπολομένους μὲν οὔ, κινδυνεύσαντας δὲ τοὺς ἐσχάτους κινδύνους διὰ τοὺς τοιούτους ἀνθρώπους· τοῦτο δὲ ἱεροῖς παραστάντες πολλοὶ δὴ καταφανεῖς ἐγένοντο οὐχ ὅσιοι ὄντες, καὶ διακωλύοντες τὰ ἱερὰ μὴ γίγνεσθαι τὰ νομιζόμενα.
I hardly think I need remind you that many a man with unclean hands or some other form of defilement who has embarked on shipboard with the righteous has involved them in his own destruction. Others, while they have escaped death, have had their lives imperilled owing to such polluted wretches. Many, too, have been proved to be defiled as they stood beside a sacrifice, because they prevented the proper performance of the rites.
§ 83
ἐμοὶ τοίνυν ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις τὰ ἐναντία ἐγένετο. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ὅσοις συνέπλευσα, καλλίστοις ἐχρήσαντο πλοῖς· τοῦτο δὲ ὅπου ἱεροῖς παρέστην, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπου οὐχὶ κάλλιστα τὰ ἱερὰ ἐγένετο. ἃ ἐγὼ ἀξιῶ μεγάλα μοι τεκμήρια εἶναι τῆς αἰτίας, ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ μου οὗτοι κατηγοροῦσι. εἰσὶ δέ μοι καὶ τούτων μάρτυρες.
With me the opposite has happened in every case. Not only have fellow-passengers of mine enjoyed the calmest of voyages: but whenever I have attended a sacrifice, that sacrifice has invariably been successful. I claim that these facts furnish the strongest presumption in my favor that the charge brought against me by the prosecution is unfounded; I have witnesses to confirm them.
§ 84
Μάρτυρες ἐπίσταμαι δὲ καὶ τάδε, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ὅτι εἰ μὲν ἐμοῦ κατεμαρτύρουν οἱ μάρτυρες, ὥς τι ἀνόσιον γεγένηται ἐμοῦ παρόντος ἐν πλοίῳ ἢ ἐν ἱεροῖς, αὐτοῖς γε τούτοις ἰσχυροτάτοις ἂν ἐχρῶντο, καὶ πίστιν τῆς αἰτίας ταύτην σαφεστάτην ἀπέφαινον, τὰ σημεῖα τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν· νῦν δὲ τῶν τε σημείων ἐναντίων τοῖς τούτων λόγοις γιγνομένων, τῶν τε μαρτύρων ἃ μὲν ἐγὼ λέγω μαρτυρούντων ἀληθῆ εἶναι, ἃ δʼ οὗτοι κατηγοροῦσι ψευδῆ, τοῖς μὲν μαρτυροῦσιν ἀπιστεῖν ὑμᾶς κελεύουσι, τοῖς δὲ λόγοις οὓς αὐτοὶ λέγουσι πιστεύειν ὑμᾶς φασι χρῆναι. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι τοῖς ἔργοις τοὺς λόγους ἐλέγχουσιν, οὗτοι δὲ τοῖς λόγοις τὰ ἔργα ζητοῦσιν ἄπιστα καθιστάναι.
Witnesses I know furthermore, gentlemen of the jury, that if the witnesses were testifying against me that my presence on shipboard or at a sacrifice had been the occasion of some unholy manifestation, the prosecution would be treating that fact as supremely significant; they would be showing that here, in the signs from heaven, was to be found the clearest confirmation of their charge. As, however, the signs have contradicted their assertions and the witnesses testify that what I say is true and that what the prosecution say is not, they urge you to put no credence in the evidence of those witnesses; according to them, it is their own statements which you should believe. Whereas every one else uses the facts to prove the worth of mere assertion, they use mere assertion for the purpose of discrediting the facts.
§ 85
ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἐκ τῶν κατηγορηθέντων μέμνημαι, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἀπολελόγημαι· οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἕνεκα δεῖν ὑμᾶς μου ἀποψηφίσασθαι. ταὐτὰ γὰρ ἐμέ τε σῴζει, καὶ ὑμῖν νόμιμα καὶ εὔορκα γίγνεται. κατὰ γὰρ τοὺς νόμους ὠμόσατε δικάσειν· ἐγὼ δὲ καθʼ οὓς μὲν ἀπήχθην, οὐκ ἔνοχός εἰμι τοῖς νόμοις, ὧν δʼ ἔχω τὴν αἰτίαν, ἀγών μοι νόμιμος ὑπολείπεται. εἰ δὲ δύο ἐξ ἑνὸς ἀγῶνος γεγένησθον, οὐκ ἐγὼ αἴτιος, ἀλλʼ οἱ κατήγοροι. καίτοι οὐ δήπου οἱ μὲν ἔχθιστοι οἱ ἐμοὶ δύο ἀγῶνας περὶ ἐμοῦ πεποιήκασιν, ὑμεῖς δὲ οἱ τῶν δικαίων ἴσοι κριταὶ προκαταγνώσεσθέ μου ἐν τῷδε τῷ ἀγῶνι τὸν φόνον.
All the charges which I can remember, gentlemen, I have answered; and for your own sakes I think that you should acquit me. A verdict saving my life will alone enable you to comply with the law and your oath; for you have sworn to return a lawful verdict; and while the crime with which I am charged can still be tried legally, the laws under which I was arrested do not concern my case. If two trials have been made out of one, it is not I, but my accusers, who are to blame; and I cannot suppose that if my bitterest enemies have involved me in two trials, impartial ministers of justice like yourselves will prematurely find me guilty of murder in the present one.
§ 86
μὴ ὑμεῖς γε, ὦ ἄνδρες· ἀλλὰ δότε τι καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ, μεθʼ οὗ ὀρθότατα εὑρίσκουσιν οἱ τὴν ἀκρίβειαν ζητοῦντες τῶν πραγμάτων. ἠξίουν μὲν γὰρ ἔγωγε περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, ὦ ἄνδρες, εἶναι τὴν δίκην κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, κατὰ μέντοι τούτους τὸ δίκαιον ὡς πλειστάκις ἐλέγχεσθαι. τοσούτῳ γὰρ ἄμεινον ἂν ἐγιγνώσκετο· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ ἀγῶνες τῇ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ σύμμαχοί εἰσι, τῇ δὲ διαβολῇ πολεμιώτατοι.
Beware of such haste, gentlemen; give time its opportunity; it is time which enables those who seek the truth to find it with certainty. In fact, gentlemen, I for one have always maintained that, while a case of this kind should certainly be tried according to law, the rights of the matter should be established as many times as the law will permit, since they would thus be the better understood; the repeated trial of a case is a good friend of the truth and the deadly foe of misrepresentation.
§ 87
φόνου γὰρ δίκη καὶ μὴ ὀρθῶς γνωσθεῖσα ἰσχυρότερον τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἐστιν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ, ἐὰν ὑμεῖς μου καταψηφίσησθε, καὶ μὴ ὄντα φονέα μηδʼ ἔνοχον τῷ ἔργῳ χρῆσθαι τῇ δίκῃ καὶ τῷ νόμῳ· καὶ οὐδεὶς ἂν τολμήσειεν οὔτε τὴν δίκην τὴν δεδικασμένην παραβαίνειν, πιστεύσας αὑτῷ ὅτι οὐκ ἔνοχός ἐστιν, οὔτε ξυνειδὼς αὑτῷ τοιοῦτον ἔργον εἰργασμένῳ μὴ οὐ χρῆσθαι τῷ νόμῳ· ἀνάγκη δὲ τῆς τε δίκης νικᾶσθαι παρὰ τὸ ἀληθές, αὐτοῦ τε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐὰν μὴ ᾖ ὁ τιμωρήσων.
In a trial for murder, even if judgement is wrongly given against the defendant, justice and the facts cannot prevail against that decision. Once you condemn me, I must perforce obey your verdict and the law, even if I am not the murderer or concerned in the crime. No one would venture either to disregard the sentence passed upon him because he was sure that he had had no part in the crime, or to disobey the law if he knew in his heart that he was guilty of such a deed. He has to submit to the verdict in defiance of the facts, or submit to the facts themselves, as the case may be, above all if his victim has none to avenge him.
§ 88
αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων ἕνεκα οἵ τε νόμοι καὶ αἱ διωμοσίαι καὶ τὰ τόμια καὶ αἱ προρρήσεις, καὶ τἆλλʼ ὁπόσα γίγνεται τῶν δικῶν ἕνεκα τοῦ φόνου, πολὺ διαφέροντά ἐστιν ἢ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα, περὶ ὧν οἱ κίνδυνοι, περὶ πλείστου ἐστὶν ὀρθῶς γιγνώσκεσθαι· ὀρθῶς μὲν γὰρ γνωσθέντα τιμωρία ἐστὶ τῷ ἀδικηθέντι, φονέα δὲ τὸν μὴ αἴτιον ψηφισθῆναι ἁμαρτία καὶ ἀσέβειά ἐστιν εἴς τε τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ εἰς τοὺς νόμους.
The laws, the oaths, the sacrifices, the proclamations, in fact the entire proceeding in connection with trials for murder differ as profoundly as they do from the proceedings elsewhere simply because it is of supreme importance that the facts at issue, upon which so much turns, should themselves be rightly interpreted. Such a right interpretation means vengeance for him who has been wronged; whereas to find an innocent man guilty of murder is a mistake, and a sinful mistake, which offends both gods and laws.
§ 89
καὶ οὐκ ἴσον ἐστὶ τόν τε διώκοντα μὴ ὀρθῶς αἰτιάσασθαι καὶ ὑμᾶς τοὺς δικαστὰς μὴ ὀρθῶς γνῶναι. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τούτων αἰτίασις οὐκ ἔχει τέλος, ἀλλʼ ἐν ὑμῖν ἐστι καὶ τῇ δίκῃ· ὅ τι δʼ ἂν ὑμεῖς ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ δίκῃ μὴ ὀρθῶς γνῶτε, τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν ὅποι ἄν τις ἀνενεγκὼν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ἀπολύσαιτο.
Nor is it as serious for the prosecutor to accuse the wrong person as it is for you jurors to reach a wrong verdict. The charge brought by the prosecutor is not in itself effective; whether it becomes so, depends upon you, sitting in judgement. On the other hand if you yourselves, when actually sitting in judgement, return a wrong verdict, you cannot rid yourselves of the responsibility for the mistake by blaming someone else for that verdict.
§ 90
πῶς ἂν οὖν ὀρθῶς δικάσαιτε περὶ αὐτῶν; εἰ τούτους τε ἐάσετε τὸν νομιζόμενον ὅρκον διομοσαμένους κατηγορῆσαι, κἀμὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος ἀπολογήσασθαι. πῶς δὲ ἐάσετε; ἐὰν νυνὶ ἀποψηφίσησθέ μου. διαφεύγω γὰρ οὐδʼ οὕτω τὰς ὑμετέρας γνώμας, ἀλλʼ ὑμεῖς ἔσεσθε οἱ κἀκεῖ περὶ ἐμοῦ διαψηφιζόμενοι. καὶ φεισαμένοις μὲν ὑμῖν ἐμοῦ νῦν ἔξεστι τότε χρῆσθαι ὅ τι ἂν βούλησθε, ἀπολέσασι δὲ οὐδὲ βουλεύσασθαι ἔτι περὶ ἐμοῦ ἐγχωρεῖ.
Then how can you decide the case aright? By allowing the prosecution to bring their charge only after taking the customary oath, and by allowing me to confine my defence to the question before the court. And how will you do this? By acquitting me today. For I do not escape your sentence even so: you will be the judges at the second hearing also. If you spare me now, you can treat me as you will then; whereas once you put me to death, you cannot even consider my case further.
§ 91
καὶ μὴν εἰ δέοι ἁμαρτεῖν τι, τὸ ἀδίκως ἀπολῦσαι ὁσιώτερον ἂν εἴη τοῦ μὴ δικαίως ἀπολέσαι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἁμάρτημα μόνον ἐστί, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον καὶ ἀσέβημα. ἐν ᾧ χρὴ πολλὴν πρόνοιαν ἔχειν, μέλλοντας ἀνήκεστον ἔργον ἐργάζεσθαι. ἐν μὲν γὰρ ἀκεστῷ πράγματι καὶ ὀργῇ χρησαμένους καὶ διαβολῇ πιθομένους ἔλαττόν ἐστιν ἐξαμαρτεῖν· μεταγνοὺς γάρ τις ἔτι ἂν ὀρθῶς βουλεύσαιτο· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀνηκέστοις πλέον βλάβος τὸ μετανοεῖν καὶ γνῶναι ἐξημαρτηκότας. ἤδη δέ τισιν ὑμῶν καὶ μετεμέλησεν ἀπολωλεκόσι. καίτοι ὅπου ὑμῖν τοῖς ἐξαπατηθεῖσι μετεμέλησεν, ἦ καὶ πάνυ τοι χρῆν τούς γε ἐξαπατῶντας ἀπολωλέναι.
Indeed, supposing that you were bound to make some mistake, it would be less of an outrage to acquit me unfairly than to put me to death without just cause; for the one thing is a mistake and nothing more: the other is a sin in addition. You must exercise the greatest caution in what you do, because you will not be able to reconsider your action. In a matter which admits of reconsideration a mistake, whether made through giving rein to the feelings or through accepting a distorted account of the facts, is not so serious; it is still possible to change one’s mind and come to a right decision. But when reconsideration is impossible, the wrong done is only increased by altering one’s mind and acknowledging one’s mistake. Some of you yourselves have in fact repented before now of having sent men to their death; but when you, who had been misled, felt repentance, most assuredly did those who had misled you deserve death.
§ 92
ἔπειτα δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀκούσια τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων ἔχει συγγνώμην, τὰ δὲ ἑκούσια οὐκ ἔχει. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀκούσιον ἁμάρτημα, ὦ ἄνδρες, τῆς τύχης ἐστί, τὸ δὲ ἑκούσιον τῆς γνώμης. ἑκούσιον δὲ πῶς ἂν εἴη μᾶλλον ἢ εἴ τις, ὧν βουλὴν ποιοῖτο, ταῦτα παραχρῆμα ἐξεργάζοιτο; καὶ μὴν τὴν ἴσην γε δύναμιν ἔχει, ὅστις τε ἂν τῇ χειρὶ ἀποκτείνῃ ἀδίκως καὶ ὅστις τῇ ψήφῳ.
Moreover, whereas involuntary mistakes are excusable, voluntary mistakes are not; for an involuntary mistake is due to chance, gentlemen, a voluntary one to the will. And what could be more voluntary than the immediate putting into effect of a carefully considered course of action? Furthermore, the wrongful taking of life by one’s vote is just as criminal as the wrongful taking of life by one’s hand.
§ 93
εὖ δʼ ἴστε ὅτι οὐκ ἄν ποτʼ ἦλθον εἰς τὴν πόλιν, εἴ τι ξυνῄδη ἐμαυτῷ τοιοῦτον· νῦν δὲ πιστεύων τῷ δικαίῳ, οὗ πλέονος οὐδέν ἐστιν ἄξιον ἀνδρὶ συναγωνίζεσθαι, μηδὲν αὑτῷ συνειδότι ἀνόσιον εἰργασμένῳ μηδʼ εἰς τοὺς θεοὺς ἠσεβηκότι· ἐν γὰρ τῷ τοιούτῳ ἤδη καὶ τὸ σῶμα ἀπειρηκὸς ἡ ψυχὴ συνεξέσωσεν, ἐθέλουσα ταλαιπωρεῖν διὰ τὸ μὴ ξυνειδέναι ἑαυτῇ. τῷ δὲ ξυνειδότι τοῦτο αὐτὸ πρῶτον πολέμιόν ἐστιν· ἔτι γὰρ καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἰσχύοντος ἡ ψυχὴ προαπολείπει, ἡγουμένη τὴν τιμωρίαν οἱ ἥκειν ταύτην τῶν ἀσεβημάτων ἐγὼ δʼ ἐμαυτῷ τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν ξυνειδὼς ἥκω εἰς ὑμᾶς.
Rest assured that I should never have come to Athens, had such a crime been on my conscience. I am here, as it is, because I have faith in justice, the most precious ally of the man who has no deed of sin upon his conscience and who has committed no transgression against the gods. Often at such an hour as this, when the body has given up the struggle, its salvation is the spirit, which is ready to fight on in the conscience that it is innocent. On the other hand, he whose conscience is guilty has no worse enemy than that conscience; for his spirit fails him which his body is still unwearied, because it feels that what is approaching him is the punishment of his iniquities. But it is with no such guilty conscience that I come before you.
§ 94
τὸ δὲ τοὺς κατηγόρους διαβάλλειν οὐδέν ἐστι θαυμαστόν. τούτων γὰρ ἔργον τοῦτο, ὑμῶν δὲ τὸ μὴ πείθεσθαι τὰ μὴ δίκαια. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἐμοὶ πειθομένοις ὑμῖν μεταμελῆσαι ἔστιν, καὶ τούτου φάρμακον τὸ αὖθις κολάσαι, τοῦ δὲ τούτοις πειθομένους ἐξεργάσασθαι ἃ οὗτοι βούλονται οὐκ ἔστιν ἴασις. οὐδὲ χρόνος πολὺς ὁ διαφέρων, ἐν ᾧ ταῦτα νομίμως πράξεθʼ ἃ νῦν ὑμᾶς παρανόμως πείθουσιν οἱ κατήγοροι ψηφίσασθαι. οὔ τοι τῶν ἐπειγομένων ἐστὶ τὰ πράγματα, ἀλλὰ τῶν εὖ βουλευομένων. νῦν μὲν οὖν γνωρισταὶ γίγνεσθε τῆς δίκης, τότε δὲ δικασταὶ τῶν μαρτύρων νῦν μὲν δοξασταί, τότε δὲ κριταὶ τῶν ἀληθῶν.
There is nothing remarkable in the fact that the prosecution are misrepresenting me. It is expected of them just as it is expected of you not to consent to do what is wrong. I say this because if you follow my advice, it is still open to you to regret your action, and that regret can be remedied by punishing me at the second trial: whereas if you obediently carry out the prosecution’s wishes, the situation cannot be righted again. Nor is there a question of a long interval before the law will allow you to take the step to which the prosecution are today urging you to consent in defiance of it. It is not haste, but discretion which triumphs; so take cognizance of the case today: pass judgement on it later; form an opinion as to the truth today: decide upon it later.
§ 95
ῥᾷστον δέ τοί ἐστιν ἀνδρὸς περὶ θανάτου φεύγοντος τὰ ψευδῆ καταμαρτυρῆσαι. ἐὰν γὰρ τὸ παραχρῆμα μόνον πείσωσιν ὥστε ἀποκτεῖναι, ἅμα τῷ σώματι καὶ ἡ τιμωρία ἀπόλωλεν. οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ φίλοι ἔτι θελήσουσιν ὑπὲρ ἀπολωλότος τιμωρεῖν· ἐὰν δὲ καὶ βουληθῶσιν, τί ἔσται πλέον τῷ γε ἀποθανόντι;
It is very easy, remember, to give false evidence against a man on a capital charge. If you are persuaded only for an instant to put him to death, he has lost his chance of redress with his life. A man’s very friends will refuse to seek redress for him once he is dead; and even if they are prepared to do so, what good is it to one who has lost his life?
§ 96
νῦν μὲν οὖν ἀποψηφίσασθέ μου· ἐν δὲ τῇ τοῦ φόνου δίκῃ οὗτοί τε τὸν νομιζόμενον ὅρκον διομοσάμενοι ἐμοῦ κατηγορήσουσι, καὶ ὑμεῖς περὶ ἐμοῦ κατὰ τοὺς κειμένους νόμους διαγνώσεσθε, καὶ ἐμοὶ οὐδεὶς λόγος ἔσται ἔτι, ἐάν τι πάσχω, ὡς παρανόμως ἀπωλόμην. ταῦτά τοι δέομαι ὑμῶν, οὔτε τὸ ὑμέτερον εὐσεβὲς παριεὶς οὔτε ἐμαυτὸν ἀποστερῶν τὸ δίκαιον· ἐν δὲ τῷ ὑμετέρῳ ὅρκῳ καὶ ἡ ἐμὴ σωτηρία ἔνεστι. πειθόμενοι δὲ τούτων ὅτῳ βούλεσθε, ἀποψηφίσασθέ μου.
Acquit me, then, today and at the trial for murder the prosecution shall take the traditional oath before accusing me: you shall decide my case by the laws of the land: and I, if I am unlucky, shall have no grounds left for complaining that I was sentenced to death illegally. That is my request; and in making it I am not forgetting your duty as godfearing men or depriving myself of my rights, as my life is bound up with your oath. Respect which you will, and acquit me.
On the Choreutes · urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0028.tlg006 · Greek: Περὶ τοῦ χορευτοῦ — tlg0028.tlg006.perseus-grc2 · English: On the Choreutes — trans. Kenneth John Maidment — tlg0028.tlg006.perseus-eng2
§ 1
ἥδιστον μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἀνθρώπῳ ὄντι μὴ γενέσθαι μηδένα κίνδυνον περὶ τοῦ σώματος, καὶ εὐχόμενος ἄν τις ταῦτα εὔξαιτο· εἰ δʼ ἄρα τις καὶ ἀναγκάζοιτο κινδυνεύειν, τοῦτο γοῦν ὑπάρχειν, ὅπερ μέγιστον ἐγὼ νομίζω ἐν πράγματι τοιούτῳ, αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ συνειδέναι μηδὲν ἐξημαρτηκότι, ἀλλʼ εἴ τις καὶ συμφορὰ γίγνοιτο, ἄνευ κακότητος καὶ αἰσχύνης γίγνεσθαι, καὶ τύχῃ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀδικίᾳ.
True happiness for one who is but human, gentlemen, would mean a life in which his person is threatened by no peril: and well might that be the burden of our prayers. But well too might we pray that if we must perforce face danger, we may have at least the one consolation which is to my mind the greatest of blessings at such an hour, a clear conscience; so that if disaster should after all befall us, it will be due to no iniquity of ours and bring no shame; it will be the result of chance rather than of wrongdoing.
§ 2
καὶ τοὺς μὲν νόμους οἳ κεῖνται περὶ τῶν τοιούτων πάντες ἂν ἐπαινέσειαν κάλλιστα νόμων κεῖσθαι καὶ ὁσιώτατα. ὑπάρχει μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἀρχαιοτάτοις εἶναι ἐν τῇ γῇ ταύτῃ, ἔπειτα τοὺς αὐτοὺς αἰεὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, ὅπερ μέγιστον σημεῖον νόμων καλῶς κειμένων· ὁ χρόνος γὰρ καὶ ἡ ἐμπειρία τὰ μὴ καλῶς ἔχοντα διδάσκει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. ὥστʼ οὐ δεῖ ὑμᾶς ἐκ τῶν λόγων τοῦ κατηγοροῦντος τοὺς νόμους μαθεῖν εἰ καλῶς ἔχουσιν ἢ μή, ἀλλʼ ἐκ τῶν νόμων τοὺς τούτων λόγους, εἰ ὀρθῶς ὑμᾶς καὶ νομίμως διδάσκουσιν ἢ οὔ.
It would be unanimously agreed, I think, that the laws which deal with cases such as the present are the most admirable and righteous of laws. Not only have they the distinction of being the oldest in this country, but they have changed no more than the crime with which they are concerned; and that is the surest token of good laws, as time and experience show mankind what is imperfect. Hence you must not use the speech for the prosecution to discover whether your laws are good or bad: you must use laws to discover whether or not the speech for the prosecution is giving you a correct and lawful interpretation of the case.
§ 3
ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀγὼν ἐμοὶ μέγιστος τῷ κινδυνεύοντι καὶ διωκομένῳ· ἡγοῦμαι μέντοι γε καὶ ὑμῖν τοῖς δικασταῖς περὶ πολλοῦ εἶναι τὰς φονικὰς δίκας ὀρθῶς διαγιγνώσκειν, μάλιστα μὲν τῶν θεῶν ἕνεκα καὶ τοῦ εὐσεβοῦς, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου [αὐτοῦ] μία δίκη· αὕτη δὲ μὴ ὀρθῶς καταγνωσθεῖσα ἰσχυροτέρα ἐστὶ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.
The person whom today’s proceedings concern most of all is myself, because I am the defendant and in danger. Nevertheless, it is also, I think, of great importance to you who are my judges that you should reach a correct verdict in trials for murder, first and foremost because of the gods and your duty towards them, and secondly for your own sakes. A case of this kind can be tried only once; and if it is wrongly decided against the defendant, justice and the facts cannot prevail against that decision.
§ 4
ἀνάγκη γάρ, ἐὰν ὑμεῖς καταψηφίσησθε, καὶ μὴ ὄντα φονέα μηδʼ ἔνοχον τῷ ἔργῳ χρήσασθαι τῇ δίκῃ, καὶ νόμῳ εἴργεσθαι πόλεως, ἱερῶν, ἀγώνων, θυσιῶν, ἅπερ μέγιστα καὶ παλαιότατα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. τοσαύτην γὰρ ἀνάγκην ὁ νόμος ἔχει, ὥστε καὶ ἄν τις κτείνῃ τινὰ ὧν αὐτὸς κρατεῖ καὶ μὴ ἔστιν ὁ τιμωρήσων, τὸ νομιζόμενον καὶ τὸ θεῖον δεδιὼς ἁγνεύει τε ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἀφέξεται ὧν εἴρηται ἐν τῷ νόμῳ, ἐλπίζων οὕτως ἂν ἄριστα πρᾶξαι.
Once you condemn him, a defendant must perforce accept your verdict, even if he was not the murderer or concerned in the crime. The law banishes him from his city, its temples, its games, and its sacrifices, the greatest and the most ancient of human institutions; and he must acquiesce. So powerful is the compulsion of the law, that even if a man slays one who is his own chattel and who has none to avenge him, his fear of the ordinances of god and of man causes him to purify himself and withhold himself from those places prescribed by law, in the hope that by so doing he will best avoid disaster.
§ 5
ἔστι μὲν γὰρ τὰ πλείω τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τοῦ βίου ἐν ταῖς ἐλπίσιν· ἀσεβῶν δὲ καὶ παραβαίνων τὰ εἰς τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ αὐτῆς ἂν τῆς ἐλπίδος, ὅπερ ἐστὶ μέγιστον ἀνθρώποις ἀγαθόν, αὐτὸς αὑτὸν ἀποστεροίη. καὶ οὐδεὶς ἂν τολμήσειεν οὔτε τὴν δίκην τὴν δεδικασμένην παραβαίνειν, πιστεύσας ὅτι οὐκ ἔνοχός ἐστι τῷ ἔργῳ, οὔτʼ αὖ συνειδὼς αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ἔργον εἰργασμένος τοιοῦτον μὴ οὐ χρῆσθαι τῷ νόμῳ· ἀνάγκη δὲ τῆς τε δίκης νικᾶσθαι παρὰ τὸ ἀληθές, αὐτοῦ τε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, κἂν μὴ ὁ τιμωρήσων ᾖ.
Most of the life of man rests upon hope; and by defying the gods and committing transgressions against them, he would rob himself even of hope, the greatest of human blessings. No one would venture either to disregard the sentence passed upon him because he was sure that he had had no part in the crime, or to disobey the law if he knew in his heart that he was guilty of such a deed. He has to submit to the verdict in defiance of the facts, or submit to the facts themselves, as the case may be, even if his victim has none to avenge him.
§ 6
αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων ἕνεκα οἵ τε νόμοι καὶ αἱ διωμοσίαι καὶ τὰ τόμια καὶ αἱ προρρήσεις, καὶ τἆλλʼ ὅσα γίγνεται τῶν δικῶν τοῦ φόνου ἕνεκα, πολὺ διαφέροντά ἐστιν ἢ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα, περὶ ὧν οἱ κίνδυνοι, περὶ πλείστου ἐστὶν ὀρθῶς γιγνώσκεσθαι· ὀρθῶς μὲν γὰρ γνωσθέντα τιμωρία ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀδικηθέντος, φονέα δὲ τὸν μὴ αἴτιον ψηφισθῆναι ἁμαρτία καὶ ἀσέβεια εἴς τε τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τοὺς νόμους. καὶ οὐκ ἴσον ἐστὶ τόν τε διώκοντα μὴ ὀρθῶς αἰτιάσασθαι καὶ ὑμᾶς τοὺς δικαστὰς μὴ ὀρθῶς γνῶναι. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τούτου αἰτίασις οὐκ ἔχει [νῦν] τέλος, ἀλλʼ ἐν ὑμῖν ἐστι καὶ τῇ δίκῃ· ὅ τι δʼ ἂν ὑμεῖς μὴ ὀρθῶς γνῶτε, τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν ὅποι ἂν ἀνενεγκών τις τὴν αἰτίαν ἀπολύσαιτο.
The laws, the oaths, the sacrifices, the proclamations, in fact the whole of the proceedings in connection with trials for murder differ as profoundly as they do from the proceedings elsewhere simply because it is of supreme importance that the facts at issue, upon which so much turns, should themselves be rightly interpreted. Such a right interpretation means vengeance for him who has been wronged; whereas to find an innocent man guilty of murder is a mistake, and a sinful mistake, which offends both gods and laws. Nor is it as serious for the prosecutor to accuse the wrong person as it is for you judges to reach a wrong verdict. The charge brought by the prosecutor is not in itself effective; whether it becomes so, depends upon you, sitting in judgement. On the other hand, if you yourselves arrive at a wrong verdict, you cannot rid yourselves of the responsibility for so doing by blaming someone else for that verdict.
§ 7
ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν γνώμην ἔχω περὶ τῆς ἀπολογίας ἥνπερ οἱ κατήγοροι περὶ τῆς κατηγορίας. οὗτοι γὰρ τὴν μὲν δίωξιν εὐσεβείας ἕνεκά φασι ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τοῦ δικαίου, τὴν δὲ κατηγορίαν ἅπασαν πεποίηνται διαβολῆς ἕνεκα καὶ ἀπάτης, ὅπερ ἀδικώτατόν ἐστι τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις· καὶ οὐκ ἐλέγξαντες, εἴ τι ἀδικῶ, δικαίως με βούλονται τιμωρεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ διαβαλόντες, καὶ εἰ μηδὲν ἀδικῶ, ζημιῶσαι καὶ ἐξελάσαι ἐκ τῆς γῆς ταύτης.
My own attitude to my defence, gentlemen, is very different from that of my accusers to their prosecution. They, on their side, allege that their object in bringing this action is to discharge a sacred duty and to satisfy justice; whereas they have in fact treated their speech for the prosecution as nothing but an opportunity for malicious falsehood, and such behavior is the worst travesty of justice humanly possible. Their aim is not to expose any crime I may have committed in order to exact the penalty which it deserves, but to blacken me, even though I am entirely innocent, in order to have me punished with exile from this country.
§ 8
ἐγὼ δὲ ἀξιῶ πρῶτον μὲν περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος ἀποκρίνεσθαι, καὶ διηγήσασθαι ἐν ὑμῖν τὰ γενόμενα πάντα· ἔπειτα περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὧν οὗτοι κατηγοροῦσιν, ἐὰν ὑμῖν ἡδομένοις, βουλήσομαι ἀπολογήσασθαι. ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ ἐμοὶ τιμὴν καὶ ὠφέλειαν αὐτὰ οἴσειν, τοῖς δὲ κατηγόροις καὶ τοῖς ἐπηρεάζουσιν αἰσχύνην· ἐπεί τοί γε καὶ δεινόν, ὦ ἄνδρες· ἵνα μὲν ἐξῆν αὐτοῖς,
I, on the other hand, consider that my first duty is to reply to the charge before the court by giving you a complete account of the facts. Afterwards, if you so desire, I shall be pleased to answer the remaining accusations made, as they will, I feel, turn to my own credit and advantage, and to the discomfiture of my opponents to whose impudence they are due. For it is indeed a strange fact, gentlemen:
§ 9
εἴ τι ἠδίκουν ἐγὼ τὴν πόλιν ἢ ἐν χορηγίᾳ ἢ ἐν ἄλλοις τισίν, ἀποφήνασι καὶ ἐξελέγξασιν ἄνδρα τε ἐχθρὸν τιμωρήσασθαι καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὠφελῆσαι, ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐδεὶς πώποτε οἷός τε ἐγένετο αὐτῶν οὔτε μικρὸν οὔτε μέγα ἐξελέγξαι ἀδικοῦντα τόνδε τὸν ἄνδρα τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον· ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τῷ ἀγῶνι, φόνου διώκοντες καὶ τοῦ νόμου οὕτως ἔχοντος, εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα κατηγορεῖν, μηχανῶνται ἐπʼ ἐμοὶ λόγους ψευδεῖς συντιθέντες καὶ διαβάλλοντες τὰ εἰς τὴν πόλιν. καὶ τῇ μὲν πόλει, εἴπερ ἀδικεῖται, κατηγορίαν ἀντὶ τιμωρίας ἀπονέμουσιν, αὐτοὶ δὲ οὗ τὴν πόλιν φασὶν ἀδικεῖσθαι, τούτου ἰδίᾳ ἀξιοῦσι δίκην λαμβάνειν.
when they had the opportunity of avenging themselves on an enemy and doing the state a service by exposing and bringing home to me any public offence of which I had been guilty, as Choregus or otherwise, not one of them was able to prove that I had done your people any wrong, great or small. Yet at today’s trial, when they are prosecuting for prosecution to the charge before the court, they are seeking to achieve my downfall with a tissue of lies calculated to bring my public life into disrepute. If the state has in fact been wronged, they are compensating it not with redress, but with a mere accusation; while they are themselves demanding that reparation for a wrong which has been suffered by the state should be made to them in person.
§ 10
καίτοι αὗται αἱ κατηγορίαι οὔτε χάριτος ἄξιαι οὔτε πίστεως. οὔτε γὰρ δὴ οὗ ἡ πόλις ἐλάμβανεν ἂν δίκην εἴ τι ἠδίκητο, ἐνταῦθα τὴν κατηγορίαν ποιεῖται, ὥστε χάριτος ἄξιον εἶναι τῇ πόλει· οὔτε ὅστις [οὐκ] ἄλλα κατηγορεῖ ἢ ἃ διώκει ἐν πράγματι τοιούτῳ, πιστεῦσαι δήπου αὐτῷ ἀξιώτερόν ἐστιν ἢ ἀπιστῆσαι. ἐγὼ δὲ σχεδὸν ἐπίσταμαι τὴν ὑμετέραν γνώμην, ὅτι οὔτʼ ἂν καταψηφίσαισθε οὔτʼ ἂν ἀποψηφίσαισθε ἑτέρου τινὸς ἕνεκα μᾶλλον ἢ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος· ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ δίκαια καὶ ὅσια. ἄρξομαι δὲ ἐντεῦθεν.
Indeed, they deserve to win neither gratitude nor credence with these charges of theirs. The circumstances in which they are prosecuting are not such as to allow the state to obtain satisfaction if really wronged, and only so would they be entitled to its gratitude; while the prosecutor who refuses to confine himself to the charge before the court in an action such as the present does not so much deserve to be believed as to be disbelieved. I myself know well enough what your own feelings are; nothing save the facts immediately at issue would lead you either to condemn or to acquit, because only thus can the claims of heaven and of justice be satisfied. So with those facts I will begin.
§ 11
ἐπειδὴ χορηγὸς κατεστάθην εἰς Θαργήλια καὶ ἔλαχον Παντακλέα διδάσκαλον καὶ Κεκροπίδα φυλὴν πρὸς τῇ ἐμαυτοῦ, [τουτέστι τῇ Ἐρεχθῇδι,] ἐχορήγουν ὡς ἄριστα ἐδυνάμην καὶ δικαιότατα. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν διδασκαλεῖον ᾗ ἦν ἐπιτηδειότατον τῆς ἐμῆς οἰκίας κατεσκεύασα, ἐν ᾧπερ καὶ Διονυσίοις ὅτε ἐχορήγουν ἐδίδασκον· ἔπειτα τὸν χορὸν συνέλεξα ὡς ἐδυνάμην ἄριστα, οὔτε ζημιώσας οὐδένα οὔτε ἐνέχυρα βίᾳ φέρων οὔτʼ ἀπεχθανόμενος οὐδενί, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ ἂν ἥδιστα καὶ ἐπιτηδειότατα ἀμφοτέροις ἐγίγνετο, ἐγὼ μὲν ἐκέλευον καὶ ᾐτούμην, οἱ δʼ ἑκόντες καὶ βουλόμενοι ἔπεμπον.
When I was appointed Choregus for the Thargelia, Pantacles falling to me as poet and the Cecropid as the tribe that went with mine [;that is to say the Erechtheid];, I discharged my office as efficiently and as scrupulously as I was able. I began by fitting out a training-room in the most suitable part of my house, the same that I had used when Choregus at the Dionysia. Next, I recruited the best chorus that I could, without indicting a single fine, without extorting a single pledge, and without making a single enemy. Just as though nothing could have been more satisfactory or better suited to both parties, I on my side would make my demand or request, while the parents on theirs would send their sons along without demur, nay, readily.
§ 12
ἐπεὶ δὲ ἧκον οἱ παῖδες, πρῶτον μέν μοι ἀσχολία ἦν παρεῖναι καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· ἐτύγχανε γάρ μοι πράγματα ὄντα πρὸς Ἀριστίωνα καὶ Φιλῖνον, ἃ ἐγὼ περὶ πολλοῦ ἐποιούμην, ἐπειδήπερ εἰσήγγειλα, ὀρθῶς καὶ δικαίως ἀποδεῖξαι τῇ βουλῇ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἀθηναίοις. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν τούτοις προσεῖχον τὸν νοῦν, κατέστησα δὲ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, εἴ τι δέοι τῷ χορῷ, Φανόστρατον, δημότην μὲν τουτωνὶ τῶν διωκόντων, κηδεστὴν δʼ ἐμαυτοῦ, ᾧ ἐγὼ δέδωκα τὴν θυγατέρα, καὶ ἠξίουν αὐτὸν ὡς
For a while after the arrival of the boys I had no time to look after them in person, as I happened to be engaged in suits against Aristion and Philinus, and was anxious to lose no time after the impeachment in sustaining my charges in a just and proper manner before the Council and the general public. Being thus occupied myself, I arranged that the needs of the chorus should be attended to by Phanostratus, a member of the same deme as my accusers here and a relative of my own (he is my son-in-law); and I told him to perform the task with all possible care.
§ 13
ἄριστα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτῳ δύο ἄνδρας, τὸν μὲν Ἐρεχθῇδος Ἀμεινίαν, ὃν αὐτοὶ οἱ φυλέται ἐψηφίσαντο συλλέγειν καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς φυλῆς ἑκάστοτε, δοκοῦντα χρηστὸν εἶναι, τὸν δʼ ἕτερον ..., τῆς Κεκροπίδος, ὅσπερ ἑκάστοτε εἴωθεν ταύτην τὴν φυλὴν συλλέγειν· ἔτι δὲ τέταρτον Φίλιππον, ᾧ προσετέτακτο ὠνεῖσθαι καὶ ἀναλίσκειν εἴ τι φράζοι ὁ διδάσκαλος ἢ ἄλλος τις τούτων, ὅπως ὡς ἄριστα χορηγοῖντο οἱ παῖδες καὶ μηδενὸς ἐνδεεῖς εἶεν διὰ τὴν ἐμὴν ἀσχολίαν.
Besides Phanostratus I appointed two others. The first, Ameinias, whom I thought a trustworthy man, belonged to the Erechtheid tribe and had been officially chosen by it to recruit and supervise its choruses at the various festivals; while the second, . . ., regularly recruited the choruses of the Cecropid tribe, to which he belonged, in the same way. There was yet a fourth, Philippus, whose duty it was to purchase or spend whatever the poet or any of the other three told him. Thus I ensured that the boys should receive every attention and lack nothing owing to my own preoccupation.
§ 14
καθειστήκει μὲν ἡ χορηγία οὕτω. καὶ τούτων εἴ τι ψεύδομαι προφάσεως ἕνεκα, ἔξεστι τῷ κατηγόρῳ ἐξελέγξαι ἐν τῷ ὑστέρῳ λόγῳ ὅ τι ἂν βούληται [εἰπεῖν]. ἐπεί τοι οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ ἄνδρες· πολλοὶ τῶν περιεστώτων τούτων τὰ μὲν πράγματα ταῦτα πάντα ἀκριβῶς ἐπίστανται, καὶ τοῦ ὁρκωτοῦ ἀκούουσι, καὶ ἐμοὶ προσέχουσι τὸν νοῦν ἅττα ἐγὼ ἀποκρίνομαι, οἷς ἐγὼ βουλοίμην ἂν δοκεῖν αὐτός τε εὔορκος εἶναι καὶ ὑμᾶς τἀληθῆ λέγων πεῖσαι ἀποψηφίσασθαί μου.
Such were my arrangements as Choregus. If I am lying as regards any of them in order to exonerate myself, my accuser is at liberty to refute me on any point he likes in his second speech. For this is how it is, gentlemen: many of the spectators here present are perfectly familiar with every one of these facts, the voice of the officer who administered the oath is in their ears, and they are giving my defence their close attention; I would like them to feel that I am respecting that oath, and that if I persuade you to acquit me, it was by telling the truth that I did so.
§ 15
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἀποδείξω ὑμῖν ὅτι οὔτʼ ἐκέλευσα πιεῖν τὸν παῖδα τὸ φάρμακον οὔτʼ ἠνάγκασα οὔτʼ ἔδωκα καὶ οὐδὲ παρῆ ὅτʼ ἔπιεν. καὶ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα ταῦτα σφόδρα λέγω, ὡς ἐμαυτὸν ἔξω αἰτίας καταστήσω, ἕτερον δέ τινα εἰς αἰτίαν ἀγάγω· οὐ δῆτα ἔγωγε, πλήν γε τῆς τύχης, ἥπερ οἶμαι καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς ἀνθρώπων αἰτία ἐστὶν ἀποθανεῖν· ἣν οὔτʼ ἂν ἐγὼ οὔτʼ ἄλλος οὐδεὶς οἷός τʼ ἂν εἴη ἀποτρέψαι μὴ οὐ γενέσθαι ἥντινα δεῖ ἑκάστῳ.... Μάρτυρες
In the first place, then, I will prove to you that I did not tell the boy to drink the poison, compel him to drink it, give it to him to drink, or even witness him drinking it. And I am not insisting on these facts in order to incriminate someone else once I have cleared myself; no indeed—unless that someone else be Fortune; and this is not the first time, I imagine, that she has caused a man’s death. Fortune neither I nor any other could prevent from fulfilling her destined part in the life of each of us. . . .
§ 16
μεμαρτύρηται μὲν οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες, περὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἃ ἐγὼ ὑμῖν ὑπεσχόμην· ἐξ αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων χρὴ σκοπεῖν ἅ τε οὗτοι διωμόσαντο καὶ ἃ ἐγώ, πότεροι ἀληθέστερα καὶ εὐορκότερα. διωμόσαντο δὲ οὗτοι μὲν ἀποκτεῖναί με Διόδοτον βουλεύσαντα τὸν θάνατον, ἐγὼ δὲ μὴ ἀποκτεῖναι, μήτε χειρὶ ἐργασάμενος μήτε βουλεύσας.
Witnesses The facts have been confirmed by evidence as I promised, gentlemen; and you must let that evidence help you to decide which of the two sworn statements made, the prosecution’s or my own, reveals more respect for truth and for the oath by which it was preceded. The prosecution swore that I was responsible for the death of Diodotus as having instigated the act which led to it; whereas I swore that I did not cause his death, whether by my own act or by instigation.
§ 17
αἰτιῶνται δὲ οὗτοι μὲν ἐκ τούτων, ὡς αἴτιος ὃς ἐκέλευσε πιεῖν τὸν παῖδα τὸ φάρμακον ἢ ἠνάγκασεν ἢ ἔδωκεν· ἐγὼ δὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν τούτων ὧν αἰτιῶνται οὗτοι ἀποφανῶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔνοχός εἰμι· οὔτε γὰρ ἐκέλευσα οὔτʼ ἠνάγκασα οὔτʼ ἔδωκα· καὶ ἔτι προστίθημι αὐτοῖς ὅτι οὐ παρεγενόμην πίνοντι. καὶ εἴ φασιν ἀδικεῖν εἴ τις ἐκέλευσεν, ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀδικῶ· οὐ γὰρ ἐκέλευσα. καὶ εἴ φασιν ἀδικεῖν εἴ τις ἠνάγκασεν, ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀδικῶ· οὐ γὰρ ἠνάγκασα. καὶ εἰ τὸν δόντα τὸ φάρμακόν φασιν αἴτιον εἶναι, ἐγὼ οὐκ αἴτιος· οὐ γὰρ ἔδωκα.
Further, in making their charge, the prosecution invoke the principle that the responsibility rests with whoever told the boy to drink the poison, forced him to drink it, or gave it to him to drink. By that very principle, however, I will myself prove that I am innocent: for I neither told the boy to drink the poison, nor forced him to drink it, nor gave it to him to drink. I will even go a step further than they and add that I did not witness him drink it. If the prosecution say that it was a criminal act to tell him to drink it, I am no criminal: I did not tell him to drink it. If they say that it was a criminal act to force him to drink it, I am no criminal: I did not force him to drink it. And if they say that the responsibility rests with the person who gave him the poison, I am not responsible: I did not give it to him.
§ 18
αἰτιάσασθαι μὲν οὖν καὶ καταψεύσασθαι ἔξεστι τῷ βουλομένῳ· αὐτὸς γὰρ ἕκαστος τούτου κρατεῖ· γενέσθαι μέντοι τὰ μὴ γενόμενα καὶ ἀδικεῖν τὸν μὴ ἀδικοῦντα οὐκ ἐν τοῖς τούτων λόγοις ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι, ἀλλʼ ἐν τῷ δικαίῳ καὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ. ὁπόσα μὲν γὰρ λάθρᾳ πράττεται καὶ ἐπὶ θανάτῳ βουλευθέντα, ὧν μή εἰσι μάρτυρες, ἀνάγκη περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν λόγων τῶν τε τοῦ κατηγόρου καὶ τοῦ ἀποκρινομένου τὴν διάγνωσιν ποιεῖσθαι καὶ θηρεύειν καὶ ἐπὶ σμικρὸν ὑπονοεῖν τὰ λεγόμενα, καὶ εἰκάζοντας μᾶλλον ἢ σάφα εἰδότας ψηφίζεσθαι περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων·
Now accusations and lies can be indulged in at will, as they are at the command of each one of us. But that what never happened should be transformed into fact, that an innocent man should be transformed into a criminal is not, I feel, a matter which depends upon the eloquence of the prosecution; it is a question of what is right and what is true. Admittedly, with a deliberately planned murder, carried out in secret and with none to witness it, the truth can only be determined from the accounts given by the prosecutor and the defendant, and from them alone; their statements must be followed up with care and suspected on the slightest grounds and the final verdict must necessarily be the result of conjecture rather than certain knowledge.
§ 19
ὅπου δὲ πρῶτον μὲν αὐτοὶ οἱ κατήγοροι ὁμολογοῦσι μὴ ἐκ προνοίας μηδʼ ἐκ παρασκευῆς γενέσθαι τὸν θάνατον τῷ παιδί, ἔπειτα τὰ πραχθέντα φανερῶς ἅπαντα πραχθῆναι καὶ ἐναντίον μαρτύρων πολλῶν, καὶ ἀνδρῶν καὶ παίδων, καὶ ἐλευθέρων καὶ δούλων, ἐξ ὧνπερ καὶ εἴ τίς τι ἠδίκηκε, φανερώτατος ἂν εἴη, καὶ εἴ τις μὴ ἀδικοῦντα αἰτιῷτο, μάλιστʼ ἂν ἐξελέγχοιτο.
But in the present instance, the prosecution themselves admit to begin with that the boy’s death was not due to premeditation or design: and secondly, everything which happened happened publicly and before numerous witnesses, men and boys, free men and slaves, who would have ensured the complete exposure of the criminal, had there been one, and the instant refutation of anyone who accused an innocent person.
§ 20
ἄξιον δʼ ἐνθυμηθῆναι, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἀμφότερα καὶ τῆς γνώμης τῶν ἀντιδίκων καὶ οἵῳ τρόπῳ ἔρχονται ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα. ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ οὐδὲν ὁμοίως οὗτοί τε πρὸς ἐμὲ πράττουσι καὶ ἐγὼ πρὸς τούτους.
Both the spirit shown by my opponents and the way in which they set to work are worth noticing, gentlemen; for their behavior towards me has been very different from mine towards them from the outset.
§ 21
ἔλεξε μὲν γὰρ Φιλοκράτης οὑτοσὶ ἀναβὰς εἰς τὴν ἡλιαίαν τὴν τῶν θεσμοθετῶν, τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ᾗ ὁ παῖς ἐξεφέρετο, ὅτι ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ ἀποκτείναιμι ἐγὼ ἐν τῷ χορῷ, φάρμακον ἀναγκάσας πιεῖν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὗτος ταῦτʼ ἔλεγεν, ἀναβὰς ἐγὼ εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον τοῖς αὐτοῖς δικασταῖς ἔλεξα ὅτι τὸν μὲν νόμον οὐ δικαίως μου προκαθισταίη Φιλοκράτης κατηγορῶν καὶ διαβάλλων εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, μελλόντων ἔσεσθαί μοι ἀγώνων πρὸς Ἀριστίωνα καὶ Φιλῖνον αὔριον καὶ ἕνῃ, ὧνπερ ἕνεκα τοὺς λόγους τούτους λέγοι·
Philocrates yonder presented himself before the Heliaea of the Thesmothetae on the very day of the boy’s burial, and declared that I had murdered his brother, a member of the chorus, by forcing him to drink poison. At that, I presented myself before the court in my turn. I told the same jury that Philocrates had no right to place legal impediments in my way by coming to court with his outrageous charge, when I was bringing suits against Aristion and Philinus on the following day and the day after: for that was his only reason for making such allegations.
§ 22
ἃ μέντοι αἰτιῷτο καὶ διαβάλλοι, ῥᾳδίως ἐξελεγχθήσοιτο ψευδόμενος. εἶεν γὰρ οἱ συνειδότες πολλοί, καὶ ἐλεύθεροι καὶ δοῦλοι, καὶ νεώτεροι καὶ πρεσβύτεροι, σύμπαντες πλείους ἢ πεντήκοντα, οἳ τούς τε λόγους τοὺς λεχθέντας περὶ τῆς πόσεως τοῦ φαρμάκου καὶ τὰ πραχθέντα καὶ τὰ γενόμενα πάντα ἐπίσταιντο.
However, I said, there would be no difficulty in proving his monstrous accusation a lie, as there were plenty of witnesses, slave and free, young and old, in fact, over fifty in all, who knew how the drinking of the poison had been accounted for and were in complete possession of the facts and circumstances.
§ 23
καὶ εἶπόν τε ταῦτα ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, καὶ προὐκαλούμην αὐτὸν εὐθὺς τότε, καὶ αὖθις τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς δικασταῖς, καὶ ἰέναι ἐκέλευον λαβόντα μάρτυρας ὁπόσους βούλοιτο ἐπὶ τοὺς παραγενομένους, λέγων αὐτῷ ὀνόματι ἕκαστον, τούτους ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἐλέγχειν, τοὺς μὲν ἐλευθέρους ὡς χρὴ τοὺς ἐλευθέρους, οἳ σφῶν τʼ αὐτῶν ἕνεκα καὶ τοῦ δικαίου ἔφραζον ἂν τἀληθῆ καὶ τὰ γενόμενα, τοὺς δὲ δούλους, εἰ μὲν αὐτῷ ἐρωτῶντι τἀληθῆ δοκοῖεν λέγειν, εἰ δὲ μή, ἕτοιμος εἴην διδόναι βασανίζειν τούς τε ἐμαυτοῦ πάντας, καὶ εἴ τινας τῶν ἀλλοτρίων κελεύοι, ὡμολόγουν πείσας τὸν δεσπότην παραδώσειν αὐτῷ βασανίζειν τρόπῳ ὁποίῳ βούλοιτο.
Not only did I make this declaration before the court, but I offered Philocrates a challenge there and then, and repeated it the following day in the presence of the same jury. Let him take with him as many witnesses as he liked: let him go to the persons who had been present at the accident (I specified them by name): and let him interrogate and cross-examine them. Let him question the free men as befitted free men; for their own sakes and in the interests of justice, they would give a faithful account of what had occurred. As to the slaves, if he considered that they were answering his questions truthfully, well and good; if he did not, I was ready to place all my own at his disposal for examination under torture, and should he demand any that did not belong to me, I agreed to obtain the consent of their owner and hand them over to him to examine as he liked.
§ 24
καὶ ταῦτα ἐμοῦ προκαλουμένου καὶ λέγοντος ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, οὗ καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ δικασταὶ καὶ ἕτεροι ἰδιῶται πολλοὶ μάρτυρες παρῆσαν, οὔτε τότε παραχρῆμα οὔτε ὕστερον ἐν παντὶ τῷ χρόνῳ οὐδεπώποτε ἠθέλησαν ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ τοῦτο τὸ δίκαιον, εὖ εἰδότες ὅτι οὐκ ἂν τούτοις κατʼ ἐμοῦ ἔλεγχος ἐγίγνετο οὗτος, ἀλλʼ ἐμοὶ κατὰ τούτων, ὅτι οὐδὲν δίκαιον οὐδʼ ἀληθὲς ᾐτιῶντο.
That was the challenge which I addressed to him before the court; and not only the jurors themselves but numbers of private persons also were there to witness it. Yet the prosecution refused to bring the case to this issue at the time, and have persistently refused ever since. They knew very well that instead of supplying them with proof of my guilt, such an inquiry would supply me with proof that their own charge was totally unjust and unfounded.
§ 25
ἐπίστασθε δέ, ὦ ἄνδρες, ὅτι αἱ ἀνάγκαι αὗται ἰσχυρόταται καὶ μέγισταί εἰσι τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις, καὶ ἔλεγχοι ἐκ τούτων σαφέστατοι καὶ πιστότατοι περὶ τοῦ δικαίου, ὅπου εἶεν μὲν ἐλεύθεροι πολλοὶ οἱ συνειδότες, εἶεν δὲ δοῦλοι, καὶ ἐξείη μὲν τοὺς ἐλευθέρους ὅρκοις καὶ πίστεσιν ἀναγκάζειν, ἃ τοῖς ἐλευθέροις μέγιστα καὶ περὶ πλείστου ἐστίν, ἐξείη δὲ τοὺς δούλους ἑτέραις ἀνάγκαις, ὑφʼ ὧν καὶ ἢν μέλλωσιν ἀποθανεῖσθαι κατειπόντες, ὅμως ἀναγκάζονται τἀληθῆ λέγειν· ἡ γὰρ παροῦσα ἀνάγκη ἑκάστῳ ἰσχυροτέρα ἐστὶ τῆς μελλούσης ἔσεσθαι.
You do not need to be reminded, gentlemen, that the one occasion when compulsion is as absolute and as effective as is humanly possible, and when the rights of a case are ascertained thereby most surely and most certainly, arises when there is an abundance of witnesses, both slave and free, and it is possible to put pressure upon the free men by exacting an oath or word of honor, the most solemn and the most awful form of compulsion known to freemen, and upon the slaves by other devices, which will force them to tell the truth even if their revelations are bound to cost them their lives, as the compulsion of the moment has a stronger influence over each than the fate which he will suffer by compulsion afterwards.
§ 26
εἰς πάντα τοίνυν ἐγὼ ταῦτα προὐκαλεσάμην τούτους, καὶ ἐξ ὧν γε χρὴ ἄνθρωπον ὄντα τἀληθῆ καὶ τὰ δίκαια πυνθάνεσθαι, ἐξῆν αὐτοῖς πυνθάνεσθαι, καὶ πρόφασις οὐδεμία ὑπελείπετο. καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν ὁ τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχων καὶ ἀδικῶν, ὡς οὗτοί φασιν, ἕτοιμος ἦ αὐτοῖς κατʼ ἐμαυτοῦ παρέχειν ἔλεγχον τὸν δικαιότατον· οἱ δʼ αἰτιώμενοι καὶ φάσκοντες ἀδικεῖσθαι αὐτοὶ ἦσαν οἱ οὐκ ἐθέλοντες ἐλέγχειν εἴ τι ἠδικοῦντο.
It was to this, then, and nothing less that I challenged the prosecution. Every means which mortal man finds it necessary to use in order to discover the true rights of a matter, they had the opportunity of using; not the vestige of an excuse was left them. I, the defendant, the alleged criminal, was ready to give them the chance of proving my guilt in the fairest possible way; it was they, the prosecutors, the professedly injured party, who refused to obtain proof of such injury as they had sustained.
§ 27
καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐγὼ τούτων προκαλουμένων μὴ ἠθέλησα τοὺς παραγενομένους ἀποφῆναι, ἢ θεράποντας ἐξαιτοῦσι μὴ ἤθελον ἐκδιδόναι, ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ πρόκλησιν ἔφευγον, αὐτὰ ἂν ταῦτα μέγιστα τεκμήρια κατʼ ἐμοῦ ἐποιοῦντο ὅτι ἀληθὴς ἦν ἡ αἰτία· ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐμοῦ προκαλουμένου οὗτοι ἦσαν οἱ φεύγοντες τὸν ἔλεγχον, ἐμοὶ δήπου δίκαιον κατὰ τούτων τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τεκμήριον γενέσθαι ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθὴς ἦν ἡ αἰτία ἣν αἰτιῶνται κατʼ ἐμοῦ.
Suppose that the offer had come from them. Then had I refused to disclose who the eyewitnesses were: had I refused to hand over my servants at their request: or had I been afraid to accept some other challenge, they would be claiming that those facts in themselves afforded to my detriment the strongest presumption of the truth of their charge. Instead, it was I who issued the challenge, and the prosecution who evaded the test. So it was surely only fair that this same fact should afford me a presumption to their detriment that the charge which they have made against me is untrue.
§ 28
ἐπίσταμαι δὲ καὶ τάδε, ὦ ἄνδρες, ὅτι εἰ μὲν τούτοις ἐμοῦ κατεμαρτύρουν οἱ μάρτυρες οἱ παραγενόμενοι, αὐτοῖς ἂν τούτοις ἰσχυροτάτοις ἐχρῶντο καὶ πίστιν ταύτην σαφεστάτην ἀπέφαινον, τοὺς μάρτυρας τοὺς καταμαρτυροῦντας· τῶν αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων μαρτυρούντων, ἃ μὲν ἐγὼ λέγω, ἀληθῆ εἶναι, ἃ δὲ οὗτοι λέγουσιν, οὐκ ἀληθῆ, τοῖς μὲν μάρτυσι τοῖς ἐμοὶ μαρτυροῦσιν ἀπιστεῖν ὑμᾶς διδάσκουσι, τοῖς δὲ λόγοις οἷς αὐτοὶ λέγουσι πιστεύειν ὑμᾶς φασι χρῆναι, οὓς ἐγὼ εἰ ἔλεγον ἄνευ μαρτύρων, ψευδεῖς ἂν κατηγόρουν εἶναι.
Further, I am certain, gentlemen, that if the witnesses present at the accident were testifying in the prosecution’s favor and against me, the prosecution would be treating them as supremely important: they would be showing that such unfavourable evidence was proof conclusive. As, however, these same witnesses are testifying that what I say is true and that what the prosecution say is not, they urge that the evidence of those witnesses in my favor is untrustworthy; according to them, it is their own statements which you should believe, statements which they would be attacking as false, were I making them myself without witnesses to support me.
§ 29
καίτοι δεινὸν εἰ οἱ αὐτοὶ μάρτυρες τούτοις μὲν ἂν μαρτυροῦντες πιστοὶ ἦσαν, ἐμοὶ δὲ μαρτυροῦντες ἄπιστοι ἔσονται. καὶ εἰ μὲν πάνυ μὴ παρεγένοντο μάρτυρες, ἐγὼ δὲ παρειχόμην, ἢ τοὺς παραγενομένους μὴ παρειχόμην, ἑτέρους δέ τινας, εἰκότως ἂν οἱ τούτων λόγοι πιστότεροι ἦσαν τῶν ἐμῶν μαρτύρων· ὅπου δὲ μάρτυράς τε ὁμολογοῦσι παραγενέσθαι, καὶ ἐγὼ τοὺς παραγενομένους παρέχομαι, καὶ εὐθὺς ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης ἡμέρας καὶ αὐτὸς ἐγὼ καὶ οἱ μάρτυρες ἅπαντες φανεροί ἐσμεν λέγοντες ἅπερ νυνὶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς, πόθεν χρή, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἢ τἀληθῆ πιστὰ ἢ τὰ μὴ ἀληθῆ ἄπιστα ποιεῖν ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων;
Yet it is strange that the witnesses who would be trustworthy, were their evidence favorable to the prosecution, are to be untrustworthy when it is favorable to me. Were I producing eyewitnesses when there had been none, or were I not producing the true eyewitnesses, there would be some ground for treating the statements of the prosecution as more trustworthy than my witnesses. But the prosecution admit that witnesses were actually present: I am producing those witnesses: and both I and all my witnesses are well known to have maintained from the very first day what we are repeating to you now. So what other means than these are to be employed to confirm what is true and to disprove what is not?
§ 30
ὅπου μὲν γὰρ λόγῳ τις διδάσκοι περὶ τῶν πραχθέντων, μάρτυρας δὲ μὴ παρέχοιτο, μαρτύρων ἄν τις τοὺς λόγους τούτους ἐνδεεῖς φαίη εἶναι· ὅπου δὲ μάρτυρας μὲν παρέχοιτο, τεκμήρια δὲ αὖ τοῖς μαρτυροῦσιν ὅμοια μὴ ἀποφαίνοι, ταὐτὰ ἄν τις ἔχοι εἰπεῖν, εἰ βούλοιτο.
If a bare statement of the facts were made, but not supported by the evidence of witnesses, it might well be criticized for the absence of that support; and if witnesses were forthcoming, only to conflict with the presumptions furnished by the pleader, his opponent might well pass a corresponding criticism, should he so wish.
§ 31
ἐγὼ τοίνυν τοὺς τε λόγους ὑμῖν εἰκότας ἀποφαίνω, καὶ τοῖς λόγοις τοὺς μάρτυρας ὁμολογοῦντας καὶ τοῖς μάρτυσι τὰ ἔργα, καὶ τεκμήρια ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων, καὶ ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις δύο τὼ μεγίστω καὶ ἰσχυροτάτω, τούτους μὲν αὐτούς τε ὑπὸ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἐξελεγχομένους καὶ ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ, ἐμὲ δὲ ὑπό τε τούτων καὶ ὑπὸ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολυόμενον·
Now in my own case, you are being presented with an account which is reasonable, with evidence which is consistent with that account, with facts which are consistent with that evidence, with presumptions drawn immediately from those facts, and with two arguments of the greatest significance and weight in addition:
§ 32
ὅπου γὰρ ἐθέλοντος ἐλέγχεσθαι ἐμοῦ περὶ ὧν ᾐτιῶντο οὗτοι μὴ ἤθελον ἐλέγχειν εἴ τι ἠδικοῦντο, ἐμὲ μὲν δήπου ἀπέλυον, αὐτοὶ δὲ κατὰ σφῶν αὐτῶν μάρτυρες ἐγένοντο, ὅτι οὐδὲν δίκαιον οὐδʼ ἀληθὲς ᾐτιῶντο. καίτοι εἰ πρὸς τοῖς ἐμαυτοῦ μάρτυσι τοὺς ἀντιδίκους αὐτοὺς μάρτυρας παρέχομαι, ποῖ ἔτι ἐλθόντα δεῖ ἢ πόθεν ἀποδείξαντα τῆς αἰτίας ἀπολελύσθαι;
the first, the circumstance that the prosecution have been proved impostors both by themselves and by me: and the second, the circumstance that I have been proved innocent both by the prosecution and by myself; for in refusing to obtain proof of such injury as they had sustained when I was ready for an inquiry into the crime with which they were charging me, they were clearly acknowledging my innocence and testifying to the injustice and falsity of their own accusation. If I supplement the evidence of my own witnesses with that of my opponents in person, what other expedients, what other proofs are necessary to establish my entire freedom from the charge?
§ 33
ἡγοῦμαι μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ἀποδεδειγμένων, ὦ ἄνδρες, δικαίως ἄν μου ἀποψηφίσασθαι ὑμᾶς, καὶ ἐπίστασθαι ἅπαντας ὅτι οὐδέν μοι προσήκει τῆς αἰτίας ταύτης. ἵνα δʼ ἔτι καὶ ἄμεινον μάθητε, τούτου ἕνεκα πλείω λέξω, καὶ ἀποδείξω ὑμῖν τοὺς κατηγόρους τούτους ἐπιορκοτάτους ὄντας καὶ ἀσεβεστάτους ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἀξίους οὐ μόνον ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ μισεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑφʼ ὑμῶν πάντων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν τῆς δίκης ἕνεκα ταυτησί.
I feel that both the arguments and proofs which I have put before you, gentlemen, would justify you in acquitting me; you all know that the charge before the court does not concern me. However, to confirm you in that knowledge, I will go further. I will prove that my accusers here are the most reckless perjurors and the most godless scoundrels alive: that they have earned not only my own hatred, but the hatred of every one of you and of your fellow-citizens besides, by instituting this trial.
§ 34
οὗτοι γὰρ τῇ μὲν πρώτῃ ἡμέρᾳ ᾗ ἀπέθανεν ὁ παῖς, καὶ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ᾗ προέκειτο, οὐδʼ αὐτοὶ ἠξίουν αἰτιᾶσθαι ἐμὲ [οὐδʼ] ἀδικεῖν ἐν τῷ πράγματι τούτῳ οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ συνῆσαν ἐμοὶ καὶ διελέγοντο· τῇ δὲ τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ ᾗ ἐξεφέρετο ὁ παῖς, ταύτῃ δὴ πεπεισμένοι ἦσάν [τινες] ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν τῶν ἐμῶν, καὶ παρεσκευάζοντο αἰτιᾶσθαι καὶ προαγορεύειν εἴργεσθαι τῶν νομίμων. τίνες οὖν ἦσαν οἱ πείσαντες αὐτούς; καὶ τίνος ἕνεκα καὶ πρόθυμοι ἐγένοντο πεῖσαι αὐτούς; δεῖ γάρ με καὶ ταῦτα ὑμᾶς διδάξαι.
On the first day, the day of the boy’s death, and on the second, when the body was laid out, not even the prosecution themselves thought of accusing me of having played any kind of criminal part in the accident: on the contrary, they avoided neither meeting me nor speaking to me. It was only on the third day, the day of the boy’s burial, that they yielded to my enemies and set about bringing a charge and proclaiming me to be under the usual disabilities. Now who was it who instigated them? And what reason had those others for wanting to do such a thing? I must enlighten you on these further points.
§ 35
κατηγορήσειν ἔμελλον Ἀριστίωνος καὶ Φιλίνου καὶ Ἀμπελίνου καὶ τοῦ ὑπογραμματέως τῶν θεσμοθετῶν, μεθʼ οὗπερ συνέκλεπτον, περὶ ὧν εἰσήγγειλα εἰς τὴν βουλήν. καὶ αὐτοῖς ἐκ μὲν τῶν πεπραγμένων οὐδεμία ἦν ἐλπὶς ἀποφεύξεσθαι—τοιαῦτα ἄρʼ ἦν τὰ ἠδικημένα—· πείσαντες δὲ τούτους ἀπογράφεσθαι καὶ προαγορεύειν ἐμοὶ εἴργεσθαι τῶν νομίμων, ἡγήσαντο ταύτην σφίσιν ἔσεσθαι σωτηρίαν καὶ ἀπαλλαγὴν τῶν πραγμάτων ἁπάντων. ὁ γὰρ νόμος οὕτως ἔχει,
I was about to prosecute Aristion, Philinus, Ampelinus, and the secretary to the Thesmothetae, with whose embezzlements they had been associated, on charges which I had presented to the Council in the form of an impeachment. As far as the facts of the case were concerned, they had no hope of acquittal: their offences were too serious. On the other hand, could they but induce my accusers here to register a charge and proclaim that I was under the statutory ban, they would, they thought, be safely rid of the whole business.
§ 36
ἐπειδάν τις ἀπογραφῇ φόνου δίκην, εἴργεσθαι τῶν νομίμων· καὶ οὔτʼ ἂν ἐγὼ οἷός τʼ ἦ ἐπεξελθεῖν εἰργόμενος τῶν νομίμων, ἐκεῖνοί τε ἐμοῦ τοῦ εἰσαγγείλαντος καὶ ἐπισταμένου τὰ πράγματα μὴ ἐπεξιόντος ῥᾳδίως ἔμελλον ἀποφεύξεσθαι καὶ δίκην οὐ δώσειν ὑμῖν ὧν ἠδίκησαν. καὶ τοῦτʼ οὐκ ἐπʼ ἐμοὶ πρῶτον ἐμηχανήσαντο Φιλῖνος καὶ οἱ ἕτεροι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ Λυσιστράτῳ πρότερον, ὡς αὐτοὶ ὑμεῖς ἠκούσατε.
The law runs that the ban comes into force as soon as anyone has a charge of murder registered against him; and if placed under it, not only should I myself have been unable to proeeed with my case, but once the party responsible for the impeachment and in possession of the facts failed to proceed, the four would gain an acquittal without difficulty, and the wrong which they had done you would go unpunished. I was not, I may say, the first against whom Philinus and his companions had employed this device; they had already done the same to Lysistratus, as you have heard for yourselves.
§ 37
καὶ οὗτοι τότε μὲν πρόθυμοι ἦσαν ἀπογράφεσθαί με εὐθὺς τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ᾗ ὁ παῖς ἐθάπτετο, πρὶν τὴν οἰκίαν καθῆραι καὶ τὰ νομιζόμενα ποιῆσαι, αὐτὴν ταύτην φυλάξαντες τὴν ἡμέραν ἐν ᾗ ἔμελλεν ὁ πρῶτος ἐκείνων κριθήσεσθαι, ὅπως μηδὲ καθʼ ἑνὸς αὐτῶν οἷός τε γενοίμην ἐπεξελθεῖν μηδʼ ἐνδεῖξαι τῷ δικαστηρίῳ τἀδικήματα·
The prosecution started by doing their utmost to register a charge at once, on the day after the burial, before the house had been purified or the proper rites performed; they had taken care to choose the very day on which the first of the other four was to be tried, to make it impossible for me to proceed against a single one of them or present the court with any of their offences.
§ 38
ἐπειδὴ δὲ αὐτοῖς ὁ βασιλεὺς τούς τε νόμους ἀνέγνω, καὶ χρόνους ἐπέδειξεν ὅτι οὐκ ἐγχωροίη ἀπογράψασθαι καὶ τὰς κλήσεις καλεῖσθαι ὅσας ἔδει, καὶ ἐγὼ τοὺς ταῦτα μηχανωμένους εἰσάγων εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον εἷλον ἅπαντας, καὶ ἐτιμήθη αὐτοῖς ὧν ὑμεῖς ἐπίστασθε, καὶ οὗτοι ὧν ἕνεκα ἐλάμβανον χρήματα οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς οἷόι τε ἦσαν ὠφελῆσαι, τότε δὴ προσιόντες αὐτῷ τʼ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς φίλοις ἐδέοντο διαλλαγῆναι, καὶ δίκην ἕτοιμοι ἦσαν διδόναι τῶν ἡμαρτημένων.
However, the Basileus read them the law, and showed that there was not sufficient time to register a charge or issue the necessary writs; so I took the originators of the plot into court, and secured a conviction in every case—and you know the amount at which the damages were fixed. No sooner, however, did my accusers here find it impossible to give the help which they had been paid to give than they approached me and my friends with a request for a reconciliation, and offered to make amends for their past errors.
§ 39
καὶ ἐγὼ πεισθεὶς ὑπὸ τῶν φίλων διηλλάγην τούτοις ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐναντίον μαρτύρων, οἵπερ διήλλαττον ἡμᾶς πρὸς τῷ νεῷ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς· καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο συνῆσάν μοι καὶ διελέγοντο ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς, ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ, ἐν τῇ ἐμῇ οἰκίᾳ, ἐν τῇ σφετέρᾳ αὐτῶν καὶ ἑτέρωθι πανταχοῦ.
I took my friends’ advice, and was formally reconciled to them on the Acropolis in the presence of witnesses, who performed the ceremony near the temple of Athena. Afterwards, they met me and spoke to me in temples, in the Agora, in my house, in their own—everywhere in fact.
§ 40
τὸ τελευταῖον, ὦ Ζεῦ καὶ θεοὶ πάντες, Φιλοκράτης αὐτὸς οὑτοσὶ ἐν τῷ βουλευτηρίῳ ἐναντίον τῆς βουλῆς, ἑστὼς μετʼ ἐμοῦ ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος, ἁπτόμενος ἐμοῦ διελέγετο, ὀνόματι οὗτος ἐμὲ προσαγορεύων, καὶ ἐγὼ τοῦτον, ὥστε δεινὸν δόξαι εἶναι τῇ βουλῇ, ἐπειδὴ ἐπύθετο προειρημένον μοι εἴργεσθαι τῶν νομίμων ὑπὸ τούτων, οὓς ἑώρων μοι τῇ προτεραίᾳ συνόντας καὶ διαλεγομένους.
The crowning point was reached in the Council-chamber in front of the Council—heavens, to think of it! —when Philocrates here himself joined me on the tribune and conversed with me, his hand on my arm, addressing me by my name as I addressed him by his. No wonder that the Council was astounded to learn that I had been proclaimed under the ban by the very persons whom they had seen in my company chatting to me on the previous day.
§ 41
σκέψασθε δὲ καί μοι μνήσθητε, ὦ ἄνδρες· ταῦτα γὰρ οὐ μόνον μάρτυσιν ὑμῖν ἀποδείξω, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων ἃ τούτοις πέπρακται, ῥᾳδίως γνώσεσθε ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγω. καὶ πρῶτον ἃ τοῦ βασιλέως κατηγοροῦσι καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐμὴν σπουδὴν οὔ φασιν ἐθέλειν αὐτὸν ἀπογράφεσθαι τὴν δίκην, τοῦτο δὴ κατʼ αὐτῶν τούτων ἔσται τεκμήριον ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγουσιν.
And now I want your attention, gentlemen: I want you to cast your minds back; for I shall not use witnesses alone to prove the facts to which I am now coming; your own knowledge of how the prosecution have acted will itself show you at once that I am telling the truth. To begin with, they complain of the Basileus and attribute his refusal to register their charge to activities of mine.
§ 42
ἔδει μὲν γὰρ τὸν βασιλέα, ἐπειδὴ ἀπεγράψατο, τρεῖς προδικασίας ποιῆσαι ἐν τρισὶ μησί, τὴν δίκην δʼ εἰσάγειν τετάρτῳ μηνί, ὥσπερ νυνί· τῆς δʼ ἀρχῆς αὐτῷ λοιποὶ δύο μῆνες ἦσαν, Θαργηλιὼν καὶ Σκιροφοριών. καὶ οὔτʼ εἰσάγειν δήπου οἷός τʼ ἂν ἦν ἐφʼ ἑαυτοῦ, οὔτε παραδοῦναι φόνου δίκην ἔξεστιν, οὐδὲ παρέδωκεν οὐδεὶς πώποτε βασιλεὺς ἐν τῇ γῇ ταύτῃ. ἥντινα οὖν μήτε εἰσάγειν μήτε παραδοῦναι ἐξῆν αὐτῷ, οὐδʼ ἀπογράφεσθαι ἠξίου παρὰ τοὺς ὑμετέρους νόμους.
That complaint, however, will serve merely to damage their case by suggesting that their statements in general are untrue; for after registering the action, the Basileus was obliged to hold three preliminary inquiries in the course of the three months following, only bringing the case into court during the fourth—as he has done today. Yet only two months of office remained to him, Thargelion and Scirophorion. It would thus clearly have been impossible for him to bring the case into court during his own period of office; and he is not allowed to hand on an action for murder to his successor; such a thing has never been done by any Basileus in this country. So, as it was a case which he could neither bring into court nor hand on to his successor, he did not see why he should break your laws by registering it.
§ 43
καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἠδίκει αὐτούς, μέγιστον σημεῖον· Φιλοκράτης γὰρ οὑτοσὶ ἑτέρους τῶν ὑπευθύνων ἔσειε καὶ ἐσυκοφάντει, τούτου δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως, ὅν φασι δεινὰ καὶ σχέτλια εἰργάσθαι, οὐκ ἦλθε κατηγορήσων εἰς τὰς εὐθύνας. καίτοι τί ἂν ὑμῖν μεῖζον τούτου τεκμήριον ἀποδείξαιμι, ὅτι οὐκ ἠδικεῖτο οὔθʼ ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ οὔθʼ ὑπʼ ἐκείνου;
There is, indeed, one very striking indication that he did not rob the prosecution of their rights: whereas Philocrates yonder tormented other magistrates who had to render account of their office with vexatious complaints, he failed to come forward with any grievance when this particular Basileus, whose conduct, we are told, had been so outrageously high handed, was rendering account of his. What clearer indication could I present to you that Philocrates had suffered no injury from either myself or him?
§ 44
ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὑτοσὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς εἰσῆλθεν, ἐξὸν ἀυτοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης ἡμέρας ἀρξαμένοις τοῦ Ἑκατομβαιῶνος μηνὸς τριάκονθʼ ἡμέρας συνεχῶς τούτων ᾗτινι ἐβούλοντο ἀπογράφεσθαι, ἀπεγράφοντο οὐδεμιᾷ· καὶ αὖθις τοῦ Μεταγειτνιῶνος μηνὸς ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης ἡμέρας ἀρξαμένοις ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς ἀπογράφεσθαι ᾗτινι ἐβούλοντο, οὐδʼ αὖ πω ἐνταῦθα ἀπεγράψαντο, ἀλλὰ παρεῖσαν καὶ τούτου τοῦ μηνὸς εἴκοσιν ἡμέρας· ὥστε αἱ σύμπασαι ἡμέραι ἐγένοντο αὐτοῖς πλεῖν ἢ πεντήκοντα ἐπὶ τούτου τοῦ βασιλέως, ἐν αἷς ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς ἀπογράψασθαι οὐκ ἀπεγράψαντο.
Moreover, after the present Basileus had come into office, there were thirty clear days from the first of Hecatombaeon onwards, on any of which they could have registered their charge, had they wanted to; yet they did not do so. Similarly, they could have registered it any day they liked from the first of Metageitnion onwards. But even then they did not do so: they let twenty days of this second month by as well. Thus the total number of days in the present archonship on which they could have registered their charge, but failed to do so, was over fifty.
§ 45
καὶ οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι ἅπαντες ὅσοις ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ βασιλέως ὁ χρόνος μὴ ἐγχωρεῖ οὗτοι δʼ ἐπιστάμενοι μὲν τοὺς νόμους ἅπαντας, ὁρῶντες δʼ ἐμὲ βουλεύοντα καὶ εἰσιόντʼ ἐς τὸ βουλευτήριον—καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ βουλευτηρίῳ Διὸς βουλαίου καὶ Ἀθηνᾶς βουλαίας ἱερόν ἐστι καὶ εἰσιόντες οἱ βουλευταὶ προσεύχονται, ὧν κἀγὼ εἷς ἦ, ὃς ταὐτὰ πράττων, καὶ εἰς τἆλλα ἱερὰ πάντα εἰσιὼν μετὰ τῆς βουλῆς, καὶ θύων καὶ εὐχόμενος ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως ταύτης, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις πρυτανεύσας τὴν πρώτην πρυτανείαν ἅπασαν πλὴν δυοῖν ἡμέραιν, καὶ ἱεροποιῶν καὶ θύων ὑπὲρ τῆς δημοκρατίας, καὶ ἐπιψηφίζων καὶ λέγων γνώμας περὶ τῶν μεγίστων καὶ πλείστου ἀξίων τῇ πόλει φανερὸς ἦ·
Ordinarily, anyone who has not time enough under one archon registers his charge as soon as he can under the next. But the prosecution, who were perfectly familiar with the laws concerned and could see that I was a member of the Council and used the Council-chamber —why, in that very chamber itself stands a shrine of Zeus the Councillor and Athena the Councillor, where members offer prayers as they enter; and I was one of those members: I did as they did: in their company I entered all our other sanctuaries: I offered sacrifices and prayers on behalf of this city: nay more, I acted as a Prytanis for the whole of the first Prytany save two days: I was to be seen sacrificing and making offerings on behalf of our sovereign people: I was to be seen putting motions to the vote: I was to be seen voicing my opinion on the most momentous, the most vital public questions.
§ 46
καὶ οὗτοι παρόντες καὶ ἐπιδημοῦντες, ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς ἀπογράφεσθαι καὶ εἴργειν ἐμὲ τούτων ἁπάντων, οὐκ ἠξίουν ἀπογράφεσθαι· καίτοι ἱκανά γʼ ἦν ὑπομνῆσαι καὶ ἐνθυμηθῆναι, εἴπερ ἠδικοῦντο, ἀμφότερα καὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἕνεκα καὶ τῆς πόλεως. διὰ τί οὖν οὐκ ἀπεγράφοντο; διʼ ὅ τι συνῆσαν καὶ διελέγοντο· συνῆσάν τε γάρ μοι οὐκ ἀξιοῦντες φονέα εἶναι, καὶ οὐκ ἀπεγράφοντο τούτου αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα, οὐχ ἡγούμενοί με ἀποκτεῖναι τὸν παῖδα οὐδʼ ἔνοχον εἶναι τοῦ φόνου, οὐδὲ προσήκειν μοι τούτου τοῦ πράγματος οὐδέν.
And the prosecution were in Athens: they witnessed it: by registering their charge they could have debarred me from it all. In spite of that, they did not see fit to do so. Yet if their wrong was real, their duty to alike enough to keep the memory of it fresh and to make it their constant thought. Then why did they fail to register a charge? Their reason was the same as their reason for not refusing to associate and converse with me. They associated with me because they did not think me a murderer and they refused to register a charge for exactly the same reason: they did not think that I had either killed the boy, been concerned in his death, or had any part in the affair at all.
§ 47
καίτοι πῶς ἂν ἄνθρωποι σχετλιώτεροι ἢ ἀνομώτεροι γένοιντο; οἵτινες ἅπερ αὐτοὶ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἔπεισαν, ταῦθʼ ὑμᾶς ἀξιοῦσι πεῖσαι, καὶ ἃ αὐτοὶ ἔργῳ ἀπεδίκασαν, ταῦθʼ ὑμᾶς κελεύουσι καταδικάσαι· καὶ οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι τοῖς ἔργοις τοὺς λόγους ἐξελέγχουσιν, οὗτοι δὲ τοῖς λόγοις ζητοῦσι τὰ ἔργα ἄπιστα καταστῆσαι.
Where indeed could one find fewer scruples or a greater contempt for law? Here are men who expect to persuade you to believe what they have failed to persuade themselves to believe, who bid you declare guilty the man whom they have themselves in fact declared innocent; whereas everyone else uses the facts to prove the worth of mere assertion, they use mere assertion for the purpose of discrediting the facts.
§ 48
καίτοι εἰ μηδὲν ἄλλο μήτε εἶπον μήτε ἀπέφηνα μήτε μάρτυρας παρεσχόμην, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ὑμῖν ἀπέδειξα, τούτους ὅπου μὲν χρήματα λαμβάνοιεν ἐπʼ ἐμοί, αἰτιωμένους καὶ προαγορεύοντας, ὅπου δὲ μὴ εἴη ὁ δώσων, συνόντας καὶ διαλεγομένους, ἱκανὰ ἦν καὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἀκούσαντας ἀποψηφίσασθαι καὶ τούτους νομίζειν ἐπιορκοτάτους καὶ ἀνοσιωτάτους πάντων ἀνθρώπων.
Indeed, if I had said nothing, established nothing, and produced evidence of nothing, but had proved to you the one fact that, whereas when paid to attack me the prosecution produced charges and proclamations, they frequented my society and were on speaking terms with me when there was no one to finance them, you would have heard enough to acquit me and treat the prosecution as the worst perjurors and the most impious scoundrels alive.
§ 49
οὗτοι γὰρ ποίαν δίκην οὐ δικάσαιντʼ ἂν ἢ ποῖον δικαστήριον οὐκ ἐξαπατήσειαν ἢ τίνας ὅρκους οὐκ ἂν τολμήσειαν παραβαίνειν; οἵτινες καὶ νῦν τριάκοντα μνᾶς ἐπʼ ἐμοὶ λαβόντες παρὰ τῶν ποριστῶν καὶ τῶν πωλητῶν καὶ τῶν πρακτόρων καὶ τῶν ὑπογραμματέων οἳ τούτοις ὑπεγραμμάτευον, ἐξελάσαντές με ἐκ τοῦ βουλευτηρίου, ὅρκους τοιούτους διωμόσαντο, ὅτι πρυτανεύων πυθόμενος αὐτοὺς δεινὰ καὶ σχέτλια ἐργάζεσθαι εἰσῆγον εἰς τὴν βουλήν, καὶ ἐδίδαξα ὡς χρὴ ζητοῦντας ἐπεξελθεῖν τῷ πράγματι.
What accusation would they hesitate to bring, what court would they hesitate to mislead, what oaths would they feel any compunction in breaking, after taking thirty minae, as they have, from the Poristae, the Poletae, the Practores, and the clerks attached to them, to bring me into court, after driving me from the Council-chamber, and after swearing oaths so solemn, all because during my Prytany I learned of their scandalous malpractices, brought them before the Council, and showed that an inquiry should be instituted and the matter probed to the bottom.
§ 50
καὶ νῦν δίκην διδόασιν ὧν ἠδικήκασιν αὐτοί τε καὶ οἱ μεσεγγυησάμενοι καὶ παρʼ οἷς ἐτέθη τὰ χρήματα, καὶ τὰ πραχθέντα φανερὰ γεγένηται, ὥστʼ οὐδʼ ἂν οὗτοι βούλωνται ἀρνεῖσθαι ῥᾳδίως οἷοί τʼ ἔσονται· οὕτως αὐτοῖς πέπρακται τὰ πράγματα.
As it is, they themselves, those who struck the bargain with them, and the parties with whom the money was deposited are paying the price of their misdeeds; and the facts have been revealed so clearly that the prosecution will find it difficult to deny them, even if they wish to; such is the lack of success which they have had.
§ 51
ποῖον οὖν δικαστήριον οὐκ ἂν ἔλθοιεν ἐξαπατήσοντες, ἢ τίνας ὅρκους οὐκ ἂν τολμήσαιεν παραβαίνειν οὗτοι οἱ ἀνοσιώτατοι; οἵτινες καὶ ὑμᾶς εἰδότες εὐσεβεστάτους τῶν Ἑλλήνων δικαστὰς καὶ δικαιοτάτους καὶ ἐφʼ ὑμᾶς ἥκουσιν ἐξαπατήσοντες εἰ δύναιντο, ὅρκους τοσούτους διομοσάμενοι.
What court, then, would they hesitate to invade with their lies, what oaths would they feel the slightest compunction in breaking? The impious scoundrels! They knew that you are the most conscientious and the fairest judges in this nation; yet they come before you intent on deceiving even you, if they can, in spite of the solemn oaths which they have sworn.
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