The structure of the Divinatio《预审篇》之章法

Cum de constituendo accusatore quaeritur iudiciumque super ea re redditur, cuinam potissimum ex duobus pluribusue accusatio subscriptioue in reum permittatur, ea res atque iudicum cognitio diuinatio appellatur. Id uocabulum quam ob causam ita factum sit quaeri solet. Gauius Bassus in tertio librorum quos de origine uocabulorum composuit 'diuinatio' inquit 'iudicium appellatur, quoniam diuinet quodammodo iudex oportet, quam sententiam sese ferre par sit.' … Sed alii quidam diuinationem esse appellatam putant quoniam, cum accusator et reus duae res quasi cognatae coniunctaeque sint neque utra sine altera constare possit, in hoc tamen genere causae reus quidem iam est, sed accusator nondum est, et idcirco quod adhuc usque deest et latet diuinatione supplendum est, quisnam sit accusator futurus.

When the question is the appointment of a prosecutor, and judgement is given on that matter — to which of two or more the prosecution, or a junior place in it, is to be granted — that business and the jurors' hearing of it is called a divinatio. Why the word was coined so is often asked. Gavius Bassus, in the third of the books he composed on the origin of words, says: 'It is called a divinatio because the juror must in a manner divine what verdict it is right for him to give.' … But others think it is called divinatio because, although prosecutor and defendant are two things as it were akin and joined, neither able to stand without the other, in this kind of case the defendant already exists but the prosecutor does not yet, and therefore what is so far missing and hidden must be supplied by divination: who is going to be the prosecutor.

Bearing案 The formal definition of the proceeding, and the reason the ordinary shape of a forensic speech does not fit it.

Das Verfahren ist etwas durchaus Römisches; weder hat es eine Entsprechung in der griechischen Rechtspraxis, noch ist es berücksichtigt in der von Hause aus an griechischen Verhältnissen orientierten Redetheorie. Es geht ja hier nicht wie sonst um ein vorliegendes factum, das seiner Tatsächlichkeit oder seiner rechtlichen Qualifikation nach zu beurteilen wäre, es geht um ein in der Zukunft liegendes faciendum: Wen soll man als den „wahrhaftigsten Ankläger" (part. or. 98 de verissimo accusatore) zur Klageerhebung zulassen? Mit anderen Worten: Die Rede in der divinatio hat vorwiegend symbuleutischen, nicht eigentlich dikanischen Charakter. Rein äußerlich drückt sich diese Besonderheit schon darin aus, daß dem Prozeß eine Beweisaufnahme fehlt; die Richter entscheiden sine testibus et sine tabulis (Ps.-Ascon. argum., p. 185 ST.), was einmal der rednerischen Erfindung reiche Möglichkeiten eröffnet, zum andern — so sollte man jedenfalls meinen — auf die Anlage der Rede nicht ohne Einfluß sein kann.

The procedure is thoroughly Roman; it has no counterpart in Greek legal practice, nor is it taken into account in a theory of oratory oriented from the outset to Greek conditions. What is at issue here is not, as elsewhere, a factum already before the court, to be judged as to its facticity or its legal qualification; it is a faciendum lying in the future: whom is one to admit to bring the charge as the 'truest prosecutor' (Part. or. 98 de verissimo accusatore)? In other words: the speech in a divinatio has a predominantly deliberative, not properly judicial character. Outwardly this peculiarity shows itself in the fact that the proceeding has no taking of evidence; the judges decide sine testibus et sine tabulis — which opens rich possibilities for rhetorical invention, and which, one would think, cannot be without effect on the design of the speech.

Bearing案 Why every division below is an application of categories built for a different kind of speech.

Um so mehr mag man schon bei flüchtiger Lektüre von Ciceros „Divinatio" darüber staunen, wie genau er sich an das für den λόγος δικανικός entwickelte Schema hält. Auffallend ist besonders das Vorhandensein einer narratio; sie erscheint zwar nicht ganz suo loco, ist vielmehr mit dem prooemium verwoben (prooemium 1–9, narratio 2–5), aber daß sie überhaupt auftritt, ist doch bemerkenswert, da ja ein im Sinn der Prozeßrede ‚erzählfähiges' Faktum hier nicht vorliegen kann.

One may be all the more astonished, even on a cursory reading of Cicero's Divinatio, at how exactly he holds to the scheme developed for the λόγος δικανικός. Especially striking is the presence of a narratio; it does not appear altogether in its own place, being rather woven into the prooemium (prooemium 1–9, narratio 2–5), but that it appears at all is remarkable, since no fact 'capable of narration' in the sense of a trial speech can be present here.

Bearing案 The problem stated as a surprise: Cicero imposed forensic form on a proceeding that has no room for it.

This apparent familiarity, however, is deceptive. In forming any speech, the appropriate structure and elements were largely determined by genre and then adapted to suit the particular occasion, but a diuinatio resists easy generic categorization. Although it is argued in a forensic context before a jury, a diuinatio is more akin to a deliberative speech inasmuch as there is no completed factum that exists or any legal issue that must be resolved, but rather a faciendum — a matter of what must be done in the future. This open-ended and ambiguous genre gave the speaker scope for flexibility and creativity in structuring his speech. Instead, Cicero assessed the challenges he faced in bidding against Caecilius to lead the prosecution and let the disadvantages of the situation dictate his form. … He met this difficulty in part by structuring the Diuinatio in Caecilium as a λόγος δικανικός. Speech elements such as a narratio, a reprehensio, and other forensic conventions allowed him to craft a speech that was, at least initially, an exercise in self-defence.

Bearing案 Watson's account of why the forensic shape is there at all, and the frame of his own division.

Divinatio dicitur haec oratio, quia non de facto quaeritur hic coniectura, set de futuro, quae est divinatio uter debeat accusare. Alii ideo putant divinationem dici, quod iniurati iudices in hac causa sedeant et, quod velint, praesentire de utroque possint; alii, quod res agatur sine testibus et sine tabulis, et his remotis argumenta sola sequantur iudices et quasi divinent.

This speech is called a divinatio because here the inquiry is not into a fact by conjecture, but into the future — and a divination is just this: which of the two ought to prosecute. Others think it is called a divinatio because in this case the jurors sit unsworn, and are able to foresee, as they please, about either man; others, because the matter is conducted without witnesses and without documents, and, these being absent, the jurors follow arguments alone and, as it were, divine.

Bearing案 The three ancient explanations of the word divinatio, given together. The third — that the hearing proceeds without witnesses and without documents, so that the jurors have arguments only — is the one modern accounts quote; the other two are found nowhere else.

De accusatore constituendo, quae iudicia diuinationes uocantur: in quo genere Cicero quidem, qui mandantibus sociis Verrem deferebat, hac usus est diuisione: spectandum a quo maxime agi uelint ii quorum de ultione quaeritur, a quo minime uelit is qui accusatur. Frequentissimae tamen hae sunt quaestiones, uter maiores causas habeat, uter plus industriae aut uirium sit allaturus ad accusandum, uter id fide meliore facturus.

On the appointment of a prosecutor, the hearings called divinationes: in which kind Cicero, bringing Verres to trial at the allies' commission, used this division — one must consider by whom those whose vengeance is in question most wish the case to be conducted, and by whom the accused least wishes it. The commonest questions, however, are these: which has the greater grievance; which will bring more energy or force to the prosecution; which will do it in better faith.

Bearing案 The load-bearing text. Quintilian quotes Cicero's division and then — tamen — gives the questions that were usual, which is how we know Cicero's was not.

Aut si partitio de ipsa causa non sumitur, ea membra ponit orator, quae ipse ingenio inuenit et sibi dicenda constituit, non ex negotii factis ad causam sumptis sed argumentatione oratoris in causa conlocatis, ut in diuinatione: Ego sic intellego, cum de pecuniis repetundis quaestio sit, si nomen cuiuspiam deferatur, haec duo in primis spectari oportere, quem maxime actorem uelint hi qui eas iniurias passi sint et quem minime uelit is qui eas iniurias fecisse arguatur.

Or, if the division is not taken from the case itself, the orator sets down those members which he has himself found by his talent and determined to say — not taken from the facts of the business as they bear on the case, but placed in the case by the orator's own argumentation, as in the divinatio: 'As I understand it, when the question is one of extortion and someone's name is laid, these two things must chiefly be considered: whom those who have suffered the wrongs most want as prosecutor, and whom he who is charged with having done them least wants.'

Bearing案 The ancient witness that §10 is an invented partitio, not one derived from the facts. Quoted from Watson's printed text; the edition is not on disk.

§10 of this speech and pro Mur §11 are instances of partitio or divisio. See de invent i §31, Quintilian iv 5 §1. Hortensius was the first to introduce partitiones into Roman oratory as essential to a speech. See Brutus §§302, 303, pro Quinctio §35. … [Quintilian iv 5 §24] nec immerito multum ex diligentia partiendi tulit laudis Q. Hortensius, cuius tamen divisionem in digitos diductam nonnunquam Cicero leviter eludit … et vitanda ut quae maxime concisa nimium et velut articulosa partitio.

Heitland's note supplies the theory §10 works from — and the irony that the man who made the partitio essential to Roman oratory is Verres' defender in this very case.

Bearing案 Hortensius, who will answer this speech, is the inventor of the device Cicero uses at §10.

The partitio is phrased as a contentio (ἀντίθετον), in which two res are contrasted with one another, with typical syntactic symmetry; see Lausberg §787: 'With all variants of the antitheton, the tendency toward equality of the elements (isocolon) may be observed; the outward equality itself forms a contrast to the opposition of the conceptual content' and here gives the impression of completeness. … The two indirect questions constitute the quaestiones around which C. will structure his confirmatio. … These quaestiones are precipitated by a first-order issue (constitutio) which is left unexpressed here, but it implicitly asks not 'Who has the greater cause?' but even more fundamentally 'By what rationale should a prosecutor be chosen?' … C. will eventually address motive (causa), diligence or ability (industria aut uires), and sincerity (fides) as a matter of course, but he does not allow them to become the organizing principles of his confirmatio.

Bearing案 The hinge: Quintilian's three questions are all in the speech, but none of them organizes it.

Im übrigen finden wir eine schulmäßige Abfolge der Redeteile: Der partitio (§§10 f.), in der wenigstens die beiden ersten Hauptteile der confirmatio angekündigt werden, folgt die argumentatio, die sich, wie von der Theorie gefordert, in einen konstruktiv beweisenden (§§11–47 confirmatio) und einen widerlegenden Teil (§§47–71 refutatio) gliedert. Eine resümierende peroratio (§§71–73) schließt ab.

For the rest we find a schoolbook sequence of the parts of the speech: the partitio (§§10 f.), in which at least the first two main parts of the confirmatio are announced, is followed by the argumentatio, which, as theory requires, divides into a constructively probative part (§§11–47 confirmatio) and a refuting part (§§47–71 refutatio). A summarising peroratio (§§71–73) closes it.

Bearing案 Stroh's own division, with the refutation beginning at §47.

Die Begriffe confirmatio und refutatio sind zwar insofern nicht vollkommen zutreffend, als Cicero im zweiten Teil (also der ‚refutatio') immer auch zeigt, wie die Gründe, die Caecilius für seine Sache anführen kann, letztlich sogar gegen ihn sprechen; dennoch ist hier die refutatio weit selbständiger als sonst in Ciceros Gerichtsreden, wo sich ja für den (an zweiter Stelle sprechenden) Verteidiger schon von der Sache her kaum die Möglichkeit ergibt, einen positiven Unschuldsbeweis (confirmatio) unabhängig von der Widerlegung des gegnerischen Schuldbeweises zu führen.

The terms confirmatio and refutatio are not perfectly apt, in so far as in the second part (the 'refutatio') Cicero always also shows how the grounds Caecilius can adduce for his case tell in the end against him; nevertheless the refutatio is here far more independent than elsewhere in Cicero's forensic speeches, where for the defender (speaking second) the matter itself scarcely allows a positive proof of innocence to be conducted independently of the refutation of the opponent's proof of guilt.

Bearing案 The author of the §47 boundary admitting the terms fit imperfectly — and saying why they fit better here than elsewhere.

Ähnlich disponiert DE LA VILLE DE MIRMONT (S. 43 f.), der aber die refutatio erst mit §52 beginnen lassen will (was allenfalls möglich ist). Ganz anders möchte STERNKOPF die argumentatio gliedern (S. 5 f.): (1) §§11 ff.: Wunsch der beiden Parteien. (2) §§27 ff.: innere Qualitäten der beiden Ankläger. (3) §§52 ff.: Begründung durch die äußeren Umstände. Aber es kann doch kein Zufall sein, daß erst von §47 an gegnerische Argumente referiert werden.

De la Ville de Mirmont arranges it similarly (pp. 43 f.), but wants the refutatio to begin only at §52 (which is at any rate possible). Sternkopf wants to articulate the argumentatio quite differently (pp. 5 f.): (1) §§11 ff.: the wish of the two parties. (2) §§27 ff.: the inner qualities of the two accusers. (3) §§52 ff.: grounding from the external circumstances. But it can hardly be an accident that only from §47 onward are the opponent's arguments reported.

Bearing案 The only access this library has to Sternkopf 1904-5 and to de la Ville de Mirmont, and the argument for §47 over §52.

A. Exordium §§1–9, quibus rebus adductus ad causam accesserit. — B. Probatio §§10–71. [Divisio §10, for the place of which see Quintil. iii 9 §1.] se accusatorem esse debere: (1) quod se Siculi maxime velint, §§11–22. (2) quod se Verres minime velit, §§22–26. (3) quod ea sine quibus causa sustineri non possit Caecilium deficiant, §§27–51: (α) integritatem, §§27, 28; (β) veritatem, §§29–35; (γ) facultatem agendi, §§35–51. (4) quod ipse maiores causas habeat quam Caecilius, §§52–60. (5) quod vetus consuetudo institutumque maiorum sibi suffragetur declaretque se diligentem accusatorem fore, §§61–71. — C. Peroratio §§71–73: se eum esse cui tanta causa committi possit, neque sine turpitudine et iudiciorum periculo posse Caecilium sibi anteponi.

Heitland's plan, in his own Latin: one probatio running §§10–71, articulated as five propositions. There is no refutatio in his scheme at all.

Bearing案 The oldest division held here, and the only one with no refutation.

Daß die Einleitung die §§ 1—9 umfaßt, darüber kann gar kein Zweifel herrschen, obschon merkwürdigerweise im Altertum die Ansicht einen Verfechter gefunden hat, daß die argumentatio schon bei § 2 ihren Anfang nehme … er tut dies dann klar und unzweideutig von § 2 bis § 9 und wendet sich endlich in § 10 seinem eigentlichen Thema zu mit der gar nicht mißzuverstehenden transitio.

That the introduction takes in §§1–9 admits of no doubt at all, although curiously enough the view found a defender in antiquity that the argumentatio begins as early as §2 … he does this plainly and unambiguously from §2 to §9, and turns at last in §10 to his real theme with a transitio that cannot possibly be mistaken.

Bearing案 Sternkopf does have an exordium, and a transitio at §10. This file recorded him as having neither, because it had only Stroh's report of his three Hauptteile. The 'ancient defender' of an argumentatio beginning at §2 is Pseudo-Asconius, whom this site now holds.

Dieser erste Hauptteil, der von den Wünschen der beiden Parteien, der mißhandelten Siculer und ihres Peinigers Verres, handelt und also naturgemäß in zwei Unterabteilungen zerfällt, reicht von § 11 bis § 26. Der zweite Hauptteil … erörtert die Eigenschaften, die man von einem Ankläger, wie er sein soll, verlangen muß; er umfaßt mit dem Exkurs über die subscriptores die §§ 27—51. Mit den Worten 'Verum ut ad te redeam' … bahnt sich dann Cicero den Weg zu dem dritten Hauptteile, dessen Thema überhaupt nicht näher angegeben wird.

This first main part, which treats of the wishes of the two parties — the ill-used Sicilians and their tormentor Verres — and so naturally falls into two subdivisions, runs from §11 to §26. The second main part … sets out the qualities one must require of a prosecutor as he ought to be; with the excursus on the subscriptores it takes in §§27–51. With the words 'Verum ut ad te redeam' … Cicero then makes his way to the third main part, whose theme is nowhere stated.

Bearing案 The three Hauptteile as Sternkopf states them. The first two are what Stroh reports; the third, as the next passage shows, does not run to §73.

Man sieht leicht, daß das prooemium von Ciceros Rede nichts anderes ist als eine unter dem Vorwand der Selbstrechtfertigung nach vorne gezogene argumentatio. Wie die behandelten §§2–5 den ersten Teil der confirmatio vorwegnehmen (§§11–22: quem maxime velint actorem esse ii quibus factae esse dicantur iniuriae [§10]), so die §§6–9 den zweiten Teil (§§22–26: quem minime velit is qui eas iniurias fecisse arguatur): A–B–A–B. Zwar macht Cicero selbst auf einen solchen sachlichen Zusammenhang zwischen prooemium und argumentatio aufmerksam (am Ende von §1); er verschleiert ihn aber doch auch wieder bezüglich des ersten Teils: Hier versucht er, das, was er offen nicht zu behaupten und in der argumentatio nicht eigentlich zu beweisen wagt, durch die Suggestivkraft der narratio den Richtern einzureden, wobei er deren erwünschte Entscheidung als seine eigene ‚vorspielt'. So kann der erste Teil der argumentatio auf dem im prooemium gewonnenen Kredit aufbauen. Nicht zuletzt auf diesem feinen Kunstgriff dürfte die Wirkung unserer Rede beruht haben.

It is easy to see that the prooemium of Cicero's speech is nothing other than an argumentatio pulled forward under the pretext of self-justification. As §§2–5 anticipate the first part of the confirmatio (§§11–22: quem maxime velint actorem esse ii quibus factae esse dicantur iniuriae), so §§6–9 anticipate the second (§§22–26: quem minime velit is qui eas iniurias fecisse arguatur): A–B–A–B. Cicero himself draws attention to such a connection between prooemium and argumentatio (at the end of §1); yet he also veils it again as regards the first part: here he tries to talk the judges into what he does not dare to assert openly, and does not really dare to prove in the argumentatio, by the suggestive force of the narratio, in doing which he 'acts out' their desired decision as his own. So the first part of the argumentatio can build on the credit won in the prooemium. Not least on this fine artifice will the effect of our speech have rested.

Bearing案 The most consequential structural claim in the literature: on this reading §§1-9 and §§11-26 are the same argument twice.

Wir können nunmehr den Grund dafür angeben, was die — in der divinatio so überraschende — narratio am Beginn der Rede leisten soll. Während es uns nämlich anfangs so schien, als könne es in diesem Verfahren nicht um einen umstrittenen Tatbestand der Vergangenheit gehen, hat sich mittlerweile gezeigt, daß dies wahrscheinlich doch der Fall ist. Die Ereignisse, die zur nominis postulatio des Caecilius und Cicero geführt haben, scheinen in der Tat kontrovers zu sein, wobei jedoch diese Kontroverse von Cicero nicht offen ausgetragen wird. Hierfür bietet sich nun die Form der narratio geradezu an. Sie hat ja schon immer den Vorteil, daß der Redner in ihr, wenigstens im Nebensächlichen, mehr behaupten kann, als er nachher wahrscheinlich zu machen in der Lage ist: Reden sind lang und Gedächtnisse kurz. In unserem Fall kommt hinzu, daß gerade die narratio durch ihren nicht beweisenden, ‚unlogischen' Charakter die Möglichkeit gibt, Hintergründe und Zusammenhänge zu suggerieren, die nicht existieren und die offen auch gar nicht genannt werden.

We can now state what the narratio at the beginning of the speech — so surprising in a divinatio — is meant to achieve. Although at first it seemed to us that this proceeding could not turn on a disputed past state of affairs, it has meanwhile emerged that this is probably the case after all. The events that led to the nominis postulatio of Caecilius and Cicero do indeed seem to be controversial, but this controversy is not fought out openly by Cicero. For that, the form of the narratio positively offers itself. It has always had the advantage that in it the speaker can assert, at least in incidentals, more than he is afterwards in a position to make probable: speeches are long and memories short. In our case there is the further point that the narratio, by its non-probative, 'illogical' character, gives the opportunity to suggest backgrounds and connections that do not exist and are not openly named at all.

Bearing案 Why a narratio exists in a proceeding with no factum. Quoted in part by Watson 2025, 22.

Unser Verdacht wächst, wenn wir die Reihenfolge der Reden beachten. Zwar haben wir keine Nachricht darüber, wie nach der römischen Strafprozeßordnung die Redenfolge in der divinatio geregelt ist; aber daß im rhetorischen Zweikampf der zweite Platz der günstigere ist, versteht sich doch wohl von selbst. Was könnte natürlicher sein, als daß derjenige, welcher seinem Vorgänger bei der postulatio das Recht auf die Anklage streitig macht, quasi die Rolle des Klägers übernehmen und somit an erster Stelle sprechen muß, während der Angegriffene den Vorteil der zweiten Rede erhält? Nun: Cicero greift an, Caecilius darf antworten. Ich meine also, es spricht in der Tat eine hohe Wahrscheinlichkeit dafür, daß Caecilius und nicht Cicero als erster beim Prätor um das Recht der Anklageerhebung nachgesucht hat.

Our suspicion grows when we attend to the order of the speeches. We have no report of how the order of speaking in a divinatio was regulated under Roman criminal procedure; but that in a rhetorical duel the second place is the more favourable is surely self-evident. What could be more natural than that the man who disputes his predecessor's right to the prosecution at the postulatio should take on, as it were, the role of plaintiff and so have to speak first, while the one attacked receives the advantage of the second speech? Now: Cicero attacks, Caecilius is allowed to answer. I think, then, that there is in fact a high probability that Caecilius and not Cicero was the first to apply to the praetor for the right to bring the charge.

Bearing案 An argument about dispositio, not about history: the order of speaking is a formal datum.

Kann man ernstlich glauben, daß Cicero hier die Situation seiner eigenen Entscheidung beschreibe? Nein, nicht sein Dilemma ist es, das er hier vorführt, sondern das — der jetzigen Richter! Was er von sich behauptet, gilt für sie: Sie müssen ja nun tatsächlich entscheiden, ob Cicero die Anklage erheben soll; und genauso wie Cicero angeblich den Q. Caecilius für den geeigneten Mann gehalten haben will, so dürften auch sie zunächst geneigt sein, denjenigen für den verissimus accusator zu halten, der als Quästor mit den Dingen vertraut und überdies — das verschweigt Cicero an dieser Stelle denn doch — von Verres persönlich geschädigt worden ist. Cicero, so könnten wir sagen, agiert gewissermaßen in der äußeren Form der narratio die Situation seiner Hörer. … [n. 40] Für Richter, die etwa wüßten, daß die Sizilianer zunächst bei Caecilius waren, kann es heißen: „Ihr habt bereits Caecilius als Anwalt." Andere müssen verstehen: „Caecilius wäre für euch ein geeigneter Ankläger."

Can one seriously believe that Cicero is describing here the situation of his own decision? No — it is not his dilemma that he performs here, but that of the present judges! What he asserts of himself holds for them: they must now actually decide whether Cicero is to bring the charge; and just as Cicero would have it that he held Q. Caecilius to be the suitable man, so they too may at first be inclined to hold him the verissimus accusator who as quaestor was familiar with the matter and who besides — this Cicero does pass over at this point — had been personally injured by Verres. Cicero, we might say, acts out in the outward form of the narratio the situation of his hearers. … [n. 40] For judges who happened to know that the Sicilians were first with Caecilius, it can mean: 'You already have Caecilius as your advocate.' Others must understand: 'Caecilius would be a suitable prosecutor for you.'

Bearing案 On dicebam habere eos actorem Q. Caecilium (§4). One of the two best short passages for teaching dispositio in this speech.

Geringfügiger ist ein drittes Argument: Caecilius soll praevaricator, also mit der Gegenpartei im Bunde sein. Cicero kann dies weder beweisen noch auch nur irgendwie wahrscheinlich machen; so begnügt er sich denn mit gelegentlichen Andeutungen, praeteritiones usw. — dergleichen dürfte wohl zur festen Topik der divinatio gehört haben, und so sollte es auch hier nicht fehlen! Wie wenig Cicero bei dieser Unterstellung auf den Glauben seiner Zuhörer rechnet, zeigt schon allein die Tatsache, daß er sie nicht einmal konsequent durchführt: In den §§36 ff. etwa ist vorausgesetzt, daß Caecilius ein zwar unfähiger, aber doch redlicher Ankläger wäre.

A third argument is slighter: Caecilius is supposed to be a praevaricator, that is, in league with the other side. Cicero can neither prove this nor make it in any way probable; so he contents himself with occasional hints, praeteritiones and the like — such things will have belonged to the fixed topics of the divinatio, and so were not to be missing here either. How little Cicero counts on his hearers' belief in this insinuation is shown by the mere fact that he does not even carry it through consistently: in §§36 ff., for instance, it is presupposed that Caecilius would be an incapable but nonetheless honest prosecutor.

Bearing案 Quintilian's third quaestio (fides) is gestured at rather than argued; §29 says so: quibus ego nunc non utor.

Wo aber beginnt der Epilog? Allgemein setzt man in der Mitte von § 71 ab: Quam ob rem hoc statuere, iudices, debetis usw. Dies ist sicherlich falsch. … Es ist also ein Fehler, diese Sätze auseinander zu reißen. Wir haben hier keine Rekapitulation vor uns, sondern ein einzelnes neues Beweisstück, das noch zur argumentatio gehört … Demnach ist der kurze Epilog in dem einzigen § 73 enthalten; er beginnt, wie es sich gehört, mit den Worten: Quapropter, iudices, vestrum est deligere, quem usw.

But where does the epilogue begin? It is generally divided in the middle of §71: Quam ob rem hoc statuere, iudices, debetis, and so on. This is certainly wrong. … It is therefore a mistake to tear these sentences apart. What we have here is no recapitulation but a single new piece of proof, which still belongs to the argumentatio … Accordingly the short epilogue is contained in the single §73; it begins, as it should, with the words: Quapropter, iudices, vestrum est deligere, quem, and so on.

Bearing案 The joint this site listed as agreed by everyone. Sternkopf denies it in terms, and puts the peroration in §73 alone. §71 is therefore contested, and §73 is a boundary only he draws.

alterum est deliberativum, tertium iudiciale. ceterae species in haec tria incident genera, nec invenietur ex his ulla, in qua non laudare ac vituperare, suadere ac dissuadere, intendere quid vel depellere debeamus. illa quoque sunt communia, conciliare, narrare, docere, augere, minuere, concitandis componendisve adfectibus animos audientium fingere.

The second is deliberative, the third judicial. All other species fall inside these three kinds, and none will be found among them in which we do not have to praise or blame, urge or dissuade, press a charge or repel one. These things too are common to all: to win goodwill, to narrate, to instruct, to amplify, to diminish, and to shape the minds of the audience by rousing or composing their feelings.

Bearing案 The three genera, and the three pairs of functions that define them.

sed tria an plura sint, ambigitur. nec dubie prope omnes utique summae apud antiquos auctoritatis scriptores Aristotelem secuti, qui nomine tantum alio contionalem pro deliberativa appellat, hac partitione contenti fuerunt.

But whether there are three or more is disputed. And beyond doubt nearly all writers of the highest authority among the ancients, following Aristotle — who differs only in calling the deliberative kind contionalis — were content with this division.

Bearing案 That the tripartition is Aristotle's, and that Quintilian records it as near-universal rather than asserting it.

credendum est igitur his, quorum auctoritatem secutus est Cicero, tria esse, quae in omni disputatione quaerantur, an sit, quid sit, quale sit? quod ipsa nobis etiam natura praescribit. nam primum oportet subesse aliquid, de quo ambigitur; quod, quid sit et quale sit, certe non potest aestimari, nisi prius esse constiterit, ideoque ea prima quaestio.

We must therefore believe those whose authority Cicero followed: that there are three things asked in every dispute — whether it is, what it is, of what kind it is. Nature herself prescribes this to us. For first something must underlie the dispute, and what it is and of what kind it is certainly cannot be assessed unless it has first been established that it exists; and so that is the first question.

Bearing案 The three questions in order, and why the order is not arbitrary.

secundum plurimos auctores servabam tris rationales status, coniecturam, qualitatem, finitionem, unum legalem. hi mihi status generales erant. legalem in quinque species partiebar, scripti et voluntatis, legum contrariarum, collectivum, ambiguitatis, translationis.

Following most authorities I used to keep three rational statuses — conjecture, quality, definition — and one legal. These were for me the general statuses. The legal I divided into five species: of the letter and the intent, of contrary laws, of inference, of ambiguity, of transference.

Bearing案 The status scheme Quintilian reports himself as having held, with the five legal species.

nunc de iudiciali genere, quod est praecipue multiplex, sed officiis constat duobus intentionis ac depulsionis. cuius partes, ut plurimis auctoribus placuit, quinque sunt: prooemium, narratio, probatio, refutatio, peroratio. his adiecerunt quidam partitionem, propositionem, excessum; quarum priores duae probationi succedunt.

Now for the judicial kind, which is especially complex, but consists of two offices, pressing a charge and repelling one. Its parts, as most authorities held, are five: prooemium, narratio, probatio, refutatio, peroratio. To these some added partitio, propositio and excessus; of these the first two come after the proof.

Bearing案 The five parts, and the three some authorities add. Heitland cites this passage for the place of the divisio at Div. Caec. 10.

ceterum causa omnis, in qua pars altera agentis est, altera recusantis, aut unius rei controversia constat aut plurium. haec simplex dicitur, illa coniuncta. una controversia est per se furti, per se adulterii. plures aut eiusdem generis, ut in pecuniis repetundis, aut diversi, ut si quis sacrilegii et homicidii simul accusetur. quod nunc in publicis iudiciis non accidit, quoniam praetor certa lege sortitur, principum autem et senatus cognitionibus frequens est et populi fuit; privata quoque iudicia saepe unum iudicem habere multis et diversis formulis solent.

Moreover every cause in which one party acts and the other resists consists either of a dispute over one thing or over several. The latter is called simple, the former conjoined. There is one dispute in theft by itself, in adultery by itself. Several are either of the same kind, as in a charge of extortion, or of different kinds, as if a man were accused of sacrilege and homicide at once.

Bearing案 Simple and conjoined causes, with Quintilian's own examples — including extortion as the standing case of several charges of one kind.

diversum his tertium genus, quod dicitur comparativum; cuius rei tractatus in parte causae frequens est, ut cum apud centumviros post alia quaeritur et hoc, uter dignior hereditate sit. rarum est autem, ut in foro iudicia propter id solum constituantur, sicut divinationes, quae fiunt de accusatore constituendo, et nonnunquam inter delatores, uter praemium meruerit.

Different from these is a third kind, called comparative. The handling of this is frequent as part of a cause, as when before the centumviri it is asked, after other questions, which of two has the better right to an inheritance. But it is rare for courts to be constituted in the forum for that alone — as divinationes are, which are held to appoint a prosecutor, and sometimes between informers, to decide which has earned the reward.

Bearing案 The comparative kind, and Quintilian naming the divinatio as one of the rare occasions when a whole trial is constituted for it. This is where the Divinatio in Caecilium sits.

Ps.-Asconius (p. 186, 15) bestimmt den Status von Ciceros Rede als: qualitas negotialis comparativa. Die qualitas negotialis (ποιότης πραγματική) ist nach dem System des Hermogenes, auf das sich hier Ps.-Asc., wenn ich recht sehe, bezieht, ein Qualitätsstatus, bei dem der fragliche Gegenstand in der Zukunft liegt: Das läuft praktisch auf das genus deliberativum hinaus. In etwas anderer Hinsicht bezeichnet Quintilian die Besonderheit des Verfahrens, indem er es einem genus comparativum zuordnet, das von den üblichen genera der Gerichtsrede (simplex oder coniunctum, nach Einzahl oder Mehrzahl der crimina) verschieden sei (inst. 3, 10, 3).

Ps.-Asconius (p. 186,15) fixes the status of Cicero's speech as qualitas negotialis comparativa. The qualitas negotialis (ποιότης πραγματική) is, on the system of Hermogenes to which Ps.-Asconius refers here if I see rightly, a quality-status whose object in question lies in the future: which comes out in practice at the deliberative kind. Quintilian marks the peculiarity of the procedure from a somewhat different side, in assigning it to a genus comparativum distinct from the usual genera of forensic speech (simple or conjoined, according to whether the charges are one or many) (Inst. 3.10.3).

Bearing案 The only ancient assignment of a status to this speech, and the sentence that ties Ps.-Asconius' qualitas negotialis to Quintilian's genus comparativum. Ps.-Asconius' own text is not on disk; this is Stroh's report of it.

ne iis quidem accesserim, qui laudativam materiam honestorum, deliberatiuam utilium, iudicialem iustorum quaestione contineri putant, celeri magis ac rotunda usi distributione quam vera. stant enim quodam modo mutuis auxiliis omnia. nam et in laude iustitia utilitasque tractatur et in consiliis honestas, et raro iudicialem inveneris causam, in cuius non parte aliquid eorum, quae supra diximus, reperiatur.

Nor would I side with those who think that the material of praise is confined to the question of what is honourable, deliberation to what is expedient, and the judicial kind to what is just — using a distribution that is quick and rounded rather than true. For all of them stand, in a manner, by mutual support. Justice and expediency are handled in praise; honour in counsel; and you will rarely find a judicial cause in some part of which one of the things named above is not to be found.

Bearing案 Quintilian, who transmits the tripartition, refuses the neat mapping of each kind to one value. The scheme leaks by his own account — which is the licence for a speech to stand under two heads at once.

ac potissimum incipiam ab ea, quae constat laude ac vituperatione. quod genus videtur Aristoteles atque eum secutus Theophrastus a parte negotiali, hoc est πραγματικῇ removisse totamque ad solos auditores relegasse, et id eius nominis, quod ab ostentatione ducitur, proprium est.

And I shall begin by preference with the kind that consists of praise and blame. Aristotle, and Theophrastus after him, seem to have removed this kind from the practical part — that is, the πραγματική — and to have relegated it wholly to the hearers alone; and that is proper to a name derived from display.

Bearing案 Where the epideictic kind sits in the Greek scheme, and the term πραγματική (negotialis) in its original sense — the same word Ps.-Asconius uses of this speech's status.

sed mos Romanus etiam negotiis hoc munus inseruit. nam et funebres laudationes pendent frequenter ex aliquo publico officio atque ex senatus consulto magistratibus saepe mandantur, et laudare testem vel contra pertinet ad momentum iudiciorum, et ipsis etiam reis dare laudatores licet, et editi in Competitores, in L. Pisonem, in Clodium et Curionem libri vituperationem continent et tamen in Senatu loco sunt habiti sententiae.

But Roman custom has inserted this office into business as well. Funeral eulogies frequently depend on some public office and are often entrusted to magistrates by decree of the senate; to praise a witness, or to speak against him, bears on the outcome of trials; defendants too are allowed to produce men to speak for their character; and the published books Against the Rival Candidates, Against L. Piso, Against Clodius and Curio contain vituperation and were nonetheless delivered in the senate in the place of an opinion.

Bearing案 Why the epideictic kind is thin in the Roman corpus: the office is folded into business. Quintilian names In L. Pisonem among Cicero's speeches of vituperation, so the example here is his and not this page's.

iuridicialis est qui Graece dicitur δικαιολογικός Sed quemadmodum ab Archedemo qualitas exclusa est, sic ab his repudiata finitio. nam subiiciunt eam iuridiciali, quaerendumque arbitrantur iustumne sit, sacrilegium appellari quod obiiciatur vel furtum vel amentiam.

The iuridicialis is what is called in Greek δικαιολογικός. But just as quality was excluded by Archedemus, so definition was rejected by these; for they place it under the iuridicialis, and think the question to be whether it is just that what is charged should be called sacrilege, or theft, or madness.

Bearing案 Quintilian's own equation of iuridicialis with δικαιολογικός, and a reminder that where the boundary between definition and quality falls was itself disputed.

Genus causae honestum; status: qualitas negotialis comparativa de constituendo accusatore, qui potissimum de duobus aut qui solus accuset; dicit enim Caecilius actore se accusandum esse Verrem aut a se quoque.

The kind of case: honourable; the issue: a qualitative one, of the practical sort, and comparative, concerning the appointment of a prosecutor — which of two is to be preferred, or which is to prosecute alone; for Caecilius says that Verres ought to be prosecuted with himself as conductor of the case, or else by himself as well.

Bearing案 The ancient commentator's own classification of the speech, now read from the edition rather than from a footnote. The last clause is what the second-hand citations omitted: Caecilius was claiming the prosecution either instead of Cicero or alongside him, which is what makes the issue comparative. Stangl's actore is his own reading against auctore in the manuscripts.

Die §§37–39 enthalten übrigens eine kleine τέχνη ῥητορική in usum Caecilii. Diese beginnt und endet mit den partes rhetoricae (‚Arbeitsgängen' des Redners): §37 voce (ὑπόκρισις), memoria (μνήμη), consilio, ingenio (εὕρεσις, τάξις). §38 … criminibus et oratione distinguere (τάξις). putasne posse etc. (λέξις bzw. αὔξησις). §39 … et diligentia consequi (εὕρεσις) et memoria complecti (μνήμη) et oratione expromere (λέξις) et voce ac viribus sustinere (ὑπόκρισις). Eingeschaltet sind die officia oratoris: §39 dicenda, demonstranda, explicanda sunt omnia (διδάσκειν, docere), causa … graviter copioseque agenda est (κινεῖν, movere); perficiendum est, … ut homines … libenter studioseque audiant (ψυχαγωγεῖν, delectare); außerdem die drei rhetorischen Bildungsfaktoren: §39 in quo si te multum natura adiuvaret (φύσις), si optimis … disciplinis … studuisses (τέχνη) et in his elaborasses (μελέτη).

§§37–39 contain, incidentally, a small τέχνη ῥητορική for Caecilius' use. It begins and ends with the partes rhetoricae (the orator's 'operations'): §37 voce (delivery), memoria (memory), consilio, ingenio (invention, arrangement). §38 … criminibus et oratione distinguere (arrangement). putasne posse etc. (style, or amplification). §39 … et diligentia consequi (invention) et memoria complecti (memory) et oratione expromere (style) et voce ac viribus sustinere (delivery). Set inside them are the officia oratoris: §39 dicenda, demonstranda, explicanda sunt omnia (to teach), causa … graviter copioseque agenda est (to move); perficiendum est … ut homines … libenter studioseque audiant (to delight); and further the three factors of rhetorical formation: §39 in quo si te multum natura adiuvaret (nature), si optimis … disciplinis … studuisses (art) et in his elaborasses (practice).

Bearing案 Three sections of Latin that contain the whole of school rhetoric. Finer-grained than Craig's account of the same passage.

Following Quintilian, we may define dilemma as any offering to an opponent of two alternatives, such that one must be true, and such that whichever one he chooses he will harm his case. … The use of dilemma in the Divinatio in Caecilium is placed in a special context in sections 37-47 … Caecilius' alleged lack of talent is initially tied to specific inadequacies in four of the five traditional 'Aristotelian' parts of oratory, delivery, and memory (sec. 37), arrangement (38 through 'distinguere'), and style (38 fin.). … The speech contains four examples: sections 12-13 … sections 30-31 … section 58 … section 60. … In light of this declaration, it is striking that Cicero's own speech uses the same device that he attributes to the master orator Hortensius, and uses it with remarkable frequency. … If any member of the audience is rationally aware of this use of dilemma, he will see it as a sophisticated joke at Caecilius' expense.

Bearing案 Four dilemmas, and the device defined inside the speech at §45 as a trick of Hortensius. Quint. 5.10.69; complexio Inv. 1.45; duplex conclusio Rhet. Her. 2.38.